A Course in "Bounded rationality"
Spring Semester, 2004/5
Ran Spiegler
[email protected]
‫הקורס יוקדש למודלים כלכליים בהם "הסוכנים הכלכליים" אינם מצייתים לפרדיגמת‬
‫ הדיון בחלק מהמודלים יוביל אותנו לשאלות‬,‫ אולם‬.‫ אופי הקורס תיאורטי‬,‫ ככלל‬.‫הרציונאליות‬
.‫"יישומיות" יותר‬
.101 ‫ בחדר ברגלס‬,20-18 ,‫ניפגש מדי יום שלישי‬
‫ המטלה‬.‫ אשר תהיה מבוססת על החומר הנלמד בכיתה‬,‫הציון הסופי ייקבע ע"י מטלת בית‬
‫ העבודה על המטלה אמורה להיות‬.‫ ותוגש בחזרה בתוך שבועיים‬,‫תימסר בסוף הסמסטר‬
."‫ וחלות עליה הנורמות של "מבחן בית‬,‫אישית‬
General references
1. Camerer C. (1994). "Individual Decision Making". In J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds.,
Handbook of Experimental Economics, 587-704. Princeton University Press.
2. Rubinstein A. (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press. [MBR]
3. Thaler R. (1992). The Winner’s Curse. Princeton University Press. [WC]
Plan of the course
1. Rationality and rationalization
2. Preferences over beliefs
3. Boundedly rational belief formation in games
4. Boundedly rational belief formation in markets
5. Boundedly rational belief formation in bargaining interactions
6. Imperfect recall
7. Unawareness
1
I. Rationality and rationalization
1. MBR: Ch. 1
2. Kalai G., A. Rubinstein and R. Spiegler (2002). "Rationalizing Choice Functions
by Multiple Rationales". Econometrica 70, 2481-2488.
3. Sen A. (1993). "Internal Consistency of Choice". Econometrica 61, 495-521.
II. Preferences over beliefs
1. Akerlof G. and W. Dickens (1982). "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance". American Economic Review 72, 307-319.
2. Brunnermeier M. and J. Parker (2005). "Optimal Expectations". American
Economic Review, forthcoming.
3. Caplin A. and J. Leahy (2003). "The Supply of Information by a Concerned
Expert". http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/caplina/
4. Eliaz K. and R. Spiegler (2002). "Can Anticipatory Feelings Explain Anomalous
Attitudes to Information?" http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/signals.pdf
5. Geanakopolos J., D. Pearce and E. Stachetti (1989). "Psychological Games and
Sequential Rationality". Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60-79.
6. Yariv L. (2004). " I’ll See It When I Believe It - A Simple Model of Cognitive
Consistency". http://www.econ.ucla.edu/lyariv/papers/Believe.pdf
7. Yildiz M. (2004). "Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments". http://econwww.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=985
III. Boundedly rational belief formation in games
1. MBR, Ch. 7.
2. Eyster E. and M. Rabin (2002). "Cursed Equilibrium".
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=iber/econ
3. Ettinger D. and P. Jehiel (2004). "Towards a Theory of Deception".
http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/jehiel/deception.pdf
2
4. Jehiel P. (2003). "Analogy-Based Expectations Equilibrium". Journal of
Economic Theory, forthcoming. http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/jehiel/analrev.pdf
5. Osborne M. and A. Rubinstein (1998). "Games with Procedurally Rational
Players". American Economic Review 88, 834-847.
6. Osborne M. and A. Rubinstein (2003). "Sampling Equilibrium with an
Application to Strategic Voting". Games and Economic Behavior 45, 434-441.
7. Spiegler R. (2004). "Testing Threats in Repeated Games". Journal of Economic
Theory, forthcoming. http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/newt.pdf
IV. Boundedly rational belief formation in markets
1. MBR, Ch. 6.
2. Eliaz K. and R. Spiegler (2004). "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents".
http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/DIP.pdf
3. X. Gabaix and D. Laibson (2004). "Shrouded Attributes and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets". http://econwww.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=527
4. Piccione M. and A. Rubinstein (2002). "Modeling the Economic Interaction of
Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns". Journal of
European Economic Association 1, 212-223.
http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/memory.pdf
5. Rubinstein A. (1993). "On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a
Monopolistic Model". Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993), 473-484.
6. Spiegler R. (2003). "The Market for Quacks".
http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/quacks.pdf
7. Spiegler R. (2004). "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational
Expectations". http://www.tau.ac.il/~rani/comps1.pdf
3
V. Boundedly rational belief formation in bargaining interactions
1. Babcock L. and G. Lowenstein (1997). "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases". Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 109-126
2. Spiegler R. (2004). "Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession
Game". Games and Economic Behavior 47, 200-220.
3. Yildiz M. (2003). "Bargaining without a common prior – An immediate
agreement theorem". Econometrica 71, 793-811.
4. Yildiz M. (2004). "Optimism, Deadline Effect, and Stochastic Deadlines".
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=984
VI. Imperfect Recall
1. MBR: Ch. 4
2. Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997): Symposium on imperfect recall
3. Borgers T. (2004). "Complexity Constraints in Two-Armed Bandit Problems: An
Example".
4. Salant Y. (2003). "Limited Computational Resources Favor Rationality."
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp/Salant320.pdf
5. Wilson A. (2002. "Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing".
http://www.najecon.org/naj/cache/234936000000000070.pdf
VII. Unawareness
1. MBR: Ch. 3
2. Dekel E., B. Lipman and A. Rustichini (1998). “Standard State-Space Models
Preclude Unawareness.” Econometrica 66, 159-174.
3. Geanakopolos J. (1992). “Common knowledge, Bayesian Learning and Market
Speculation with Bounded Rationality.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, 5882.
4