The Impact of Social Investment Funds on Social Capital
and Violence
Evaluation of the Peace and Development Regional Programmes in
Colombia
Luca PELLERANO
Oxford Policy Management, Oxford
Institute for Fiscal Studies, London
Perspectives on Impact Evaluation.
Cairo, 1st April 2009
Introduction
•
There is an increasing need to evaluate the effects of social interventions on a
broad set of “socio-cultural” dimensions that exceed the traditional
socioeconomic variables:
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•
values, aptitudes, perceptions, motivations, capabilities, empowerment
relationships, networks, social capital
Impact evaluation in this domain is extremely challenging as:
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Socio-cultural changes are often regarded at as unexpected effects
As the analysis moves in the domain of the “intangibles”, the evaluation must be driven
my a multi method and multidisciplinary approach.
Social Investment Funds (SIFs) make of their potential effects on the community
social structure one of their main points of strength.
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–
•
They are based on a bottom up participatory approach that is expected to strengthen
and regenerate the social fabric within the community (Rao and Ibáñez, 2005).
They have been introduced in the context of violence, particularly in Latin America (i.e
Brazil, Jamaica), as a means to increase social cohesion and reduce social conflict
(Luengas and Ruprah, 2008).
In this work (Guarin et al, 2008; Attanasio et al, 2008):
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We evaluate the effect of a Social-Fund-type intervention in Colombia on social capital
and conflict management
We explore innovative methodological options for the measurement and evaluation of
“socio cultural” dimensions.
Colombia. The Peace and Development
Regional Programmes
•
Colombia has been affected by a complex civil conflict along the whole course of
its recent history. Internal displacement is one of the most evident consequences.
•
While the drivers of the conflict have evolved with time (political violence, control
over natural resources, coca), and the intensity seem to have lessened in recent
years, violence still affects many rural areas of the country, in a very clustered way.
•
The Peace and Development Regional Programmes (PRDPs):
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–
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Are networks of grassroots organizations that were formed under the
auspices of the civil society (labour unions, the church, private firms) in
some of the most poor and violent areas of Colombia.
Aim at building conditions of peace and development in these regions,
claiming that peace is the result of equitable and inclusive models of
development.
Affirm the principle of protecting life and promoting human dignity before
everything else.
Support development processes informed by environmental sustainability,
equity, solidarity and participatory democracy.
The Peace and Development Regional
Programmes
• Since 2002, 6 PRDPs have been supported by the National Government, the World
Bank (Paz y Desarrollo) and the European Union (Laboratorios de Paz), with a total
investment of around more than 80 million Euros.
• The PRDPs work basically as a Social Fund, financing
a basket of projects along three main axes:
• Productive Projects
• Institutional Development Projects
• Human Rights Projects
• The PRDPs are developed around a bottom up
approach. Projects are promoted, formulated and
executed by grassroots organizations in a
participatory way. They and express the own plans
and priorities of the local communities.
• Projects have an average duration of 2 years and
benefit on average 300 beneficiaries, who are
normally members of the grassroots organizations.
125 Municipalities, 9 Departments
Influence Strategy
• How can the PRDPs contribute to peace building, violence reduction and
conflict alleviation?
– The impact stategy of the PRPDs is integral and articulated.
The PRDPs identify
Initial Conditions
in the regions
PRDP
…and identify Modes of
Relationship
that correspond to them
Initial
Conditions
Poverty and
Violence
New
Conditions
Peace and
Development
Traditional
Relationship
Modes
New
Relationship
Modes
• With the illegal groups
• With public institutions
• With the community
Methodology
• ¿How to address the challenge of evaluating the effect of the PRDPs on
peace and the “modes of relationship” from a rigorous perspective?
• Evaluation design
– A sample of 1000 treated beneficiaries in 42 municipalities across
the 6 regions. Collected between 2006 and 2007.
– Because of the roll out of the PRDPs both within and across
municipalities, the length of exposure to the project of the sampled
beneficiaries ranges from 0 to 5 years.
– The identification strategy is based on the intensity of exposure
 Discrete approach. Comparing “high” exposed beneficiaries with “low” exposed
beneficiaries. The samples is divided evenly in 2 groups: more and less than 12
months of exposure.
 Continuous approach. Comparing beneficiaries amongst themselves according
to the dosage.
Methodology
•
•
•
A strength of the dosage intensity approach is that it overcomes by design the
risk of incurring in a programme selection bias based on unobservables.
However, a potential (self)selection bias may arise from the fact that some
beneficiaries /municipalities enter the programme first.
We implement a multivariate analysis in order to control for observable
characteristics (at the individual an municipality level) that may determine the
programme expansion pattern
Mujer
Edad
Mujer jefe de hogar
Nivel educativo
Rural
Desplazado en el hogar
Meses desde el desplazamiento
Menores en el hogar
Vivienda propia
Número de cuartos
Servicios basicos en la vivienda
Tenencia de articulos "de lujo"
Otros apoyos y/o ayudas
Indice de desempeno municipal (Indemun)
Cultivos Ilicitos
Homicidios por 1000 habitantes
Altitud
High Exposure
Control Variables
Low Exposure
Diff
0.544
36.74
0.154
2.511
0.545
0.274
236.81
1.544
0.671
3.034
0.421
0.102
0.282
34.377
41.656
0.899
1156.594
0.535
41.359
0.232
2.63
0.44
0.331
240.087
1.503
0.646
3.037
0.45
0.19
0.282
36.62
100.13
0.781
669.078
-0.009
4.619***
0.078**
0.119
-0.105**
0.056
3.277
-0.042
-0.024
0.003
0.03
0.088**
0
2.243**
58.474**
-0.117
-487.516***
Methodology
• ¿How to address the challenge of evaluating the effect of the PRDPs on
peace and the “modes of relationship” from a rigorous perspective?
• Instruments for data collection
– Traditional household survey (includes a question on human rights
violation)
– Additionally: 2 innovative instruments to explore impacts in the
domain of the “intangibles”:
1. Experimental Games
Modes of Relationship with the Community
(Social Capital)
2. Social Dilemma
Modes of Relationship with the Conflict
(Conflict Management)
Methodology
Social Dilemma
•
Beneficiaries are invited to express their views on a tale that is read to them in
third person
 “Juana’s tale”
• “una señora de su casa, una campesina común y corriente, hasta el día en que los violentos le
mataron a Jacinto, su esposo...”
• “... la vecina y el esposo, que eran cultivadores de fique, convencieron a Juana de que también
se metiera en se negocio...”
• “... su prestigio fue creciendo cada vez más, hasta el punto que Pedraza, un concejal y político
muy conocido, le propuso que se lanzara como candidata al Concejo...”
• “... sin embargo, antes de la posesión comenzaron a llegar mensajes anónimos con amenazas
de muerte, dirigidas a Juana, provenientes del mismo grupo armado que había asesinado a su
marido...”
•
Juana faces a dilemma. How should she manage a threat from an illegal group?
•
Beneficiaries are expected to identify with Juana. The instrument explores the
processes of moral judgement (what is right) on decisions (like conflict
management) that can be hardly assessed through direct survey questions.
Methodology
Social Dilemma
Immediate Displacement
Individual conflict management
Community conflict management
Institutional conflict management
Life danger associated to community leadership
Results. Conflict Management
Social Dilemma
Exposure
Displacement
Individual conflict
management
Community conflict
management
Institutional conflict
management (Justice)
Institutional conflict
management (Army)
Institutional conflict
management (Local
Institutions)
Danger associated to
leadership
Impact
(discrete)
Impact
(continuous)
-0,4 pp*
Low
High
Simple
difference
t=5 months
25,5 %
t=29 months
20,3%
-5,2 pp
-8,4 pp **
17,3 %
21,2%
3,9 pp
6,7 pp **
56,9%
67,7%
10,8 pp **
13,0 pp***
88,4%
87,9%
-3,3 pp
-
88,6%
93,4%
4,8pp
3,10 pp**
96,8%
97,6%
0,8 pp
-
0,1 pp **
67,4%
66,3%
-1,0 pp
-
-1,57 pp***
- 0,9 pp**
-
Methodology
Experimental Games
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Simulated decision scenarios where the beneficiaries face alternative on
the use of a monetary endowments.
•
Based on the theoretical framework of the experimental economics:
players’ decisions should reveal their preferences.
•
As the decisions imply a real monetary payoff (on average the equivalent
of 5 USD) participants are expected to reveal their preferences more
similarly to how they would behave in a real life situation. This doesn’t
necessarily happen if questions on preferences are asked in a traditional
survey.
•
The “controlled” experiments are designed in such a way that decisions
only have economic consequences (no reputation effects).
1.
2.
Trust Game (trust, reciprocity and philanthropy)
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (aptitude to contribute to
the public good)
Methodology
Experimental Games
Ejercicio 2. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM)
•
•
•
•
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Played in group.
The experiment is a simple public good game in which subjects decide to
invest in a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ project (public or private account).
Every token invested in the public account yields benefits for the whole
group, while the token inverted in the private account only yields benefits to
the owner of the account.
The dilemma consists in that there is a conflict between the self interest and
the optimum social outcome.
If everyone invests in the public project the total earnings for the group are
bigger than if everyone invests in the private account. However an individual
is always better off by investing in the private account (Nash Equilibrium).
Results: Contribution to the Public Good
Experimental Games
Control
“Contamin
“Pure”
Treatment
ated”
Contribution to the
public good.
•
•
•
59,3%
68,0%
63,5%
Simple
Difference
(TTO-CTRL)
-0,8 pp
Simple difference
(contaminatedpure)
8,7 pp**
There is no significant difference in the contribution rates between beneficiaries
with high and low exposure the to the programme.
The level of contribution to the public good is much higher in municipalities
where the PRDPs operate, than in other municipalities in the country with
comparable characteristics (Attanasio et al, 2007).
Social capital effects seem to propagate within the municipality through a spillover mechanism.
Conclusions
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The work of the PRDPs is purposefully directed to strengthening the social
fabric in the community. In facts, the PRDPs centre their efforts on the
promotion of civic participation, leadership and active citizenship.
Indeed, the PRDPs contribute to building social capital and creating new
aptitudes/abilities for conflict management in communities affected by
violence.
Does this lead to a reduction in the violation of human rights? No, or not
yet?
These results shall not be generalized to all SIFs because of the peculiarity
of the PRDPs influence strategy.
More research should be undertaken on strength and limitations of
Experimental Games and Social Dilemmas as instruments for the evaluation
of the effect of social interventions on “socio cultural” dimensions.
A follow-up study, for the impact evaluation of the PRDPs is currently
undergoing, with new expanded data collection and improved instruments.
The Impact of Social Investment Funds on Social Capital
and Violence
Evaluation of the Peace and Development Regional Programmes in
Colombia
THANKS
Perspectives on Impact Evaluation.
Cairo, 1st April 2009