THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
iFirst, 1 – 9
Short article
Intention and attention in ideomotor learning
Arvid Herwig
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
Florian Waszak
Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, UMR 8158, CNRS and Université Paris Descartes, Paris, France
Human actions may be carried out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus based) or they may be
selected endogenously on the basis of the agent’s intentions (intention based). We studied the
functional differences between these two types of action during action– effect (ideomotor) learning.
Participants underwent an acquisition phase, in which each key-press (left/right) triggered a specific
tone (low pitch/high pitch) either in a stimulus-based or in an intention-based action mode.
Consistent with previous findings, we demonstrate that auditory action effects gain the ability to
prime their associated responses in a later test phase only if the actions were selected endogenously
during acquisition phase. Furthermore, we show that this difference in ideomotor learning is not
due to different attentional demands for stimulus-based and intention-based actions. Our
results suggest that ideomotor learning depends on whether or not the action is selected in the
intention-based action mode, whereas the amount of attention devoted to the action – effect is
less important.
Keywords: Action-control; Sensorimotor integration; Ideomotor-learning.
The host of actions that humans perform every day
can be described and analysed in two principal
ways. On the one hand, actions are carried out to
manipulate the environment on the basis of the
agent’s intentions or goals (e.g., taking the car to
visit a friend). On the other hand, actions are
carried out in response to external stimuli to
accommodate to environmental demands (e.g.,
stopping the car at a red traffic light). We refer
to these different types of action as intention
based and stimulus based, respectively.
In the past decades research focused on the
differences of intention- and stimulus-based
actions regarding the underlying neural mechanisms. These efforts resulted in a large body of evidence suggesting that one and the same overt
action can be controlled by different (but partially
overlapping) neural substrates, with the medial
Correspondence should be addressed to Arvid Herwig, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive
and Brain Sciences, Stephanstraße 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]
The research reported here was conducted in partial fulfilment of a PhD thesis by Arvid Herwig. We thank André Spitaler for
collecting the data and Joachim Hoffmann and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous version of this article.
# 2008 The Experimental Psychology Society
http://www.psypress.com/qjep
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DOI:10.1080/17470210802373290
HERWIG AND WASZAK
wall of the premotor cortex being primarily
involved when the action is intention based and
parietal and lateral premotor areas being involved
when the action is stimulus based (e.g.,
Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser,
2002; Goldberg, 1985; Mueller, Brass, Waszak,
& Prinz, 2007; Waszak et al., 2005). Although
intention-based actions are at the core of
humans’ efficiency to interact with the environment, the majority of studies in the field of psychology investigated stimulus-based actions. One
reason for this imbalance might be the difficulty
to investigate intentions experimentally.
Nevertheless, one approach to investigate
intention-based actions by means of experimental
psychology can be derived from ideomotor
theory (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890/1950;
Prinz, 1997). Ideomotor approaches claim that
actions are selected with respect to their perceptual
consequences. It is assumed that this ability is
acquired in two steps (e.g., Elsner & Hommel,
2001). People first compile associations between
movements and their ensuing sensory effects
(“action – effect bindings”). These associations are
bidirectional and can be used in a second step in
the reverse direction to voluntarily select an
action by anticipating its effect. The validity of
the ideomotor principle was supported in several
studies (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel,
Alonso, & Fuentes, 2003; Waszak & Herwig,
2007). For example, Elsner and Hommel made
participants first undergo an acquisition phase, in
which a self-selected key-press always produced a
particular tone (e.g., left key-press ! high-pitch
tone; right key-press ! low-pitch tone). In a
second phase, the same tones were used as imperative stimuli for a speeded-choice response. If the
key-press was performed in response to the tone
that the action had previously produced (e.g.,
low-pitch tone ! right key-press), the response
times were faster than they were to a tone that
had been previously produced by the alternative
action (e.g., high-pitch tone ! right key-press).
This result indicates that the perception of a
learned sensory effect activates the action it is
associated with, which can be interpreted as evidence for action –effect (or ideomotor) learning.
2
However, recently Herwig, Prinz, and Waszak
(2007) have shown that ideomotor learning highly
depends on the mode of movement the actions are
performed in. In their experiment, ideomotor
learning as demonstrated by Elsner and Hommel
(2001) occurred only if participants freely selected
between left and right key-presses (intentionbased acquisition). In contrast, if the actions that
participants performed were triggered by external
stimulus events (stimulus-based acquisition) no
action – effect learning took place whatsoever. To
explain this result Herwig et al. suggested that
actions are governed with respect to their anticipated sensory consequences only if the agent acts
in the intention-based action mode. When
acting in the stimulus-based mode, by contrast,
participants pass on control to the stimulus (prepared reflex, Hommel, 2000)—that is, actions
are selected with respect to their antecedents.
This difference in action control in turn results
in different types of learning: The activity of the
system guiding intention-based actions results in
action – effect or ideomotor learning, whereas the
activity of the system controlling stimulus-based
actions results in stimulus – response or sensorimotor learning.
However, note that manipulating the action
mode by making participants freely choose
between two actions versus responding to target
stimuli with one of two actions might entail differences in allocation of attention to the external
events involved in the two conditions. In the
stimulus-based action mode each action is sandwiched between the imperative stimulus and the
effect tone, whereas in the intention-based action
mode only the effect tone, but not the preceding
stimulus, was presented. As a consequence, participants’ attention in the stimulus-based action
mode might be divided between three
elements—namely, the imperative stimulus, the
response, and the effect tone (S –R –E). In contrast, in the intention-based action mode, participants might attend only two elements (R – E).
Assuming that attention is a limited resource and
that the strength of each acquired association
depends on the attention directed to each
element in a given learning situation (Rescorla
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INTENTION AND ATTENTION IN IDEOMOTOR LEARNING
& Wagner, 1972), the R– E associations in the
stimulus-based action mode might be weaker
than those in the intention-based action mode. If
so, then ideomotor learning as demonstrated by
Elsner and Hommel (2001) might not depend
on the action mode per se, as suggested by
Herwig et al. (2007), but merely on the amount
of attention devoted to the processing of the
effects.
This question is pivotal in research on action
control. The intention hypothesis put forward by
Herwig et al. (2007) is based on the notion that
differences in ideomotor learning reflect the fundamentally different, complementary way in
which “the two routes” to action work. The attention hypothesis, by contrast, assumes that they are
simply due to the two systems drawing differently
on attentional mechanisms.
We tested whether ideomotor learning depends
on intention or attention in two complementary
ways. In Experiment 1, we made the attentional
requirements of intention-based actions more
similar to the requirements of stimulus-based
actions by introducing a stimulus that the participants have to discriminate before making the freechoice action (just as they have to do in the stimulus-based condition). This manipulation was
meant to divide participants’ attention in an intention-based action mode between three elements—
namely, the preceding stimulus, the response, and
the effect (S– R– E). In Experiment 2, in contrast,
we stressed the action –effect (R – E) relation of
stimulus-based actions by directing participants’
attention towards the effect tone. We did so by
presenting catch trials in which the action triggered the wrong effect and which the participants
had to detect. Experiment 3 finally controlled
whether stressing the R– E relation by presenting
catch trials leads to ideomotor learning with intention-based actions. If ideomotor learning primarily
depends on the attentional resources that are
available for the processing of the effect, then
transfer effects as demonstrated by Elsner and
Hommel (2001) should be observed only in
Experiments 2 and 3. If, by contrast, ideomotor
learning primarily depends on the mode in which
actions are performed during acquisition phase,
then one would expect to find transfer effects
only in Experiments 1 and 3.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
A total of 40 participants (mean age: 24.2 years)
took part. The experiment was divided into an
acquisition phase and a test phase (see Figure 1
for an overview). Throughout the experiment, a
small white cross (þ) presented on a black background in the centre of the screen served as fixation point. The viewing distance was about
70 cm. A trial in the acquisition phase started
with the presentation of a small green or red asterisk (mean extension: 0.38 0.38), which was displayed about 0.88 below the fixation point.
Depending on the colour of the asterisk, participants were instructed either to produce one of
two key-presses with their left or right index
finger depending on their own choice (go trials),
or to omit their response (no-go trials). Each
key-press in a go trial directly triggered a particular
auditory effect tone (high/low). Participants were
not informed about the action – effect mapping but
were told that tones were presented as a feedback
that their responses were recorded by the computer. The action – effect mapping was balanced
across participants. Auditory stimuli were 200ms-lasting MIDI tones (instrument oboe) of
392 Hz (low pitch) and 784 Hz (high pitch), presented through the speakers of a headphone.
Anticipations, response omissions (go trials), and
false alarms (no-go trials) were recorded and fed
back by a visual warning message. The next trial
started 1,500 ms after the response (go trials) or
the no-go stimulus. The acquisition phase comprised 200 go trials and 100 no-go trials.
After completing the acquisition phase, participants received a computerized on-screen instruction of the required stimulus– response (S –R)
mapping for the test phase. In each test trial, one
of the two effect tones was presented as a target
stimulus. There were two subgroups of participants: In the acquisition-compatible subgroup,
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HERWIG AND WASZAK
Figure 1. Design of Experiments 1–3. Catch trials of Experiment 2 and 3 were presented in 10% of acquisition trials and differed with
respect to the effects (E1 0 and E2 0 ) triggered by the response. S ¼ stimulus, R ¼ response, E ¼ effect.
participants had to respond with the key that preceded the tone in the acquisition phase. In the
acquisition-incompatible subgroup, participants
were to respond with the key that preceded the
other tone in the acquisition phase. The next
trial started 1,000 ms after the response.
Participants worked through 200 test trials.
Results and discussion
The significance criterion was set to p , .05 for all
analyses. Violations of sphericity were corrected
using the Huynh –Feldt 1, and partial h2 is
reported as a measure of the size of an effect.
4
Acquisition phase
Participants executed freely selected actions about
386 ms after the onset of the go stimulus. The distribution of left-hand versus right-hand keypresses was nearly equal (49.2 vs. 50.8%). The
response was correctly omitted in 97.9% of the
no-go trials. There was no significant a priori
difference between the acquisition-compatible
and acquisition-incompatible subgroups.
Test phase
Mean reaction times (RTs) and percentages of error
were analysed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with the between-subjects factor group (acquisition
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INTENTION AND ATTENTION IN IDEOMOTOR LEARNING
compatible vs. acquisition incompatible) and the
within-subjects factor block (40 trials each). As
shown in Figure 2 (left panel), the acquisitioncompatible group responded more quickly than
the acquisition-incompatible group. The effect of
group was the only significant effect, F(1, 38) ¼
4.55, MSE ¼ 7,612.42, p , .05, h2 ¼ .11, whereas
neither the block-factor, F(4, 152) ¼ 1.12,
MSE ¼ 749.82, 1 ¼ .84, h2 ¼ .03, nor the interaction, F , 1, h2 ¼ .02, was significant. Response
errors were rare (2.9% vs. 2.6% in the acquisitioncompatible and the acquisition-incompatible
group, respectively), and the ANOVA of error
rates did not produce any effects.
Before we interpret this data pattern, however,
it is important to show that the implementation of
an additional stimulus preceding the action actually captures attentional resources during acquisition. First, it has to be noticed that participants
performed the go/no-go task very accurately
with only 2.1% responses on no-go trials and
only 0.4% response omissions on go trials.
Second, in contrast to the RTs of the intentionbased acquisition groups of Elsner and Hommel
(2001) and Herwig et al. (2007), which were
about 220– 275 ms, response execution times in
the present study (386 ms) are comparable to the
stimulus-based acquisition groups investigated by
Herwig et al. (2007). The data, thus, clearly
show that participants actually attended to the
go/no-go stimulus and that this manipulation
matched the attentional requirements of intention-based actions to those of stimulus-based
actions. Importantly, despite this successful
manipulation of attention, ideomotor learning
took place during the (intention-based) acquisition phase of Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to make the attentional requirements of stimulus-based actions
more similar to the requirements of intentionbased actions by guiding participants’ attention
towards the effect tones.
Method
A total of 40 participants (mean age: 24.8 years)
took part. The experiment was divided into an
acquisition phase and a test phase (see Figure 1
for an overview). The acquisition phase of
Experiment 2 was comparable to that of
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions:
depending on the colour of the asterisk (red or
green), participants were now instructed to
respond with either a left or a right key-press
(stimulus-based acquisition phase). Each keypress directly triggered a particular auditory
effect tone of 392 Hz (low pitch) or 784 Hz
(high pitch). In 10% of acquisition trials, the
Figure 2. Mean reaction times in the test phase of Experiment 1 (left panel), Experiment 2 (middle panel), and Experiment 3 (left panel) as
a function of 40-trial blocks and group. Error bars show standard errors.
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HERWIG AND WASZAK
effect tone was a semitone below (low pitch:
370 Hz) or above (high pitch: 830 Hz) the standard effect tone. Participants were instructed to
respond to these catch trials with a repetition of
the previously performed key-press. Data of one
participant who did not respond to the catch
trials at all were excluded from the analyses. The
acquisition phase comprised 234 standard acquisition trials and 26 catch trials.
Stimuli and procedures during test phase were
identical to those in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Acquisition phase
Participants responded to the onset of the asterisk
with a mean RT of 423 ms. The hit rate for catch
trials was 85.5%, whereas false alarms in standard
acquisition trials occurred in 2.7% on average.
Importantly, there was no significant a priori
difference between the acquisition-compatible
and acquisition-incompatible subgroup.
Test phase
Mean RTs and percentages of error were analysed
as in Experiment 1. As shown in Figure 2
(middle panel), the acquisition-compatible group
responded as fast as the acquisition-incompatible
group. The ANOVA of RTs yielded that neither
the block factor, F(4, 148) ¼ 2.15, MSE ¼
1,304.93, 1 ¼ .74, h2 ¼ .06, nor the group factor
and the interaction (both Fs , 1, h2 ¼ .002 and
.02, respectively) was significant. Response errors
were rare (2.9% vs. 3.8% in the acquisition-compatible and the acquisition-incompatible group,
respectively), and the ANOVA of error rates did
not produce any effects.
Experiment 2 again confirms that there is no
ideomotor learning if participants performed a
stimulus-based acquisition phase (Herwig et al.,
2007). What is more, Figure 2 indicates that even
at the very beginning of the test phase—that is,
immediately after the acquisition phase—no
transfer effects are present. This rules out that a
weak memory trace simply goes undetected due
to fast decay. A post hoc power analyses revealed
that large effects ( f ¼ .40, which corresponds to
h2 ¼ .14) as defined by Cohen (1988) could be
detected for the group factor with a probability of
1 – b ¼ .88, given the sample size (N ¼ 39), an a
value of .05, and an average population correlation
between the levels of the repeated measures factor
of .50. We specified the population effect size as
“large” due to the sample effect sizes obtained in
experiments investigating intention-based acquisitions in the present study (Experiments 1 and 3,
both fs ¼ .35) and previous studies (Elsner &
Hommel, 2001; Herwig et al., 2007; d ¼ 0.78 to
1.42; note, d ¼ 0.80 defined by Cohen as large
effect). Moreover, the sample size of 216 participants in stimulus-based conditions Herwig and
colleagues meta-analysed was sufficient to detect
even “medium” effect sizes ( f ¼ .25) with a high
power of .96. All power analyses were conducted
using G Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007).
Most importantly, there is no ideomotor learning even though in Experiment 2 the processing
of the effect tones was necessary to correctly
report catch trials, suggesting that in the stimulus-based action mode ideomotor learning cannot
be boosted simply by making the agent allocate
attention to the action–effects. To make sure,
that the missing compatibility effect is in fact due
to the stimulus-based nature of the task and not
to some unmeant processes based on the implementation of the detection task,1 we reran Experiment 2
with an intention-based acquisition phase.
1
Although the task of detecting catch tones among ordinary effects was implemented to guide participants attention toward the effects
and, thus, to promote ideomotor learning, it might have worked against ideomotor learning for two unmeant reasons. First, it might be
that participants coded the effects merely with regard to their categorical membership (standard tone vs. catch tone) with the consequence
that the two standard effect tones were no longer distinguished, and, thus, distinct action–effect relations could not be established. Second,
it is also possible that participants learned to suppress the additional key-press necessary to indicate a catch tone on the appearance of the
standard effect tones, so that the standard effect tone might have served as a no-go signal, and, thus, no compatibility effects were observed
in the test phase. We are grateful to Joachim Hoffmann and an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
6
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INTENTION AND ATTENTION IN IDEOMOTOR LEARNING
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
A total of 40 participants (mean age: 24.3 years)
took part. Experiment 3 was a replication of
Experiment 2 with the only exception that
actions in the acquisition phase were freely
selected on appearance of a white asterisk (i.e.,
intention-based acquisition).
Results and discussion
Acquisition phase
Participants executed freely selected actions
329 ms after the onset of the asterisk. Catch
trials were correctly detected in 83.6%, whereas
false alarms in standard acquisition trials occurred
in 2.8% on average. Importantly, there was no significant a priori difference between the acquisition-compatible and acquisition-incompatible
subgroups.
Test phase
The ANOVA of RTs yielded a main effect
of group, F(1, 38) ¼ 4.46, MSE ¼ 14,889.60,
p , .05, h2 ¼ .11, indicating faster responses in
the acquisition-compatible than in the acquisition-incompatible group (309 vs. 345 ms,
respectively). This main effect was further modulated by a significant interaction with block, F(4,
152) ¼ 2.65, MSE ¼ 1,132.71, 1 ¼ .82, p , .05,
h2 ¼ .07. As depicted in Figure 2 (right panel),
and as was revealed by t tests, there was a compatibility effect in the first, third, and fourth blocks,
t(38) ¼ 2.66, p , .05; t(38) ¼ 2.22, p , .05;
t(38) ¼ 2.04, p , .05, but not in the second and
fifth blocks, t(38) ¼ 1.34, p ¼ .19; t(38) ¼ 1.12,
p ¼ .27. The main effect of block missed the significance criterion, F(4, 152) ¼ 2.36, MSE ¼ 1,132.71,
1 ¼ .82, p ¼ .07, h2 ¼ .06. Response errors were
rare (2.5% vs. 3.1% in the acquisition-compatible
and the acquisition-incompatible group, respectively), and the ANOVA of error rates produced
only a main effect of block, F(4, 152) ¼ 5.64,
MSE ¼ 1,159.75, p , .001, h2 ¼ .13, indicating a
decrease of error rate with progressing test phase.
Experiment 3 clearly shows that ideomotor
learning occurs, if the actions during acquisition
are performed in an intention-based way. Thus,
modifying the design by implementing a detection
task to guide participants’ attention toward the
effects did not impair ideomotor learning.
CONCLUSIONS
The main goal of this study was to see whether
ideomotor learning depends on the action mode
(i.e., intention based vs. stimulus based) or on
the attentional resources available for the processing of the effect stimulus. Experiments 1 and 3
showed that auditory action effects gain the
ability to prime their associated responses in a
later test phase, when the actions performed in
the acquisition phase are internally selected. By
contrast, Experiment 2 showed that ideomotor
learning does not take place when the actions performed in the acquisition phase are exogenously
driven. These findings perfectly replicate the selective impact of the action mode on ideomotor
learning demonstrated by Herwig et al. (2007).
More importantly, guiding participants’ attention
away (Experiment 1) or towards (Experiments 2
and 3) the effect tone, did not influence the
pattern of results. Hence, ideomotor learning is
boosted whenever the action is selected endogenously, whereas it is hampered whenever the
action is selected with respect to some external
demand, regardless of the amount of attention
devoted to the action –effect.
Evidently, the detection of transfer effects from
an acquisition phase to a test phase depends chiefly
on two factors: the strength of the associations
formed during acquisition and the sensitivity of
the test. The present results show that the strength
of the association between actions and their
ensuing effects is tremendously affected by the participant’s intention, to the point that—given the
particular test sensitivity of Experiments 1 to 3—
a stimulus-based acquisition phase did not result
in any observable transfer effect whatsoever.
However, ideomotor learning has already been
demonstrated for actions that are selected
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HERWIG AND WASZAK
exogenously (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2004;
Hoffmann, Sebald, & Stoecker, 2001; Kunde,
Hoffmann, & Zellmann, 2002; Ziessler &
Nattkemper, 2002). As discussed in detail by
Herwig and colleagues (2007) there are two reasons
that might account for the divergent results. The
first concerns differences in test phase sensitivity
between the studies. Research on priming recently
demonstrated that the sensitivity to detect priming
effects can be enhanced by protracting the operation
time of the probe event (Waszak & Hommel, 2007).
A number of studies reporting ideomotor learning
with stimulus-based actions might have been very
sensitive to transfer effects due to their rather slow
overall RTs in the test phases (e.g., Elsner &
Hommel, 2004; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2002).
The second reason concerns a factor other than intention that might influence the strength of the associations compiled in the acquisition phase: The
stimulus-based actions used in the present study
were relatively easy or reflex-like compared to all of
the studies mentioned above. Using more complex
(i.e., less reflex-like) S–R mappings might reduce
the degree to which participants pass on control to
the stimulus so that the action’s consequences
might become more important in action control.
It is thus possible that the difference in results
between the intention- and the stimulus-based
acquisition phases is rather a question of degree.
However, the fact that ideomotor learning might
be influenced by several factors not addressed in
the present study notwithstanding, our experiments clearly show that differences in ideomotor
learning reported by Herwig et al. (2007) are due
to the action mode and not to the amount of attention devoted to the processing of the effects.
Original manuscript received 8 April 2008
Accepted revision received 12 June 2008
First published online day month year
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