Conference Proceeding for EUSA 2017 Miami (Work in Progress please do not cite)
Normative Interactions between China and the EU: Talking Past Each Other?
JING JING
Abstract: This article firstly points out the normative power shift between China and the EU as China
is expanding its normative efforts. It then reveals two reasons why the EU’s normative approach to
China has not lived up to the expectations. The first is the mismatched normative goals of the Chinese
government and the EU’s Normative discourse and actions towards the other. While the EU aims at
engaging China into the international market based on the existing rules and spread the EU’s values,
China’s goal is to develop the country’s economy and establish rules which are preferable for China
and other developing countries. The second is the mismatch of the normative strategies of China and
the EU. While the EU has been convinced that it should shift from a values-based approach to an
interest-based approach, it misunderstood the implications of the Chinese “pragmatic” approach and
overlooked the long-term risk of giving up its norms and values on China.
Keywords: EU-China relations, normative power, goals, approaches, mismatch
Introduction
Two on-going dynamics in the normative interactions between China and the EU should draw our
attention. One is the switch of normative roles between China and the EU. While the EU has
traditionally been the normative power in China-EU relations for the past twenty years, there are clear
indications in both discourse and facts that China is becoming more proactive in establishing new norms
in China-EU relations. The single direction normative formation in EU-China relations has become one
with double movements. The other dynamic is that, since the EU’s normative approach to China has
not lived up to the expectations, many have been convinced that the EU should shift its approach to
China from a value-based one to an interest-based one.
Discussion of the EU’s Normative approach to China have so far all suggested that the EU’s normative
approach to China has not been successful as it could be (Fox and Godement, 2009). Some regard that
the problems in Sin-EU relations resulted from the complications and incompetency of the EU itself
and therefore the EU should address its internal problems first instead of trying to convert other
countries according to European norm and values (Balducci, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Mattlin, 2012). A
significant number of scholars believe that the problems in Sino-EU relationship are a result of the
different engagement styles of the Chinese government and the EU. A significant number of scholars
are critical about EU’s normative approach to China. In terms of solution, realists argued that ChinaEU relations should shift from a value-based normative approach, or the “unconditional engagement”
to an interests-based pragmatic approach. They argue that the value-based approached has proven to be
not effective and has affected economic cooperation. The EU should require more benefit from China
other than offering China favourable conditions and expect China to behave as the EU anticipates
(Crookes, 2013; Holslag, 2010; Wang, 2009; Freeman and Geeraerts, 2011; Fox and Godement, 2009).
Some liberalists also believe that a pragmatic approach will be more beneficial with a different rationale.
They think more engaged and disrupted economic cooperation will have spill-over effects on other
areas such as social and political spheres (Islam and Diaz, 2014).
There are others, however, maintain that the EU should keep its normative approach to China.
Mattlin, for example, calls for a ‘defensive’ normative approach to China (Mattlin, 2010). Waegemans
argues that the EU should not give up its values-based approach to China as its normative power is one
major resource of the EU if it wants to remain one of the “poles” in a multipolar world(Waegemans,
2014). He argues that the EU could develop on its military power but subject to the EU’s budget
available to defence, the EU army could not be large enough to sustain the EU as a strong hard power
(Waegemans, 2014).
The aim of this article is therefore to explore why the EU’s normative approach to China has been
ineffective and upon that, make my share of contribution on which approach should the EU take when
it comes to China. Based on a combined approach of content analysis and policy analysis, this article
points out that the mismatches in the normative goals, priorities and approaches between the Chinese
government and the EU’s normative efforts form one major source of the underperformed relations
between the two. The article further argues that the EU should keep its normative approach to China
instead of shift to the so-called interests-based or pragmatic approach to China. This is because the
normative nature is the fundamental defining features of the EU. It is not possible for the EU to discard
its values, neither it is necessary when it comes to the EU’s relations to China. However, the EU does
need to reform its normative approaches from using the values as leverages to focusing on China’s
social issues such as the environmental pollution, the social welfare and issues of the immigrants which
require joint efforts of China and the EU to resolve. These issues are affecting China’s human rights
but are also not over-crossing China’s “red-lines” about sovereignty and political system. The benefits
of cooperation in these areas will spill over to other areas the EU has been emphasizing on and push
China to reform from within. This approach is more sustainable for both China and the EU.
Methodologically this research is inspired by Ian Manner’s call of “tripartite analysis”, which
incorporates the study of perception, discourse and identity in EU external actions (Manners, 2009).
The article makes use of two types of materials: the normative discourse in the official documents
between the EU and China and the normative projects between the two. The official documents include
the policy papers between China and the EU during 1995 and 2016, the Chinese top leaders’ speeches,
the EU official’s speeches as well as other relevant official documents of China and the EU. The
normative projects include the EU’s refusal of granting MES to China in 2016 and China’s new
normative project such as One Belt One Road, Asia Infrastructure Bank as well as China’s norm-making
efforts in its interactions with international organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APEC and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The article is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the EU’s normative goals, priorities
and the controversies related to this. This section will include a review of the theoretical and
methodological framework related to the Normative Power Europe (NPE) so as to provide both the
starting point and the justification for the analysis in this article. The second section discusses the goals,
priorities as well as the challenges related to China as a normative power. This leads to a comparative
view of China and the EU’s mismatched goals and priorities and the argument that the two have
different aims and emphases in their normative efforts in the third section. The third section then
highlights the debates about the EU’s approach to interact with China, that is whether the EU should
take a normative approach, a value-based approach, or the pragmatic, interests-based approach. My
stance is that the EU should take a revised normative approach to China. The current normative
approach does not match China’s needs as argued in section two, but discarding the normative approach
completely would be not only impossible but also harmful for the long-term, healthy development of
both China-EU relations and the Chinese society.
1. EU as a Normative Power: Concept, Goals and Controversies
The end of the Cold War brought international relations to a new stage where military force was the
main way for a country or an entity to excerpt impacts on other entities. Against this background, a
series of concepts has been put forward to explain the existence and operation of the EU. Among these
are Ian Manner’s Normative Power Europe (NPE). As this concept is the foundation of analysis in this
article, the following section will review the concept and the analytical framework of Ian Manner’s
NPE.
Normative power is defined by Ian Manners as the “ability to shape conceptions of normal”(Manners,
2002, p.239). According to him, the EU “changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world
politics away from bounded expectations of state-centricity’, which ‘are generally acknowledged,
within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable’ (Manners, 2008, pp.45–46). The notion
of normative power aims at explaining the nature of the EU and the role it should play in the
world(Manners, 2002). In this sense the notion normative power is future-oriented instead of just
descriptive. This is also related to the aspiration for a more unified European identity which could
combine the member states of the EU together. Literatures so far mostly consider the EU as the only
normative power (Manners, 2002, 2006; Fiott, 2011), thus the term “Normative Power Europe”
(Waegemans, 2014).
According to Manners, the EU has five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human
rights protection. He also pointed out additional norms of the EU including solidarity, antidiscrimination, sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2002). The EU’s normative
basis, as shown in the following table, includes four dimensions: its founding principles, takes and
objectives, institutions as well as the fundamental rights it promotes (Manners, 2002):
Table 1The EU's Normative Basis from (Manners, 2002)
Manners also highlighted six factors influencing the EU’s normative diffusion, namely contagion,
informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter
(Manners, 2002, pp.244–245). Furthermore, he suggests that analyses on normative power should be
conducted at three levels: the principles and norms made by the entity; the actions the entity does in
order to promote these principles; the results of these actions (Manners, 2009). This article therefore
will look into both the normative discourse and the normative practices as well as their results when
evaluating the EU’s normative approach to China and vice versa.
Goals and Priorities
According to Manners, the EU aims at “prosperity in Europe and beyond” since it was established
(Manners, 2009). In this sense being altruism and extend its values to other parts of the world is part of
the EU’s nature. Referring to the EU’s official discourse, the basic normative goals and principles are
stated in a clear manner in the Treaty on European Union states in Chapter 1: General provisions on the
Union's external action. Promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, human dignity,
equality and solidarity and respects for the UN charter are the prioritized goals of the EU’s normative
practices:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (The European Union, 2008).
Controversies
Although the EU claims to work for promoting “the common good in international society” (Aggestam,
2009), there are many voices against the legitimacy of its ambition. Is the EU is an eligible normative
power? While the EU tries to promote its values, do these values sounds attractive to other countries?
On this Manners himself is critical about the ethics of the EU as a normative power. In his article “The
Normative Ethics of the European Union”, he argues that the EU is a normative power but not
necessarily acts in a normative, or an ethical way (Manners, 2008). Similarly, the legitimacy, or the
justification of the EU’s normative power has been viewed critically by both western and Chinese
scholars.
Many western scholars point out the universality of the EU’s norms is problematic. Gerrits pointed out
that Europe has misplaced the sense of universalism (Gerrits, 2009). Aggestam, while recognizing part
of the eligibility of the EU norms as they are derived from the United Nations, does raise the questions
whether the EU can force other actors to change and whether the norms are attractive to developing
countries (Aggestam, 2009).
In terms of the universality of the EU’s values, Chinese scholar are in general critical although most of
them do recognise the good intention of the EU. Song Lilei recognises that the EU as a normative power
bears a sense of responsibility and a historical perspective. Due to its experience in the war, the EU
feels obliged to promotes the values of peace, democracy and the structural model of itself (Song, 2008).
Wang Yiwei has more harsh opinions on the legitimacy of the EU’s “responsibility”. He takes the
position that while the EU represents a small population in the world who live in a post-modern society
with post-modern values, most countries in the rest of the world are not in post-modern stages. There
is a gap between the EU’s idealism and the realities of other countries. Particularly he emphasized that
China-EU relations should not be the mistaken as a “teacher-student” relations (Wang, 2009). For
other Chinese scholars, it is not so much about which norms are universal, but whether the promotors
of the norms are in the power centre of the world’s politics. The normative power is just the pursuit of
self-interests and real political power under another name (Cui, 2007; Wang, 2015).
I argue that four weak links in the EU’s normative approach to China have particularity impacted ChinaEU relations. The first is the gap between the EU’s normative discourse and its actual actions as well
as the results of those actions. The second is the EU’s “negative” way, namely using sanctions and
punishments, in conducting its normative mission. The third is the inconsistency of policies between
the EU as a whole and the member states. The last is using norms such as human rights as leverages to
bargain for more economic benefits.
The EU’s existence itself is a unique substance in the international politics. Making wars materially
impossible was the starting-point of the EU. The values of promoting peace, human rights and freedom
are essentially what makes the EU valuable. In this sense the EU’s normative approach is more based
on its values and beliefs. As Manners puts it, “the most important factor shaping the international role
of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is (Manners, 2002)”. However, one problem of
the idealist feature of the EU is that its values are put down in documents as either commitments or
requirements for the other country. The gap between words and actions are big.
Taking the EU’s human rights approach to China as an example, the EU has often states that “EU
Concerns” and is extremely worried on the Human Rights situation in China (GOV.UK, 2016; Voice
of America, 2017), the EU and China failed to agree on any of the issues which the EU claims to concern.
This is of course also related to the fact that China and the EU have fundamental different
understandings about what human rights includes and the intentions of some religious figures in terms
of the potential to separate China. These differences have been raised for years and the EU should so
far have a clear idea that Tibetan-related issues are within the “red-line” (Hammond and JING, 2016)
of the Chinese government. However, the EU is reluctant to shift its focus outside the red area for the
Chinese government such as poverty, social welfare and the life-threatening air pollution in China.
The way Manners see this is that the EU’s perceptions, strategies and actions should not been seen
separately (Manners, 2009). In other words, what the EU says and thinks are part of what the EU is and
what it does. I agree with him in the way that the EU’s aspiration and claims are part of its efforts,
however, this does not eliminate the gaps between what the EU wants for China and what is has
achieved in terms of EU-China relations.
Many agree that norms and interests are inseparable(Aggestam, 2009; Youngs, 2004). I agree that it is
not necessary to separate the normative approach with the interest-based approach. The norms can be
spread during the process of win-win cooperation. In fact, norms related to fair trade and free market,
for example, will be better adopted and accepted in China’s interactions with each member states
through their actual cooperation. It is not a problem, therefore, if the EU applies its norms as leverage
to gain benefits from China-EU relations. The real problem of this approach is its punitive nature: the
EU tends to use sanctions and moral denounces in order to pressure China in terms of human rights and
market economy status as observed by (Smith, 2014)in (Waegemans, 2014).
Another major problem in the implementation of normative practice is the different interests between
the EU as a while and individual member states (MS). The EU and MS could follow different strategies
(Wissenbach, 2009). The EU’s internal segmental nature makes it difficult for the EU to conduct a
consistent approach to China. As commented by some, the EU’s political system allows the member
states to pursue their own interests. Each of the member states have its own pragmatic interest which
means the mission to spread norms of the Union is often overlooked in actual China-Europe interactions.
The EU would have to integrate the interest clashes among the member states as well as between the
member states and the Union in order to carry out an integrated approach to China (Mattlin, 2010;
Geeraerts, 2011; Holslag, 2010; Waegemans, 2014) (Gerrits, 2009). There are also indications that MS
prioritize interest instead of norms, which affected the normative effects of the EU(Aggestam, 2009).
Some observe that China tends to turn to the EU member states rather than the EU for negotiations
(Godement and Fox, 2009: 36).
2. China as A Normative Power
Although normative power could be one defining feature of the EU, it does not mean other countries
cannot be normative powers. China, though not normative in the way the EU does, but it does have
normative capabilities and its normative practices are more active and progressive than those of the EU.
This section discusses the normative shift manifested in the official discourse of China and the EU
respective in the last twenty years and the underlying driving force behind this power shift: the different
goal of the Chinese government and the EU’s normative discourse and actions. This section also looks
at the different priorities of the two in their normative discourse and practices as a result of their different
normative goals and outlooks of the world.
Goals and Priorities of China’s Normative Efforts
If China is can be viewed as a new normative power, what are the norms China is trying to promote?
Wang Zhengxu argues that peace and development are the answer. After the cold war, since the U.S.
and Europe have been in the centre of the world’s power, the values of human rights and democracy
have become the mainstream international values whereas the values promoted by the Chinese
government including peaceful development and independency are pushed to the edge of the world’s
values (Wang, 2015).
Some Chinese scholar hold the view that “the rising China will for sure become a normative power”
(Guo Qiong et al., 2016). They argue that China is becoming both the adapter of the existing rules but
the maker of the new norms and is making efforts to shift its identity from rule-taker to a rule-taker.
China should pay more attention on balancing between identity, power and responsibilities, they
argue(Guo Qiong et al., 2016).
Norms are articulated and conveyed by discourse. Official discourse is also where an actor shows its
first signs of pursuit normative power. The early normative discourse initiated by China are the Five
principles of Peaceful Co-existence, namely the principles of “equality, mutual benefit and mutual
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty”, WERE promoted by China as the basic principles in
international interactions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1995). These
values, although revised later, have been the backbones of the Chinese guidelines in its foreign
diplomacy.
The Chinese government’s tone towards contributing to the international norms began proactive in the
recent decade. In 2010 in the Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, the Chinese government stated its determination to stick to the “going
global” strategy by engaging in and contributing to the international economic system:
It is necessary to actively participate in global economic governance and regional cooperation, to
push forward development, deepen reform and promote innovation by opening up, and to
vigorously create new advantages for participating in global economic cooperation and
competition(Xinhua News Agency, 2010).
Two years later, the report in the Eighteenth Party Congress by Hu Jintao provided a comprehensive
description of the values China promotes as the norms of the international relations. These include
“equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutually beneficial cooperation in
international relations” as well as “international fairness and justice” (Hu, 2012):
In promoting equality and mutual trust, we should observe the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, and support equality among all countries, big or small, strong or
weak, rich or poor. We should advance democracy in international relations, respect sovereignty,
share security, and uphold world peace and stability.
In promoting inclusiveness and mutual learning, we should respect diversity of civilizations and
development paths, respect and safeguard the rights of all peoples to independently choose their
social system and development path, learn from others to make up for our shortcomings, and
advance human civilization.
In promoting mutually beneficial cooperation, we should raise awareness about human beings
sharing a community of common destiny. A country should accommodate the legitimate concerns
of others when pursuing its own interests; and it should promote common development of all
countries when advancing its own development. Countries should establish a new type of global
development partnership that is more equitable and balanced, stick together in times of difficulty,
both share rights and shoulder obligations, and boost the common interests of mankind(Hu, 2012).
Since the first ten years of this century, China’s discourse has been increasingly assertive and
confirmative. The current Xi-Li administration is known for walking away from the traditional modesty,
shine-hiding discourse style and switch to more confident tones in the official documents and speeches.
In President Xi Jinping’s 2014 College of Europe speech, for example, he used several normative
discourse patterns such as “we should not”, “we need to”, “China cannot” and “China is committed to”
to indicate China’s determination in creating new norms:
The Chinese people want peace, we do not want war. This is the reason why China follows an
independent foreign policy of peace. China is committed to1 non-interference to other countries’
internal affairs. And China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs. This is the position
that we have upheld in the past. It is what we will continue to uphold in the future. (Xi, 2014: 1,
para.12, line 16-18)
Having said that we should not forget that there's still great room for the growth of China-EU
relations, and the potential is yet to be fully tapped. To move our relationship forward, China
needs to know more about Europe, and Europe needs to know more about China.(Xi, 2014: 1,
para.9, line 1-3)
We need to build a bridge of peace and stability, linking the two strong forces of China and EU.(Xi,
2014: 1,para.20, line 21)
We need to build a bridge of growth and prosperity linking the two big markets of China and
Europe. (Xi, 2014: 1,para.21,line 21)
We need to build a bridge of reform and progress, linking the reform processes in China and EU.
(Xi, 2014: 1, para.22, line 21)
We need to build a bridge of common cultural prosperity linking the two major civilizations of
China and Europe.(Xi, 2014: 1, para.23, line 21)
The world's development is multi-dimensional, and its history is never a lenient movement. China
cannot copy the political system or development model of other countries.(Xi, 2014: 1, para.17,
line 11-12)
The norms shaped by these commissive discourse include the pursuit of peace, the urge to deepen
mutual trust and understanding between China and the EU, the promotion of stable and sustainable
development, the pursuit of economic prosperity, reform and improvement, the integration of Asia and
European civilization, and the autonomy for a country to make decisions about its own developmental
path.
China’s Normative Practice
While the EU’s normative impact on China are mostly statements on paper and are taking the
form of sanctions and disapproves, China’s normative power to the EU is realized by
progressive economic and financial projects. In the recent years China has been proactive in
establishing new international organizations and new schemes. In Asia China has been the advocator
of BRICS cooperation Mechanism，Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Free
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific（ FTAAP）as well as the Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (CICA). OBOR and AIIB, two of the biggest new projects by China,
involves Europe. Wang Zhengxu named the Chinese efforts to set up these new institutes and structures
as “Incremental Inter-Continentalism”(Wang, 2015). His point is China’s strategy is extending its
normative advantages as much as possible without overthrowing the existing international norms.
Another other China-lead project, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), has sixteen
European founding members out of fifty-seven in total, among which thirteen (the UK included) are
the EU member states until June 2016 (AIIB, 2016).
Wang Zhengxu has pointed out that, in terms of promoting development, China has two ways to achieve
its goals. The first is to create economic benefits through its domestic economy development. The
Chinese tourism and overseas students, for example, have contributed to the economy of countries
cooperating with China. The second way is to create new organisations and projects such as the One
Belt One Road project, the bank for BRICS countries alongside with the bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements with other countries (Wang, 2015).
Extending his thoughts, I argue that there are two kinds of norms. One group refers to specific norms
in the form of agreements, principles, or guides on ethics promoted by an entity by purposeful designs.
Another group of norms refers to actions which could, in the long term, generate norms. This include a
wide range of economic actions and cultural communications. The point I am making here is that norms
1
The underlines in the sample discourse are all added by the author of this thesis
are not only those which can be translated into guidance and rules. Effective norms spreading is related
to soft power and can therefore be realised unconsciously through the process of actions. The Chinese
normative approach is taking both forms. Currently the unconscious norms spread through economic,
cultural and educational exchanges with other countries takes a high proportion of the Chinese normmaking.
China’s Pragmatism Misunderstood
As a result of their distinct domestic situations and ideologies, while the EU’s normative practices on
China mostly takes the form of discursive influence and social projects, China’s normative power to
the EU is put in to actions by economic and financial projects such as the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
project, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) project. China’s pragmatic approach has been
focused more on efficiency and actions. However, the Chinese pragmatism has been misinterpreted and
comprehended incompletely by the EU as an economy-only approach regardless of means and moral
pursuits. This misconception is leading EU-China relations to an unhealthy track of development.
Another contradiction of China is that while the Chinese government claims that it cares about both
“righteousness” and “interests” and put “righteousness”, or ethics in the first place, what is does in
practice is pragmatic and economic-focused. In Xi Jinping’s speech in the UN Developmental Summit,
he emphasised that China will strike a balance between interests and righteousness and put moral
standards and justified purposes before interests .
Regarding the discussion about China’s pragmatism, while most scholars use this as one reason why
the EU should take an interests-based approach to China, I do not agree that the EU should take a pure
interests-oriented approach. The reason is that the Chinese pragmatism has been severely
misunderstood by the west in general in both academia and governments. The Chinese pragmatism
focuses on the efficiency and effectives of projects, on feasibility of plans and most important of all, on
actions instead of words. This is particularity true in the current Xi-Li administration where Xi Jinping’s
personal experience and approach manifest in China’s approaches and policies with the EU. “One
percent of Planning and Ninety percent of Action” is the slogan of the Chinese government. Pragmatism
in China, or more specifically the Xi style pragmatism is also anti-dogmatism. Xi does not favour
dogmatism which limit people’s actions to the so-called right or moral teachings. This is also why the
EU’s traditional normative approach has not been effective in China-EU relations. Most government
and academic interpretations focus on the economy-intensive aspect of the Chinese pragmatism but
overlooked the emphasize on actions and efficiency and the disfavour of dogmatism or western moral
preaching.
Controversies about China’s Normative Power
Although this article focuses more on being critical about the EU’s normative approach to China, it
does not imply that China’s normative approach to the EU is flawless. While the last section I argued
that the EU did not conform to what it has claim to achieve in EU-China relations, disjunctions between
discourse and practice also manifest on the Chinese side. On the one hand, China claims to abide by the
international norms. Meanwhile China is revising the international norms. In other words, China is
tailoring the international norms so that China’s interests are more protected. This would also raise the
question of how honesty has the Chinese discourse being about China abiding by the existing
international norms.
Another problem is that although China has the will the revise the international norms, its ability derived
from a heavily-populated developing country may impede its efforts. In 2011, for example, when IMF
was in need of candidates for the CEO, the BRICS countries could not agree on the nomination of an
Asia candidate although they do hope to break that tradition that the CEO of IMF has been always from
the Europe.
3. The EU’s Pragamtic Turn to China?
I am in line with Mattlin and Matthias in the sense that the EU should keep its normative approach with
China. However, I do not agree with his stances that the EU has lived up to its normative commitments
with China. In my opinion, the EU’s normative approach to China should be maintained but reformed.
The rationale to maintain it is that the normative nature is in the DNA of the EU. It defines the EU and
identifies it. Without its values and norms, the EU lost its advantages and identity. Furthermore, China
will lose the chance to reflect on and be critical about its weakness in areas such as human rights if it
lost the external pressure. However, currently the EU has not live up to its normative commitments to
China. The gap between the EU’s normative discourse and its normative practice in China is huge.
Being normative is part of the EU. Manners looks back at the establishment of the EU when he
introduced the Normative Power Europe. He points out that the reason why the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) was founded was that member states wanted to make war not only
unthinkable but also materially impossible. On top of that countries hope to share capitals, resource,
labour and market for common prosperity(Manners, 2009).
Plus, the EU’s approach to China has never been really only based on values. Behind the values are the
interest. Take the EU’s human right approach to China as an example:
Furthermore, the EU have misunderstood the “pragmatic” approach of China as an economy-only
approach. As far as I can see there has been a partial understanding from the EU of the pragmatic
approach advocated by the current Chinese administration.
In the previous section I have argued that China and the EU’s different priorities in their normative
approaches to each other reflect their different domestic priorities. The EU emphasizes more on social
power and promotion of the European social values besides the economic goals. China’s domestic
priority is economic growth while being conscious about not turning itself into a state with
Europeanized values. The values behind the policies have also forged the different emphases of the EU
and China’s normative projects. The EU member states share the common value of human rights and
liberalization of the economy. These beliefs have been the backbones of EU’s official discourse to
China since it issued its first policy paper to China in 1995. The Chinese value is a more Marxist
materialistic one featured by the belief that economic status is the foundation of normative influence.
Therefore, China’s normative discourse to the EU is lesser than the EU’s normative discourse to China
while China’s normative economic projects are more than those of the EU’s to China. These differences
in their priorities have led to the mismatched approaches between China and the EU which are why the
relationship between the two has been suffering from an awkwardness and persistent tensions despite
the high expectation that the two should get one well with the absence of territorial issues and direct
clashes in interest.
To this point it could be easy to misunderstood the aim of this article as blaming China or the EU for
their failure to understand each other’s needs. The point I want to re-emphasize is that differences and
mismatches have not been articulated in a clear and systematic manner and should be given more
attention to. However, I do not agree on the EU’s intention to change is normative approach to China
to an interest-based one. It is an unhealthy, short-vision approach based on incomplete understanding
of the Chinese approach to the EU.
The policy implications of this article lays its emphasis on mutual understanding without overcompromises. China’s practical approach is partly determined by the fact that it is still in the early stage
of modern society. However, if the EU completely gives up its post-modern values and norms in its
interactions with China, it has to force itself to accommodate to the values of an early modern society.
For the EU it is not only impossible but also not helpful. This is not to say, however, the EU should not
do better at understanding the priorities and goals of China at the moment. The primary argument of
this article is that the two should listen to each other. However, my second argument is that the EU’s
pragmatic turn in its China policies is based on the misunderstandings of the Chinese approach. The
Chinese approach seems being pragmatic at the cost of part of the post-modern values, but the value of
righteousness, brotherhood, morality are not deleted from the official promises and practice. Plus,
China’s human rights conditions, for example, have improved greatly partly due to the external pressure
from the EU. It is true that China and the EU have different connotations of what constitutes human
rights. It is just that difference and mismatch, or that shocking clash, which expands the notions of
human rights for both. It is against the principle of diversity of either side decide to completely
compromise and accommodate itself to the other. The whole point of calling for better mutual
understanding is for both sides to bear the other’s need at heart and tailor its own goals and approaches
to the needs of the other. It is not my purpose to promote the complete change of any sides.
Conclusion
This article takes the mutual normative impact between the EU and China as the context and discusses
in what ways do the EU’s normative approach to China the approach of China to the EU differ and how
the mismatches between their approaches impacts EU-China relations.
It argues that the EU’s current normative approach does not work because of two reasons. The first is
that the EU and the Chinese government have different goals in their normative interactions with each
other. While the EU aims at expanding the “universal” EU values, China aims at establishing Chineseled new international economic schemes. Second, the EU and the Chinese government has different
approaches in reaching their normative goals. The EU takes a plan first, implement later approach and
its normative discourse to China outweighs its normative practices or assistance in China. The EU
mostly takes a “negative” approach, or a punishing approach of which sanctions and disapproves are
the main methods. China however, takes a positive approach which focus one building new
international projects and the norms. China does not punish or disapprove on the EU as much as EU
does on China. This difference has also led to the fact that China has more effective normative practice
to the EU than those of the EU on China.
Based on the findings, the paper further suggests that the EU should maintain but reform its normative
approach to China. In response to the deficiencies in the EU’s current normative approach to China, the
EU should revise its normative approach so its matches the actual situation in China. In terms of human
rights, for example, instead of using it as a leverage to disapprove China’s MES, the EU should assist
China in combating poverty, improve China’s social welfare and cooperate with China more on social
issues such as migrant works and their children, medical condition in China and the environmental
problems in China. These will be more beneficial to the Chinese people at the current stage. Human
rights are also related to political dissidents and their political freedoms in China, and this is where the
Chinese government is prudent about and draw a red-line at. The EU should postpone the focus on these
aspects, especially those out of essentially the desire to change China’s political system to a much later
stage where the Chinese government and society is more open to these criticisms and suggestions. This
is also because some of these issues, such as Dalai Lama issues, are related to Chinese sovereignty
which is China’s core interests and which China will never compromise at. In a nutshell the EU should
keep but revise its normative approach to China. Instead of focusing on value exporting and the
punishments, the EU should focus more on the areas where the Chinese government can approve, or
areas outside the red-line including environmental issues and social welfare. The spill-over effects of
cooperation in non-red areas will ultimately help the EU to keep its normative commitments as well as
creating the best environment for China to reform from within on its politics and ideologies.
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