The Tragedy of the Commons
Olaf Weber
1
The Fishing Game
•  What happened?
–  how did you make decisions?
–  what strategy/ies did you follow?
–  were you ‘successful’ (how defined?)?
2
Background: The tragedy of
the commons
•  What happens to the common good if
everybody acts in favour of his or her own
benefit?
–  The common good will be depleted
–  There is no formal solution for the problem
without regulations
Tragedy of the Commons
•  Multiple individuals, acting independently
and rationally consulting their own selfinterest, will ultimately deplete a shared
limited resource even when it is clear that
it is not in anyone's long-term interest for
this to happen.
•  It is not a problem of willingness or
understanding, but an unavoidable
consequence.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons.
Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
4
Graphical Explanation
Harvest(E)
Sustainable state
Individual rationality
Natural system
Benefit - cost
Effort
How to close this gap?
Background
•  Scientific research by Hardin, Ostrom and
others
•  CC-PP game (Commonalize Costs –
Privatize Profits
The CC-PP Game
Private
ownership
Common
ownership
Bad outcome
Tragedy of the
anticommons
Tragedy of the
commons
Good outcome
Successful
capitalism
Comedy of the
commons
•  Do you know examples for the four fields?
Fish landing over the years:
Why is there a difference?
Lobster: red
Ground fish: blue
How to solve the problem?
•  Work in groups for 20 minutes
Solutions
•  Promising strategies for addressing these
problems include
–  dialogue among interested parties, officials,
and scientists
–  complex, redundant, and layered institutions
–  a mix of institutional types
–  designs that facilitate experimentation,
learning, and change
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The
struggle to govern the commons. SCIENCE, 302
(5652), 1907-1912.
Overcoming the ‘tragedy’?
•  The role of an authority
–  CO2 regulation on car fleet
•  The role of property rights
–  Private ownership provides incentives to manage resources
wisely and creates better likelihood of prosperity.
–  CO2 emissions trading
•  The role of community
–  Stakeholders, NGOs
•  The role of incentives
–  Incentives influence how people choose to use resources
The Economic Approach:
Property Rights
•  Property rights
–  Formal and informal rules regarding the use,
ownership, and transfer of property
Types of Property Rights
•  Open access:
–  Absence of enforced property rights
•  Group property
–  Resource rights held by a group of users who can
exclude others
•  Individual property
–  Resource rights held by individuals (or firms) who can
exclude others
•  Government property
–  Resource rights held by a government that can
regulate or subsidize use
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., &
Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the commons: local
lessons, global challenges. Science, 284(5412),
278-282.
Requirements of Effective
Regulation
•  Providing information
•  Dealing with conflicts: participatory
processes
•  Inducing rule compliance
•  Providing Infrastructure
•  Being prepared for change
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003).
The struggle to govern the commons.
SCIENCE, 302(5652), 1907-1912.
Principles for Robust
Governance of the Commons
Discussion
•  How to manage the commons?
17