Peacekeepers in Karabakh: Iran's Stance and Possible
Actions
By Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Lragir.am – 28/1/2017
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Iran’s current political leadership is conducting a persistent foreign policy with pragmatic goals.
Iran is trying to start a dialogue with Azerbaijan, proposing a certain hierarchy of political services
which includes a persistently promoted system of political resources. Iran’s tactics clashes into several
principled claims by Azerbaijan, which are hard for Iran to meet.
For the time being, the Iran-Azerbaijani relations, despite some demonstrative actions, have not
resulted in a regime when one should expect serious steps aimed at the interests of Armenia.
According to the representatives of Iran’s Supreme Council of Security, unlike Russia which
constantly appears confused when it comes to the foreign policy, especially in the Caucasus, Iran does
not view the American military presence in the region as a long-term factor, even if 20 years are taken
into account. Therefore, the actions that may lead to loss of important strategic positions, including
those of relations with Armenia are not acceptable for Iran.
At the same time, Tehran considers the relations with Azerbaijan as more important and preferable
than the relations with Armenia. This is clear and this has to be accepted.
It is necessary to review the importance of the Karabakh factor in the Iran-Azerbaijani and
Iran-Armenian relations.
Iran has constantly tried to demonstrate to Azerbaijan that it is not interested in the Karabakh issue and
has repetitively declared support to its territorial integrity. However, from time to time Iran
demonstrates historical moods with regards to the possible Karabakh settlement.
There are a number of cases of such behavior of the Iranians. In September-December 2005 and in
January 2006 the representatives of the Iranian officious circles made efforts to clarify the conditions
and circumstances of the process of normalization. The Iranians worked not only in Armenia and
Azerbaijan but also the United Kingdom. There are signs that the Iranians have made preliminary
conclusions.
Currently such attempts repeat. These conclusions result in that the Azerbaijani political leaders and
political circles are, on the whole, interested in the development of the settlement process, with a hope
to return the territories.
The Iranians think that the leaders of Armenia and NKR review the process of settlement in the
context of the general political process in the country, as an important political resource.
At the same time, the Iranians do not forecast a fast progress in the process of settlement, viewing the
process as a possible factor for their own policy on the region.
The Iranians set the following political goals:
Demonstrate to Azerbaijan and possibly to the West that Iran supports the Karabakh settlement, peace
and stability;
Iran is trying to develop specific actions which are aimed at thwarting the process of settlement,
follows attentively the events and needs advice;
Iran finds that its analysts and intelligence services have clarified the main circumstances and interests
of the settlement and insists that the process is doomed to failure due to several circumstances (the
unconfident position of the United States, controversies between the United States and Europe, the
unpreparedness of the Azerbaijani leadership and political class for bold decisions, the lack of
understanding among external stakeholders of real adverse factors in Armenia);
The Iranian representatives are not prone to admit even a smallest share of their guilt for the current
status of the settlement process, reviewing only the slowness of some Iranian officials to develop
relations with Armenia, including in the economic sphere;
The Iranians have big concerns that the opinion on change of Iran’s stance on Karabakh lowlands and
Karabakh in general will be imposed on the Armenian public, viewing that opinion as a factor of
influence on Armenia;
Iran is trying not to accelerate the pace of developments, and is not negotiating with Azerbaijan
currently on the possible stationing of peacekeepers, being reluctant to give Azerbaijan advantage in
their relations but will have to enter into direct talks on this issue, using its leverages of pressure on
Azerbaijan;
As soon as the relations between Sargsyan and Aliyev expose the national security of Iran, the Iranian
diplomats in the European countries have a preliminary task to make efforts to prevent possible
dangers for Iran.
The issue of stationing peacekeepers in the area of the Karabakh conflict is in the focus of
attention of the top political and military leadership of Iran, and Iran will undertake defensive
actions to address it
Depending on the results of negotiations between Sargsyan and Aliyev, the Iranian embassy in
Armenia will set out for broad interaction with the political parties and NGOs of Armenia to clarify
Iran’s stance on this issue.
It should be noted that the Iranians understand they are facing the prospect of losing the situation and
they have to perceive it as the result of their own policy of “waiting”, which they explain by the
necessity to take into consideration the moods of the Azerbaijani population living in the north of Iran.
Despite such tactical issues, Iran has to develop a backup plan in case a peacekeeping contingent is
stationed there. In that case Iran’s main partner in the Karabakh issue will be Azerbaijan because the
issue of the peacekeepers will be related to Azerbaijan’s rights and initiatives.
Over time the state and presence of the peacekeeping forces will increasingly depend on Azerbaijan.
In this context, Azerbaijan is left out of Iran-Azerbaijan-Armenia relations with regards to the lands in
the lowlands of Karabakh.
The Iranians consider this situation as a real prospect. The Iranians cannot ignore this possible option.
This is related to one of the core national security issues of Iran.
Now that the relations between Iran and the United States are being normalized quickly, one has to
understand that there will be no change of regional political priorities of Iran.
First, the security of Iran depends on this, Iran has spent a lot of time and resources to build its current
regional positions. Second, Iran’s interests in the regions will be in line with the American interests in
case of normalization with the United States.
In this case there will be no harm to the positions of Armenia.
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