Recasting Child Protection
following Munro
Patrick Ayre
Department of Applied Social Studies
University of Bedfordshire
Park Square, Luton
email: [email protected]
web: http://patrickayre.co.uk
The background
Widespread and persistent concern
over standards
 Far reaching reforms
 Little evidence of improvement, in
England at least

Key themes
Failure to learn from experience
 Lack of effective engagement with
research
 Process and procedures prioritised over
outcomes and objectives

Key themes
Targets and indicators prioritised over
values and professional standards
 Compliance and completion prioritised
over analysis and reflection
 The proceduralisation, technicalisation
and deprofessionalisation of the social
work task.

Munro and the Mission Statement
Fallacy
In the ‘mission statement fallacy’, it is
assumed that if one asserts an objective
with which all relevant stakeholders agree
strongly in principle, this objective will be
realised in practice.
How did we get where we are
now? Deprofessionalisation
Part of a wider trend
 Managerialism, McDonaldisation and
the audit culture
 Management by external objectives
 Professionals not to be trusted

How did we get to where we are now?

Research

Legal and adversarial context of child
protection

Child abuse scandals
Scandals

Public pillorying

Public enquiry with many
recommendations

Law and guidance from the
government
Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame
Responsible journalism at its best
“Today The Sun has demanded justice for Baby P — and vows not
to rest until those disgracefully ducking blame for failing the tot are
SACKED”
“The fact that Baby P was allowed to die despite 60 visits from
Haringey Social Services is a national disgrace.
I believe that ALL the social workers involved in the case of Baby P
should be sacked - and never allowed to work with vulnerable
children again.
I call on Beverley Hughes, the Children's Minister, and Ed Balls, the
Education Secretary, to ensure that those responsible are removed
from their positions immediately”.
(The Sun, 13 November 2008)
Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame
Climate of mistrust
‘Child stealers’ who ‘seize sleeping children in
the middle of the night’; ‘abusers of authority,
hysterical and malignant’, ‘motivated by
zealotry rather than facts’ or ‘like the SAS in
cardigans and Hush Puppies’.
On the other hand, they are ‘naïve, bungling,
easily fobbed off’, ‘incompetent, indecisive and
reluctant to intervene’ and ‘too trusting with too
liberal a professional outlook’.
Climate of mistrust
The safeguarding worker
who took a child away
from its parents
The safeguarding worker
who failed to take a child
away from its parents
Climatic conditions

Climate of fear

Climate of mistrust

Climate of blame
Trusting procedures

Procedural proliferation

Blaming and training

The myth of predictability
Blaming and training
Causes of accidents can be traced to ‘latent failures and
organizational errors arising in the upper echelons of the
system in question Accident sequences begin with problems
arising in management processes such as planning,
specifying, communicating, regulating and developing.
Latent failures created by these organisational errors are
‘transmitted along various organizational and departmental
pathways to the workplace where they create the local
conditions that promote the commission of errors and
violations (e.g. high workload, deficient tools and equipment,
time pressure, fatigue, low morale, conflicts between
organizational and group norms and the like’ (Reason, 1995
p.1710). In this analysis, ‘people at the sharp end are seen as
the inheritors rather than the instigators of an accident
sequence’ (Reason, 1995 p.1711).
Procedures as a net to catch problems
Procedures as a net to catch problems
Procedures as a net to catch problems
Procedures as a net to catch problems
But what are the principles:

Child centred system

Family usually the best place for a child but…

Importance of relationships

Early help is better for children

Variety of available response

Evidence based practice

Uncertainty and risk are inevitable: risk sensible,
not risk averse

What we should measure is whether children are
receiving effective help
KPIs: Ministers and managers

Outcomes hard to measure, process easy

Easy to obtain, easy to digest (but what do
they tell us?)

Quality = KPI scores

False sense of security

Distort resource allocation

?A third of the mix
KPIs: On the front line

Learn by doing

What is important in what I do?

What is good practice?

Supervision: qualitative or quantitative?
Redesigning the system
We need:
 Clear understanding of the capabilities
required by staff,
 operational structure and systems which
enable direct work and values continuity
of worker
 Robust selection process
 Clear view on what local regulation is
absolutely necessary
Redesigning the system
Sufficient professional development
activity for the necessary skills set
 Frequent case consultations to explore
and reflect on direct work and plans
 Frequent case supervision for to reflect
on service effectiveness and case
decision-making
 Managers to observe practitioners’
direct work with children and families

Redesigning the system
Teaching culture, where all managers
involved in case consultation, direct
work with children and families and
teaching theory and practice
 Learning culture which results in the
organisation knowing its service and
making adjustments to facilitate its
effectiveness
 To listen to children families and
frontline staff

The basic questions
What are most important challenges
facing Middlesbrough in reshaping its
services in the light of Munro?
 What are the greatest obstacles which
lie in the way of progress?
 What are the greatest strengths we
have in meeting these challenges?
 How much progress have we made so
far?
