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Is Abortion Wrong?
III
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Baruch Brody: “Thomson on Abortion”
Brody’s Project
• Brody argues that, given Thomson’s presumption that the
squidge has a full right to life, her argument that abortion may
be justified fails.
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Recall Thomson’s Argument:
• Abortion is not morally impermissible at least in (some?)
cases where the squidge threatens the mother’s life.
• Abortion is not morally impermissible at least in (some?)
cases where the pregnancy is the result of rape.
 Famous violinist thought experiment
 Henry Fonda thought experiment
• Abortion is not morally impermissible at least in (some?)
cases where the mother went to reasonable lengths to
prevent the pregnancy.
 People seeds thought experiment
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Brody Rephrases the “Extreme View” Argument
(See Slide #6 from last class.)
Suppose a woman has become pregnant, but learns she
has a heart condition such that she will die if she carries the
squidge to term.
1. From the moment of conception, a squidge is a human
being with the same rights to life as any other human being.
2. It is always wrong to take (directly) the life of an innocent
human being.
3. Therefore, it is always wrong to have an abortion.
 Thomson challenges (2), and argues that a woman has
the right to secure an abortion even if (1) is true.
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Arguments from Self-Defense
Brody argues that there are much easier ways to defeat
premise (2):
It is always wrong to take (directly) the life of an
innocent human being.
• Y is about to shoot X.
• X can only save his life by taking
Y’s life.
• We certainly want to say that X
has the right to take Y’s life,
“even if Y is a perfectly
innocent child.”
• So premise (2) is false.
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Arguments from Self-Defense
In a normal case of self-defense, three factors seem to be
involved:
a) The continued existence of Y poses a threat to the life of
X, a threat that can only be met by taking Y’s life.
b) Y is unjustly attempting to take X’s life.
c) Y is responsible for his attempt to take X’s life and is
therefore guilty of attempting to take X’s life.
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Arguments from Self-Defense
Indeed, it seems that all three factors must be involved if X is
justified in taking Y’s life in self-defense:
• Y’s guilt is what makes X’s life take precedence over Y’s.
• If (a) is not satisfied, then Y’s living is no threat to X, but if
(b) and (c) are not satisfied, then there is no relevant guilt
on Y’s part that makes X’s life take precedence over his.
But, it seems, if (a) and (b), but not (c), are satisfied, X has
the right to take Y’s life in self-defense.
• So what is the justification for taking a life in self-defense?
What conditions are required for an act of self-defense to
be justified?
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Arguments from Self-Defense
If Z threatens to kill X unless X kills Y, then Y’s continued
existence poses a threat to X’s life.
• Nevertheless, if X kills Y, we want to say that he did so
unjustly.
• So merely
satisfying condition
(a) is not
enough to
justify a killing.
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Arguments from Self-Defense
Since the squidge is not attempting to take the mother’s life:
• The squidge does not satisfy condition (b).
• The squidge does not satisfy condition (c).
• So it seems problematic that abortions can be
justified on grounds of self-defense.
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Lifeboat Argument
As Thomson points out, in abortion cases, we are dealing with
only two individuals (presumably each with an equal right to
life). Both are innocent, but one threatens the life of the other.
We feel that the one threatened can justly kill the other.
• Consider this scenario: X and Y are adrift in a lifeboat.
• Y has a disease that he will survive,
but which will kill X if he contracts
it.
• The only way X can avoid this
is by pushing Y overboard, thus
killing him.
• Surely X has no right to do this.
• So surely there must be some
other grounds to justify
abortion.
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Different Duties, Different Outcome
In the lifeboat case, both X and Y have an equal right to use
the lifeboat. But in an abortion case, the woman’s body is hers,
and not the squidge’s, and she has the primary right to use it.
• I have no duty to X to save X’s life by giving him the use of
my body, and X has no right (even to save his life) to my
body.
• The duty to save X’s life (if such a duty exists) is
presumably weaker than the duty not to take X’s life.
• So I might be relieved of my duty to save X’s life by the fact
that fulfilling it means abandoning my primaryvs.
right to my
body.
• But I am not relieved of my duty not to take X’s life by the
same fact.
• Like the self-defense cases, something more is required
here.
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Different Duties, Different Outcome
The woman’s primary rights to her body are not relevant to
abortion cases:
• In a case of abortion, one chooses between saving the
woman by taking the life of the squidge, and not taking the
life of the squidge, thereby saving the woman.
• As such, if it is true that from the moment of conception the
squidge is a human being and has the same right to life as
any other human being, then it is wrong to perform an
abortion even to save the life of the woman.
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Is it Ever Right to Secure an Abortion?
There is at least one case in which, even if it is true that the
squidge has a full right to life, the woman has the right to
secure an abortion:
It is permissible for Y to take X’s life in order to save his
own life if:
• X is going to die anyway in a relatively short
time; and
• Taking X’s life is the only way to save Y’s life;
and either
i. Taking Y’s life will not save X’s life; or
ii. There is a way to save X’s life, but it has been
determined by a fair random method that Y’s
life should be saved rather than X’s.
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Is it Ever Right to Secure an Abortion?
In such a case, there is everything to gain by Y’s taking X’s life
and nothing to lose:
• Both Y and X will die soon if nothing is done, so X loses
nothing by Y killing him; and
• Either X’s life cannot be saved, or Y won over X in
a fair random choice.
This is not a principle of self-defense – X is in no
way attempting to take Y’s life, and is doing no
action that leads to Y’s death.
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Is it Ever Right to Secure an Abortion?
An abortion would be justified if:
• Were the abortion not performed, both the woman and the
squidge would soon die; and
• We either cannot save the squidge, or have determined
by a fair random procedure that it is the woman
that should be saved.
This argument makes no appeal to any special fact
about the squidge, the woman, or their relationship.
It depends solely upon a general principle about
the taking of some human lives to save other.