Institutional Investors: What Is Their Role
as Owners of Public Companies?
By Padma Venkat, CFA
Categories: Corporate Governance, Standards, Ethics & Regulations (SER)
There is a lot of buzz around the topic of institutional investor engagement in
Asia.
A recent blog post on shareholder engagement highlights global trends in board–
shareowner engagement. The blog post also raises an important question: Is
engagement worth it from a corporate or investor point of view?
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently
released a corporate governance working paper on “Institutional Investors as
Owners: Who Are They and What Do They Do? ”The paper has been written
from a public policy perspective and considers the role of ownership engagement
in effective capital allocation and monitoring of corporate performance. I found
this paper fascinating and would like to summarize the contents for the benefit of
readers.
Defining the role of institutional shareholders depends on whether the
shareholders contribute capital, information, and monitoring, or whether they only
contribute capital.
Institutional investors are a complex, heterogeneous group. The common
characteristic is that institutional investors are not physical persons; instead they
are legal entities.
Statistics noted in the OECD working paper show that the percentage of public
equity held by physical persons has declined over the years. In the mid-1960s,
physical persons held as much as 84% of all publicly listed stocks in the United
States. Today they hold less than 40%. In the UK, the percentage has reduced
from 54% to 11% in the last 50 years, and in Japan, only 18% of all public equity
was held by physical persons in 2011.
Diversity and Complexity of Institutional Investors
Character, quality, and degree of institutional investor engagement across the
globe vary widely because of the different categories of institutional investors and
their business models. The OECD report authors have analyzed the complex
landscape of institutional investors by bifurcating them as traditional (i.e., pension
funds, investment funds including mutual funds, and insurance companies) and
alternative (i.e., sovereign wealth funds, private equity, hedge funds, and
exchange-traded funds).
Asset managers have been added as a separate class due to the rapid growth of
outsourcing to asset managers, as reflected in the UK Stewardship Code. The
report defines asset managers (as opposed to asset owners) as having the dayto-day responsibility of managing investments; they are not expected to invest in
their own name but directly in their clients’ name and based on their clients’
investment policy. The report’s authors recognize that other categories like
closed-end investment companies, proprietary trading desks of investment
banks, foundations, and endowments could be added but have been
conspicuously omitted due to lack of reliable data.
Growing Importance of Institutional Investors in the Investment Chain
The report says that the combined holdings of all institutions represented US
$84.8 trillion as of 2011. Out of this, 38% (US $32 trillion) was held in the form of
public equity. The traditional institutions held US $28 trillion in public equity, and
alternative institutions held US $4.6 trillion in public equity.
Globally, asset management firms were estimated to have had about US $63
trillion under management at the end of 2011, according to a 2012 joint research
report by Towers Watson and Pensions and Investments. The OECD report
authors recognize that institutional investors increasingly invest in instruments
offered by other institutional investors. Pension funds, for instance, invest in
private equity, and insurance companies invest in mutual funds. Some of the
asset managers are traditional or alternative institutional investors that manage
their assets through a special asset management arm.
Key Findings of the OECD Report
 Equity ownership in its own right is not a determinant of ownership
engagement.
 Investment chain is complex due to cross-investments among institutional
investors, increased complexity in equity market structure and trade
practices, and an increase in outsourcing of ownership and asset
management functions.
 Ownership engagement plays an important role for effective capital
allocation and the informed monitoring of corporate performance.
 Exercising shareholder rights (i.e., access to information, participation in key
decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, election of board of
directors, etc.) is always associated with certain costs and requires adequate
resources.

Shareholders need to be distinguished by whether they contribute risk capital
and monitor/provide information or whether they only contribute risk capital.
The latter shareholder will not be interested in engaging with the company.
A number of features and choices define the institutional investor’s business
model and its ability and willingness to serve as informed and engaged owners.
These features and choices are then used to establish taxonomy for identifying
different degrees of ownership engagement ranging from “no engagement” to
“inside engagement.”
Determinants of Ownership Engagement
Source: Çelik, S. and M. Isaksson (2013), “Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and
What Do They Do?” OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing.
Four Broad Categories of Ownership Engagement
1. No Engagement: This category comprises institutions that do not monitor
individual investee companies actively or do not actively engage in any
dialogue with the management of investee companies. One example would
be institutional investors that are subject to engagement limitations or an
outright prohibition to vote their shares.
2. Reactive Engagement: This relies on buying advice and voting services
from external providers, such as proxy advisers, or may include reactions to
engagement based on other active shareholders. One example would
include mutual funds that are subject to legal requirements to vote their
shares with the help of proxy advisers.
3. Alpha Engagement: This engagement level is associated with ownership
engagement that seeks to support short- or long-term returns above market
benchmarks. Both active hedge funds and private equity funds can be
examples of alpha engagement.
4. Inside Engagement: This encompasses fundamental corporate analysis,
direct voting of shares, and often assuming board responsibilities. One
example would be a closed-end investment company like Berkshire
Hathaway, which is the largest shareholder in Coca-Cola and is represented
on the board of Coca-Cola by one of its directors.
The following conclusions were reached as a result of the working paper:
1. In order to understand the level of ownership engagement, we need to
identify a whole range of different determinants.
2. Legal or regulatory requirements for voting may have little effect on
ownership engagement if other and more dominant determinants for
ownership engagement remain unchanged.
3. Institutions with the highest degree of engagement typically have no
regulatory obligation with respect to the degree of their ownership
engagement.
4.
Do you agree? We’re interested in hearing your views.