Electocracy with Accountabilities?
England and Wales’ Novel Public Governance
Model of Police and Crime Commissioners
Professor John W Raine
14th May 2015
Just a week in politics….

The possible election of a Labour
Government and the abolition of Police and
Crime Commissioners! (though no indication
of how a Labour Government would approach
police governance and accountability instead)
 But now a degree more stability for the PCC
model and the prospect of a second round of
PCC elections in May 2017.
A mostly troubled start…

Voter ignorance, confusion and apathy
 Allegations of cronyism
 Criticisms of excessive spending
 The TV Revelations from Kent’s PCC
 Fall-outs with chief constables
 The ‘Rotherham problem’
How much are the police and crime commissioners
costing you?
• BBC research how many staff the new PCCs are employing
and how much they are being paid.
• No central register of the information - but found that 41
PCCs have employed at least 449 staff since taking office.
• Wide variations in salaries and the size of each PCC team
in the 41 police areas outside of London.
• The Home Office said it expected the directly elected
commissioners to cut costs - but it's not clear yet whether
PCCs are costing more or less than the system they
replaced.
Channel 4 programme:
‘Meet the Police
Commissioner’
Kent PCC, Ann Barnes
…who struggled to explain
what her role involved
Police and crime commissioner Ann Barnes has
apologised for appearing in a controversial fly-onthe-wall TV documentary.
But she defiantly insisted she would carry on in the
£85,000-a-year job despite accusations from officers
in Kent that the Channel 4 programme made their
force a "laughing stock".
Lincolnshire's PCC spent £160,000 by
'unnecessarily' suspending the chief
constable, a report found.
Temporary police chief Neil Rhodes was suspended by the
force's PCC, Alan Hardwick, in February 2013 over an
employment dispute.
A judicial review found in Mr Rhodes' favour and he has since
been given the job permanently.
South Yorkshire Police
and Crime Commissioner
FINALLY resigns over
Rotherham sex abuse
scandal 'for sake of
victims'
A police and crime commissioner made a "serious error of
judgement" by revealing the name of a whistleblower, an
investigation has found.
In May, Avon and Somerset's Chief Constable Nick Gargan was suspended
over allegations he made inappropriate advances to female staff.
The Police and Crime Panel found Sue Mountstevens breached her own
code of conduct by telling Mr Gargan who had made the allegations. Last
week, Ms Mountstevens apologised.
A police and crime
commissioner (PCC)
MPs 'cast Gwent police threatened to "humiliate" a
chief constable if she did
commissioner Ian
not quit, MPs have been
Johnston as villain'
told.
Carmel Napier, the former
chief constable of Gwent
police, stepped down in
June after PCC Ian
Johnston ordered her to
retire.
But what about the basic
concept, and experience
so far, of the PCC model
of police governance?
Electocracy with Accountabilities?
Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of
Constabulary
Assoc of
Chief Police
Officers
The Home
Secretary
The tripartite
relationship
Chief
Constable
The Police
Authority
The Public
Local Councils
The Pre-2012 Police Governance and
Accountability Framework
The Home
Secretary
Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of
Constabulary
Assoc of
Chief Police
Officers
The Strategic
Policing Requirement
Chief
Constable
Police & Crime
Commissioner
The Public
Police &
Crime Panel
Local Political
Parties/Councils
The PCC Police Governance and
Accountability Framework
PCC Relationships and Accountabilities
The Voters and the Local Public
The Police &
Crime Panel
Sponsoring
Political Party
The Police and Crime
Commissioner
Local Authority
Community
Safety
Partnerships
The Chief
Constable &
Police Force
The Local
Criminal
Justice
Agencies
Other Providers
of Community
Safety/Crim
Justice Services
Central Govt (Home Office)
(plus Ministry of Justice/Dept for Communities & Local Govt)
Five Potential Accountabilities
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Accountability of the PCC to the Voters and Public
Accountability of the PCC to the Police and Crime Panel
Accountability of the PCC to Central Government
Accountability of the PCC to Political Sponsors
Accountability of the Chief Constable to the PCC
The Underlying Conceptual Framework of
Principal-Agent Theory

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Problems of ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘multiple
principals’
PCC as Agent of the voters/people
PCC in a (weak) Agent role with the Police and
Crime Panel
PCC in a (limited) Agent role with the Home
Secretary
Some PCCs in a (limited) Agent role with their
political sponsors
PCC as Principal to the chief constable and police
force
The Research…

Interviews with 9 PCCs
– conducted between June and October
2013
 Three
Conservative; three Labour; and 3
Independents
 One of each in (respectively) the north, the
midlands and the south of England & Wales
 A cross-section of mainly rural, mixed
urban/rural, and mainly metropolitan police
force areas
The Nine
selected PCCs
1. Accountability to Voters & wider Public

Significant out-and-about in communities and with
local groups
– “PCCs are set to become some of the most recognised
public leaders in the country – more so than most local
councillors and many members of parliament.”
– “The police themselves have been amazed at what this
is all producing by way of complaints from public.”
– “Being out and about and listening is how you learn
about how the force is working.”
– I have listened to your experiences, concerns, and
suggestions; So in a very real sense, this is your Police and
Crime Plan. You are my co-authors because you know your
communities better than anyone else”.
– “In determining my priorities I have listened to the
views that the public have expressed through
engagement events and feedback questionnaires.
– “This plan sets out our priorities for 2013-2017 which
are based on the issues you have raised. You have
told me that your concerns are anti-social behaviour,
burglary and domestic and sexual violence. I will
ensure that wherever you live – rural, suburban, town
or city – your police will work with you to deliver these
priorities.”
– “Listening is what this job is all about – people say
things to you in the street that they wouldn’t say to you
in a booked appointment or if they were come into the
building”.
2. Accountability to the
Police and Crime Panel



Several of the PCPs shifted their position from initial
scepticism and negativity to being generally
supportive - once they had heard the Commissioner’s
explanations and had understood the thinking behind
the choices and decisions.
The challenge for former police authority members in
coming to terms with their role as ‘scrutineers’ of the
Commissioner’s decisions.
The challenge for panels of part-time councillors
(from across the area) in scrutinising the decisions of
a full-time PCC

Most PCCs were fairly sceptical about the
quality of scrutiny offered by their panels;
– “a bit tokenistic”,
– “without real teeth” and “not very dynamic”,
– “a wholly inadequate way of holding you to
account”.
 But do the Panels select the right councillors
for the role?
3. Accountability to Central
Government


Contrary to expectations, PCCs commented
positively on the constructive balance they felt the
Home Office had struck between providing support, if
and when requested (including good access to the
Home Secretary in person), and allowing each to go
about their role in their own way
While recognising their obligations in support of the
national ‘strategic policing requirement’, none saw
this as presenting contentious pressures for them, or
creating particular conflicts with their own
commitments and priorities.
4. Accountability to
Political Sponsors

Of 41 elected PCCs, 29 were sponsored by a
political party (16 by the Conservative party
and 13 by the Labour party), while the other
12 (nearly one in 3) are ‘independents’.
 “a clear message from the [election]
campaign was that the public don’t want
politics in policing – so the rosettes are off”.

But some perceptible differences in polity:
– Three Conservative PCCs emphasised a strong
managerialist agenda (improving VfM in policing,
in ‘getting upstream’ and preventing crime; and in
more integration between services)
– One was very critical of the police in relation to
strategic management.


“ They talk endlessly about strategy but are not good at
it. Most of their work is about meeting deadlines in
minutes and hours, and they struggle to lift their sights
towards the longer term”,
“I hadn’t prepared [myself] for the shambolic state of the
business side of policing - not policing itself – but the
systems and processes by which it is managed”.


Three Labour PCCs talked more about local issues –
and more about ‘problem-solving’
PCCs with experience in the judiciary also articulated
strong concerns for issues of fairness and equity.
– One former magistrate talked of concerns about the force’s
‘stop and search’ policies and practices and spoke of the
challenges in communicating with hard-to-reach groups and
minorities.
– Another with judicial experience had prioritised domestic and
sexual abuse and violence in the Police and Crime Plan.

Possibly some differences reflected the character of
the different areas and criminogenic factors. But also
individual backgrounds and experience of PCCs.
5. Holding the Chief Constable
to Account

The PCC as Principal!

Keen awareness of the significance of the less-thanclearly-defined ‘boundary line’ between their own
more strategic area of responsibility and that for
operational policing of their chief constable
In most cases, the boundary line had been (gently)
‘tested’ on more than one occasion!





working relationships mostly described as ‘good’, but
emphasising the importance of the ‘keeping of
distance’ and ‘retaining a certain formality’.
Two had made their own appointments; and two had
known their chief constables very well from previous
roles.
All held regular formal meetings with their chief
constables for the purpose of ‘holding to account’
(and with official minutes taken of such meetings);
mostly on a weekly or fortnightly basis, plus near
daily additional contact.
Mostly PCCs have chosen to site their offices within
Police Headquarters - for pragmatic and cost
reasons.
Conclusions





The dominant accountability is with the voters and
public (and with little indication of competing
accountabilities in practice)
The personal dimension is particularly important (in
meetings and in public settings) though public
knowledge of the PCC role and person remains low
It is still too early to reach firm conclusions about
either the impacts or balance of benefits of the PCC
model of police governance.
The story so far seems to be of police governance in
England and Wales becoming distinctly more visible,
more consultative and, by implication, more publicly
accountable too.
But is it the most appropriate model?
An alternative model…?

The Committee on Standards in Public Life
– I argued for a directly-elected PCC to chair a
Police Committee of nominated councillors from
each constituent local authority of the police area.
 Along the lines informally established by the
late Bob Jones in West Midlands.
 Retaining the advantages of strong, informed
and democratic leadership and account-holding
by the PCC, while also building and sustaining
strong local accountability and responsiveness
 Abandoning Police & Crime Panels to provide
scrutiny as well as support for the PCC
Thank you for Listening!