FIRST, PROVISIONAL DRAFT! PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY!
Strong Parties?
Individual Preferences and Legislative Behavior of Austrian Members of
Parliament
Wolfgang C. Müller and Marcelo Jenny
Department of Government
University of Vienna
Hohenstaufengasse 9
A-1010 Vienna
Austria
[email protected]
Paper prepared for the workshop "Parliamentary Control of the Executuve", ECPR Joint Sessions
of Workshops, Copenhagen, 14–19 April 2000.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we address the fundamental question of the Public Choice research program: how do
individual preferences translate into public decisions. More specifically, we are interested in how
political parties affect the behavior of their Members of Parliament (MPs). Drawing on the work
of Keith Krehbiel (1993; 1999; 2000) we are interested in the question whether Austrian parties
can be considered strong. This question may appear trivial in Western Europe and particularly in
Austria, which may be considered a "party state" par excellence. However, there is much to be
said for "a stronger standard for strong parties" (Krehbiel 1993: 260). In trying to apply this
standard to the Austrian parties, we not only question common wisdom but also the parties’ selfportraits as communities of faith or value communities.
In the paper we first address the theoretical question of strong parties. Then we take a look at
parliamentary party cohesion in the Austrian Nationalrat. Next we turn to the preferences of MPs.
Based on a recent survey we map out their preferences in the five most important policy
dimensions and show how they aggregate. This will allow us to draw conclusions on party
strength.
STRONG PARTIES?
Research on Western European parliaments as a rule proceeds from the assumption that the
behavior of MPs is structured by their party affiliation. Indeed, there is much to support this
premise, in particular the largely cohesive behavior of the parliamentary parties. In many
European parliaments this cohesion is so overwhelming, that it hardly has ever been measured
systematically.1 More recently, strong political parties have also been found in the US Congress.
In contrast to their European colleagues, US scholars have taken the trouble of trying to measure
party strength. Predictably, there is no consensus. As Krehbiel has forcefully argued, the literature
which claims a strong role of political parties in Congress mixes up two things: the behavior of
Congress Members and their preferences. In his words the question is, "do individual legislators
vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement with the policy in question, or do
they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about the policy in question?
(1993: 238)
In more general terms: if members of parliament act cohesively, they may do so because they
have shared preferences or because of party influence upon them. Strictly speaking, parties only
matter if the party line is contrary to the personal preferences of the parliamentarians but
nevertheless observed by them (Krehbiel 1993: 240). If, however, party positions and individual
preferences are identical or, at least, very close to each other, parties can be considered
superfluous: if parliamentarians act in accordance with their own preferences they automatically
maintain party cohesion (Krehbiel 1999: 35). Hence, Krehbiel has argued that parties can be
considered strong only if parliamentarians follow the party line which conflicts with their
preferences. In Germany and Austria, and more generally in Western Europe, such behavior is
discussed by employing the highly normative terms of "Fraktionszwang" or "Klubzwang",
meaning enforced party cohesion (Patzelt 1998).
1
For surveys see Saalfeld (1995) and Bowler, Farrell, and Katz (1999).
2
If parties "are empirically significant, then politics should be significantly different with parties
from what it is without them" (Krehbiel 1993: 240). In more technical terms: In a world without
parties, parliaments should vote for the policies which represent the preferences of the median
legislator. 2 In a world with parties, in majority situations parliaments should vote for the median
of the majority party and in minority situations for policies which are somewhere between the
medians of those parties which form a voting coalition. In special cases these policies can be
identical with those representing the preferences of the median legislator.
The "stronger standard for strong parties" has been developed for the US Congress, however,
Krehbiel has suggested that this approach "can and perhaps ought to be applied elsewhere, too"
(1993: 259). In different context William Riker has referred to Krehbiel’s work by saying, "it is,
of course, necessary to repeat his work on other Congresses, on other legislatures, and in other
ways" (1997: 198). This is the purpose of the present paper.
In the European context the Krehbiel approach is useful because it translates the essentially
normative debate about the tensions between the free mandate and enforced party cohesion
("Fraktionszwang" or "Klubzwang") in an empirical research question. However, in importing
this approach from a presidential system to parliamentary systems, the different properties of
these systems need to be considered. In parliamentary systems majorities usually form not for
individual legislative action but for supporting a government and its legislative program.
In parliamentary systems we can consider political parties strong, when they (1) maintain the
support of those MPs of the government party or parties whose preferences are not reflected in
the government’s legislative program in spite of the fact that they could (2) bring about a
government which is more in tune with their preferences if they would not follow the party line.3
Party loyalty of MPs in the first instance means the support of the government in investiture,
confidence and no confidence votes. However, strong parties not only ensure the survival of the
government but also guarantee that the government program gets enacted. That means that their
MPs support the government in legislative voting even if (1) the legislative proposals conflict
with their individual preferences and (2) there would be an alternative majority which would
enact a bill which is closer to the preferences of the MPs.
Parliamentary systems are characterized by package deals when it comes to building majorities.
That means that MPs may vote against their preferences in some cases because they can be sure
that they will realize more of their preferences under the given government than under its
alternatives. Parliamentary behavior which contradicts the MPs’ preferences then would not be
due to strong parties but to individual calculations of MPs who expect to get their sufferings over
specific policies compensated by more rewarding ones. However, package deals within majority
parties and between coalition parties as a rule are hammered out by party leaders and need to win
2
See, for instance, Black (1958), Downs (1959), Elenow and Hinich (1984), Mueller (1989, ch 5), Hinich and
Munger (1997, chs. 2-4).
3
One possibility of MPs to create such a government is to break away from the parliamentary party (Mair 1990). The
relevant case in Austria is the break-away of five Freedom Party MPs in 1993, who then founded the Liberal Forum.
This created a new potential majority coalition of SPÖ, Greens, and Liberal Forum, who together controlled more
seats than the People’s Party and the Freedom Party between 1993 and 1994. However, a new government which
better reflects the preferences of individual MPs can also be achieved without their breaking away from their party.
As the examples of the Fourth French Republic and Italy demonstrate, MPs of the government parties can achieve
their policy and office goals by voting against their own government (Hine 1993: 170-1; Sartori 1997: 111).
3
acceptance of the respective backbenchers. This introduces the problem of non-simultaneous
exchange (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Mores specifically, party leaders demand from their
backbenchers to act against their preferences today, and promise that they will be compensated at
some time in the future. The "selling" of such package deals to the backbenchers also requires
strong parties. It is the more difficult, the more legislative proposals violate the preferences of
MPs and the more prominent these are. In the present study we have tried to minimize the impact
of the package deal problem by focusing on policy areas.
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY COHESION
Let us first take a look at parliamentary party cohesion. This question has been addressed in a
personal interviews with all 183 Austrian MPs. In the interviews the Members of Parliament had
been asked whether they have ever remained in a minority in their own parliamentary party in a
matter important to them. 17 percent of the MPs reported that this had never occurred, while 83
percent could recall such cases. 36 percent of the MPs reported that in their entire career there had
been a single such case, 42 percent reported several such occasions, and eight percent claimed
that they frequently had remained in the minority in their own party (Müller et al. 2000).
We have recorded the important cases of internal disagreement reported by the MPs and have
asked them about their subsequent behavior in the plenary meeting. Most MPs could or were
willing to recall their behavior. Table 1 reports their answers. Altogether 110 MPs answered this
question, some of whom reported several cases (therefore the percentages do not always sum up
to 100). According to Table 1 four fifth of the parliamentarians could remember their behavior.
We assume that the remaining 20 percent are more likely to have voted with their party. Almost
half of the MPs recorded that they had voted with their party. 15 percent took rescue to the mild
means of disagreement – absenteeism. 30 percent claimed that they had voted against their party.
Keep in mind, however, that Table 1 registers singular or very rare events. In other words, only 30
percent of the Austrian MPs claim that they have voted against their party once (and in a few
cases more often) in their entire career. We take this as evidence of a high degree of party
cohesion in parliamentary voting.
Table 1: MPs behavior in plenary meeting in specific cases of disagreement with the party line
(percentages; more than one coding possible)
SPÖ
Voted with my party
Absence
Voted against my party
Cannot remember
(n)
50
27
21
21
(44)
ÖVP
49
11
17
29
(35)
FPÖ
44
0
52
13
(23)
LF
50
0
50
0
(2)
G
17
0
83
0
(6)
Parliament
46
15
30
20
(110)
Abbreviations:
SPÖ
Social Democratic Party of Austria
ÖVP
Austrian Poeple’s Party
FPÖ
Freedom Party of Austria
LF
Liberal Forum
G
Greens
4
Unfortunately, roll-call votes are relatively rare events in the Austrian parliament. Thus, we
cannot subject the evidence from the interviews to large-scale checks with behavioral data. Table
2 reports the Rice index for the 75 roll-call votes which were held in the 1994–97 period. Full
party cohesion produces a Rice index of 100, a split in the middle of a parliamentary party gives a
Rice index of 50. We have calculated a second version of the Rice index in which we have
counted absent MPs as dissenters. While disagreement is certainly one of the reasons for
absenteeism, it is not the only one. After having checked the individual absentees, we doubt that
policy disagreement is the most important explanation of absenteeism.
Table 2: Rice index of party cohesion in roll-call votes, 1994–97
Legisl.
term
(XIX.)
(n=29)
1994–95
(XX.)
(n=46)
1996–97
Rice index (mean)
SPÖ ÖVP FPÖ
LF
G
Parliament
Voting MPs
Absentees counted as "silent
protest"
Voting MPs
Absentees counted as "silent
protest"
99,3
96,8
99,7
96,0
99,2
94,0
93,3
76,0
97,7
79,7
98,9
93,9
99,9
97,3
99,0
96,0
99,5
92,9
98,8
88,0
96,2
78,1
99,3
94,5
The Rice index indicates very high degrees of party cohesion. Interestingly, the decline of party
cohesion in the alternative version of the index (which counts absenteeism as "silent protest") is
most severe in the cases of the Liberals and Greens, parties which are less concerned about party
cohesion than the major parties or even reject the idea of party discipline in the sense of the
"Klubzwang".
Compared to party cohesion in other parliamentary systems, Austrian parties stand out as
extremely cohesive. According to the rudimentary data contained in the literature, no country
displays a higher degree of party cohesion. The cohesion of the Austrian parties is similar to that
of the French Communists and Socialists in the 1960s and early 1970s and the German Social
Democrats until the end of the 1950s, that is parties that are well known for their cohesion at that
time (Wilson and Wiste 1976; Saalfeld 1995: 109). Party cohesion in the Austrian Nationalrat is
considerably higher (that is some index points higher) than in the German Bundestag and in the
Norwegian Storting (Saalfeld 1995: 109-10; Rasch 1999: 131). Compared to the parties of the
center-right in France (until the early 1970s), the Finish parties (until the mid-1960s), or the
Swiss parties, cohesion is extremely high in Austria (Wilson and Wiste 1976; Lanfranchi and
Lüthi 1999: 109).
It is thus fair to say that Austrian MPs act in accordance with their fellow partisans. In so doing
the members of the government parties also respect coalition discipline. Austrian legislative
behavior is overwhelmingly structured by the opposition mode, that is, the government and their
parliamentary parties constitute one block which acts cohesively (King 1976; Müller 1993;
Sickinger 1996). Indeed, there has never been a violation of coalition discipline, that is, one
government party outvoting the other one by joining forces with the opposition (Müller 2000c).
When individual MPs have not respected the party line, this has never led to a result which was
5
different from the coalition’s policy position (Müller and Steininger 2000: 81). Finally, we are not
aware of non-decisions which were caused by anticipated parliamentary defeat of the government.
However, there had been two important pieces of legislation in the 1994–96 and 1996–99
parliamentary terms in which the government had to water-down its legislative proposals in order
to maintain the support of the government backbenchers. In the 1994–96 term a package of
austerity measures, the so-called "Sparpaket 1", faced the resistance of Social Democratic MPs
and was eventually enacted only in a watered-down version. The same happened to a legislative
proposal reforming the pension system in the 1996–99 term. While important, these were singular
events.
PREFERENCES AND THEIR AGGREGATION
We can now turn to the question why the MPs have acted so cohesively and supportive for the
government. Is it because they act according to their own preferences or because they are
influenced or forced by their parties to do so against their preferences? Only in the latter case we
can consider the parties strong.
This question has never been systematically addressed with regard to Austrian MPs, though
occasionally authors have issued their opinions on the basis of "participatory observation". Thus
Heinz Fischer (1974: 134) has characterized the relevance of the "Klubzwang" (enforced party
cohesion) as "highly overrated" by external observers (mainly journalists). He has argued that an
MP whose preferences are different from those of the majority of his or her parliamentary party
may not necessarily agree with the positions put forward by the other parties. Indeed, a rather
rightist Social Democratic policy may be the best a left Socialist can hope for in a parliament
where the Social Democratic Party is the parliamentary group most to the left. In this paper we
take up this question by taking a systematic look at the preferences of the MPs.
In the remainder of the paper we distinguish one-stage and two-stages aggregation of preferences.
In a one-stage preference aggregation the MPs vote according to their own preferences or as
delegates of external decentralized bodies (such as electoral districts or local party organizations).
According to the median voter theorem this means that the median legislator’s preferences will be
decisive. In a two-stages preference aggregation the preferences of the MPs are first aggregated in
the various political parties. The resulting positions are then accepted by all MPs of the respective
party. Schütt-Wetschky (1984: 18) labels this the "group type" of parliamentary democracy, in
which the MPs are members of parliamentary parties and act cohesively, with the MPs who have
remained in the minority accepting and supporting the majority position in their external behavior
in order to enhance the political success of the group. According to the median voter theorem, the
party-internal median becomes the party position. In the second stage of preference aggregation
only the party positions matter. In the case of the Austrian parliament this means that 183
individual positions are first aggregated to five party positions, which are backed by the
respective MPs. According to the median voter theorem the majority should form around the
party which includes the new median legislator.
6
Data
This paper draws on the most comprehensive political elites survey ever conducted in Austria. All
183 Members of Parliament have been interviewed orally (Müller et al. 2000). After the
interviews they were asked to complete a questionnaire, on which the present paper draws.4
Altogether 137 MPs have returned the questionnaire, what means a return rate of 75 percent.5
This is an excellent return rates compared to surveys among MPs in other countries.6
The written questions mainly served the purpose to identify the political preferences of the
representatives by asking them about their agreement or disagreement with a range of political
statements. Three different scales were employed, ranging from 1 to 4, 1 to 7, and 1 to 10
respectively.
The Tables 3 to 7 mainly report raw data. The Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party are
slightly over-represented while the Freedom Party, the Liberal Forum and the Greens are slightly
under-represented. This is irrelevant, as long as one focuses on the preferences within individual
parties. If, however, the whole parliament comes into focus, the result would be misleading. We
have therefore calculated a weighted mean and a weighted median for the parliament.7
In this section we present data on the preferences of Austrian Members of Parliament with respect
to those five policy dimensions, which traditionally have been of paramount importance in
Austrian politics and/or which have become so in the 1980s and 1990s (Müller, Philipp, and
Jenny 1995; Müller 2000b). These are (1) the traditional economic conflict dimension, (2) the
religious conflict dimension, (3) the socio-cultural policy dimension, (4) the European integration
conflict dimension, and (5) the conflict over the Austrian political system. Together these conflict
dimensions structure party competition in the 1980s and 1990s.
The economic conflict dimension
The economic cleavage has been the most important one for the structuring of the Austrian party
system since the late 19th century. This cleavage has divided the parties of the left (Social
Democrats, Communists, Greens) from those of the right (People’s Party, Freedom Party, Liberal
Forum). In Table 1 we present data on several sub-dimensions of this cleavage (social justice,
government role in the economy, welfare vs. taxes, fighting unemployment or inflation, and
government role at the European level).
4
The bulk of the questionnaires were completed in the spring and fall of 1997. A few more were added in the winter
1997/98 and in the spring of 1998.
5
The individual parties are represented with 76 percent (SPÖ), 77 to 81 percent (ÖVP), 62 to 71 % (FPÖ) and 56
percent (LF, Greens) of their MPs.
6
A survey with an equivalent questionnaire and has resulted in an average return rate of 37.6 percent in most other
EU countries. Only Sweden had a higher return rate with 90.9 percent. The other countries ranged between 14.9
percent and 58 percent (Belgium) (Katz and Wessels 1999: 252).
7
We have based our calculations on the seat distribution after the partial repetition election of 1996 and the change
of one Liberal Forum MP to the Freedom Party. This seat distribution was the one which held for most of the
legislative term and it is the one which is reflected in the interviews. SPÖ 71, ÖVP 52, FPÖ 42, LF 9, Greens 9.
7
Table 3 shows that the ideological spectrum within the individual parties is broad and overlaps
considerably. In 18 out of 25 cases – and in 15 of 15 cases in the three major parties – it covers
more than half of the scale, that means that individual parties contain MPs with very left and
rather right positions or very right and rather left positions. The partly considerable standard
deviations indicate that this is not due to ideological mavericks. Rather the three big parties have
ideological wings. Therefore the parties’ cohesive parliamentary behavior is not due to preference
identity or homogeneity.
However, does the two-stages aggregation of preferences have an effect on the outcome? Would
there be a different majority position (according to the median voter theorem) if the MPs would
vote according to their own individual preferences rather than along the party line? The answer is
a clear "Yes". There is a left-of-center majority with regard to all economic issues. The two-stages
aggregation of these preferences, however, produce right-of-center majorities in three out of five
sub-dimensions (incomes inequality, government role in the economy, welfare). In the "reduce
inequality of incomes" dimension, for instance, the median based on the MPs’ individual
preferences is 2. However, working from the five party medians and taking into account the
voting power of the individual parties, the new median is 4.8 With regard to one more issue
(fighting unemployment) the two-stages aggregation shifts the median position slightly to the
right. In contrast, the median for the remaining issue (EU employment program) is shifted slightly
to the left by the two-stages aggregation of preferences. In both cases, the new median is the
FPÖ’s party position.
We can conclude this brief discussion by stating that in the most important policy dimension the
two-stages aggregation has a significant effect on the outcome. Parties indeed can be considered
strong.
8
This is based on the following distribution of preferences: 80 MPs (71 of the SPÖ and 9 of the Greens) favor 1 on
the seven point scale, 9 MPs (LF) favor 3, while a total of 94 MPs (52 of the ÖVP and 42 of the FPÖ) favor 4. Hence
the new median is 4.
8
Table 3. MPs’ preferences with regard to the economic cleavage
9
"Fully agree" (=1) to "Fully disagree" (=7)
Reduce inequality of incomes
"There should be greater efforts to reduce the inequality of incomes."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Median
Mean
Range
SD
(n)
4
4
3
1
2
2
3,7
3,7
3,4
1,2
2,7
2,7
1-7
1-7
2-5
1-2
1-7
1,7
2,0
1,5
0,5
1,8
(40)
(26)
(5)
(5) (130)
(183)
Government role in the economy
"The government should have a greater role in the economy."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Median
Mean
Range
SD
(n)
1
1,6
1-5
0,9
(54)
3
2,6
1-5
1,0
(54)
4,5
4,5
2-7
1,7
(40)
Twostages
4
Twostages
4,5
5
7
4
3
3
4,4
6,2
3,0
3,7
3,7
1-7
5-7
1-5
1-7
2,0
1,1
1,9
1,8
(30)
(5)
(5) (134)
(183)
Welfare vs. taxes
"The present level of welfare should be maintained even at the price of tax increases."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
Median
2
5
5
6
2
3
3
5
Mean
1,9
4,7
5,1
6,2
1,6
3,6
3,6
Range
1-6
1-7
1-7
5-7
1-3
1-7
SD
0,8
1,9
1,6
0,8
0,6
2,1
(n)
(54)
(39)
(30)
(5)
(5) (133)
(183)
Unemployment vs. inflation
"It is more important to reduce unemployment than to limit inflation."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
Median
1
4
2,5
4
1
2
2
2,5
Mean
1,6
3,9
2,8
4,6
1,2
2,7
2,7
Range
1-4
1-7
1-7
4-6
1-2
1-7
SD
0,9
1,7
1,6
0,9
0,5
1,7
(n)
(54)
(38)
(30)
(5)
(5) (132)
(183)
EU employment program (=1) vs. completion of single market (=10)
"The former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, has proposed that the
EU shall provide financial means for a comprehensive employment program. Others
believe that the completion of the single market is the best means to solve the problem of
unemployment."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
Median
1
4
1,5
9
3
2
2
1,5
Mean
1,6
4,6
3,3
8,6
3,2
3,2
3,3
Range
1-8
1-10
1-10
6-10
1-6 1-10
SD
1,2
2,7
3,2
1,5
2,3
2,8
(n)
(54)
(42)
(30)
(5)
(5) (136)
(183)
10
The religious cleavage
The religious cleavage traditionally has been the second policy dimension in the Austrian party
system, dividing the secular parties from the Christian Socials (in the pre-WW II period) and the
People’s Party (since 1945). This conflict dimension has lost much of its saliency in the post-war
period, with the Social Democrats and the Catholic Church making peace. However, the question
whether public law conflicts with religious values has not completely disappeared from the
political agenda. Relevant issues include Sunday work, divorce, and abortion. The abortion issue
has not only been a recurring but also by far the most important one. We therefore use it to
measure the preferences of MPs with regard to the religious conflict dimension. However, note
that the abortion issue also has a socio-cultural dimension (women’s rights).
Table 4. MPs’ preferences with regard to the religious cleavage
SPÖ
Median
Mean
Range
SD
(n)
1
1,5
1-7
1,1
(54)
"Fully agree" (=1) to "Fully disagree" (=7)
Abortion
"Women should be free to decide on abortion."
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
5
4,7
1-7
1,9
(39)
2
2,9
1-7
2,3
(30)
1
1,2
1-2
0,5
(5)
1
2
1,0
2,7
1-2
1-7
0,0
2,2
(5) (133)
2
2,7
Twostages
2
(183)
Table 4 shows that the three major parties again have a remarkably broad spectrum of
preferences. Collectively, the representatives of each of the major parties exhaust the full scale.
This cleavage – or the specific issue – polarizes more within the individual parties than the
economic cleavage. Accordingly, the standard deviation is higher than in the four economic
issues which have been measured with the same seven point scale. Consequently, it is not
preference identity or homogeneity which makes MPs to vote cohesively when such issues come
on the agenda.
In contrast to the economic conflict dimension, the two-stages aggregation of preferences does
not change the outcome. The median remains 2, what implies largely the acceptance of the
women’s autonomy to decide about abortion.
The socio-cultural cleavage
The socio-cultural cleavage summarizes conflicts between liberterian and conservative positions
(cf. Kitschelt 1994; 1995). These include the gender conflict, the conflict over immigration, and
the conflict between civil rights and the state. While all these conflicts can be considered as
cleavages in their own right, they are highly correlated both at the elite and mass levels. Table 5
contains two issues which both belong to the last-mentioned sub-dimension. They address the
11
latent conflict between civil rights and the effective fight against crime and the issue of
decriminalizing "soft" drugs. However, we believe that these issues can be generalized to the
cleavage as we have outlined it above.
Table 5. MPs’ preferences with regard to the socio-cultural cleavage
"Fully agree" (=1) to "Fully disagree" (=7)
Fighting crime
"There should be tougher action against crime."
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Median
Mean
Range
SD
(n)
3
3,0
1-7
1,7
(54)
SPÖ
Median
Mean
Range
SD
(n)
5
4,7
1-7
2,1
(54)
2
2,4
1-7
1,4
(40)
5
5
2
2
5,0
5,0
2,6
2,7
3-6
4-6
1-7
1,2
0,7
1,7
(5)
(5) (134)
(183)
Drugs
"Decriminalize use of marijuana."
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
7
6,2
1-7
1,6
(40)
1
1,5
1-6
1,0
(30)
7
6,9
6-7
0,3
(30)
1
1,2
1-2
0,5
(5)
1
7
1,0
5,4
1-1
1-7
0,0
2,2
(5) (134)
7
5,3
Twostages
2
Twostages
7
(183)
Table 5 once again reveals a very broad spectrum of preferences among the MPs of the Social
Democrats and the People’s Party, each of which again collectively exhaust the whole scale. It is
the Social Democratic Party which is particularly characterized by the existence of ideological
wings with regard to this cleavage. In contrast, the preferences in the Freedom Party MPs are
relatively well aligned. In sum, however, we can once again conclude that cohesive parliamentary
behavior of the parties is not due to preference identity or homogeneity. However, the two-stages
preference aggregation, first within parties and then between them, does not change the outcome
compared to individual voting in parliament.
The European integration cleavage
The European integration cleavage has become mass relevant in Austria not before the 1980s and
particularly the 1990s. The conflict is between the preservation of full national sovereignty and
full participation in the European integration process.
12
Table 6. MPs’ preferences with regard to the European integration cleavage
Maintain national currency (=1) vs. European currency (=10)
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
10
Median
10
10
2
10
10
10
10
Mean
9,2
9,2
3,0
9,8
9,2
7,8
7,8
Range
2-10
1-10
1-9
9-10
6-10 1-10
SD
1,5
1,8
2,4
0,5
1,8
3,1
(n)
(54)
(42)
(30)
(5)
(5) (136)
(183)
Continue to remove national borders in the EU (1) vs. tougher border controls to fight
crime more effectively (10)
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
Median
2
2
7,5
1
1
3
3
2
Mean
2,6
2,7
6,9
1,4
1,2
3,5
3,5
Range
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-2
1-2 1-10
SD
2,2
1,9
2,9
0,6
0,5
2,9
(n)
(54)
(41)
(30)
(5)
(5) (135)
(183)
Table 6 provides a picture already familiar to the reader: the major parties are characterized by a
enormous range of preferences. This is also true for the Freedom Party. The standard deviation is
particularly high in this party which used to be the most pro-European of all Austrian parties until
its electorally motivated U-turn in the early 1990s. Table 5 suggests that the new anti-European
party line is not very deeply rooted among FPÖ MPs. Again we can say that the cohesive
parliamentary behavior of the parties cannot be explained exclusively by the representatives’
preferences.
Two-stages preference aggregation does not change the policy outcome with regard to the issue of
the European currency. However, there is such an effect with regard to the second issue. While
the median based on the individual preferences of the MPs is 3 and thus indicates a middle level
of consent with a further removal of national borders in the EU, the two-stages aggregation leads
to a meadian of 2 and hence a stronger pro-European position. We can again take this as
indicating the existence of strong parties.
The conflict dimension of the political system
Since the 1980s core elements of the Austrian political system have been challenged in party
competition. The Freedom Party has demanded a comprehensive change of the institutional
framework. All opposition parties have challenged the corporatist mode of policy-making.
However, the most rewarding target of the opposition parties has been the "secret agenda" of
grand coalition politics: the dividing up of the public sector in party political spheres of influence
(of the Social Democrats and People’s Party exclusively), which goes far beyond what
parliamentary majorities can claim as legitimate means of implementing their policies in liberal
democracies (Müller 1989).
13
We have not raised the many different controversial issues of the political system conflict
dimension in the MPs questioneer. Rather we have asked them for a summary evaluation of the
working of democracy in Austria (Table 7). With regard to this dimension the preferences of the
MPs of the various parliamentary parties are rather homogeneous. They are largely dependent on
their status as either in-groups or out-groups in the political system. Only MPs of those parties
which have shaped the political system have proofed completely satisfied, in turn, all completely
dissatisfied MPs belong to the Freedom Party. The two-stages aggregation of preferences does not
change the outcome.
Table 7. MPs’ satisfaction with the working of democracy
Satisfaction with democracy
"How satisfied are you, considering everything, with the working of democracy in
Austria?"
"Very satisfied" (=1) to "completly dissatisfied" (=4)
SPÖ
ÖVP
FPÖ
LF
G
Raw Weighted
Twostages
Median
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
Mean
1,9
1,8
3,1
2,6
2,8
2,2
2,2
Range
1-3
1-3
2-4
2-3
2-3
1-4
SD
0,6
0,6
0,4
0,6
0,5
0,7
(n)
(54)
(42)
(29)
(5)
(5) (135)
(183)
CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the question whether Austrian parties are indeed strong if the "stronger
standard for strong parties", as suggested by Krehbiel (1993; 1999), is applied. According to this
standard, parties are only strong if individual MPs vote with fellow party members but against
their individual preferences although they could achieve an outcome which is closer to their
preferences by not supporting the party line.
Our empirical look at party cohesion has indeed demonstrated that MPs vote with the party in all
but exceptional circumstances. We then have looked at the political preferences of the MPs to
figure out whether their parliamentary behavior is just an expression of their preferences or
whether it reflects the influence of strong parties. With regard to most policy dimensions and
issues we have found considerable preference divergencies among the MPs of one and the same
party. If they vote together in parliament, they do not so because their preferences are so well
aligned that this is the natural thing to do. Whatever the party position, a good deal of the
respective MPs will hold preferences which are quite remote from it. Thus there is ample
evidence for the first condition of strong parties.
However, the question remains whether the MPs could have done better in terms of policy
outcome by not voting with their party. With regard to two policy dimensions we have indeed
found such effects of political parties. If the preferences would not have been aggregated in two
stages, first within the individual parties and then between them, the outcome would have been
14
different. In the economic policy dimension and the European integration policy dimension,
parties have managed to shift the median position considerably. With regard to economic issues,
the existence of political parties shifts the median from the left to the right of the political
spectrum. This result is particularly puzzling since this policy dimension is generally considered
the most important one. In the European integration dimension political parties shift the median
slightly in the pro-European direction.
With regard to the other three policy dimensions, the religious, socio-cultural, and the political
system dimensions, we have not observed such shifts. Although the preferences held by MPs of
one and the same party are highly diverse, their patterns of distribution account for the fact that
the two-step aggregation does not change the outcome. Hence, with regard to the "stronger
standard for strong parties" only the first criterion is fulfilled.
Although our findings are not uniform, we nevertheless interpret them as supporting the claim
that Austrian parties are indeed strong according to the "stronger standard for strong parties".
It is beyond the ambition of the present paper to explain what makes political parties strong, that
is, what means they employ to make their MPs to behave cohesively (see Müller 2000a for a
discussion). In the most general sense, however, it can be mentioned that parties help to avoid
transaction costs – search, information and decision costs for the formation of majorities9 – and
have a arsenal of positive and negative incentives to solve the problem of collective action.
9
The relevance of these considerations is confirmed by Christian Brünner (1994: 168), a former MP of the People’s
Party. He claims that the MPs lack information about the preferences and the behavior of other MPs and therefore
maintain the party line.
15
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