doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01798.x
THE DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION AND
INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING IN CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:
A EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
RENATE E. MEYER AND GERHARD HAMMERSCHMID
This article reports a comparative study of human resource management (HRM) practices in Europe.
We focus on the extent to which decision-making authority is decentralized, that is, passed down
to management, and individualized in the sense of being in the discretion of a single decision
maker. Using these two dimensions, this paper gives a picture of the distinct way HR decisionmaking practices are organized in Europe: although decentralization has been a common goal of
modernization initiatives, we still find a rather high degree of centralization. Moreover, we find
that decentralized decision making frequently goes hand in hand with a higher degree of shared
decision making. In addition, we examine the influence of several cultural and institutional factors
to address the question of embeddedness in more detail. Our results show that national culture,
administrative traditions and institutional arrangements play an important role as explanatory
factors for the organization of HR decision-making in Europe.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, public administration modernization initiatives in the majority
of countries have pointed in two major, albeit somewhat inconsistent directions, both
strongly linked to the doctrine of a new public management (for example, Hood 1991;
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; OECD 2005). On the one hand we have decentralization
of authority and responsibility and the increase of management autonomy in order to
improve performance. Highly centralized, hierarchical organizational structures can be
seen to have increasingly been replaced by decentralized management environments
where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are made closer to the point
of delivery. On the other hand, often as a consequence, the second, almost ubiquitous,
feature of current reform initiatives includes efforts to strengthen the accountability of
decision makers, political control and policy coherence (for example, Deleon 1998; Christensen and Lægreid 2001, 2003; Gregory 2003). Finding the appropriate balance between
centralization and decentralization and between autonomy and accountability can be
considered to be perennial tensions of public governance. This tension is reflected in a
fundamental contradiction within the new public management doctrine since it ‘holds
not only that decentralization is good, and letting/making managers manage is good,
but also that political control and accountability need to be strengthened’ (Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004, p. 145). Increasing management autonomy and managerial flexibility –
often in form of specialized agencies – have become central threads and recurrent themes
of public management reform initiatives (for example, Moynihan and Pandey 2006; Pollitt
2006). The promise of performance improvement is strongly related to managers being
given increased authority over administrative matters and being freed from red tape. We
argue that this management autonomy comprises two different dimensions which need
to be looked at separately: (1) the devolution of control over administrative matters down
Renate E. Meyer is in the Institute for Public Management, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business. Gerhard
Hammerschmid is in the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.
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to line managers; and (2) the enlarging of discretion in the hand of individual managers to
take decisions according to the changing needs of organizations. In this study, we therefore
distinguish between the degree of decentralization and the degree of individual decisionmaking discretion. The latter strongly relates to individualization, another frequently
identified trend in public sector management argued to go hand in hand with NPMinspired reforms (for example, OECD 2004; Lawler 2008). Previous research and studies
from a great variety of regions and with different foci (for example, Boyne et al. 1999;
Hou et al. 2000; Coggburn 2001; Selden et al. 2001; Shim 2001; Kellough and Selden 2003;
Whittaker and Marchington 2003; OECD 2004; Hays 2004; Hays and Sowa 2006) observed
increasing decentralization in the area of HRM. While this could be seen as leading to a
declining degree of national differences or to a greater convergence, various strands of
research argue that countries are destined to follow particular trajectories that reflect their
cultural and institutional peculiarities and, thus, all reform trajectories are path dependent
(for example, Czarniawska and Sevon 1996; Whitley 1999; Christensen and Lægreid 2001,
2003, 2007; Sahlin-Andersson 2001; Campbell 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Kickert
2005). Hence, despite European integration and global trends, national cultures and institutional arrangements of individual EU member states have a strong influence on how
global trends are interpreted, ‘translated’ and implemented. Moreover, HRM – in the
public or private sector alike – is regarded as one of those areas where a ‘national flavour’
is most likely to be maintained (Mayrhofer and Brewster 2005). For Europe especially,
it has been argued, we need to be aware of national, cultural, regional and institutional
differences at various levels that influence how HR management is organized (Brewster
2006).
The lack of comparative empirical research is an often repeated concern in public sector
research (for example, Coggburn 2001; Schnapp 2004; Torres 2004; Eglene and Dawes
2006; Pollitt 2006; Gualmini 2008) and in research on HRM more generally (Brewster
2006; for exceptions, see, for example, Brewster et al. 2004; Mayrhofer and Brewster 2005;
Tregaskis and Brewster 2006; Stahl and Björkman 2006). Although decentralization is a
central issue on most central governments’ reform agendas (for example, Pollitt 2005)
and, in recent years, the question whether we are observing increasing homogenization
or continuing heterogeneity in public administration governance has become a central
topic of discussion both in academia (for example, Meyer 2000; Brunsson and SahlinAndersson 2000; Pollitt 2001; Christensen and Lægreid 2003; Featherstone and Radaelli
2003; Kickert 2005; Demmke 2006; Olsen 2006; Gualmini 2008) and in administrative
practice (for example, the EUPAN Ministers Meeting in June 2005), we still have limited
knowledge about the actual current status concerning decentralization and managerial
discretion in different states in relation to each other and of factors explaining different
national patterns. This article takes a step in this direction and presents comparative
research findings from the central government level of all 27 EU member states plus the
European Commission (EC) with the aim of allowing us to focus on national differences
in the way HR decision making is organized. Not surprisingly, we find great variation
in the extent to which HR decision-making competencies are devolved down to the
management level and which individual line managers are given the discretion to take
decisions.
Apart from the objective of sketching the degree of HR decentralization and individual
decision-making discretion in the EU member states and the EC relative to each other,
we are interested in what influences the particular organization of HRM in central
government. In particular, we are looking at cultural and institutional factors that
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are commonly assumed to affect the way global trends are translated into national
arrangements and shape actual practices, and we therefore test some hypotheses regarding
these presumed relationships.
HUMAN RESOURCE DECISION MAKING IN EU COUNTRIES: A FIELD
IN CHANGE?
The crucial role of HRM within government operations has been underscored by a great
number of authors (for example, Coggburn 2001; Kellough and Selden 2003; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004; Ingraham 2005; OECD 2005; Lægreid and Wise 2007). Decentralized
HRM, with competencies and decision-making authority at the level of line management,
is generally assumed to contribute to several of the frequently proclaimed objectives
of management-driven reforms. It links empowerment and commitment issues on the
one hand with efficiency concerns and performance management on the other. Given
these high expectations, the move from centralized to decentralized decision making and control has become a prominent reform issue (Ingraham 2005; OECD 2004,
2005).
Decentralization of various types of functions occupies a central place on the reform
agenda of many countries. It is a vivid manifestation of the idea of ‘let managers manage’
and ‘make them manage’ (Kettl 1997) with regard to ‘modern’ public management. Given
this, it is important to underscore that government objectives can be achieved by more
decentralized or more centralized systems of public administration; both have several
benefits and risks; the advantages of one system often being the shortcomings of the other.
Thus, finding the right balance between too much of either in terms of HRM is a major
challenge for all governments (see, for example, Shafritz and Russell 2000; Coggburn 2005;
OECD 2005).
The degree of centralization generally refers to the extent that decision-making powers
are vested in bodies at or near the top of the hierarchy. These central powers or rules
are often applicable to the entire public administration. Centralized HR systems were
put in place to guarantee politically neutral decision making and to protect employees
against political coercion and patronage. Moreover, it has often been argued that the
standardization of HR practices secures coherence of service delivery and promotes fair
and equitable treatment of employees. In addition, centralized approaches are seen to
offer higher efficiency due to economies of scale and a higher effectiveness due to the
fact that qualified HR experts are in charge of tasks such as reviewing and ranking job
candidates. According to the United Nations (2005), decentralized approaches, paired
with ineffective or non-existent central coordination mechanisms, increase the danger of
conflicts among the different constituents and institutions – ministries, agencies or HRM
authorities.
Proponents of decentralized responsibilities for managers on the other hand assert that
decentralization increases the efficiency and effectiveness of HRM and public administration in general (see, for example, Oswick and Grant 1996). Decisions may be taken faster,
recruitment can be tailored to the specific needs of the organization and less complex
procedures are needed. In addition, effectiveness is increased because decentralization
increases managers’ discretion, thus enabling them to recruit, evaluate, offer incentives,
promote, suggest training needs, and communicate according to their specific demands.
The philosophy underlying decentralization and deregulation is well-known: centralized
HRM is rigid, unresponsive, slow and ineffective. Finally, there is little empirical evidence
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thus far to suggest whether or not decentralized HR systems are really more vulnerable to
cases of political pressure and politicization (for example, Ulrich 1997; Hou et al. 2000; Coggburn 2005). On the other hand, arguments brought forward against highly decentralized
systems concern the danger of a decline in the professionalism of the core civil service,
a loss of a civil service ethos and the fragmentation of policies from a strategic point
of view. In addition, the success of decentralized systems greatly depends on the skills
managers and HR professionals possess to carry out their tasks and responsibilities. Thus,
greater autonomy and decentralization of responsibilities require considerable investment
in management qualifications at all levels. Critics of decentralization also cite fairness
and equity as being other important issues. In addition, decentralized HR systems may
have unintended centralizing effects if the HR functions are bundled and/or outsourced
to one centralized entity within ministries (Whittaker and Marchington 2003; Coggburn
2005). Finally, whether these reforms actually lead to empowerment and a reduction
of bureaucracy or whether they give rise to different and new forms of bureaucracy –
for example, through the formalization of targets, as well as by extensive monitoring
and reporting requirements that often appear to be no less intrusive or bothersome to
managers than old-style by-the-book controls and inspections (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004,
p. 173; United Nations 2005) – remains to be seen.
Decentralization is often argued to go along with an easing of HR rules and regulations
which in turn increases the individual manager’s discretion to take decisions. Individualization in HRM is a rather broad concept, one that is difficult to grasp conceptually
and empirically (see, for example, Lawler 2008). It increases when the qualities, capacities
and outputs of individual persons, as opposed to those of groups and larger populations,
are used as the basis of decisions. Following a wider notion of the concept (for example,
Lawler 2008, p. 24), we regard the extent to which HR decisions are made by a single actor
or involve multiple actors as central and distinct dimensions of management autonomy.
In its report on trends in HRM policies, the OECD (2004, p. 4) concludes that reform
trends in the field have resulted in individualization as well as fragmentation and warns
that ‘while the individualization of HR practices is at the heart of the reforms aiming
at increasing the responsiveness of the public service, it can have deleterious effects on
collective values and ethical behaviour’. However, researchers of comparative HRM (for
example, Guest 1990; Brewster 2007) have argued that the acknowledgement of individualism and managerial autonomy is related to American values much more than to
European values which highly appreciate participation.
In 2005, a report of the United Kingdom EU Presidency (2005, p. 12) on ‘Innovative
HR Strategies’ concluded that ‘the majority of Member States devolve responsibility
for operational aspects of HR transactions to the Ministries or Agencies’ and that these
ministries and agencies ‘may choose to devolve these responsibilities further to the
managers’. As our study will show, in the European context decentralization of decision
making is often translated into practices that involve lower hierarchical levels but
do not devolve the decision-making authority solely to them. Thus, a higher degree
of decentralization does not necessarily imply a higher degree of overall autonomy
for individual managers since it may entail the involvement of multiple actors and,
consequently, a higher degree of collective decision making. The first objective of this
study, therefore, is to analyse the extent to which HR competences and authority have
been passed down to lower levels of management in European central governments and
the extent to which HR decisions are individualized in the sense of being within the
discretion of a single decision maker.
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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION
AND INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
The increasing flow of ideas and reform trends, such as new public management or good
governance, around the globe, promoted by supranational institutions such as OECD or
the World Bank, is seen as an important driver towards homogeneity. In this context, it is
often assumed that the globalized pressures towards institutional isomorphism decreases
the impact of nation states. In the European context, the idea of a gradual convergence
of administrative structures, processes and values towards a common European model
is frequently linked to the notion of a ‘European Administrative Space (EAS)’. The emergence of an EAS is assumed to be driven by a variety of forces that bring about common
understandings as, for instance, a European acquis communautaire or constant interaction
and networks amongst civil servants and politicians at EU level (Rutgers and Schreurs
2000).
However, more and more studies challenge the notion of homogeneity and convergence (for example, Brunsson 1989; Pollitt 2001, 2006; Christensen and Lægreid 2001,
2003, 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Schnapp 2004). This is particularly so for the
European public management context (for example, Knill 2001; Page 2003; Kickert 2005;
Olsen 2006; Bouckaert 2007; Gualmini 2008) and for HRM (for example, Brewster et al.
2004; Tregaskis and Brewster 2006). Such studies draw attention to a variety of contextual factors that structure the way in which countries organize their administrations.
Recently even the OECD – in the past one of the grand observers of ‘universal trends’
of public administration modernization and itself a driver of homogenization – has
become more cautious and has stressed diversity and the relevance of context. The 2005
report ‘Modernising Government: The Way Forward’ (OECD 2005, p. 13) concluded
that ‘modernisation is dependent on context’ and that ‘there are no public management cure-alls’. From the perspective of institutional theory, Olsen (2006, 13 ff.) argues
that, in Europe, ‘neither have the internal market, common legislation, and intense
interaction among the public administrations produced structural convergence (. . .).
Member States continue to organize their administrations differently both at home and in
Brussels’.
We are guided by the assumption that the design of institutions and the distribution
of competencies and responsibilities are shaped by deep-seated, macro-level factors. A
further aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine what factors account for similarities
and dissimilarities we find regarding the way national HR decision-making practices
are organized. In particular, we ask to what extent the degrees of (de)centralization (see
hypothesis H1a) and individual versus collective decision making (see hypothesis H1b)
are rooted in dimensions of the national culture, institutional contexts or more overarching
contextual parameters such as administrative traditions.
National culture
Since the first part of our research investigates similarities and dissimilarities in the
degrees of decentralization and of individual decision-making discretion across countries,
national culture becomes an especially relevant influence factor. In the absence of a wide
consensus on the definition, let alone the operationalization of national culture, the
framework developed by Hofestede (2001) has proved useful and is widely employed
in cross-cultural and comparative research. For a discussion of the public sector, see, for
example, Pollitt 2006; Bouckaert 2007; Beuselinck et al. Bouckaert 2007; Schröter 2007; for a
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discussion on European HRM, see, for example, Brewster and Larsen 1992. For the study
at hand, three of these dimensions seem particularly germane:
1. power distance;
2. individualism/collectivism;
3. uncertainty avoidance.
It should be noted here that since we do not expect the dimension masculinity/femininity
to influence either of our dependent variables in any clear direction, we refrained from
formulating a hypothesis and testing this variable in our models. When controlling for this
dimension, we found no significant influence. In addition, the fifth Hofstede dimension –
long-term versus short-term orientation – has not been measured for most of the countries
in our study and was therefore not included in our analyses.
Power distance
Power distance represents the acceptance by the members of a society that power is
unequally distributed. Countries with a high power distance accept greater inequalities
as well as status privileges and reflect a quite hierarchical society with more centralization
of power and decision making (Hofstede 2001, p. 98). For countries with a lower power
distance we can also expect a stronger involvement of multiple actors and a higher degree
of collective decision making aimed at a more balanced distribution of power and a more
consensual style of decision making.
H1a: In countries with a lower power distance HR decision-making authority will be
more decentralized.
H1b: Countries with a lower power distance will show a higher degree of collective
HR decision making with more actors being involved in the process.
Individualism/collectivism
According to Hofstede (2001, p. 225), individualism represents the degree to which ties
are relatively loose between individuals in a society and everyone is expected to look
after themselves. Higher individualism means less social cohesion and a stronger need for
actors to pursue their own interests and engage in decision-making processes themselves
instead of relying on others to take care of them. Therefore, according to Hofstede’s
framework, we expect both decentralization and the degree of collective decision making
to be higher in countries which score high on individualism.
H2a: In countries with a higher Hofstede individualism score, HR decision making will
be more decentralized.
H2b: Countries with a higher Hofstede individualism score will show a higher degree
of collective HR decision making with more actors being involved in the process.
Uncertainty avoidance
Building on Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioural theory, Hofstede (2001, 145 ff.) used the
concept of uncertainty avoidance to account for differences in the extent to which members
of a society tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity. In countries with a high uncertainty
avoidance score, people experience a higher degree of anxiety when having to cope with
unstructured situations; hence clear rules and regulations are preferred. Countries with a
low score, on the other hand, display a greater tolerance towards heterogeneity, ambiguity
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and change. Decentralization of decision-making authority unavoidably produces some
heterogeneity and less controllable outcomes (see, for example, Brewster and Larsen
1992). Thus, we expect to find a higher degree of decentralization in countries with a
lower uncertainty avoidance score. We do not expect uncertainty avoidance to influence
the degree of multi-actor involvement in any clear direction and therefore refrain from
testing this variable in our models.
H3a: In countries with a lower Hofstede uncertainty avoidance score, HR decisionmaking will be more decentralized.
Administrative traditions
National culture is one important explanatory factor on the level of nation states.
However, within the European Union, cultural norms and values and institutional
configurations are not necessarily tied to national boundaries and there are several other
ways of identifying specific archetypes. Kickert (2005) argued that different historicalinstitutional backgrounds of European states and administrations affect the form and
content of their administrative reforms and that, as a consequence, considerably varying
trajectories among Western European states can be observed. The relevance of different
public administrative traditions or state models such as the classical contrast between
continental, state-based systems with civil law on the one hand, and Anglo-Saxon
common law systems on the other, is widely used in comparative administrative research
(for example, Hague et al. 1992; Pierre 1995; Kickert and Hakvoort 2000; Hajnal 2003; Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2004; Torres 2004; Kickert 2008). However, a closer look at the literature
makes clear that, in spite of the popularity of using clusters, no consensus regarding their
composition or scope can be found. To the contrary, country clusters are characterized by
a variety of defining features, and may be regionally, culturally, institutionally, religiously
or linguistically based (see, for example, Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). To give an
example, for European HRM research, Brewster (2007) found six different sorts of country
clusters in current use.
The most frequently cited model in public administration research from Pollitt and
Bouckaert (2004) differentiates countries with a public interest administrative culture
from countries with a Rechtsstaat one. Other suggestions stem from Kickert (2008) who
distinguishes a Napoleonic from a Germanic Rechtsstaat model, a Southern European
model and consensual corporatist Continental European states, or from Hajnal (2003)
who separates Continental European countries, Nordic countries and Southern European
countries. In this paper, we started from the established models but had to adopt and
modify them since none of them covers all 27 EU member states. We differentiated
countries with the following traditions: Anglo-Saxon; Continental European; Southern
European; Scandinavian and Eastern European; we then made a first allocation of single
countries to these categories. To secure plausibility and come to a final ‘consensual’
clustering of all countries, this was later discussed, checked and verified as part of a
workshop with the members of the HR working group within the European Public
Administration network (for further details, see below). The categories we built on this
basis are strikingly similar to a country clustering that resulted from a recent international
public sector performance comparison (SCP 2004, p. 23f) that underscores that ‘again and
again, Northern European countries, Western European countries, Southern European
countries, Central European countries, and Anglo-Saxon countries are demonstrated to
form fairly consistent clusters’.
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From a continental Rechtsstaat perspective, the state is a central integrating force within
society with the actions of individual public servants and individual citizens being set
in a context of rule following and legal control. Administrative practice is strongly
influenced by Weber’s rational bureaucracy model with its emphasis on clear lines of
authority within a strongly hierarchical system. By contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon countries,
public administration is seen as being guided by ‘public interest’ principles rooted in the
Common Law tradition in which no divide between state and society or between public
and private law is recognized. Hence, the concepts of contractualism, marketization,
decentralization and managerialism have had a much easier cognitive and normative
entry and acceptance in these traditions (Wollmann 2000). Further, Continental as well as
Scandinavian countries are often characterized by a rather strong consensus model and
corporatist features with sophisticated systems of interest representation (for example,
Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979; Kickert and Hakvoort 2000). Southern European countries
have in common a history of unstable democratic political systems and authoritarian
regimes, a distinctive southern model of bureaucracy (for example, Sotriopoulos 2004;
Kickert 2008) featuring a strong formalism and legalism in administrations, and a less
professional neutral but more politicized administration. For some time, for Eastern
European countries, the label ‘transition states’ seemed to provide a good characterization
for countries that have a strikingly different legacy and priorities in public administration.
However, for most of these countries, the period of transition is over and distinct ways of
organizing their public administrations are emerging.
Thus, with regard to the degrees of decentralization and multi-actor involvement in
decision making, we assume the administrative traditions to have an impact. In more
detail, we assume the Anglo-Saxon country cluster and, to a lesser degree, the Scandinavian cluster, to have the highest degree of decentralization, and the Continential European
cluster, due to its legalistic Rechtsstaat and consensual tradition, to have the highest degree
of collective decision making. Thus, we propose:
H4a: In countries with an Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, HR decision making
will be most decentralized.
H4b: Countries with a Continental European administrative tradition will show the
highest degree of collective HR decision making.
HR system
Finally, we assume that previous decisions and institutional arrangements prepare the
path and predetermine the way in which future decisions are made. In the same vein,
Pollitt notes that ‘the way major institutions were set up and infused with particular
cultural norms casts a long shadow down the years’ (2006, p. 28). With regard to the
institutional design of HRM, the OECD (2005; see also Selden 2003; Demmke 2004)
suggests that we distinguish between two main models of public service employment, as
follows.
Career-based systems
These are founded on bringing individuals into the system at the entry level and building
their career within government. They are characterized by life-long public service careers,
specific criteria for initial entry, a strong emphasis on career development with a high
relevance of seniority and a relatively strong differentiation between private and public
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sector employment. They tend to promote collective values and show a weaker emphasis
on individual performance and accountability.
Position-based systems
In contrast, these are characterized by a focus on selecting the candidates for each position,
more open access and a higher mobility between private and public sector employment.
They tend to have weaker cross-government values but stronger links across levels of
hierarchy and status as well as a stronger focus on individual performance assessment.
In its 2005 report on ‘Modernising Government’, the OECD notes that position-based
systems vis-à-vis career-based systems tend to give more HR autonomy and flexibility
to lower hierarchical levels. Together with the argued strong emphasis of career-based
systems on a common HR-system and on collective values, this leads to the following
hypotheses:
H5a: The more career-based a country’s HR system, the higher is the degree of
centralization in HR decision making.
H5b: The more career-based a country’s HR system, the higher is the degree of collective
HR decision making with more actors being involved in the process.
DATA AND METHOD
Dataset
Our study encompasses central (federal) public administration in the 27 EU member
states and the European Commission. The data on HR decision-making patterns stems
from a questionnaire-based electronic survey that was sent in May 2006 to the Human
Resources Working Group within the EUPAN (The European Public Administration
Network) which is an informal network of Directors General responsible for public
administrations in EU member states and the European Commission. We are well aware
of the limitations of this dataset such as a single data source or the possibility of image
cultivation. On the other hand, we see the following advantages. The respondents are
situated in structurally equivalent positions, have excellent knowledge of the subject, and
are in a privileged position to give reliable information on their country’s HRM situation
(see also Coggburn 2001; Donahue et al. 2004; OECD 2004). In addition, the grounding
of the study within the EUPAN network under the Austrian EU presidency gave the
responses a semi-official character. The whole questionnaire included 20 open and closed
questions with the option to comment on all questions and answers (an option that was
extensively used by the respondents). In this paper we focus on the questions concerning
the degree of (de-)centralization of HR competencies which were conceptualized as closed
questions to allow for comparative analyses. It is clear that there is no universal ‘language’
of HRM and differences of understanding can always impact the results of comparative
surveys. To overcome this problem, a workshop and a further meeting held with the
respondents gave room for discussion, feedback and comments. The workshop was held
in the initial phase of the survey to clarify open questions and divergent understandings
as well as the two clusters (administrative tradition and HR system) used in the study;
the meeting gave the participants the opportunity to comment on interim findings. In
addition, a preliminary version of the results was sent to all respondents for a cross-check
of the findings. The final report was presented and discussed at a meeting of the Directors
General responsible for public administration in Europe.
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Variables
Centralization/decentralization and individual/collective decision making are concepts
that are difficult to measure empirically (for example, Peckham et al. 2005; for HR
decentralization, see Donahue et al. 2004). Coggburn (2001, p. 229) noted that systematic
comparative research into the issue of personnel deregulation has been impeded by the
lack of a measurable scale that captures different states’ levels of (de-)centralization.
Taking into consideration potential different understandings and starting points, we
refrained from using the respondents’ self-assessments regarding their countries’ status.
Instead we looked at 15 typical HR decision-making tasks within the core administration
(for a brief summary of these tasks, see the appendix). HRM is a function without an
agreed definition or list of tasks to be covered. Nonetheless, several aspects, such as
resourcing, development and training, rewards, are covered in most descriptions of what
HRM is about and can therefore be regarded as typical tasks (for example, Guest 1990;
Brewster 2007). However, it is important to note that this does not imply that the actual
practices are carried out at the same level or with the same degree of sophistication in all
countries.
Since decentralization is not an either/or question, but a matter of degree, we inquired
about the extent of involvement (main involvement, minor involvement, no involvement)
of different actors (central government-wide units, line ministers, central units within
line ministries, top public administration level, line management level, lower hierarchical
level, staff representatives, trade unions and/or other actors – this category had to be
specified if employed). Level of involvement was coded as follows:
• Centralized system: involvement of a central government-wide operating body, the
responsible line minister, a central HR unit within the line ministry, or the top public
administration level were taken as indicative of a centralized system.
• Decentralized system: involvement of line or agency managers and/or of lower
hierarchical levels were taken as pointing to a more decentralized system.
The category ‘others’ was coded as either central or decentral according to the respondents’
specifications. In order to compare the results, we created a (de)centralization scale for
each HR decision-making issue that varies between minus 1 (only ‘central’ actors involved
in decision making) and plus 1 (only decentral actors involved). In order to sketch a map
of the countries’ positions relative to each other, for each country, a total score was
aggregated from the different HR decision-making tasks. Equally, for each task, a score
was aggregated across countries to identify task-related differences.
Apart from the centralization/decentralization dimension, we also analysed the question to what extent decisions are made (1) by an individual actor; or (2) collectively.
Depending on the number of actors involved (1) or (2), above, and the extent of their
involvement (main involvement, minor involvement, no involvement), we calculated a
collective decision-making index for each country and HR task that varies between 0
and 1. Thus, a score of 0 means that one single actor has full decision-making discretion
whereas 1 would mean that for all types of actors in our study the category ‘main
involvement’ applies for a specific HR decision-making task. Again, in order to map the
countries’ positions relative to each other, for each country, a total score was aggregated
from the different HR decision-making tasks. It is important to note that we do not wish
to make a judgement on the efficiency and effectiveness of either of the arrangements.
Thus, an increasing degree of collective decision making may be indicative of a lesser
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HRM: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
465
autonomy of individual actors, but also of a higher decision-making complexity (with all
the advantages and disadvantages), and – in case of lower-level actors being involved –
of increasing participation.
To test our hypotheses in regression models we used these decentralization and collective decision-making scores as dependent variables. As independent variables for the
national culture dimensions (power distance, individuality, and uncertainty avoidance),
we employ the Hofstede’s scales (2001) for the individual countries. Since there are no measures available for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and the EC, these countries were
omitted in the respective models (models II, III, IV and the full model) of the regression
analyses. Concerning the different administrative traditions, we formed clusters for the
27 EU member states as described above. Table 1 shows the assignment of the individual
countries to the clusters. Since the EC combines elements from various traditions (especially the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon tradition) we refrained from assigning the EC to one of these clusters. Although these clusters give interesting insights with
regard to our research question, shortcomings and difficulties of such categorizations – for
example, the weakening or taking shape of relevant differences – may not be adequately
taken into account and have to be kept in mind (for example, assigning The Netherlands
to the Continental European tradition and Malta to the Anglo-Saxon tradition).
Regarding HR systems, current reform trends show that pure career or pure position
models no longer exist in practice (Demmke 2004, 2006; OECD 2004, 2005). Instead of clearcut categories, countries are rather to be understood as showing stronger characteristics
of one or the other model. In this paper, the classification of HR systems was taken from
a recent survey conducted for the EUPAN network (see also Demmke et al. 2007b) that
assessed the systems in place in each country on the basis of 17 indicators (such as specific
civil service employment rules, existence of life-time tenure, specific pension scheme).
The degree to which a country shows the features of a career system was calculated based
on the number of elements from a career system found in place (0 = 0 per cent of all
career-system indicators; 1 = 100 per cent). For Slovakia, which had not participated in
the study on the HR systems, a proxy of 0.73 based on a previous categorization (Demmke
et al. 2007a) was used. The EC is not included in the regression model as there are no data
available. Countries such as Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal or Romania had scores over 0.7 and thereby represent careerbased systems whereas the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia,
Sweden or the UK with scores lower than 0.5 are examples of more position-based systems.
In addition, to provide a more conservative test for our hypotheses, we included a
number of control variables (all for the year 2006) that can be assumed to be of relevance
for a country’s degree of HR decision-making (de)centralization and autonomy. We
TABLE 1 Categorization of countries according to public administration tradition
Public administration tradition
Anglo-Saxon tradition:
Continental European tradition:
Southern European tradition:
Scandinavian tradition:
Eastern European tradition:
Ireland, Malta, UK
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Sweden
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia
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RENATE E. MEYER AND GERHARD HAMMERSCHMID
controlled for the wealth of a country, measured in terms of its GDP per capita (Eurostat –
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/, accessed February 2008), and the size of a country in
terms of population. We also included controls for the length of a country’s membership
in the EU in years, government debt in percentage of GDP, and two measures for
government size. The first variable measures government consumption as a percentage of
GDP and the second the compensation for government employees as a percentage of GDP
(both Eurostat – http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/, as above, accessed February 2008).
We also controlled for federal versus unitary system government systems and the fourth
Hofstede dimension (masculinity), but since we found no significant influence in any of
the models, they are omitted in the table.
Due to the structure of our data – repeated observations from one country – the
observations from the same unit are not independent. We therefore tested our models
using STATA 10.0, clustering by country and using the robust variance estimation option
to take into account within-group-dependence and possibilities of heteroskedasticity
standard errors (see, for example, Long and Freese 2006). The explanatory variables in the
chosen models were also tested for multicollinearity.
THE HETEROGENEITY OF HR DECISION MAKING AMONG EU MEMBER
STATES
Although our data – due to the lack of the temporal dimension – do not allow for
any interpretation concerning convergence or divergence of administrative systems over
time, both indices we developed document the considerable existing variation among
the countries in their approaches to organizing HRM. Central governments of the EU
countries remain distinct in the way they organize HR decision making. Similarly, for
public and private organizations, Brewster et al. (2004) found a remarkable degree of
difference between European countries with regard to major functional areas in HRM.
Concerning the degree of (de)centralization, the observed scores for individual tasks
range between minus 1 and plus 1 (for example, recruitment of line management involves
only central actors in, for instance, Cyprus or Greece, and only decentral actors in
Sweden). According to the answers, HR tasks such as fixed salaries, codes of conduct
and ethical standards, head count reduction, and (basic) working time arrangements,
are decided with a relatively high degree of centralization. On the other hand, decision
making regarding performance-related pay, training and development, performance
management, or flexible working time patterns, to a considerably higher degree, involves
actors from lower hierarchical levels in the decision-making process.
In its work on HRM in 2004, the OECD concluded that current developments show
clear features of a general decentralization and individualization trend. Figure 1 shows
our summarized results for the individual countries. For the 15 decision-making tasks
we used in the comparative part of the study, the mean (de-)centralization score across
all tasks and all countries is -0.377 (SD 0.526). This shows that central actors still tend
to have greater responsibilities than the actual management level and that, although the
devolution of decision-making responsibilities towards the point of service delivery has
been an important element in previous and current reform initiatives (see below), the
current picture is still one of high centralization with only limited involvement or even
autonomy given to management. Obviously, across all tasks, none of the 27 countries and
the European Commission has either completely centralized or completely decentralized
HR systems. Based on the typical HR decision-making tasks we used in this study, we
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HRM: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
467
high degree of collective decision-making
0,6
France
Slovenia
Belgium
0,5
Germany
Finland
Denmark 0,4
Hungary
Ireland
EC
Austria
Lithuania
Cyprus
Portugal
Italy
UK
Malta
Estonia
Netherlands
0,3
Sweden
Czech Rep.
Romania
BulgariaPoland
0,2
Latvia
Spain
Luxembourg
0,1
Slovakia
Greece
high degree of individual decision making
-1,0
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0,0
0,0
highly central
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
highly decentral
FIGURE 1 (De)centralization and multi-actor involvement in HR decision making in European public
administrations
find a prevalence of a hierarchically centralized organization of HR tasks, for example,
in Greece, Luxembourg, Romania, Cyprus, Italy and Belgium. The highly decentralized
organization of HRM in Sweden, on the other end of the spectrum, is the result of a
step-by-step decentralization over decades. In addition, regarding the degree of collective
decision making, our results show high heterogeneity between the various countries.
France and Germany, two relatively large Continental European countries, display the
highest degree of collective decision making. These two are followed by countries that are
quite different with regard to tradition or size such as Slovenia, Finland, Malta and the
UK. In Greece, Luxembourg or Slovakia, a low degree of collective decision making goes
hand in hand with centralized decision making. In Cyprus, Belgium and Italy, decision
making is also central, with multiple actors involved.
Concerning our second dimension of autonomy, even greater caution seems to be called
for. Our results indicate that managers possess individual decision-making discretion
only to a limited degree. The replies to our survey regarding degree of individual versus
collective decision making (mean score is 0.306, SD 0.163) show that decision making
by individual actors is an exception and many HR issues are a shared responsibility
of different actors within public administration. Moreover, we find a highly significant
positive correlation (.329; p < 0.01; n = 396 questions answered) between decentralization
and the degree of collective decision making, indicating that the responsibilities are rarely
fully delegated to line management and/or lower hierarchical levels, but that, rather, these
actors are integrated in the decision-making processes. In most cases, central actors such
as central government-wide operating bodies, a central HR unit within the ministries,
ministers, or top level executives, still have a major influence (depending of course on the
task at stake).
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468
RENATE E. MEYER AND GERHARD HAMMERSCHMID
Figure 1 does not allow any interpretation in terms of future developments. Without
longitudinal data, it is unclear whether this should be interpreted as a transition period
towards more decentralized structures or the emergence of a new, more stable form
of organizing HRM. Administrative reform, it has been argued, often appears to be
cyclical. Kaufman, in his classical article (1969), suggests ‘a cycle of centralization and
decentralization’, and Peters and Savoie (1996) speak of a ‘coordination and empowerment
conundrum’ with regard to HRM, where decentralization and empowerment initiatives
automatically lead to an increasing demand for coordination and control. Several recent
studies seem to confirm this cycle: in his comparative study, Kickert (2005) finds signs that
governments in Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and The Netherlands, are ‘reducing
the autonomy of some public bodies and agencies, are questioning the democratic
accountability of excessive managerial autonomy (. . .) and want the state to get more
control once more’. Ingraham (2005) argues that, after rather extensive decentralization or
devolution in the reform process, many governments now experience a movement back
towards some central frameworks or statements of values, but not toward recentralization
in the traditional sense. The OECD (2005, p. 170) argues that it ‘does not seem clear from
evidence that further decentralization of HRM is the trend of the future’. Similarly,
Demmke et al.’s study (Demmke et al. 2007a) confirms that, on the one hand, there are
multiple current decentralization initiatives in governmental HR policies, with nearly
all countries reporting initiatives of decentralizing and deregulating HRM, albeit with
many nuances and variations between the different countries. In Austria, for instance, a
Deregulation Act for the civil service transferred competencies to the line ministries and
subordinated authorities; in France, a wide range of HR-competencies was transferred to
the line managers within the framework of general rules concerning civil servants. Finland,
Germany, The Netherlands and the UK reported a decentralization of their pay systems
although to quite different degrees. In Malta, a new Public Service Act was reported to be
in process to establish a legal framework for devolution of management powers to heads
of departments while other countries, such as Ireland or Sweden over the last decade, have
already implemented several reform initiatives to decentralize HRM. Belgium, Denmark,
France, Italy and Sweden have launched initiatives to explicitly increase the amount of
discretion to line managers. Other countries’ initiatives (for example, Austria, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Spain or the European Commission) have focused on the devolution of
HR responsibilities from central HR units to line ministries and agencies.
On the other hand, and quite parallel to considerable decentralization efforts and
initiatives, many respondents reported re-centralization initiatives, for example, in the
field of the control of personnel, the introduction of new central legislation, or the creation
of new central units (for example, the Recruitment and Re-Deployment Advisory Group in
Malta or Shared Service Centers in Finland), new coordination, control and accountability
structures being created leading to simultaneous movements of decentralization and
centralization.
THE RELEVANCE OF THE CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Given the empirical evidence of the significant differences in the organization of HR
decision-making practices across countries, the regression models take a closer look at the
cultural and institutional influence factors tested in our study. Basic descriptive statistics
and correlations between all variables and controls used in the analyses are provided
in table 2. Table 3 exhibits the results of the regression analyses. The control model is
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∗p
45.78
1.44
2.95
2.48
18.96
26.59
21.57
16.70
24.03
.41
.31
.45
.38
.38
.17
98.75
8.97
19.92
10.91
19.07
45.41
50.57
60.57
70.74
.21
.11
.29
.18
.18
.61
SD
< 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01 (two-tailed test).
1. Wealth (GDP per
capita)
2. Size (ln population)
3. Government size 1
(gov. cons. % GDP)
4. Government size 2
(cons. empl. % GDP)
5. EU membership in
years
6. Government debt
(% GDP)
7. Power Distance
8. Individualism/
Collectivism
9. Uncertainty
Avoidance
10. Continental
European tradition
11. Anglo-Saxon
tradition
12. Eastern European
tradition
13. Southern European
tradition
14. Scandinavian
tradition
15. HR system
Mean
.064
.166∗∗
.028
.135∗∗ −.120∗
−.241∗∗
−.135∗∗ −.429∗∗ −.260∗∗
−.528∗∗
.377∗∗
−.334∗∗
.555∗∗
.113∗
−.542∗∗
−.042
−.006
−.031
345
345
345
420
420
420
420
420
405
.401∗∗
5.
6.
7.
.077
−.256∗∗
.067
.666∗∗
.250∗∗
−.014
.104∗
.520∗∗
.052
.130∗∗
.056
9.
10.
.450∗∗ −.243∗∗ −.162∗∗ −.295∗∗
12.
13.
.426∗∗ −.459∗∗
.604∗∗
.333∗∗ −.053
.184∗∗
14.
.146∗∗ −.676∗∗
.177∗∗ −.535∗∗ −.243∗∗ −.162∗∗ −.295∗∗ −.217∗∗
.148∗∗ −.366∗∗
11.
.209∗∗ −.330∗∗ −.219∗∗
.281∗∗ −.249∗∗ −.181∗∗
.605∗∗ −.317∗∗
−.196∗∗
.389∗∗ −.183∗∗ −.345∗∗ −.427∗∗
.216∗∗
.537∗∗ −.574∗∗
8.
.213∗∗ −.213∗∗ −.265∗∗
.412∗∗
−.170∗∗ −.323∗∗ −.585∗∗ −.333∗∗
−.128∗∗ −.084
.103∗
−.336∗∗ −.161∗∗ −.142∗∗
.127∗ −.215∗∗ −.281∗∗ −.284∗∗ −.009
.152∗∗
.520∗∗
.226∗∗
.463∗∗
.178∗∗ −.505∗∗
.310∗∗
.347∗∗
.395∗∗
.012
405
.254∗∗ −.024
.628∗∗
4.
.397∗∗
−.126∗
3.
.663∗∗
−.024
420
.283∗∗
2.
405
−.169∗∗
.054
1.
405
420
420
N
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables and controls
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HRM: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
469
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0.013∗∗
(0.004)
Decentral
−0.000
(0.003)
0.005
(0.062)
0.029
(0.036)
0.053
(0.040)
−0.005
(0.008)
−0.005
(0.003)
Model III
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
Collective
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.015
(0.018)
0.006
(0.008)
0.011
(0.010)
0.004†
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.003∗
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.002∗
Collective
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.000
(0.011)
−0.005
(0.007)
0.014
(0.010)
0.002†
†
−1.331∗
(0.583)
−171.081
0.481
0.467
10
383
0.274
(0.199)
210.033
0.265
0.245
10
383
(0.050)
−0.112†
(0.065)
p < 0.1; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 (two-tailed test). Robust standard errors in parentheses (STATA 10.0 cluster option; country clusters).
df
N
Log-Likelihood
R2
Adjusted R2
Constant
15. HR system
13. Southern European
tradition
11. Anglo-saxon tradition
(0.184)
211.657
0.422
0.398
13
327
Decentral
0.000
(0.003
0.091†
(0.051
0.103∗
(0.036)
−0.077
(0.053)
−0.009
(0.007)
−0.000
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.000
(0.005)
−0.000
(0.004)
−0.704∗∗
Model VII
(0.923)
−139.522
0.545
0.524
14
327
−1.030∗∗ −0.058
(0.313)
(0.121)
−0.514
0.297
(0.762)
(0.282)
−216.846
177.031
0.341
0.126
0.329
0.120
7
7
383
383
Decentral
−0.000
(0.002)
−0.026
(0.060)
0.050
(0.030)
0.019
(0.040)
0.001
(0.006)
−0.004
(0.003)
Model VI
(0.045)
−0.081
(0.103)
0.077
(0.094)
0.511∗
Collective
−0.001∗
(0.001)
0.004
(0.013)
−0.003
(0.007)
0.025∗
(0.011)
0.002
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
(0.285)
−0.054
(0.200)
0.374
(0.401)
−1.738†
−0.486∗∗∗
Decentral
−0.000
(0.002)
0.052
(0.037)
0.075∗
(0.028)
−0.020
(0.035)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.002)
Model V
(0.078)
−0.169
(0.138)
Collective
14. Scandinavian tradition
−0.317
(1.051)
−187.409
0.390
0.377
7
327
−0.011∗∗
(0.004)
Decentral
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.022
(0.067)
0.032
(0.026)
0.033
(0.047)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.002
(0.003)
Model IV
12. Eastern European tradition
0.280†
(0.154)
169.149
0.251
0.234
7
327
0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
Collective
−0.002∗
(0.001)
−0.015
(0.015)
−0.008
(0.006)
0.018
(0.010)
0.004†
−0.054
(0.059)
∗∗∗
−1.100
−0.192∗∗
(0.241)
(0.056)
−0.846∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗
0.744∗∗∗
−2.029†
(0.213)
(1.025)
178.888
−196.179
0.294
0.356
0.279
0.342
7
7
327
327
(0.001)
(0.003)
−0.739
(1.117)
−189.628
0.382
0.368
7
327
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.004∗∗∗
Collective
−0.003∗∗
(0.001)
−0.023
(0.016)
0.006
(0.005)
0.003
(0.010)
0.005∗∗
Decentral
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.017
(0.067)
0.070∗
(0.027)
0.011
(0.042)
0.000
(0.008)
−0.005
(0.003)
−0.011∗∗
Model II
(0.334)
0.214
(0.216)
176.457
0.124
0.110
6
383
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.001)
Collective
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.013
(0.018)
0.008
(0.007)
0.012
(0.010)
0.004†
−0.025
(0.034)
∗∗∗
−0.835
−0.146∗
(0.148)
(0.064)
−0.734∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗
−1.989†
(0.730)
−238.672
0.262
0.250
6
383
(0.003)
Decentral
0.000
(0.003)
0.011
(0.073)
0.075∗
(0.032)
0.029
(0.041)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.006∗
Model I
(0.108)
10. Continental European
tradition
9. Uncertainty Avoidance
8. Individualism/ collectivism
7. Power distance
6. Government debt
5. EU membership in years
4. Government size 2
3. Government size 1
2. Size
Model
1. Wealth
TABLE 3 Regression models
470
RENATE E. MEYER AND GERHARD HAMMERSCHMID
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HRM: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
471
reported in model I. Models II to VI add our independent variables and report the tests
for our hypotheses. The hypotheses regarding Hofstede’s power distance are predicted in
model II, those for individualism/collectivism in model III, and in model IV we test for
uncertainty avoidance. Model V looks at the variables for the administrative traditions. In
accordance with the line of argumentation, for decentralization, the Anglo-Saxon tradition
served as reference category. With regard to collective decision making, the Continental
European tradition was used as reference category. Model VI tests the influence of the HR
system on both our dependent variables. Finally, model VII includes all relevant variables
for both dependents.
Model I shows that for the degree of decentralization government size (in terms of
consumption in percentage GDP) has a significantly positive and government debt
a significantly negative effect, albeit both moderate. Further, the degree of collective
decision making increases slightly with the length of EU membership which means that
older members involve more actors than younger ones. Table 4 sums up the suggested
directions of the independent variables in our hypotheses and indicates whether they
were confirmed in our study.
The results in model II indicate highly significant support for our hypotheses concerning
power distance. Both dependent variables decrease with the degree that power differences
are accepted in a country. Countries in which less powerful members of organizations
and institutions accept this inequality mirror this in more centralized HR decision-making
structures. Equally, in these countries, individual decision-making discretion is higher.
We also find confirmation for hypotheses 2a and 2b. As predicted, the higher Hofstede’s
individualism score, the more decentralized is HR decision making. At the same time,
the degree to which multiple actors engage in the decision making rises significantly.
Hypothesis 3a proposed that a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance would imply a
higher degree of centralized decision making, a prediction model IV confirms. However,
although highly significant, the influence of the national culture dimensions on both
dependent variables is only moderate. In the full model, their effects on decentralization
drop below the significance level, while they remain influential for the degree of collective
decision making.
In accordance with hypotheses 4a and 4b, we find administrative traditions to be quite
influential in explaining the organization of HRM. As predicted, compared to Anglo-Saxon
countries, Continental, Southern and (especially) Eastern European countries have highly
TABLE 4 Summary of hypotheses and findings
Supposed direction of influence
Hypothesis
Decentralization
H1a: Power distance
H1b: Power distance
H2a: Individualism
H2b: Individualism
H3a: Uncertainty avoidance
H4a: Anglo-Saxon tradition
H4b: Continental European tradition
H5a: Career-based HR system
H5b: Career-based HR system
−
+
−
+
−
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Collective decision making
−
+
+
+
Finding
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Confirmed
Not confirmed
472
RENATE E. MEYER AND GERHARD HAMMERSCHMID
significantly more centralized HR decision-making structures on the central government
level. For Scandinavian countries, although the results point in the hypothesized direction,
there is no significant difference to the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Equally, as predicted, the
degree of collective decision making in Continental European countries is higher than in
all other administrative traditions: significantly higher than in Scandinavian countries (at
a 10 per cent level) and Eastern European countries (at a 5 per cent level) and very highly
significantly in comparison to Southern European countries. Anglo-Saxon countries show
no significant differences from Continental European countries in this respect.
With regard to HR systems (model VI), we find confirmation for hypothesis 5a that
decision making in position-based systems vis-à-vis career-based systems tends to be
highly significantly more decentralized. However, we find no effect of the HR-system on
the degree of collective decision making (hypothesis 5b).
The great importance of the administrative traditions as explanatory variable is shown
most especially in the full model (VII). Our analysis shows that the degree of centralization
of HRM is highest in Eastern European countries and to a lesser degree in Southern
European and Continental European countries whereas Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
countries tend to prefer more decentralized solutions. National cultural variables and HR
system drop below the significance mark. Administrative traditions remain important
for the degree of collective decision making, which is considerably lower in Southern
European and Eastern European countries than in Continental European countries.
For Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, we find no significant differences to the
reference group. However, for this dependent variable, the effects of the national cultural
dimensions also remain significant.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our concluding remarks summarize the contribution of this paper as well as indicate
the limitations of our research and point to possible future research avenues. One of the
objectives of this study was to analyse the extent to which HR competences and authority
have been passed down to lower levels of management in European central governments.
In the wake of these reforms, we also look at the extent to which managers exercise
decision-making autonomy and possess individual discretion. Our study therefore makes
an empirical contribution to current debates on modernizing HRM and to comparative
research.
Our analyses stress the need to differentiate between the rhetoric and practice of
decentralization (Brunsson 1989; Pollitt 2001). While initiatives to decentralize HRM have
been reported by most countries and seem to have a high symbolic appeal, the current
picture of administrative practice throughout Europe – especially Continental, Eastern
and Southern European countries – is still rather centralized, with limited autonomy or
even involvement of line management in decision making. Empirical studies suggesting
a trend towards HR decentralization are often based on data from the United States (see,
for example, Hou et al. 2000; Coggburn 2001; Hays 2004; Hays and Sowa 2006; Nigro and
Kellough 2008) and, in the light of our results, need to be interpreted more cautiously for
the European context.
Overall, we find that the degree of decentralization mostly does not go hand in hand
with a higher extent of discretion on the part of individual managers but that there is
a strong relationship between decentralization and the involvement of multiple actors
in the decision-making processes – decentralization of decision making often seems to
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be translated into practices that involve lower hierarchical levels but do not devolve
the decision-making authority solely to them. These findings are in line with Lawler
(2008), who, on a conceptual level, has been arguing that the notion of individualization
presents a restrictive perspective that does not allow for an exploration of a broader
range of leadership approaches, particularly that of distributed leadership, which are of
particular relevance for public sector organizations. Our results indicate that in European
public administrations, distributed leadership is a current and quite frequent feature
of administrative practice. Further research is needed to assess whether this is to be
interpreted either as a particular form of organizing in a transition period or as the
emergence of a new, more stable form of arranging HRM.
A second objective of this paper was to empirically contribute to the ongoing debate
on homogeneity or convergence. The unique setting of our survey allowed us to bring in
a truly EU-wide perspective with data from all 27 EU member states as well as the EC.
However, our data – due to the lack of the temporal dimension – does not allow for any
conclusions concerning developments or shifts of administrative systems and, thus, does
not address convergence or divergence directly, but rather addresses the question of similarity and dissimilarity. Nonetheless, we believe our findings are relevant for the overall
debate. Both indices we developed document the considerable variation that exists among
the study countries and confirm recent studies that also point in this direction (see, for
example, Brewster et al. 2004; Mayrhofer and Brewster 2005; Tregaskis and Brewster 2006;
Lægreid and Wise 2007; van der Meer et al. 2007). Although most EU member states report
initiatives towards HR-decentralization and often these initiatives sound similar, we find
very different arrangements, emphases, paces and degrees of implementation throughout
Europe. In accordance with various strands of institutional thinking that have recently
exhibited a rather sceptical view with regard to convergence, especially at the level of
administrative practices, our study confirms the need for an approach to HR organization
that encompasses national, cultural and institutional differences. These institutional traditions have underscored the path dependency of all institutional arrangements and reform
trajectories and put forward the idea of practice variations due to context-dependent
interpretations and ‘translations’ of more global trends (for example, Sahlin-Andersson
1996; Czarniawska and Sévon 2005). Comparative research is required to show the homogeneity or heterogeneity of institutional arrangements and practices. To guarantee a full
range of variation of international comparative public sector reform research, Bouckaert
(2007, p. 46) recommends three types of design: (1) to compare countries in and between
country clusters in a generic or policy field-specific design; (2) to compare the same
policy fields across countries; and (3) to combine the first two. Our paper illustrates the
explanatory value of such clusters as well as the benefit of multi-causal approaches to
study complex phenomena such as administrative reform in a comparative perspective.
We have shown that the differences we found in the organization of HR decision
making are significantly rooted in contextual features. The different EU countries remain
clearly distinct in how they organize HR decision making at the central government level.
However, beyond dimensions of national culture, factors such as administrative traditions
and HR system have a significant impact and help to explain the look and shape of contemporary HRM organization. They also account for similarities between more related public
administrations. The administrative tradition proved to be especially influential for outlining different HR arrangements. In line with other recent research (for example, Pollitt 2006;
Gualmini 2008), our data confirm an Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism with regard to decentralization, but even more so a Scandinavian – and especially Swedish – exceptionalism.
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Further research is required to extend the list of influence factors, both on the country level
and the more macro level. In addition, it would be extremely interesting to see the effects
that the organization of decision making has on factors such as, for example, the perceived
effectiveness of government, trust in government, or the corruption perception index.
In spite of the explanatory value of the clusters used, our study can also be used to
initiate a debate on the differences between individual countries that were assigned to
the same administrative tradition, but have different HR systems (for example, the UK
and Ireland, or The Netherlands and Luxembourg or Austria) and the extent to which
these differences may be accounted for by other clustering categories. Another fruitful
avenue for further research might be to investigate whether or not the relevance of the
different clusters changes when comparing different areas of administrative practices (for
example, HRM, budgetary management, performance management, e-government) or
different policy fields.
Our research clearly has methodological limitations inextricably linked with international comparative research on public administration. In order to make the degrees of
decentralization and management discretion measureable and comparable, and setting
aside shortcomings of our data collection mentioned above, we had to use a number
of generalizations. For example, we do not measure the level of sophistication of the
respective HR practices or the overall standing of HRM in the different countries. Hence,
we cannot grasp whether a higher degree of multi-actor involvement is due to a more
sophisticated procedure of, for instance, recruiting or sanctioning and rewarding, or a
higher degree of decentralization is accounted for by a lower status of HRM. Moreover, the
present study has taken only a snapshot of the status of HR decision-making organization
throughout Europe and has provided a first look at factors that may influence this status.
In order to make a true judgement on trends of convergence and divergence, additional
longitudinal research is needed to address the shifts and developments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The study was conducted under the Austrian EU Presidency 2006 and the authors would
like to acknowledge the support of the EUPAN HRM Working Group, the Austrian EU
Presidency (in particular Karin Thienel) and, especially, of Christoph Demmke from the
European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht. We thank Markus Höllerer
and the EGPA working group on HRM for helpful feedback on previous versions of this
paper. In addition, we appreciate the valuable and constructive comments provided by
the three anonymous reviewers.
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APPENDIX
HR decision-making tasks
Please indicate which levels of public administration are typically involved in the following
decision-making situations (main involvement is to be interpreted as strong influence on the
actual decision). In the case of a gap between actual practice and legal regulation, please
make a short comment (for example, when ministers use their legal authority of decision
making factually on the basis of proposals from their administration).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Recruitment of a new line manager
Determining fixed salaries of employees
Determining performance-related pay of employees
Awarding the contract for a study worth 25.000 ¤ to an external contractor
Determining training and development means for employees
Performance management for line department (for example, performance goals/
contracts and performance monitoring/control)
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Determining codes of conduct and ethical norms
Decisions on a disciplinary procedure in the case of employee misconduct
Dismissal of an employee
Promotion of a line manager
Changing working time arrangements
Altering task responsibilities and areas of work of individual employees due to a
restructuring
13. Introducing teleworking arrangements within a line ministry
14. Deciding head count reductions in a line ministry
15. Relocating staff due to structural changes
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