iui
Counting All The Costs
Recognising the carbon subsidy
to polluting energy
Policy Brief
Contents
September 2014
Summary
3
Why do energy subsidies matter?
4
Energy subsidies in Australia
6
Tackling the implicit subsidy of unpriced
carbon pollution
8
BOX: Developing carbon values by
calculating the social cost of carbon
Cover Image:
Michael Hall, Creative Fellow
of The Climate Institute 2012-14
11
Acknowledgements
This policy brief was written by Olivia Kember with contributions
from Erwin Jackson and John Connor. We also thank Clare Pinder
for her input. The views expressed in this policy brief remain those
of The Climate Institute.
2
Summary
Australia’s energy sector has a long history of
subsidies, ranging from government-built
infrastructure to favourable taxation regimes. The
most significant current subsidy is the unpriced cost
of carbon emissions, measured as the impacts of
climate change on economic growth, environmental
systems, health, and security. Excluding the cost of
carbon pollution from decision-making creates
market distortions and the undervaluation of
emission reduction.
This in turn results in investment and policy settings
that cannot enable the long-term deep
decarbonisation that is necessary for Australia to
contribute to the globally agreed goal of avoiding
global warming of 2°C or more. It also results in the
transfer of the risks and costs of climate change
away from those responsible for producing
emissions and onto the community. In short, it
allows carbon-intensive energy companies to
privatise their gains and socialise their losses.
Other countries and institutions have begun to
address this “carbon subsidy” by incorporating the
costs of carbon pollution in public policy-making.
The United States, for example, has developed
carbon valuation pathways that approximate what
society should be willing to pay to reduce carbon
pollution. These pathways inform the development
of regulations to reduce emissions. Similarly, the
United Kingdom uses carbon values to test any
policies that reduce or increase emissions against
the country’s 2050 emission goal, which is derived
from the international agreement to keep climate
change below 2°C. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recently calculated the real costs of fossil fuels
for over 150 countries including Australia, using a
carbon cost of US$35 per tonne.
Applying carbon valuations developed by the US
government to carbon pollution from Australia’s
energy sector reveals an implicit “carbon subsidy”
of approximately $14-39 billion annually. This is
provided to emitters across electricity, transport,
direct combustion and fugitive emissions.1 The
electricity sector alone receives a carbon subsidy of
about $7-20 billion a year.
Without policies to significantly cut energy
emissions, the carbon subsidy to energy will
continue to grow. The annual carbon subsidy to
non-electricity energy is projected to be about $1236 billion by 2020 and $16-49 billion by 2030.
The size of the carbon subsidy to electricity will be
influenced by any changes to the Renewable Energy
Target (RET). The RET is effectively a subsidy to
renewable electricity providers, with resource costs
of approximately $14 billion (net present value)
between now and 2030. These costs are far smaller
than the carbon subsidy provided to coal and gasfired power companies. Under the current legislated
RET, the annual subsidy would be $9-28 billion by
2020 and $12-37 billion by 2030; in total the subsidy
between 2015 and 2030 would be $165-500 billion.
However, under a reduced RET the subsidy would
increase by about $0.7-2 billion annually. If the RET
were abolished altogether (and current
arrangements grandfathered), the carbon subsidy
would increase by about $0.8-2.5 billion annually.
3
Why do energy
subsidies matter?
“Many energy prices in many countries are
wrong. They are set at levels that do not
reflect environmental damage, notably global
warming, air pollution, and various side
effects of motor vehicle use. In so doing,
many countries raise too much revenue from
direct taxes on work effort and capital
accumulation and too little from taxes on
energy use.”
International Monetary Fund
Getting Energy Prices Right 2014
Governments subsidise energy production and/or
consumption in a range of ways and for a range of
reasons. Subsidies may be explicit or implicit.
Explicit financial subsidies include tax deductions
for activities related to exploration or production,
government investment in research and
development, public spending on fuel transport
infrastructure, such as power stations or pipelines,
and policies that provide above-market revenues or
hold prices below market rates. Implicit subsidies
are created by allowing energy producers or users
to avoid paying the costs of any damage their
activities cause. Such externalised costs include air
pollution, carbon emissions and congestion, among
others.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that key
rationales for energy subsidies are to promote
economic development and technological
advancement. However, the IEA also notes that
poorly directed subsidies result in the misallocation
of costs and resources by “encouraging excessive
energy consumption, artificially promoting capitalintensive industries, reducing incentives for
investment in renewable energy, and accelerating
the depletion of natural resources” (IEA, 2013).
Costs may be transferred from one type of energy
producer or consumer to another, or they may be
transferred to other groups entirely. For example, air
pollution is suffered by those in its vicinity,
irrespective of whether they contribute to it; the
costs of resulting health impacts may also be paid
by taxpayers more broadly. The costs of carbon
emissions and climate change are imposed on the
public, other nations and future generations. Failure
to price the costs of greenhouse gas emissions also
inflates the competitiveness of high-carbon energy
relative to low-carbon energy.
While subsidies may be justified if they address
market barriers to innovation in publicly desirable
areas (based on the assumption that such
innovation will ultimately improve broader public
welfare), most existing energy subsidies do not do
this. The IEA calculates that subsidies to global
fossil fuel consumption alone total about US $540
billion.2 The IMF – looking at both production and
consumption subsidies and quantifying the
externalised cost of climate change – calculated that
global subsidies to fossil fuels in 2011 totalled at
least US$1.9 trillion.3 Subsidies to renewable energy
technologies, which are considerably less mature,
totalled just $88 billion that year.4
4
Figure 1. Global subsidies to fossil fuels, 2011 (US$).
Source: IMF
Motor fuel taxes generally need to be higher
primarily to reflect the costs of accidents and traffic
congestion rather than carbon emissions and air
pollution.6
Removing subsidies would produce significant
benefits. The IMF found that including within energy
prices the costs of air pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions would reduce global emissions by 13 per
cent, or 4.5 billion tonnes. Significant health benefits
would also result, due to a 10 million ton reduction
in sulphur dioxide (SO2) and a 13 percent reduction
in other local air pollutants.7
The IMF notes that coal use is “pervasively
undercharged, not only for carbon emissions, but
also for the health costs of local air pollution”.
Significant tax increases are also necessary to
internalise the costs of carbon emissions from
natural gas, although air pollution damage from
natural gas is “modest” in comparison with coal.5
The longer a subsidy is in place, the more
entrenched its impact on market conditions, and the
greater the adjustment required to its removal. This
means that long-standing subsidies can be
extremely difficult to remove, as market participants
have factored their existence into decision-making
and may be adversely affected by subsidy removal.
For this reason, governments often face strong
opposition to attempts to reduce or remove energy
subsidies.
5
Energy subsidies
in Australia
Australia has a complex system of energy subsidies.
Analysis to date has tended to focus on explicit
financial subsidies to energy resource production
and under-priced road use.
For example, a 1996 report by the National Institute
of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR)
estimated annual financial subsidies to the
Australian energy and transport sectors at $1.9
billion (in 1994 dollars).8 In 2000, the Senate
Environment, Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts References Committee
cited this figure and found another $4 billion
indirectly provided to fossil fuels via “tax incentives,
startup grants, preferential purchasing agreements
for oil, and biased market structures”. The
Committee found renewable energy programs
received federal subsidies of $360 million per year. 9
Analysis by the Institute for Sustainable Futures
found a wide range of financial subsidies that
totalled $9-10 billion in 2005-6. Of this, more than
96 per cent supported fossil fuels, with just over
$300 million to support renewable energy and
energy efficiency. Among the largest subsidies were
the annual $4.7 billion “road user deficit” – the gap
between total government revenue from road
access and usage charges and the public cost of
establishing and maintaining the road network – and
government intervention to lower coal costs for
electricity generation, worth some $400-1100
million.10
More recent analysis by Environment Victoria and
Market Forces found a slightly higher level of fossil
fuel subsidies (about $11 billion annually) through a
different methodology. This analysis identified fuel
tax credits (nearly $6 billion annually), excise
concessions for aviation gasoline and turbine fuel
($1.3 billion) and accelerated depreciation for oil,
gas and petroleum extraction ($1.8 billion) as the
largest fossil fuel subsidies currently in operation.11
The definition of some of these measures as energy
subsidies is contentious. For example, the federal
government does not consider the fuel tax credits
regime as a subsidy. Excise on diesel fuel was
originally introduced to help fund road construction
and maintenance; off-road diesel use by mining,
agriculture and other industries should therefore not
be subject to the excise.12 13 14 On the other hand,
fuel excise is not hypothecated to road funding, and
as many changes to the excise regime have been to
increase general revenue rather than to direct more
resources at roads the provision of credits to some
industries and not others may be considered a
subsidy to the former.15
Through the G20, Australia in 2009 committed to
“rationalize and phase out over the medium term
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”.16 The federal
government concluded in 2010 that none of
Australia’s existing federal policies constitute such
subsidies: “Australia does not have any sectorspecific tax expenditures for fossil fuel production
(although fossil fuel producers are able to access
general measures that apply across the economy or
across the mining and quarrying sector as a
whole).”17 Subsidy watchdog Oil Change
International notes that this wording excludes
“policies that have the effect, though not the intent,
of subsidizing fossil-fuels [and] special tax breaks
for extractive industries (e.g., percentage depletion)
that are generally viewed as subsidies in most other
countries in the world.”18
In the past few years, governments have increased
and decreased support for renewable energy
through a range of policy changes. State
governments introduced and then wound back
6
feed-in tariffs for solar PV panels. Key avenues for
Commonwealth support for renewables are the RET,
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), and
the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA).
The CEFC and ARENA receive roughly $2.5 billion in
annual federal funding (unless both bodies are
dismantled, as proposed by the government). The
RET and state feed-in tariffs are cross-subsidies, in
that support for renewables is provided by other
electricity market participants. The government’s
recent RET review warned that the RET would result
in a “$22 billion cross-subsidy to the renewables
sector in net present value terms over the remainder
of the scheme”.19 The bulk of this cross-subsidy
comes from fossil fuelled power providers.
Little analysis exists of the scale of Australia’s
implicit energy subsidies.
NIEIR’s 1996 report developed a conservative
estimate of the “greenhouse externality” associated
with electricity use, which it placed at 1.5¢/kWh for
coal and 0.75¢/kWh for natural gas generating
facilities.
This produced an annual implicit carbon subsidy to
electricity of $1.9 billion, out of a total environmental
subsidy of $2.5 billion. Road transport was
estimated to receive an implicit subsidy of $0.2-1.3
billion for other types of environmental externalities
associated with petroleum use (primarily air
pollutants).20
The IMF has made two recent attempts to quantify
the implicit subsidies created by not pricing air
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Its 2013
analysis found that Australia’s implicit subsidies to
oil, coal and gas to be worth 1.8 per cent of GDP, or
about $23 billion annually.21 This analysis used an
estimated carbon subsidy of US$25 per tonne of
carbon dioxide (t CO2). The IMF’s 2014 report
applied an updated estimate of US$35/tCO2, along
with country-specific estimates of the cost of the air
pollution from energy-related emissions of sulphur
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and PM2.5.
This report did not provide an estimate of the total
cost of these subsidies to Australian energy.22
7
Tackling the implicit subsidy
of unpriced carbon
“A charge should be levied on fossil fuels in
proportion to their CO2 emissions multiplied
by the global damage from those emissions”
Figure 2. The United States’ “Social Cost of Carbon”’
values, 2013 update.
International Monetary Fund
Getting Energy Prices Right 2014
Putting a value on the social benefit of carbon
reduction
An essential step in valuing the costs of climate
change or, conversely, the benefits of avoiding it, is
to calculate what those costs are. Such calculations
will necessarily involve a range of uncertainties and
any estimates will need to be regularly revised.
However, estimates that are transparently produced
and regularly updated help to ensure that policy
decisions take account of improving knowledge and
evidence.
Several countries, including the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom, have adopted a
range of values for carbon emissions to use in
decision-making.
The US government has developed a set of carbon
values to estimate the social cost of carbon (see
Box 1). This is an estimate of the economic damage
caused by each additional tonne of CO2 emitted into
the atmosphere in a given year. Future costs are
discounted to represent what society should be
willing to pay in the present. The US estimates apply
different discount rates and different probability
distributions. The 3 per cent average pathway is
considered the “central estimate”, while the 3 per
cent 95th percentile pathway reflects a one-in-20 risk
of significantly greater climate sensitivity.23
The UK government takes a slightly different
approach. It has derived carbon valuation
trajectories from a long-term national emission
target of 80 per cent below 1990 levels which it
considers an appropriate UK contribution to global
emission reductions consistent with limiting global
temperature rise to “as little as possible above
2°C”.24
These carbon values represent an annual cost-pertonne limit on the investment that needs to be
triggered for the UK to reach its target. In other
words, any emissions reductions that can be
achieved at a lower cost per tonne are necessary to
reach the target.25
Because the UK participates in multinational
emission reduction efforts through the EU Emission
Trading System in addition to its domestic emission
reduction policies, it has developed separate
marginal abatement cost curves for the “traded
sector” (industries covered by the EU ETS) and the
“non-traded sector”. The prices in each sector align
from 2030, reflecting an expectation that
international carbon trading will be fully operational
from that point.26
8
Figure 3. EU Emission Trading System marginal
abatement cost curves, traded and non-traded
sectors.
Health improvements due to reductions of other
pollutants were also quantified and monetised.27
The IMF used a single, simplified US carbon value
(US$35/t CO2, based on the central estimate for
2010) to calculate the externalised carbon costs of
energy in over 150 countries (IMF 2014).
Figure 4, below, shows several carbon value paths
used by the US and UK.
The UK has incorporated carbon valuation into
guidance on policy appraisal for all UK government
agencies, to use to “assess proposals leading to an
increase or a reduction in energy use or greenhouse
gas emissions in the UK. It covers proposals that
have a direct impact on energy use and supply and
those with an indirect impact through planning,
construction, land use change or the introduction of
new products that use energy.”28
Figure 4. Carbon values, US and UK, selected years
How big are Australia’s carbon subsidies to
energy?
Applying US carbon valuations to carbon emissions
from Australian energy allows for an estimate of the
implicit carbon subsidy to energy production and
use in Australia. Applying the 3 per cent average
and 95th percentile values gives a subsidy of
approximately $14-39 billion in 2012. This can be
broken down by sector: $7-20 billion for electricity,
$3-9 billion each for transport and direct
combustion, and about $0.3-1 billion for fugitive
emissions from resource production. As noted
above, the 3 per cent average value is the US
government’s central estimate and the 95th
percentile represents the 5 per cent risk of
significantly greater climate sensitivity. The US
carbon values apply only to carbon dioxide
emissions, so the costs of other greenhouse gases
are excluded. This results in a significant
underestimate of the costs of fugitive emissions, in
particular, which are mainly methane, a more potent
but shorter-lived greenhouse gas than carbon
dioxide.
*Combined traded and non-traded sector prices, weighted by share
of total emissions
The US uses its carbon values to inform cost-benefit
analysis. For example, the US Environment
Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed
emission performance standards for existing fossil
fuel generators. The EPA’s proposal contained costbenefit analysis showing that the societal value of
avoided carbon dioxide emissions would reach
US$10-92 billion annually by 2030 (range represents
the spread of carbon value trajectories).
If Australia fails to internalise these costs in energy
prices, the carbon subsidy to energy will continue to
increase, due both to growth in energy-related
emissions and the higher social cost of emissions as
time passes. Figure 5 shows the size of the subsidy
for selected years, under the same two US carbon
valuation trajectories, based on Treasury projections
of a ‘no carbon price’ scenario.29
9
Figure 5. Carbon subsidy to Australian energy-related
CO2 in the absence of a carbon price or equivalent
regulation.
More recent electricity sector projections show a
much slower rise in electricity demand growth, so
the subsidy to electricity may grow more slowly than
Treasury’s projections would indicate. Recent
electricity sector demand forecasts produced by
ACIL Allen and Jacobs, for example, show electricity
demand about 10 per cent lower than Treasury’s
projections by 2020, and about 20 per cent lower by
2030.30 31
In 2030 the sector’s carbon emissions would reach
186 million tonnes, for a carbon subsidy of $12-37
billion. The total carbon subsidy to electricity
between 2015 and 2030 would be $165-500 billion
(Figure 6). Note that this figure already includes a
discount rate of 3 per cent.
However, reducing the RET would increase
emissions from electricity and therefore the carbon
subsidy to the sector. The carbon subsidy to the
sector would increase by $0.7-2 billion annually by
2020 if the RET were reduced to ensure renewable
generation made up no more than 20 per cent of
electricity (“Reduced RET), and by $0.8-2.5 billion
annually if the RET were closed and existing
investments grandfathered (“Abolished RET”). In
2030 the annual subsidy would have increased by
$0.7-2.3 billion under a Reduced RET, and $1-3
billion under an Abolished RET. These two scenarios
roughly correlate to the recommendations of the
Warburton RET Review.
Figure 7. Increase in carbon subsidy to electricity if the
RET is reduced or abolished, selected years.
On the other hand, the Treasury modelling scenario
used above assumed the maintenance and
achievement of the legislated RET. Modelling by
Jacobs finds that, assuming lower demand and the
current RET, carbon emissions from electricity in
2020 would total 172 million tonnes, for a carbon
subsidy of $9-28 billion.32
Figure 6. Electricity sector
emissions and carbon
subsidy, 2015-2030.
 10
How should Australia address its carbon
subsidies to energy?
As the analysis presented above demonstrates, the
carbon subsidy provided to energy is far greater any
of the explicit financial subsidies currently
benefitting Australian fossil fuels, let alone any
subsidies to Australian renewable energy.
Yet Australian decision-making assigns no weight to
carbon damages, effectively ignoring the carbon
subsidy and valuing emission reduction at zero
economic benefit.
The inadequacy of Australia’s current approach was
demonstrated by the recent RET Review. This
review considered the RET’s cost-effectiveness,
finding that the RET imposes additional resource
costs of $14 billion over the next years to 2040, and,
as noted above, a cross-subsidy of $22 billion,
mainly from fossil generators, to renewable
generators.
However, in judging that the RET represented too
high a cost to the economy, the review ignored the
carbon subsidy already provided to the power
sector. Instead it relied on unfounded assertions
about the ability of policies like the still undeveloped
Emission Reduction Fund to achieve emission
reductions at lower cost; did not consider any
potential emission reduction to be undertaken
nationally beyond Australia’s minimum 2020 target
of a 5 per cent reduction from 2000 levels; and
ignored any benefits of emission reduction.
Estimates of the social cost of carbon provide an
indication, however imperfect, of what society ought
to be willing to pay now to avoid the costs of climate
change. Australia would benefit from using a range
of estimates of the social cost of carbon as lower
bound estimates of the benefits of carbon reduction.
This would enable more thorough and realistic
assessment of the costs and benefits of decisions
that affect Australia’s prospects of carbon reduction
and clean energy.
Developing carbon values by calculating the social cost of carbon
A social cost of carbon pathway is calculated using one or several Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), which
combine a simplified climate model and a simplified economic model into a cohesive numerical model to
capture the feedback effects between the two.
This method is at best an incomplete guide to the costs of climate change, and the following weaknesses
suggest that the social cost of carbon should be treated as a lower bound estimate in policy making.33 34 35
Estimates of the social cost of carbon apply only to carbon dioxide and exclude the impacts of other
greenhouse gas emissions. They are intended to include changes in net agricultural productivity, human health,
property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change. IAMs
do not assign value to all of the impacts of climate change recognized in the climate change literature because
of lack of precise information on the nature of damages and because the science incorporated into these
models lags behind the most recent research. For example, the models currently completely omit the effects of
some large ecosystem changes that drive other climate impacts, such as ocean acidification (which leads to
decreased fish supplies and a potential large scale ecosystem collapse) and neglect or only partially address
potentially catastrophic damages such as the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation or the
West Antarctic Ice Sheet, or large releases of methane from melting permafrost and warming oceans. This has
resulted in IAM simulations ignoring the possibility of catastrophic events with significant harms to human
welfare.
Social cost of carbon calculations also take contentious approaches to inter-generational and inter-regional
welfare. Inter-generational welfare is approached via the choice of discount rate. As climate impacts occur over
long time periods, their costs are highly sensitive to discounting. The common practice of using market interest
rates gives a much lower value to benefits accruing to future generations, which has been criticised on ethical
grounds.
With regard to inter-regional welfare, the social cost of carbon has been criticised for excluding equity
weighting. Equity weighting assigns a higher value to a dollar’s worth of damage occurring in a poor region than
to one occurring in a wealthy one, in recognition of the latter’s greater adaptive capacity. A well-established
methodology for equity weighting is available, but it is not generally used in these estimates. Applying the social
cost of carbon to domestic policies is also complicated by the fact that it represents global rather than domestic
costs. Given the interdependencies of national economies and the vulnerability of each one to climate impacts
on others, however, the distinction between global and local impacts is not clear-cut.
 11
Endnotes
1
These calculations have applied two U.S. social cost of carbon estimates that use a 3 per cent discount rate and an average and 95th percentile
probability weighting. The US estimates also include discount rates of 5 per cent and 2.5 per cent. See Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government, 2013. Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/technical-update-social-cost-of-carbon-for-regulator-impactanalysis.pdf.
2
International Energy Agency, 2013. World Energy Outlook 2013. OECD/IEA, Paris.
3
International Monetary Fund, 2013. Energy Subsidy Reform – Lessons and Implications. IMF, Washington, DC.
4
International Energy Agency, 2012. World Energy Outlook 2012. OECD/IEA, Paris.
5
International Monetary Fund, 2014. Getting Energy Prices Right: From principle to practice. IMF, Washington, DC
6
IMF. Getting Energy Prices Right.
7
IMF, Energy Subsidy Reform.
8
National Institute of Economic an Industry Research (NIEIR), 1996. Subsidies to the Use of Natural Resources. Environmental Economics
Research Paper No.2. Report prepared for the Department of the Environment, Sport and Territories.
9
ECITA Committee, 2000. The Heat Is On: Australia's Greenhouse Future, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Senate
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee, Canberra, November 2000.
10
Chris Riedy, 2007. Energy and Transport Subsidies in Australia, 2007 Update. Final Report For Greenpeace Australia Pacific. Institute for
Sustainable Futures, UTS, Sydney.
11
Environment Victoria and Market Forces, 2014. Ending the fossil fuel industry’s age of entitlement: An analysis of Australian Government tax
measures that encourage fossil fuel use and more pollution.
http://environmentvictoria.org.au/newsite/sites/default/files/useruploads/EV%20&%20MF_Fossil%20fuel%20subsidies%20in%202014_FINAL.p
df.
12
Riedy, Energy and Transport Subsidies.
13
Australian Treasury, 2008. Architecture of Australia's Tax and Transfer System. Paper for the Australia’s Future Tax System Review. Australian
Treasury, Canberra.
14
Sinclair Davidson, 2012. Mining Taxes and Subsidies: Official evidence. Minerals Council of Australia Background Paper.
http://www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/publications/mca_backgrounder_FINAL.pdf
15
Richard Denniss, 2014. “Viewpoints: should fuel tax credits be cut in the budget?”, The Conversation, 12 May 2014.
http://theconversation.com/viewpoints-should-fuel-tax-credits-be-cut-in-the-budget-25988
16
G20, 2009. “Leaders’ Statement”, Pittsburgh, 24-25 September 2009.
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Declaration_0.pdf
17
Australian Treasury, 2010. “Australia’s Submission to G20 Energy Experts Group.” Document 10A, documents released under a Freedom of
Information request in relation to Australia’s G20 commitment to phase out or eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and the commitments
made by other countries. http://www.treasury.gov.au/Access-to-Information/DisclosureLog/2012/G20-commitments-on-fossil-fuel-subsidies
18
Doug Koplow, 2012. Phasing Out Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in the G20: A Progress Update. Earth Track and Oil Change International.
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2012/06/FIN.OCI_Phasing_out_fossil-fuel_g20.pdf
19
Richard Warburton, Brian Fisher, Shirley In’t Veld and Matt Zema, 2014. Renewable Energy Target Scheme: Report of the Expert Panel.
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra.
20
NIEIR, Subsidies to the Use of Natural Resources.
21
IMF, Energy Subsidy Reform.
22
IMF, Getting Energy Prices Right.
23
United States Environment Protection Agency, 2013. “Fact Sheet: Social Cost of Carbon”, EPA, November 2013.
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPAactivities/scc-fact-sheet.pdf
24
Committee on Climate Change, 2008. Building a low-carbon economy – the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change. CCC, London.
25
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013. Valuation of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions for appraisal. Supplementary guidance
to the HM Treasury Green Book on Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. DECC, September.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254083/2013_main_appraisal_guidance.pdf
26
DECC, 2013. “Tables 1-20: supporting the toolkit and the guidance” [Excel file]. Last updated September 2013.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/valuation-of-energy-use-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions-for-appraisal
27
EPA, 2014. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for
Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants. EPA -542/R-14-002, EPA, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
28
DECC, Valuation of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions for appraisal.
29
Treasury and DIICCSRTE, 2013. Economic modelling of climate change mitigation scenarios to inform Climate Change Authority, 2014.
Reducing Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Targets and Progress Review—Final Report.
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/reviews/targets-and-progress-review-3.
30
ACIL Allen Consulting, 2014. RET Review Modelling: Market Modelling of Various RET Policy Options. Report to RET Review Expert Panel, 7
August. https://retreview.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/ACIL_Report.pdf.
31
Jacobs, 2014. Impacts of Changes to the RET on Electricity Market Participants. Report for The Climate Institute, Australian Conservation
Foundation and WWF Australia.
http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/Jacobs_ImpactsChangingRETonElectricityMarketParticipants_FINAL_140814.pdf
32
Jacobs, Impacts of Changes to the RET.
33
Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth A. Stanton, 2012. “Climate Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon”, Economics: The
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 6 (2012-10): 1—25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10
34
Peter Howard, 2014. Omitted Damages: What’s Missing from the Social Cost of Carbon. Environmental Defense Fund, Institute for Policy
Integrity and Natural Resources Defense Council, March.
35
Martin L. Weitzman, 2013. “Tail-Hedge Discounting and the Social Cost of Carbon”, Journal of Economic Literature, 51(3): 873-82.
 18
 12