Developing a Climate Change Strategy for
Watercare Services Limited
The following documents were developed as part of the development of a climate
change strategy for Watercare in late 2008 / early 2009:
o Literature Review
o Elements of the Climate Change Strategy
o Proposed Action Plan
The strategy was led by an external consultant, Dr Bruce Hucker, and involved staff
from Watercare’s Environmental Planning Unit and Energy and Control Systems.
A description of the development of the strategy is contained in the following
additional paper:
o Climate Change Strategy and Watercare Services Limited: the work of
its climate change strategy team
Note on GHG emissions
Since the strategy was developed, Watercare has become the integrated supplier of
water and wastewater services to the Auckland Region. As a result Watercare’s
greenhouse gas emissions have increased. Using 1990 as a baseline, the reduction
in GHG emissions is now 75%, whereas previously it had been up to 89%.
Climate Change Literature Review Prepared for Watercare Services Limited Dr Bruce Hucker Nicholas Woodley 2009 Table of Contents PART 1:
INTRODUCTION
1-18
PART 2:
NINE QUESTIONS AND NINE ANSWERS
17-66
1. Are global warming and climate change occurring and how are human activities contributing to them
through greenhouse gas emissions?
2. What are the implications of different levels of temperature increases against a pre-industrial baseline?
3. What are the desirable international targets in terms of ppm CO2 equivalents?
4. What are the international and national mechanisms to achieve significant reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions?
5. What are the ethical assumptions embedded in these mechanisms and what principles should govern
climate change policy?
6. How are we going to encourage individuals, families, businesses and communities to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions?
7. What are the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures?
8. What in a national and regional context in New Zealand is the evidence for climate change and its
effects?
9. What are other water utility businesses doing about climate change with regards to mitigation and
adaptation?
PART 3:
CONCLUSION
60-73
Bibliography
67-79
Useful Websites
73-81
ii
Part 1: Introduction Two of the primary authorities for global warming and climate change are the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Stern Review. The IPCC was set up in 1998 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. So far it has issued four sets of reports: in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. In the latest of these there is a growing confidence in its findings and an increased estimate of temperature increases. ‘Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising average sea level (IPCC Synthesis Report, 2007, p.2)’ It notes that from 1995 to 2006 the warmest years on record have occurred since 1850. Also the 100 – year trend in temperature increases from 1906 to 2005 is 0.74° C, which is higher than that reported by the IPCC in 2001. There is also little room left for doubt about the cause of global warming. There is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming. ‘Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid‐20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. It is likely that there has been significant anthropogenic warming over the past 50 years averaged over each continent (except Antarctica) (IPCC Synthesis Report, 2007, p.5).’ The Stern Review was prepared for the Cabinet Office – HM Treasury for the U.K. government. It was released at the end of 2006 and then published in 2007 by Cambridge University Press. Its conclusions are also disturbing: •
•
•
•
an overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue; most climate models show that a doubling of pre‐ industrial levels of greenhouse gases is very likely to commit the earth to a rise of between 2° and 5° C in global mean temperatures; this level of greenhouse gases will probably be reached between 2030 and 2060; some impacts of climate change itself may amplify warming further by triggering the release of additional greenhouse gases and create a real risk of even higher temperature changes; 1
•
•
warming is likely to intensify the water cycle reinforcing existing patterns of water scarcity and abundance and increasing the risk of droughts and floods; as the world warms, the risk of abrupt and large‐scale changes in the climate system will rise (Stern Review, 2007, p.3). One of the measures used for levels of greenhouse gases is the parts per million of CO2 equivalents that are present in the atmosphere. Against a base‐line of pre‐industrial times we have now reached a level of 430 ppm CO2‐eq. The setting of stabilisation goals becomes a critical element in developing approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to assess the economics of climate change. The Stern Review opts for an upper limit to the stabilisation range of 550 ppm CO2‐eq. (Stern Review, 2007, p. 337). It notes that on the basis of current evidence stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2‐eq. or below is likely to be very difficult and costly. It concludes, therefore that ‘The evidence on the benefits and costs of mitigation at different atmospheric concentrations should lie within the range 450‐550 ppm CO2‐eq. (Stern Review, 2007, p. 338) Adopting this as a goal would require two things: global emissions would need to peak in the next ten to twenty years and then fall at a rate of at least 1‐3% per year. By 2050, global emissions would need to be about 25% below current levels (Stern Review, 2007, p. 218). A notable conclusion in the Stern Review that has been widely reported is the cost of tackling climate change immediately rather than delaying this mitigation task to a more distant future. Using a number of economic models and taking into account a wide range of risks and impacts, Stern argues that the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of global GDP each year or more if we don’t act now (Stern Review, 2007, p. xv). If we start to take strong action now central estimates of the annual costs of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550 ppm CO2‐eq are around 1% of global GDP. As Gabrielle Walker and Sir David King (who until 2007 was the UK government’s chief scientific advisor) comment: ‘Paying 1 per cent now to save 20 per cent later sounds like a good deal in anyone’s books (Walker and King, 2008, p. 158).’ They continue by analysing the debate among economists about these estimates, particularly about the discount rate used, which will be explored further below. The two primary authorities, the IPCC reports and the Stern review, tend to err on the side of conservatism. This is particularly so in the case of the IPCC. 2
It does not undertake independent research itself. Instead it analyses peer reviewed literature on climate change. This is a strength but also a weakness. The 2007 reports, for example, had a cut‐ off date for peer reviewed literature to be submitted at the end of 2005. As Gwynne Dyer observes: ‘But the data being analysed in those papers are generally a good deal older than that, for two reasons. One is the publication process itself. The first step in publishing a scientific paper is to submit it to a scientific journal, whose editor then sends it out to other scientists with established reputations in the field for peer review. The other scientists reviewing the paper will often raise questions that are then referred back to the authors for comment. There may be two or more iterations of this process before the editor of the journal, if he or she is satisfied, puts the article in question into the queue for publication – which is frequently a year or more long. Realistically, the great majority of the scientific papers that were published before the end of 2005 were probably submitted for publication before the end of 2003 (Dyer, 2008, p93).’ Added to this is the age of the data being used. It has to be collated and analysed before the paper is written. That means that the data might go back to the year 2002. The predictions that are made, therefore, in 2008 are likely to rest on data that is as much as six years old. The IPCC is also influenced by the political sphere. Its most read documents are its summaries for policy makers. These involve compromises between what is politically practicable and consensus derived approaches to scientific understanding. The IPCC makes extensive use of models and scenarios. Again these are valuable tools and are essential for the interpretation of complex data and for the purposes of prediction. The models are particularly important in indicating the extent of temperature increases and explaining why these are occurring, particularly in relation to greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities. However the models that are used by the IPCC and the Stern Review to analyse climate change do not take into account the latest data and for this reason tend to understate what is likely to happen and how soon. Also they do not incorporate the more serious of possible trends suggested by new empirical data where positive feedback loops, or climate surprises, vicious cycles, or tipping points may be starting to operate. These lead to exponential rather than linear developments. As Gwynne Dyer observes: 3
‘In sum nobody can tell you with full confidence just how much worse than the IPCC scenarios the real situation is, but serious scientific opinion thinks that it is quite a lot worse. There are, for example, an estimated seventy billion tonnes of frozen methane gas in the west Siberian bog alone – and the southern fringes of it began to melt in 2005. We have less time to respond than we thought, and the emissions cuts we must make will need to be much deeper than the conventional wisdom decrees if we are to avoid runaway change. For that is the ultimate danger: that somewhere not too far beyond 2 degrees Celsius warmer than the pre‐ industrial global average temperature, the feedbacks will create a self‐sustaining process of further warming that we cannot stop, no matter how deeply we cut our emissions subsequently (Dyer, 2008, p. 96).’ Since both the IPCC 2007 reports and the Stern Review were completed the literature reflects an even stronger degree of urgency about climate change. To some extent it builds on qualifications already indicated by the IPCC and Stern about the data they have employed and its interpretation. The Stern Review, as has already been noted, suggested that some impacts of climate change may amplify warming further, trigger the release of additional greenhouse gases and create a risk of even higher temperature changes. It also drew attention to the increased risk of abrupt and large ‐ scale changes in the climate system (Stern Review, 2007, p.3). Concentration of greenhouse gases and temperature rises. The first issue where the science has moved on is the connection between the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and likely temperature rises. Earlier it had been assumed that the average global surface temperature could be prevented from rising by more than 2°C above its pre‐industrial levels if the concentration of greenhouse gases could be restricted to 550 ppm CO2‐eq. As Walker and King comment: ‘550 ppm, which has long been the target that was supposed to keep us below 2°C, has no chance at all of doing this, and might even take us up to 5°C (Walker and King, 2008, p.98).’ Basing their estimates largely on the work of Working Group III and its contribution to the IPCC’s 2007 report on mitigation of climate change they maintain that: •
‘For 450 ppm CO2‐eq, the temperature rise will probably be between 2 and 3.5°C with the likeliest value around 2.5°C. •
For 550 ppm CO2‐eq, the rise will be between 3 and 5°C with a likeliest value at about 3.5°C 4
•
For 650 ppm CO2‐eq, the rise will be between 3.5 and 6°C, with the likeliest value around 4°C (Walker and King, 2008, p.96).’ The 2°C temperature rise has achieved some currency with the U.K. government, the European Union and the United Nations as the climate window that should not be exceeded. All of those institutions have a stated commitment of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change by preventing 2°C rises being reached (Monbiot, 2008, p.43). Mark Lynas observes: ‘So if our target is two degrees, in order to avoid the unstoppable climatic domino effect of positive feedbacks, global emissions of all greenhouse gases must peak by 2015, and drop steadily thereafter with an ultimate CO2 stabilisation target of 400 ppm (or 450 ppm for CO2‐ equivalent) however politically unrealistic this emissions trajectory might seem. The actual percentage emission cut this target implies will depend on how the Earth’s carbon cycle behaves, but in my view current science suggests that it means a worldwide 60 per cent cut by 2030, and a 90 per cent cut by 2050 (Lynas, 2007, p. 276).’ Sea level rises The second issue affected by views about positive feedback loops and their implications for exponential rather than linear changes is that of sea level rises. In its 2007 report the IPCC projected an 18 to 59cm rise in sea levels by the end of the century (for the period 2090‐
2099). However it also introduced some qualifications relating to this estimate. ‘Because understanding of some important effects driving sea level rise is too limited, this report does not assess the likelihood, nor provide a best estimate or an upper bound for sea level rise.... The projections do not include uncertainties in climate‐carbon cycle feedbacks nor the full effect of changes in ice sheet flow; therefore the upper values of the ranges are not to be considered upper bounds for sea level rise. They include a contribution from increased Greenland and Antarctic ice flow at the rates observed for 1993‐2003, but this could increase or decrease in the future (IPCC Synthesis Report, 2007, pp7‐8).’ The IPCC 2007 report also argues: ‘Anthropogenic warming could lead to some impacts that are abrupt or irreversible, depending upon the rate and magnitude of the climate change. Partial loss of ice sheets on polar land could imply metres of sea level rise, major changes in coastlines and inundations of low‐lying areas, with greatest effects in river deltas and low‐lying islands. Such changes are projected to occur over millennial time scales, but more rapid sea level rise on century time scales cannot be excluded (IPCC Synthesis Report, 2007, p.13).’ 5
Sea level rise in the future will continue as a result of thermal expansion. But there are other factors also to take into account. At what rate will the Greenland ice sheet disintegrate and what influence will an earlier than anticipated loss of Arctic sea ice have on it? How quickly will the West Antarctic ice sheet disintegrate? These questions as Spratt and Sutton note have contributed to turmoil in scientific circles because of the general acknowledgment that the sea‐level rise will be a good deal higher than the early 2007 IPCC report suggests ( Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.34). There is growing evidence that Arctic summer sea ice is melting more quickly than expected and that the hundred years the IPCC thought it would take for it to disintegrate is not consistent with the speed of change actually occurring in that environment. Studies were published in March and May 2007 by Marika Holland of the US National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado and Mark Serreze and Julienne Stroeve of the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) at Colorado University. They suggested that the Arctic may be free of summer sea ice as early as 2030 (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.12). The NSIDC noted that on 16 September, 2007 the Arctic sea ice minimum fell to a record low of 4.13 million square kilometres compared with 5.32 million square kilometres in 2005. This was a 22 per cent decline in two years. By way of comparison between 1979 and 2005 the decreasing trend in ice area was 7 per cent per decade (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.13). The sea ice was also thinning. In the early 1960s the ice was 3.5 metres thick. In the late 1980s it was 2.5 metres. In 2008 large areas are only 1 metre thick. Half of the thinning has occurred in the last seven years. Studies by Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate College in California used US military sonar mapping of the Arctic sea ice from the days of the Cold War to model sea ice loss. He argued that the thinning ice was losing volume at a much faster rate than had been indicated by satellite‐derived surface‐area data. He also found that the sea ice was being thinned by the northward heat flux of warm summer Pacific and Atlantic waters, not just higher temperatures (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.14‐15). Further studies are summarised by Lester R. Brown. He also notes scientific concern about the albedo effect: ‘When incoming sunlight strikes the ice in the Arctic Ocean, up to 70 per cent of it is reflected back into space. Only 30 per cent is absorbed as heat. As the Arctic sea ice melts, however, and the incoming sunlight hits the much darker open water, only 6 per cent is reflected back into space and 94 per cent converted into heat. This may account for the accelerating shrinkage of the Arctic sea ice and the rising regional temperature that directly affects the Greenland ice sheet (Brown, 2008, p.58).’ 6
The melting of Arctic sea ice does not contribute directly to sea level rise. It may however have an indirect effect on the Greenland ice sheet. If that were to melt entirely sea levels would increase world‐ wide a full seven metres. In 2001 IPCC reports the conclusion drawn was that neither the Greenland nor the Antarctic ice sheets would lose significant mass by 2100 (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.20). In terms of the Greenland ice sheet the degree of uncertainty about its future stability and resilience has been increasing. The range of studies and expert opinion that has contributed to this are canvassed in a number of sources (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, pp20‐27; Brown, 2008, p.59; Romm, 2007, pp.79‐83; Walker and King, 2008, pp.78‐80; Fry, 2008, pp112‐113; Pearce, 2006, pp81‐90). The evidence points to Greenland’s ice shelf beginning to melt. Satellite measurements of Greenland’s interior suggest that snow has been building up, but the ice is getting thinner. Outlet glaciers seem to have been speeding up too, more than doubling their annual loss of ice over the past decade (Walker and King, 2008, pp78‐79). Thomas Mote of the Climatology Research Laboratory at the University of Georgia found the summertime melt in 2007 to be the most extreme so far: 60 per cent greater than the previous highest rate, in 1998 (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p23). None of the models being employed took account of an important factor. As Walker and King put it: ‘In 2002 several researchers noticed that something alarming seemed to be happening in one region during the summertime. Just when the summer sun began melting parts of the surface of west‐central Greenland, the glacier there began to slip more quickly. That’s surprising because Greenland’s glaciers are hundreds of metres thick. And because they slip on their bellies, something that happens on the surface shouldn’t make any difference. It turned out, though, that the melting was producing giant lakes on the surface, whose water poured down through cracks and crevasses creating inner waterfalls that flow to the land below and lubricate the ice’s sliding edge. That’s worrying because in principle it means that the entire Greenland ice sheet could be more vulnerable than we think to the steadily warming air (Walker and King, 2008, p.79).’ 7
Figure 1: Surface melt on Greenland ice sheet (Roger Braithwaite / EarthIsland Institute) ‘Building an ice sheet takes a long time – many thousands of years’, says James Hansen, one of the world’s leading climate scientists. ‘It is a slow, dry process inherently limited by the snowfall rate. But destroying it, we now realize, is a wet process, spurred by positive feedbacks, and once under way it can be explosively rapid (Pearce, 2006, p.90). This is why the rate of melting of the Greenland ice sheet is still uncertain and depends on the internal dynamics of the ice sheet itself, whether, for example, glaciers begin to slide more quickly as they are penetrated by water falling through cracks. ‘If these mechanisms cause Greenland to melt more quickly than we expect, sea level could rise by a matter of metres over the next century, which would cause grave danger for our civilisation. Greenland is one of the most convincing reasons we have for the urgent need to curb climate change (Walker and King, 2008, p.80).’ 8
Similar developments are occurring at the other end of the earth. Most of the world’s ice sits on the Antarctic continent. One tenth of the total Antarctic ice volume is contained in the smaller West Antarctic ice sheet. If it disintegrated it would raise sea levels by around five metres. Generally it has been thought that the West Antarctic sheet would be more stable that Greenland at a 1‐2°C rise. But as with the more northern climes more recent research indicates that the southern ice shelf reacts far more sensitively to warming temperatures than had been believed previously. Ice core data from the Antarctic Geological Drilling Project shows that major melting occurred in the Antarctic three million years ago when the average global temperature in the oceans increased by only 2‐3°C above the present temperature. The heating effect caused by climate change is greater at the poles, and the air over the West Antarctic peninsula has warmed nearly 6 degrees since 1950 (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.29). In March 2002 there was a rapid collapse of the 200 metre thick Larsen B ice shelf. It had been weakened by water‐filled cracks where its shelf attached to the Antarctic Peninsula. It gave way in a matter of days releasing five hundred billion tonnes of ice into the ocean. ‘Much of the West Antarctic ice sheet sits on a bedrock that is below sea level, buttressed on two sides by mountains, but held in place on the other two sides by the Ronne and Ross ice shelves; so, if the ice shelves that buttress the ice sheet disintegrate, sea water breeching the base of the ice sheet will hasten the rate of disintegration (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.30).’ Pine Island Bay is another vulnerable spot on the West Antarctic ice sheet. Two large glaciers, Pine Island and Thwaites, drain about 40% of the ice sheet in to the sea. They are responding to melting of their ice shelves and their rate of flow has doubled, while the rate of mass loss from their catchment has now tripled. Joseph Romm, who was acting assistant secretary at the Department of Energy in the Clinton administration summarises the studies that point to accelerating changes. The 2005 British Antarctic Survey and US Geological survey reported the results of a comprehensive analysis of the glaciers on the peninsula. Of 244 glaciers, 212 have retreated since the earliest positions recorded five decades ago, and they have retreated far greater distances than the few advancing glaciers have expanded (Romm, 2007, p.84). A major 2004 study led by NASA researchers using satellite and aircraft laser altimeter surveys found that glaciers in this sector of the ice sheets were discharging about 250 cubic kilometres of ice per year to the ocean. In 2006 University of Colorado at Boulder 9
researchers reported that Antarctica as a whole was losing up to 150 cubic kilometres of ice annually (Romm, 2007, p.85). The 2005 British and US study used ice penetrating radar to map the rocks under the Pine Island and Thwaites glaciers. They found that inland along its major tributaries the Pine Island glacier sits on great lakes of melt water (Pearce, 2006, p.99). As Romm concludes: ‘Perhaps the most important, and worrisome, fact about the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) is that it is fundamentally far less stable than the Greenland Ice Sheet because most of it is grounded far below sea level. The WAIS rests on bedrock as deep as 2 kilometres underwater… The warmer it gets, the more unstable WAIS outlet glaciers will become. Since so much of the ice sheet is grounded underwater, rising sea levels may have the effect of lifting the sheet, allowing more – and increasingly warmer – water underneath it, leading to further bottom melting, more ice‐shelf disintegration, accelerated glacial flow, further sea‐level rise, and so on and on, another vicious cycle (Romm, 2007, p.86).’ Even without Greenland and the Western Antarctic Ice Sheet contributing significantly to sea level rises, increases of a ½ to 1 metre will cause serious human suffering. John Houghton, in his classic text, instances Bangladesh. About ten per cent of the country’s habitable land (with about six million people) would be lost with half a metre of sea level rise. Twenty per cent (with about 15 million people) would be lost with a one metre rise. Estimates of the sea level rise are of about one metre by 2050. Of this, 70cm would be due to subsidence because of land movements and removal of groundwater and 30 cm from the effects of global warming. By 2100, 2 metres is projected (1.2 metres from subsidence and 70cm from global warming). While there may be considerable uncertainty in these estimates, they illustrate how even modest sea level rises can be exacerbated by subsidence (Houghton, 2004, 3rd ed., p.150). While climate surprises or abrupt climate changes have been well established by research over the last decade, Mark Maslin from University College, London, in his useful and short book on global warming discusses reports from the Royal Society in London and the National Research Council in the US on abrupt climate change. The latter makes five recommendations: •
improve the fundamental knowledge base related to abrupt climate change; •
improve modelling focussed on abrupt climate change; •
improve palaeoclimatic data related to abrupt climate change; 10
•
improve statistical approaches; and •
investigate ‘no‐regrets’ strategies to reduce vulnerability (Maslin, 2004, pp.102‐104). Climate change: a serious challenge or an emergency? The third issue that appears in the latest literature relates to whether climate change is a serious challenge or a global emergency. Ban Ki‐Moon, the secretary‐general of the UN, on 10 November 2007 said, ‘This is an emergency, and for emergency situations we need emergency action (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.1).’ Al Gore, who through his film and writing An Inconvenient Truth has popularised this view more than anyone else, in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, on 11 December 2007, commented: ‘We, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilisation that is gathering ominous and destructive potential…the Earth has a fever. And the fever is rising. The experts have told us it is not a passing affliction that will heal by itself. We asked for a second opinion. And a third. And a fourth. And the consistent conclusion, restated with increasing alarm, is that something basic is wrong. We are what is wrong, and we must make it right (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.73).’ Three of the books that address this issue in more detail are Lester Brown, Plan B 3.0. Mobilising to Save Civilisation, David Spratt and Philip Sutton, Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action, and Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Brown, 2008; Spratt and Sutton, 2008; Dyer, 2008). All take up the theme of a climate emergency, draw parallels with the rapid deployment of economic resources in the United States when during World War Two the economy was transformed and placed on a war footing, and note the engagement of the whole society through rationing measures to achieve a common purpose. The barriers to achieving a similar approach to climate change in today’s context are going to be difficult to overcome. This is because: (a) the impacts of climate change are going to be experienced more dramatically by future generations after 2050 and 2100, rather than by this generation and acting on the basis of longer term altruism is difficult to sustain; (b) the co‐operation required to achieve this is international rather than national in scope in contrast to war‐time mobilisation in the United States; 11
(c) the insecurity created by the meltdown in international financial institutions and the sharp economic decline that is occurring globally will have an impact on the resources likely to be committed for mitigation of and adaptation to global warming. But who thought dealing with global warming and climate change was going to be easy? While these barriers are going to be difficult to negotiate they are not insuperable. Also it is not a struggle we can afford to lose, or to put it more positively it is one we must win. The first step, however, is to acknowledge the magnitude of the task without allowing it to paralyse us and hinder active responses. As Thomas Friedman argues in his latest book: ‘For starters, let’s remember what we’re trying to do: We’re trying to change the climate system – to avoid the unmanageable and manage the unavoidable! We are trying to affect how much rain falls, how strong the winds blow, how fast the ice melts. In addition to all that, we’re trying to preserve and restore the world’s rapidly depleting ecosystem ‐ our forests, rivers, savannahs, oceans, and the cornucopia of plant and animal species they contain. Finally, we are trying to break a collective addiction to gasoline that is having not only profound climate effects but also geopolitical ones. It doesn’t get any bigger than this. This is not something you do as a hobby, and the adjective “easy” should never – ever, ever‐ accompany this task. The truth is: Not only are there not 205 easy ways to really go green; there isn’t one easy way to really go green! If we can pull this off, it will be the biggest single peace‐
time project humankind will ever have undertaken (Friedman, 2008, p.209).’ First the international financial crisis brings with it the opportunity to rethink our catastrophic climate change trajectory. George Monbiot in a recent column cites the work of Pavan Sukhdev, the Deutsche Bank economist leading a European study on ecosystems. It reported that we are losing natural capital worth between $2 trillion and $5 trillion every year as a result of deforestation alone. The study arrived at these figures by estimating the value of the services, such as locking up carbon and providing fresh water, that forests perform, and calculating the cost of either replacing them or living without them. By way of contrast, the losses incurred so far by the financial sector amount to between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion. Monbiot argues: ‘The financial crisis for which we must now pay so heavily prefigures the real collapse, when humanity bumps against its ecological limits… The credit crunch is petty when compared to the nature crunch. 12
The two crises have the same cause. In both cases, those who exploit the resource have demanded impossible rates of return and invoked debts that can never be repaid. In both cases we denied the likely consequences. I used to believe that collective denial was peculiar to climate change. Now I know that it’s the first response to every impending dislocation (Monbiot, 2008a, p.20).’ Secondly, to avoid the unmanageable (which is a useful way of understanding the mitigation of climate change) would be more achievable if this huge task could be broken down into smaller tasks. One of the seminal articles that has proposed a “wedge” approach was written by Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala of Princeton University (Socolow and Pacala, 2004, pp. 968‐972). Thomas Friedman summarised the article in this way: ‘To convey the scale involved Socolow and Pacala created a pie chart with fifteen different wedges. Some wedges represent carbon‐free or carbon‐diminishing power‐generating technologies; other wedges represent efficiency programs that could conserve large amounts of energy and prevent CO2 emissions. Socolow and Pacala argue that beginning today – right now – the world needs to deploy any eight of these fifteen wedges on a grand scale, or sufficient amounts of all fifteen, in order to generate enough clean power, conservation, and energy efficiency to grow the world economy and still avoid the doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere by mid‐century (Friedman, 2008, p.212).’ Here are the fifteen wedges: •
Double fuel efficiency of two billion cars from 30 miles per gallon (mpg) to 60 mpg. •
Drive two billion cars only 5,000 miles per year rather than 10,000, at 30 mpg. •
Raise efficiency at 1,600 large coal‐fired plants from 40 to 60 percent. •
Replace 1,400 large coal‐fired electric plants with natural‐gas‐powered facilities. •
Install carbon capture and sequestration capacity at eight large coal‐fired plants, so that the CO2 can be separated and stored underground. •
Install carbon capture and sequestration at new coal plants that would produce hydrogen for 1.5 billion hydrogen‐powered vehicles. •
Install carbon capture and sequestration at 180 coal gasification plants. •
Add twice today’s current nuclear capacity to replace coal‐based electricity. •
Increase wind power forty‐fold to displace all coal‐fired power. 13
•
Increase solar power seven hundred‐fold to displace all coal‐fired power. •
Increase wind power eighty‐fold to make hydrogen for clean cars. •
Drive two billion cars on ethanol, using one‐sixth of the world’s cropland to grow the needed corn. •
Halt all cutting and burning of forests. •
Adopt conservation tillage, which emits much less CO2 from the land, in all agricultural soils worldwide. •
Cut electricity use in homes, offices, and stores by 25 percent, and cut carbon emissions by the same amount (Friedman, 2008, pp. 212‐213). Some of these wedges are controversial. Using cropland to produce corn‐based ethanol when food prices are increasing worldwide at the expense of the poor, carbon capture and sequestration and nuclear power are good examples around which there is limited agreement. Also, the goal itself may need to be made more stringent. Hence the wedges may need to be increased in size. However the wedged‐based approach itself could be a promising way of dealing with the seriousness of climate change. When new technologies are also added as wedges, collective hopes may have a stronger and more realistic base. The key is to start as soon as possible as the wedges become thicker over time. Every year of delay leads to much more the next year. Delay for a decade or two could make the task impossible. Thirdly the more we understand climate change as an emergency rather than simply as a serious challenge to be met with additions to business as usual, the more imperative it becomes to combine bottom‐up with top‐down strategies. So far most of the approaches (in New Zealand at least) have been developed by political leaders and senior people in management in public and private sectors. But climate change issues cannot be resolved through technical and engineering measures alone. They require a cultural shift and a change of behaviour at all levels, including in our communities and households. They also require determining the right balance between the state (including regional and local government), the market (including the business sector), and civil society to deal with climate change and its effects individually and collectively. Two of the best books dealing with civil society and its links with state and market are John Ehrenberg’s, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (Ehrenberg, 1999) and Michael Edwards’s, Civil Society (Edwards, 2004). At the time of writing Ehrenberg was an American 14
professor of political science, and Edwards was head of the Ford Foundation’s Governance and Civil Society Program. Bruce Hucker discussed their analyses in ‘Community Development: A Pathway to a Sustainable Future’, a report prepared for the Manukau City Council (Hucker, 2008). This last work provides a useful theoretical and practical guide to community development. Its last chapter ‘What is to be Done and How to Do It?’ lists global warming, climate change, and greenhouse gas emission reduction as examples where community development approaches are essential. Hucker also argues that in comparison with other issues with engineering components, community development is people intensive rather than capital intensive, It also involves a partnership approach between the public sector, business and local communities down to a household level. Spratt and Sutton also describe a number of starting points to initiate action in communities on a climate change emergency: •
Mobilising community networks. •
Building deliberative democracy. •
Figuring out how it can work. •
Experiencing the climate options. •
Creating a radical innovation programme. •
Developing a public computer‐modelling agency (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, pp.234‐
240). They also support as a move towards a safe climate economy the introduction of a carbon rationing system. They argue that it is feasible to administer and is fairer than other options. In an Australian context households are responsible for about one‐quarter of greenhouse gas emissions (mainly from energy use and private travel). For this reason one quarter of the overall carbon budget would be made available free of charge to each citizen as an equal carbon credit. The electronic swipe card would draw down a credit balance each time household gas and electricity, petrol and air tickets were paid for. Unused credits could be sold (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.246). They outline reasons for supporting such an approach: ‘Personal carbon rationing appears more equitable than the alternatives. Because rationing works by imposing quantity restrictions at the outset, rather than by raising prices, it does not in itself increase the price of the household and personal energy consumed – provided that society takes steps to create an economy, including affordable goods and services, that does not require the emission of greenhouse 15
gases. Rationing is also fairer than increasing taxes, because personal greenhouse‐
emission allowances provide free entitlements to individuals and only impose financial penalties on those who go above their entitlement, while providing an income supplement to those who use less than their entitlement. In general, people on low incomes use less energy and emit less carbon dioxide than average (particularly if personal air travel is included), while wealthier people consume more resources and are, therefore, responsible for greater‐than‐average level of emissions. Wealthier people will need, on average, to buy allowances from poorer people, who are likely to use less than their ration (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, pp. 246‐
247).’ They continue by arguing: ‘Rationing offers a number of other benefits. It is egalitarian, in that everyone gets an equal, free carbon allowance; it allows people to make choices and to create a personal carbon budget, which is more empowering than simply watching prices go up; it encourages positive behavioural changes, in the knowledge that others, including businesses and the government are also within the scheme; it helps address our depleting energy resources; and it is more effective in reducing emissions when targets are strong (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.247).’ For rationing proposals to achieve public acceptance more water will have to pass under the bridge. There will also need to be a broader constituency for the perception that a climate emergency is present and needs to be dealt with quickly. The urgent question is how quickly? 16
Part 2: Nine Questions and Nine Answers Literature review questions In the rest of this literature review we shall focus on nine questions: 1. Are global warming and climate change occurring and how are human activities contributing to them through greenhouse gas emissions? 2. What are the implications of different levels of temperature increases against a pre‐
industrial baseline? 3. What are the desirable international targets in terms of ppm CO2 equivalents? 4. What are the international and national mechanisms to achieve significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions? 5. What are the ethical assumptions embedded in these mechanisms and what principles should govern climate change policy? 6. How are we going to encourage individuals, families, businesses and communities to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions? 7. What are the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures? 8. What in a national and regional context in New Zealand is the evidence for climate change and its effects? 9. What are other water utility businesses doing about climate change with regard to mitigation and adaptation? 17
1. Are global warming and climate change occurring and how are human activities contributing to them through greenhouse gas emissions? In our discussion so far we have argued that the processes adopted by the IPCC have strengths and weaknesses. Some of the issues raised have highlighted the weaknesses. In exploring answers to this question it is helpful to return to their strengths. The Stern Review also comes to similar conclusions to the IPCC. Carolyn Fry summarises the clear trends in the way the IPCC has firmed up its views on the connections between greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities and global warming and climate change since its first assessment report in 1990: ‘In the early days no one really knew whether human activities were truly the cause of the observed warming trend and elevated CO2 levels. But as time went by it became more and more obvious that humans were the culprits and were beginning to take control of the Earth’s climate. This increasing understanding of the scale of human influence is reflected in the changing language used in the reports. Whereas the 1996 publication reported: “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate”, the 2001 publication said that “there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities”. The 2007 report leaves no room for doubt about the cause of global warming: “Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid‐twentieth century is very likely [more than 90 percent certain] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [caused by humans] greenhouse gas concentrations”. The FAR [Fourth Assessment Report] confirms that the increase in the global CO2 concentration from a pre‐industrial level of 280 ppm to 370 ppm in 2005 has pushed up the temperature by 0.76°C (Fry, 2008, p.31).’ Thomas Friedman quotes John Holdren who is professor of environmental policy at Harvard, director of the Woods Hole Research Center and the former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science: ‘The more aspects of the problem you know something about, the more pessimistic you are. Someone who studies atmospheric science is pessimistic. Someone who knows atmospheric science and oceans is more pessimistic, and someone who knows about atmospheric science, oceans and ice is even more pessimistic, and someone who knows about the atmosphere, oceans, ice and biology is still more pessimistic, and someone who knows about all these things, as well as engineering, economics and politics, is the most pessimistic of all – because then you know how long it takes to change all the systems that are driving the problem. 18
‘The way I like to put it’, Holdren added, ‘is that we’re driving in a car with bad brakes in a fog and heading for a cliff. We know for sure now that the cliff is out there, we just don’t know exactly where it is. Prudence would suggest that we should start putting on the brakes (Friedman, 2008, pp.125‐126).’ One of the most incisive thinkers about global warming and climate change is George Monbiot in his book Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning (Monbiot, 2006). He contends that to doubt today, that manmade climate change is happening, you must abandon science and revert to some other means of understanding the world: alchemy, perhaps, or magic. He provides a summary of scientific studies in support of his argument: •
Ice cores extracted from the Antarctic show that the levels of carbon dioxide and methane in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for 650,000 years. Throughout that period the concentration of these gases has been closely tracked by global temperatures. •
CO2 levels have been rising over the past century faster that at any time over the last 20,000 years. Human action is the only way this could have happened so quickly. CO2 is produced by burning oil, coal and gas, and by clearing forests, while methane is released from farms and coal mines and landfill sites. •
Both gases let heat in from the sun more readily that they let it out. As their levels in the atmosphere increase, the temperature rises. Most of the growth has taken place in the past fifty years (Monbiot, 2006, pp.3‐4). What is clear is a widespread scientific consensus about the importance of human contributions to global warming and climate change. Disagreements are largely on the margins and not about the central thesis. Monbiot, therefore, argues: ‘If you reject this explanation for planetary warming, you should ask yourself the following questions: 1. Does the atmosphere contain carbon dioxide? 2. Does atmospheric carbon dioxide raise the average global temperature? 3. Will this influence be enhanced by the addition of more carbon dioxide? 4. Have human activities led to a net emission of carbon dioxide? If you are able to answer “no” to any of them, you should put yourself forward for a Nobel Prize. You will have turned science directly on its head (Monbiot, 2006, p.4).’ 19
He then proceeds to list how the direct links have been established in the peer‐reviewed literature. These include a study of ocean warming over the past forty years that records a precise match between the distribution of heat and the intensity of human produced carbon dioxide emissions. Sea ice in the Arctic has shrunk to the smallest area ever recorded. Global sea levels have been rising partly because water expands as it warms, partly because of the melting of ice and snow. Almost all of the world’s glaciers are now retreating. Permafrost in Alaska and Siberia has started to melt. Parts of the Amazon rainforest are turning to savannah as the temperatures there exceed the point at which trees can survive. Coral reefs in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific have begun to wilt. Diseases are spreading faster at higher temperatures. Water shortages, increasing droughts, food famine, very wet winters and storm surges are also listed along with extreme weather events. Other species will be hit harder than humans, and eco‐diversity will be seriously undermined. In 2004 researchers on five continents found that if temperatures rise to about the middle of the expected range between 15 and 37 percent of the world’s species are committed to extinction by 2050. The Amazonian forest is currently near its critical resiliency threshold. With just a small degree of warming the interior of the Amazon basin becomes essentially void of vegetation. Numbers of carbon sinks will become carbon sources. There are deep concerns about threats to ocean circulation systems. According to Monbiot he has concentrated on effects which could take place within the IPCC’s 2001 range of 1.4 to 5.8°C of global warming (Monbiot, 2006, pp.4‐12). Monbiot’s account is echoed in similar ways in the climate change literature generally. But what about the position of the climate change deniers? One of the best analyses of the ‘denial industry’ can be found in chapter two of Monbiot’s Heat (Monbiot, 2006, pp.20‐42). It links in a definitive way climate change denial with an orchestrated public relations campaign originating in the tobacco industry and reasserted from sources in the oil industry. There is however still legitimate scientific scepticism present in the continuing debate about humanly caused greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. These are explored in a range of general literature. Mark Maslin’s Global Warming: A Very Short Introduction does this well by articulating the arguments of dissenters well and then providing counter‐
arguments. The same is true in Robert Henson’s, The Rough Guide to Climate Change, Joseph Romm’s, Hell and High Water, John Houghton’s, Global Warming, Gabrielle Walker and Sir David King’s, The Hot Topic as well as the IPCC reports and the Stern Review (Maslin, 2004; Henson, 2006; Romm, 2007; Houghton, 2004, 3rd edition; Walker and King, 2008). One of the strongest arguments in favour of the influence of human activities on climate change is the Global Climate Models (GCMs). As Walker and King suggest: 20
‘They envisage the atmosphere as adjoining towers of boxes, all of which obey the basic laws of physics. Air, heat and moisture pass between the boxes, radiation goes in and comes out. The air can also interact with the ocean, and in many cases with vegetation on the Earth’s surface (Walker and King, 2008, p.30).’ As with all models they are abstractions from reality, and they can be tweaked to fit the present. Their explanatory value depends on how well they fit the past about which there are independent sources of evidence on climate change such as ice cores, tree rings, and corals. If they can retrodict the past, the confidence in their ability to approximate the future will also increase. Generally the best GCMs reproduce the past well. ‘The models are not perfect. For instance, they still can’t get down to the sort of regional detail we need to predict the events that will affect individual communities – such as storms and local shifts in rainfall patterns; they’re not very good at simulating clouds; aerosols provide a particular challenge, and for this and other reasons different models still give a spread of answers about exactly how much temperature rise will come from a given rise in carbon dioxide (Walker and King, 2008, pp.30‐31).’ The advantage of models is that because we are dealing with the same planet, different variables can be introduced and tested in relation to the way they interact with other variables. Their strength is that they generally do a good job of explaining all of the changes that have taken place in the twentieth century (including the slight temperature drop that occurred between the 1940’s and 1960’s because of the impact of sulphur‐containing aerosols (Walker and King, 2008, pp.31, 33). Of course natural influences and cycles can be expected to play a role in climate change (when there are different natural systems interacting with one another). As Walker and King put it: ‘You can let a model run with different inputs – only solar activity, say, and volcanoes, or only greenhouse gases, and then see what the results look like. Comparing that to the real world gives us clues about what was really to blame. And when the GCMs do that, they all come to the same conclusion. There is no way to explain the warming of the past few decades unless you include the rise in greenhouse gases. But when you do put the gases in, you see exactly what happened in the real world. The same story applies individually to every inhabited continent on Earth. Each one has seen dramatic warming in the past few decades, and in every case the models can account for the warming only if greenhouse gases are added to the mix (Walker and King, 2008, p.31).’ 21
The following IPCC sourced set of graphs illustrates this point clearly. Figure 2: Temperature change over past 150 years (Walker and King, 2008) Walker and King came to the same conclusion as George Monbiot: ‘All evidence points to the same thing, The recent heating up of the planet Earth has carbon dioxide’s fingerprints all over it. Or, to put it more succinctly…Wedunnit. Human activity is to blame for the rise in temperature over recent decades, and will be responsible for more changes in the future. There are plenty of areas of debate in the global warming story but this is not one of them. If anybody tells you differently they either have a vested interest in ignoring the scientific arguments or they are fools (Walker and King, 2008, pp.36‐37).’ 22
2. What are the implications of different levels of temperature increases against a pre‐
industrial baseline? There is also in the scientific literature a range of agreement about the likely effects of different degrees of temperature increases. At present the concentration of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere added to the 0.76°C average global temperature rise commits us in the future to a minimum of a 1.4°C average global temperature increase against a pre‐industrial baseline. For discussions of the link between levels of temperature increase and its impacts see Mark Lynas’s book, Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet. He outlines, on the basis of extensive reading, the impacts of temperature rises from 1° to 6°C, a degree at a time, Carolyn Fry’s, The Impact of Climate Change, lists the impacts from 2°C to 4°C. Her main source is a WWF publication and her presentation of the issues is strikingly graphic. George Monbiot’s, Heat, covers a range from 1°C to 6°C. The IPCC reports and The Stern Review also have a wealth of information on impacts (Lynas, 2007; Fry, 2008, pp.125‐127; Monbiot, 2006; Stern, 2007 pp.66‐67). Walker and King provide a useful account of the changes predicted by the IPCC. We shall quote this in full: ‘Vulnerabilities at warming of up to 2°C: •
Global crop yield will be higher than today but this masks an inequality. In some middle and high‐latitude countries crop yields go up, but in the tropics they are already falling. 10‐30 million more people at risk of hunger. •
Increase in human health problems from heatwaves, malnutrition, floods, droughts and spread of infectious diseases. •
Less water availability and more droughts in the middle latitudes and semi‐
arid tropics. 0.4‐1.7 billion people suffering increased water scarcity. •
Environmentally driven migration with the potential to exacerbate conflicts over scarce resources and cultural invasions. •
More intense individual rainfall events, causing potential for flooding even in regions that are otherwise suffering from more severe droughts. •
Increase in intensity of hurricanes. •
Increased heatwaves in continental areas, as well as more droughts and fires in mid‐latitude continental areas as the storm tracks move polewards. Additional vulnerabilities at warming of 2‐3°C: 23
All of the above plus: •
0‐3 million more people at risk of flooding. •
Up to a further 10 million at risk of hunger. •
Most of the world’s coral reefs bleached. •
Commitment to widespread de‐glaciation of the Greenland and perhaps the West Antarctic Ice Sheet with potential sea level rise of several metres. •
Considerable weakening of the ocean conveyor belt, with potential for significantly reducing monsoon rains. •
Further increase in intensity of hurricanes, enough to exceed infrastructure design criteria, cause significant economic loss and threaten large numbers of lives. •
More flooding in North America and Europe as winter rainfall increases and less water is stored as snow. •
Rapid increase in frequency of serious heatwaves causing many deaths and crop failures, loss of forest and fires. •
Extreme drought in increasingly larger areas. •
Serious threat of inundation in low‐lying coastal areas and small islands. •
Accelerated shrinking and eventual loss of tropical mountain glaciers. •
Considerably more environmentally driven migration. •
20‐30 percent of all species on Earth at increasingly high risk of extinction. Additional vulnerabilities at warming of 3‐4°C: All of the above plus: •
Increasing likelihood of near‐total melting of Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets leading to eventual sea level rise of twelve metres over the coming centuries. •
Rather than soaking up carbon as they do today, terrestrial ecosytems switch to being a net source of carbon, accelerating the warming rate. •
Major species extinctions around the world. •
Widespread death of coral reefs. 24
•
Falls in food yields in some parts of the higher latitudes. Global food production begins to fall. Additional vulnerabilities at warming of 4‐5°C: All of the above plus: •
Food yields fall even at the most favourable locations in higher latitudes. Global production plummets. •
Increasing risk of serious, abrupt changes to the climate system including shutdown of the ocean circulation and major release of carbon from thawing permafrost. •
Up to a fifth of the world’s population affected by flooding. •
Up to 120 million more people at risk of hunger. •
1.1‐3.2 billion people suffer from increased water scarcity. •
Loss of almost all high‐latitude forest and very large tracts of the Amazon rainforest. •
Ecosystems covering 40 percent of the world’s land area subject to major changes. •
Very substantial increases in human deaths from malnutrition, diseases, heatwaves, floods and droughts. Additional vulnerabilities at warming of 5‐6°C: •
The IPCC didn’t want to do there, and nor do we (Walker and King, 2008, pp.90‐93).’ The next two pages of tables come from the IPCC’s 2007 Synthesis Report, its ‘Summary for Policy Makers’, and from the Stern Review. The first table measures the global average temperature change relative to 1980‐1999. The second set measures the changes relative to pre‐industrial times. The starting point should always be noted. The IPCC and Stern tables are included with a reminder. Both documents are conservative in their estimates. 25
Figure 3: Impacts with temperature change (IPCC, 2007) 26
Figure 4: Impact of rising temperature (Stern, 2007) 27
3. What are the desirable international targets in terms of ppm CO2 equivalents? The materials we have explored on the impacts of climate change at different levels of average temperature increases are sobering and daunting. Projections of the growth of greenhouse gas emissions raise similar challenges. The Stern Review summarises this growth by noting that greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere now stand at around 430 ppm CO2 equivalent compared with 280 ppm in pre‐industrial times. Annual emissions are still rising. In 2000 they were increasing at a rate of about 2.7 ppm CO2 equivalent per year. Without action to combat climate change, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to rise. In a plausible ‘business as usual’ scenario, they will reach 550 ppm CO2‐ equivalent by 2035, then increasing at 4.5 ppm per year and still accelerating (Stern, 2007, p.193). This gives an urgency to the question of stabilisation. Stabilisation requires that annual emissions be brought down to the level that balances the Earth’s natural capacity to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (Stern, 2007, p.218). If we keep in mind Walker and King’s estimate that in the light of the latest science for 450 ppm CO2‐eq., the temperature rise will probably be between 2 and 3.5°C with a likeliest value around 2.5°C, the Stern Review’s assessment of this ppm target makes interesting reading: ‘To stabilise at 450 ppm CO2‐eq, without overshooting, global emissions would need to peak in the next 10 years and then fall at more than 5% per year reaching 70% below current levels by 2050. This is likely to be unachievable with current and foreseeable technologies. If carbon absorption were to weaken, future emissions would need to be cut even more rapidly to hit any given stabilisation target for atmospheric concentration (Stern, 2007, p.218).’ George Monbiot adopts a version of differentiated convergence (you start, we’ll follow) in his support for a 2°C target and for richer nations to achieve a 90 percent reduction in their greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. He does not see 2°C as a safe level of warming but one that is less dangerous than what lies beyond. It is also the point at which some of the larger human impacts and the critical positive feedbacks are expected to begin. In his view, based on a 2003 study, if we do not greatly reduce our emissions, temperatures are likely to reach the 2°C increase by 2030 (Monbiot, 2006, p.15). In an article in the Guardian on October 16 2008 ‘Government pledges to cut carbon emissions by 80% by 2050’ the new climate change secretary in the UK government, Ed Miliband, announced this new goal to replace the former target of 60%. Tough economic conditions were not an excuse to “row back” on the commitment to tackle global warming. 28
He accepted the recommendations from the government‐appointed Climate Change Committee, chaired by Lord Turner, which a week earlier had said that the UK ought to commit to an 80% reduction from 1990 levels for all greenhouse gases and covering all sectors. The Climate Change Committee is to advise on the first 15 years of carbon budgets in December. These will involve ‘national limits to our total emissions within which we will have to live as a country’. Miliband also supported complementing the renewable obligation for large‐scale projects and guaranteed prices for small‐scale electricity generation – feed‐in tariffs (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/16/greenpolitics‐
edmiliband). Getting started earlier rather than later makes a significant different to the amount of carbon emitted. Monbiot illustrates this in relation to his 90 percent reduction goal for 2030. Here he focuses on CO2 emissions rather than greenhouse gas emissions: Figure 5: Carbon emissions over time (Monbiot, 2006) 29
There are three overlapping types of goals that require consideration: •
Stabilising emissions by making sure that each year we emit no more than the year before, ideally less. •
Stabilising concentrations by reducing emissions enough so that the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere levels off at a target and stays there (or falls back down). •
Stabilising temperatures by keeping the atmosphere from warming beyond a certain point (Henson, 2006, pp.262‐263). As part of a ‘lesser evil’ approach that still involves real dangers, the 2°C – 450 ppm CO2‐eq nexus is probably the goal around which there is most agreement. Fred Pearce notes the views of methane specialist Euan Nisbet of Royal Holloway College in London and one of the world’s leading climate scientists, American Jim Hansen, that a quick hit on global warming to allow time to deal more effectively with CO2 emissions could be achieved by acting hard on methane: leaks from landfills, gas pipelines, coal mines, the guts of ruminants and much else (Pearce, 2006, pp. 355‐356). Spratt and Sutton take a different view of desirability of 2°C and 3°C targets for warming. As they argue: ‘Efforts to tackle climate change, so far, have been aimed at creating a “less bad” outcome. Society seems to be preparing simply to head into the catastrophe more slowly, which does not seem to be a very practical strategy. The alternative would be to aim for the future we want: a safe climate (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.111).’ They maintain that we have the most powerful economy of all time which has the potential to create a safe climate. In their view the first task is to understand what a safe climate means and what action is required to achieve it. In establishing the boundaries of the safe climate zone, policy and action should be framed: •
‘To protect all people, all species, and all generations; •
To accept an even smaller risk of failure than the best‐practice standards for the protection of people in civil engineering (the one‐in‐a‐million principle) in avoiding dangerous changes to the Earth caused by the climate change; and •
To keep the Earth in the safe‐climate zone, rather than to simply avoid dangerous climate change (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.119).’ Their work is a way of putting flesh on these bones of a proposal and helping to create the political will to give emergency priority to dealing with climate change. They wish to make 30
explicit what should be protected, the underlying values at stake, and whom or what we intend to benefit. 4. What are the international and national mechanisms to achieve significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions? The Stern Review provides one of the best sources for analysing the policy frameworks and mechanisms for responding effectively to climate change. Its primary disciplinary source is economics. It also contains ethical assessments and explores different institutions that have been established to promote international cooperation to deal with what is essentially a global issue that affects different parts of our planet in different ways. Stern argues that effective policy requires three things: credibility, flexibility and predictability. Credibility is about the belief that the policy will endure, and be enforced. Flexibility is about the ability to change the policy in response to new information and changing circumstances. Predictability is about setting out the circumstances and procedures under which the policy will change (Stern, 2007, p.369). For Stern, climate change is both international and intergenerational and results from greenhouse gas emissions associated with economic activities including energy, industry, transport and land use. From the standpoint of economics, climate change is and example of an externality, but an externality with a difference. It is also an example of a serious market failure affecting climate as a public good. He argues: ‘Those who produce greenhouse‐gas emissions are bringing about climate change, thereby imposing costs on the world and on future generations, but they do not face directly, neither via markets nor in other ways, the full consequences of the costs of their actions. Much economic activity involves the emission of greenhouse gases…However the full cost of GHG emissions, in terms of climate change, are not immediately – indeed they are unlikely ever to be – borne by the emitter, so they face little or no economic incentive to reduce remissions. Similarly, emitters do not have to compensate those who lose out because of climate change. In this sense, human‐induced climate change is an externality, that is not “corrected” through any institution or market, unless policy intervenes (Stern, 2007, p.27).’ Why is climate change an externality with a difference? •
‘Climate change externality is an externality that is global in both its causes and consequences. The incremental impact of a tonne of GHG on climate change is 31
independent of where in the world it is emitted…because GHG’s diffuse in the atmosphere and because local climatic changes depend on the global climate system. While different countries produce different volumes, the marginal damage of an extra unit is independent of whether it comes from the UK or Australia, •
The impacts of climate change are persistent and develop over time. Once in the atmosphere, some GHG’s stay there for hundreds of years. Furthermore, the climate system is slow to respond to increases in the atmospheric GHG concentrations and there are yet more lags in the environmental, economic and social response to climate change. The effects of GHGs are being experienced now and will continue to work their way through in the very long term. •
The uncertainties are considerable, both about the potential size, type and timing of impacts, and about the costs of combating climate change; hence the framework used must be able to handle risk and uncertainty. •
The impacts are likely to have a significant effect on the global economy if actions is not take to prevent climate change, so the analysis has to consider potentially non‐
marginal changes to societies, not merely small changes amenable to ordinary project appraisal (Stern, 2007, p.28).’ These insights have implications for policy makers. Policy instruments chosen need to distinguish between the short term and long term so that short term policy outcomes do not hinder the achievement of long term goals. There is a need to establish a long term goal for stabilising concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In the short term the policy maker will want to choose a flexible approach to achieving this long term goal with respect to the size of emissions reductions (Stern, 2007, p.358). Stern argues that there are three appropriate ways of approaching a serious global externality from the standard theory. A tax can be introduced so that emitters face the full social cost of their emissions. Regulation can be used to impose quantity restrictions that will limit the volume of emissions. A market can be created in which “property rights” can be allocated among those causing the externality or those affected by it (including future generations) which can underpin bargaining or trading (Stern, 2007, p.353). In a New Zealand context a carbon tax proposal failed for want of a parliamentary majority. Instead an emissions trading scheme was established. This has three aims: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to indicate responsible participation in a Kyoto and post 2012 Kyoto agreement, and to promote New Zealand as clean and green in the international market place. It is part of a bottom up national and regional strategy to meet the top down approach that is also part of international cooperation. This also fits the recommendations of the Stern Review. 32
Tax, regulation, and markets and combinations of them are all concerned with creating an implicit or explicit price of carbon that will be as uniform as possible globally, given issues of complexity, uncertainty and risk and the need to adopt and fund mitigation and adaptation measures. Efficiency, effectiveness and equity are key drivers in shaping policy instruments from the perspective of economics. The establishment of a closely similar price for carbon is also an incentive to increase investment in technologies that support the transition to a low carbon global economy, and will also foster greener technology transfers to developing nations that depend on deforestation or the burning of fossil fuels to promote their growth and prosperity. For a detailed discussion of international collective action on climate change, the Stern Review is a useful source (Stern, 2007, pp.509‐529). Analysis is offered of multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. Partnerships, networks, and organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) assist with coordinated international action. Further actions on a regional level are supported by the EU, China, and California. They are examples where strong mandatory initiatives have been adopted that will reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Organisations such as the Clinton Climate Initiative and the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group have pledged to reduce emissions and increase energy efficiency by creating a purchasing consortium to lower the prices of energy‐saving products and accelerate their development. In addition, international companies are taking a lead in demonstrating how profits can be increased while reducing emissions from industrial activities globally (Stern, 2007, pp. 517‐518). Walker and King also add their voice to the Stern Review. They argue in a chapter ‘The Road from Kyoto’ that the new agreement will need to cover four points (Walker and King, 2008, pp. 180‐196): •
A global target on temperature rise. •
National targets to cut greenhouse gas emission reductions and how they should be divided among developed and developing nations and against what baseline date. •
A firm mechanism to encourage nations to meet their targets, and provide sanctions if they don’t. The carrot and the stick are likely to be financial. •
A mechanism to transfer a flow of resources including technology and funds from the richest countries to the developing world. They also identify the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 as the last‐
chance saloon. This will be attended by all of the Kyoto signatories and will be the occasion to settle on the essential elements of the new treaty (Walker and King, 2008, p. 196). 33
As they observe: ‘The eventual agreement will have to find some way of accounting for the different state of development, and historical responsibility, of the signatories. It will have to be flexible, cost effective and do the climate job (Walker and King, 2008, p.187).’ Walker and King also produce a summary of negotiating principles that are likely to be on the table. They list six: •
Contraction and convergence (or, we’ll meet you in 2050). The convergence is the target all nations would agree to meet on in 2050. If 450 ppm pf greenhouse gases were the target, in 2050 that would mean on a per head basis, 2 tonnes of CO2‐eq. This would be lower than the current emissions of the richest countries, and probably higher than those of developing nations. •
Differentiated convergence (or, you start, we’ll follow). This puts more onus on the countries historically responsible, while giving more breathing space to developing nations. The richest countries would agree to converge their emissions to the same lower figure within a specified time frame. The developing nations would agree to the same figure, but would not have to start until their emissions per head reached a threshold determined as a percentage of the (steadily declining) global average. •
Multi‐stage targets (or climb up when you’re ready). This involves a set of stages with different levels of commitment. When a country reaches a certain threshold it climbs another rung on the ladder with more extensive commitments. The determination of the thresholds and how to measure them make for a complicated scheme. The richest nations would start at the top of the ladder. •
Global triptych (or, do what you can). Triptych means three‐fold, and was a way of distinguishing the EU emissions allowances from the Kyoto Protocol. It looked at the three sectors responsible for most of a country’s emissions: power generation, energy intensive industry and domestic (homes and transport). It was able to develop a carbon budget that encouraged low carbon power sources, improved efficiency in industry and the importance of living standards. •
Sector by sector (or, I will if you will). The purpose of this approach is to alleviate concerns about the effect of emissions reductions on global competiveness by applying the same rules to an individual sector regardless of the country involved. An example is the world car industry agreeing to a standard level of emissions per passenger kilometre, regardless of where the car is built or driven. Such an approach would not guarantee that we stay below the threshold of maximum greenhouse gases in the air. 34
•
Intensity (or, never mind the total, feel the efficiency). This is the approach of President Bush. It abandons overall emission targets in favour of calculating the emissions per unit of economic growth (GDP). Its benefit: future economic growth would be as carbon efficient as possible. Its disadvantage: even if countries improved their carbon efficiency as they continued to grow, greenhouse gases would continue to rise. For this reason its environmental effectiveness is not guaranteed. 5. What are the ethical assumptions embedded in these mechanisms and what principles should govern climate change policy? Climate change and climate change policy are not simply an economic matter. They have irreducibly ethical dimensions. Their implications go to the heart of a range of important relationships. Climate change has global dimensions, it is intertemporal and highly inequitable. Those who suffer the most are poor countries, and poor people generally, although rich countries are responsible for the bulk of past greenhouse gas emissions that are contributing to global warming now. Climate change will also have an impact on many dimensions of human well‐being, on other species, on ecosystems and the environmental services they provide. The Stern Review puts it this way: ‘Our response to climate change as a world is about the choices we make about development, growth, the kind of society we want to live in, and the opportunities it affords this and future generations. The challenge requires focusing on outcomes that promote wealth, consumption, health, reduced mortality and greater social justice. The empirical analysis of impacts and costs, together with the ethical frameworks we have examined, points to strong action to mitigate GHG emissions. And given the responsibility of the rich countries for the bulk of the current stock of GHGs, and the poverty and vulnerability of developing countries that would be hardest hit, the analysis suggests that rich countries should bear the major responsibility for providing the resources for adjustment, at least for the next few years. The reasons for strong actions by the rich countries are similar to those for aid: •
The moral consequences which flow from a recognition of a common humanity of deep poverty; •
The desire to build a more collaborative, inclusive and better world; •
Common interest in the climate and in avoiding dislocation; •
Historical responsibility (Stern, 2007, p. 43).’ 35
Stern draws attention to ethical frameworks that go beyond consequentialism and welfare economics. These include questions of rights, protection from harm, approaches to liberty, freedom and justice, as well as principles of sustainability, polluter pays and an ethic of stewardship and responsibility (Stern, 2007, pp. 46‐49). These are applied to the ends sought as well as the means to achieve them. While the Kyoto mechanisms have flaws and ambiguities, in practice they are informed by ethical assumptions such as those outlined above. Three special mechanisms are Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emissions Trading. JI allows industrialised countries to implement projects that reduce emissions or increase removals by sinks in the territories of other industrialised countries. CDMs allow industrialised countries to implement projects that reduce emissions in developing countries. This helps industrialised countries to meet their emissions targets, while assisting developing countries to achieve sustainable development. Emissions Trading allows industrialised countries to purchase assigned amount units of emissions from other industrialised countries that find it easier to meet their emissions targets. This is aimed at reducing the overall cost of mitigating climate change. There are also detailed regulations concerning the implementation of these mechanisms. Projects will be approved if they lead to real, measurable and long term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change and if they are additional to any that would have occurred without the project (Houghton, 2004, p. 248). It is now 2008. In 1992 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development was agreed to by over 160 countries. In the same year the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was also published. John Houghton draws on four principles from them: •
The Precautionary Principle. In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost‐effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. •
The Principle of Sustainable Development. Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development 36
in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command. •
The Polluter Pays Principle. National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment. •
The Principle of Equity ‐ International and Intergenerational. The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations. All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world (Houghton, 2004, pp. 230‐231). To these four we would add a fifth. •
The No Regrets Principle. Actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will have positive spin‐offs for people and the environment even if they do not achieve their objectives fully. No serious harm will be done and the quality of life will be enhanced. So why indulge in a spirit of regret? Thomas Friedman with his optimistic American focus puts it in this way: ‘If those of us who have become concerned about climate change turn out to be wrong – but we refocus America anyway on producing clean electrons, and the most energy‐efficient vehicles, appliances, and buildings in the world, and we make America the global leader in aiding the protection of tropical forests and natural habitats, what is the worst that will happen? Our country will have cleaner air and water, more efficient products, more workers educated in the next great global industry, higher energy prices but lower bills, greater productivity, healthier people, and an export industry in clean power products that people across the world will want to buy – not to mention the respect and gratitude of more people around the world than ever. And we’ll have to fight fewer wars over natural resources – because if the human race cannot create greater abundance, we will fight over everything that is in shortage, which is going to be a lot of things in a world that is hot, flat, and crowded. And what if the climate sceptics and deniers who say climate change is a hoax turn out to be wrong – but we listen to them and do nothing? What will happen? We will have a future full of droughts, floods, melting glaciers, rising sea levels, resource conflicts, massive disruptions along coastal areas all over the world, and as the eco‐
37
consultant Rob Watson puts it, “the human race as a bad biological experiment on the planet” (Friedman, 2008, p.174).’ But are principles enough? No, they need to be implemented. Between the idea and the reality falls the shadow. What is required is an exercise of will. It is to this that we now turn. 6. How are we going to encourage individuals, families, businesses and communities to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions? Statements of ideals, values and principles are not in short supply. What is missing are the capability and resolve to carry them out. That is why this question about how to bolster the will to act, follows immediately after an exploration of the ethics of climate change. Sir John Houghton, who comes from a Christian background, makes this comment: ‘Many recognise this lack of will to act as a “spiritual” problem (using the work spiritual in a general sense), meaning that we are too obsessed with the “material” and the immediate and fail to act according to generally accepted values and ideals particularly if it means some costs to ourselves or if it is concerned with the future rather than the present. We are only too aware of the strong temptations we experience at both the personal and the national level to use the world’s resources to gratify our selfishness and greed (Houghton, 2004, p.210).’ Yet human existence does have a material base and human beings as individuals and parts of collectivities combine both a capacity for justice as well as an inclination to injustice. Houghton’s insight needs to be set against the backdrop of a more sophisticated approach to religious ethics and practice as exemplified by the approach of Reinhold Niebuhr writing in 1944, before the end of World War Two. He argued in The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: ‘The preservation of democratic civilisation requires the wisdom of the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove. The children of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but remain free from their malice. They must know the power of self‐interest in human society without giving it moral justification. They must have this wisdom in order that they may beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self‐interest individual and collective, for the sake of the community (Niebuhr, 1944, pp. 40‐41).’ In considering the will to act we are drawn into the realm of the expression of power in relationships to avoid excessive harm and promote the common good. That is the stuff of politics, the responsible exercise of power. 38
Already there has been some discussion of the need to combine bottom‐up and top‐down strategies to climate change. It was suggested that community development approaches were essential and involved a partnership between the public sector, business, and local communities down to a household level. A community development perspective is about working with people rather than simply for them. It is: •
A problem solving tool for dealing with strategic issues that require a people‐centred approach and changes in our behaviour, rather than engineering and technical solutions alone; •
A means of building relationships in the medium and long term to encourage increased respect for the dignity of difference and greater social cohesion; •
A way of encouraging the participation of individuals, groups and communities in the public arena to help create a flourishing local democracy; •
A means of building stronger communities, more effective networks, and trust at different levels of the city and region; •
A method linking community services, community education and community empowerment. At the same time, it is important not to romanticise community. It is, as Reinhold Niebuhr argues, an organism and an artefact. In his view there are four factors that should be given weight in building and preserving community. 1. ‘The inclination of the individual to consider other than his own needs. Without this capacity for justice, the harmony and order of communities would depend purely upon coercion. In social philosophies such as that of Thomas Hobbes, the presupposition that men are consistently egoistic naturally leads to political conclusions in which freedom is sacrificed to the supposed necessities of order and no guarantees of justice are given. 2. Despite the capacity of men to consider the needs and interests of others, they also have an inclination to follow their own interests with little regard for the larger interests. This inclination must be defined as “particular” interest in contrast to a more universal set of interests… 3. Traditional, historical, organic, and natural forces of communal cohesion such as common language, ethnic kinship, geographic factors, common experiences, and common perils. All of these factors operate below the level 39
of conscious decision and bind men together in ways which are not explicitly coercive on the one hand but are on the other hand not the contractual relations of the business community. They create large areas of habitual rather than voluntary association, but their cohesive force is implicit rather than explicit and covert rather than overt. 4. The conscious contrivances of statecraft which seek to prevent partial and parochial interests from clashing in chaotic competition or conflict, which provide channels for the maximum degree of co‐operation, which suppress undue recalcitrance against minimal standards of justice and order, which equalize fortuitous inequalities in the interest of justice, and which create a larger community than is possible upon the basis of the “natural” limits of human sympathy and concern for the neighbour (Davis and Good, 1960, p. 99).’ Because communities are organisms, the creation of new communities and new institutions is more easily said than done. Social tissue, loyalties and relationships take time to develop. Habitual behaviour embedded in cultures and in practices and in views of what is normal and expected is always difficult to change. Communities and institutions are therefore never simply rational. Nor are politics and effective policy making. This background sets the scene for developing a bottom‐up strategy for dealing with climate change. We will not detail the content of that strategy here. Instead we will suggest some questions that would need to be addressed as part of that broader task. (a) How can we identify and encourage political commitment, political will and the exercise of good leadership in public and private sectors and in civil society? (b) How can we foster a social covenant approach that lays emphasis on the importance of relationships, commitment, loyalty and responsibility to deal effectively with climate change? (c) What role can faith communities and the energy generated by bi‐cultural and multi‐
cultural links play in relation to this issue? (d) How can we ensure a realistic approach is taken to the importance of habit, inherited ethical habit and habitual as well as voluntary association in promoting necessary behavioural and cultural change? (e) In identifying climate change as a key strategic issue that requires a people‐centred approach, are there any broader or narrower social, economic, environmental, cultural or political considerations that we need to take into account? 40
(f) What targets should be set and what priority should we give them in the short, medium and longer term? What timeframes for action should we choose, remembering that early successes can contribute to later successes and that momentum and tipping points in public acceptance are critical? (g) How can we increase understanding of the way in which global warming affects and will affect people and their relationships with other people and with the world of nature? How can we appeal to their imaginations and mobilise their energy to participate actively? (h) In working with others, what kinds of partners are needed to form relationships with to achieve viable collective action? (i) What networks, alliances, institutions and groups in public, private and community sectors can be encouraged to engage in this process, contribute time, resources or money, and take joint ownership of and responsibility for getting things done and the results? (j) What gaps can be identified in institutional capacity? How can they be filled? What new or improved capacity can be created? (k) What research can we encourage to enable the processes outlined to lead to desirable results? (l) What resources are available for detailed review and implementation? (m) How are policies, programmes and projects dealing with global warming to be evaluated in terms of an agreed framework negotiated with partners with an emphasis on outcomes? (n) What are the best ways of communicating with our districts, cities and region on this ‘learning‐by‐working‐together’ approach? What is the role of stories, especially positive stories, in effective communication and for building support for the initiatives? (o) How can we beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self‐interest individual and collective for the sake of the community and the Earth that sustains our life? 41
7. What are the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures? The extensive analysis of the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures was touched on briefly in an earlier section. We noted the detailed estimates of the costs of tackling climate change immediately rather than delaying this task to a more distant future. Using a number of economic models and taking into account a wide range of risks and impacts, Stern argues that the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of global GDP each year or more if we don’t act now (Stern Review, 2007, p XV). If we start to take strong action now central estimates of the annual cost of achieving stabilisation between 500 and 550 ppm CO2‐eq are around 1% of global GDP. As has been observed this appears to be a good trade‐off. The IPCC 2007 report roughly agrees with these estimates. It puts the range of costs for 550 ppm CO2‐eq by 2050 between 1 and 5 per cent of GDP (Walker and King, 2008). In the Synthesis Report, Summary for Policy Makers the upper range estimate indicates for the 445‐535 ppm CO2‐eq stabilisation level a range of GDP reduction percentages of ≤ 3 for 2030 and for 2050 ≤ 5.5 (Summary For Policy Makers, 2007, p.21). Among economists a debate has raged around the discount figure underlying these estimates. The clearest account of the issues involved in this disagreement is in Walker and King’s chapter ‘It’s the Economy Stupid.’ They maintain: ‘Discounting the future is economist‐speak for the “bird in the hand” principle. The idea is that a loaf of bread is worth more to you today than it would be next week because the future is uncertain. Looking on the bright side, by next week you might have won the lottery and be rich enough not to care about the price of bread. Looking on the dark side, you might no longer need it because you’ve been run over by a bus. Either way, it counts for more now than it would then, and the difference is the “discount rate”.’ The discount rate that Stern chose for his climate calculation was unusually low. In other words a loaf of bread would be worth almost as much to you in a week’s time as it would in your hand right now. This makes problems in Stern’s future cost very much more than many economists are comfortable with. By choosing a low value for the discount rate, claimed his critics, Stern was skewing the costs of future climate change so they counted for more than they should. On top of that, Stern used an unusually low figure for the discounting level between rich and poor.... Since economies tend to grow, people in the future are likely to be richer than we are today. Giving less weight to the poor (i.e. us) and more weight to the rich i.e. our 42
grandchildren) also makes damage to the future seem more expensive (Walker and King, 2008, p.159).’ Stern stands by his choices. He presents three arguments in defence: a)
Discounting for the future in your own life time is one thing. Because global warming runs into centuries, a large discount is like saying people born in the future matter less than we do today. A loaf of bread is worth more to you than your unborn grandson. It is unethical to urge such an assumption about future generations who aren’t here to stand‐up for themselves. b)
The suggestion ‘let’s leave the problem for the next generation’ could also involve each generation passing the challenge on to successively more remote descendants, while the world crashed and burned around them. c)
In relation to the rich/poor discounting figure Stern argues ad hominem. The critics who support a much higher value should also be pushing for a massive redistribution of wealth in the world today. Walker and King, after noting how sensitive the future cost of excessive carbon is in relation to the discounting figures chosen, express strong reservations about any attempt to put a firm price on future damage. If you add in the risk that the climate could tip over some of the thresholds referred to earlier, the uncertainty of economic predictions becomes even higher. They quote the Cambridge economist Sir Partha Dasgupta approvingly. He maintains: ‘Climate change and biodiversity losses are two phenomena that are probably not amenable to formal, quantitative economic analysis. We economists should not have pressed for what I believe is misplaced concreteness. Certainly we should not do so now (Walker and King, 2008, p. 161).’ Even without being able to put exact economic costs on the future, we know that global warming will contribute directly to an increase in misery and the loss of human life, through water shortages, flood, droughts and famines. The real question is not about the cost if we don’t pay to stop it now, but whether we can afford to pay if we do (Walker and King, 2008, pp.161‐162). The point is that while present costs relating to mitigation and adaptation may be affordable, predictions about the future are less reliable. This reflects what could be called the problem of incommensurability. The qualitative dimensions of the climate change issue cannot be reduced without remainder to its quantitative dimensions. What price can be placed on misery, on the loss of human life, on the extinction of other species, or on the loss of irreplaceable ecological services? 43
John Holdren, the Director of the Woods Hole Research Centre, in chairing a panel at a meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative in 2007, argued that we are already involved in three options in relation to climate change: mitigation, adaptation, and suffering. ‘We are going to do more of all three. The only question now is what the proportions are going to be and the more mitigation we do, the better the chances to adaptation to what cannot be avoided will be able to hold suffering to levels that are short of completely catastrophic (http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=1736&srcid)’. This line of argument is also pursued by George Monbiot in his analysis of the work of Bjorn Lomborg, the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist. He argues that estimates about future costs depend on whether you can trust all the assumptions about economic growth, discount rates, energy prices, new technologies, and government policies that underlie them. He then proceeds to analyse the costs that are implied by his proposals to raise the wholesale price of electricity and heat in real terms by something in the order of 100 per cent by 2030. He compares this with the 350 per cent rise in wholesale price of gas from February 2003 and February 2006 in the U.K. His conclusion: the new gas prices have caused some pain, but they have not led to economic collapse (Monbiot, 2006, p. 52). He argues that the money which needs to be spent to tackle climate change, and the economic opportunities which have to be foregone are often confused. Also the expenditure required does not take place at once but over a long number of years. As a result it is not as burdensome as it appears. In addition it is important to ask, if the changes are necessary, on whom or on what will the cost be imposed? Not all of it will be on the state, but on corporations and households. In his view the range of spending comparisons needs to be expanded. Why he asks do governments find it easy to raise the money required to wreck the biosphere, and so difficult to raise the money required to save it? (Monbiot, 2006, pp.53‐58). But his clinching argument relates to the issue of incommensurability: ‘We can determine, for example, that the financial costs of hurricane Katrina, which may have been exacerbated by climate change amount to some $75billion and we can use that number to help derive a price for carbon pollution. But does it capture the suffering of the people whose homes were destroyed? Does it capture the partial destruction, in New Orleans, of one of the quirkiest and most creative communities on earth? Does it, most importantly, capture the value of the lives of those who drowned? In other words, is it possible to place an economic price on human life? Or on an ecosystem, or on the climate? If you believe the answer is yes, then I charge that you have spent too much time with your calculator and not enough with human beings (Monbiot, 2006, p.50).’ 44
There are three remaining issues to consider in relation to the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures. The first is the range of investments that are going to have to be made irrespective of whether climate change is present or not. While the widespread diffusion of low‐carbon technologies may take decades to achieve, even if early investments in these technologies are made attractive, the overall picture is more optimistic than pessimistic. This is because initial estimates indicate that returning global energy‐related CO2 emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 require a large shift in investment patterns, but the net additional investment required ranges from negligible to 5 to 10% (Summary for Policy Makers, 2007, p.15). The key issue then is how to develop the means to shift these investment patterns. The earlier recommendations of the Stern Review to treat climate change as a global externality and a serious case of market failure, and the suggestion of different mechanisms to ensure that emitters face the full social costs of their emissions take on a new significance. So too do the mechanisms proposed under Kyoto to develop the international cooperation required to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Both sticks and carrots may be needed. Secondly mitigation and adaptation measures (and reduction of human suffering) have benefits as well as costs. This has been integral to the debate on New Zealand’s Emission Trading Scheme. Again the following two tables reflect this approach. The first deals on a sector basis with adaptation strategies, the underlying policy frameworks and the key constraints and opportunities relative to planned adaptation. The second explores selected examples of key sectoral mitigation technologies, polices and measures, constraints and opportunities. They are both sourced from the same 2007 IPCC Summary for Policy Makers (pp.15, 17). 45
Figure 6: Examples of planned adaptation by sector (IPCC, 2007) 46
Figure 7: Examples of sectoral mitigation technologies, policies and measures, constraints and opportunities (IPCC, 2007)
47
Thirdly, the international financial and economic crisis, has given rise to moves by world leaders to call for a “Green New Deal” and the rapid creation of a new energy economy. Newsweek in its November 3, 2008 issue features on its cover ‘The Green Rescue. Why Obama, Brown, Sarkozy and Other World Leaders are Pushing a Green Solution to the Economic Crisis.’ Christopher Dickey and Tracy McNicoll in their article in this issue, ‘A Green New Deal’ write: ‘With a sense of urgency bordering on desperation, the IEA [International Energy Agency] has been calling for radical changes in the way the world drives its cars, its factories and, indeed, the global economy. In November the agency will issue a collection of comprehensive reports that declare in no uncertain terms, “a global revolution is needed in ways that energy is supplied and used.” (Dickey and McNicoll, 2008, p. 19).’ Thomas Friedman had also argued passionately in 2008 for an international green revolution as a means of renewing our global future: ‘...the human race can no longer continue to power its growth with the fossil fuel‐
based system that has evolved since the Industrial Revolution and thrust us into the Energy‐Climate Era. If we do, the earth’s climate, forests, rivers, oceans and ecosystems are going to be increasingly disrupted. We need a new Clean Energy System to drive our economies forward and bring more people out of poverty‐
without despoiling our planet‐ and therefore the countries, communities, and companies that invent and deploy clean power technologies most effectively will have a dominant place in tomorrow’s global economy. Because in a world that is hot, flat and crowded – where energy, water, land, natural resources, and energy resources are all being stressed – everybody, in time, is going to be forced to pay the true cost of the energy they are using, the true cost of the climate change they are causing, the true cost of the biodiversity loss they are triggering, the true cost of the petrodictatorship they are funding, and the true cost of the energy poverty they are sustaining (Friedman, 2008, p.171)’ Friedman also offers an interesting account of the institutional history of how the electricity system in the U.S. actually works. He also creates a scenario of what major reforms would look like at a personal level and charts a pathway to that desirable future. He even explains what a REEFIGDCPEERPC ≤ TTCOBCOG would look like in the real world. What is that? A renewable energy ecosystem for innovating, generating and deploying clean power, energy efficiency, resource productivity and conservation ≤ the true cost of burning coal, oil, and gas (Friedman, 2008, pp. 217‐240). Dickey and McNicoll develop a strong argument that the major public intervention in the financial markets has given currency to the notion that the state might intervene massively 48
to redirect the energy market. This no longer seems extreme, even to the normally laissez‐
faire British and Americans. Once you open the floodgates of government funding to the banks, why not for green industry, too? They note that the U.S. Congress endorsed a green response to the global crisis when it demanded provisions for developing renewable energy supplies as a condition for approving the massive financial rescue package in October. They also outline the policies of Barack Obama, now president–elect. Among a range of programmes, he says he’ll “strategically invest $150 billion over 10 years in a “clean energy economy” that will “help the private sector create 5 million new green jobs, good jobs that cannot be outsourced”(Dickey and McNicoll, 2008, pp. 20‐21). The band of leaders whose policy approaches on these issues are outlined includes Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, Ban Ki‐moon, and Taro Aso (the Prime Minister of Japan). The policies they are implementing display a clear commonality of purpose. The conclusions that Dickey and McNicoll draw err on the side of optimism: ‘But the political and financial reality is that no government will be so moved by the dire predictions of the world’s scientists and the doomsday scenarios on computer models that it will allocate trillions of dollars just to meet those postulated challenges. What governments might do, and some certainly will do, however, is spend huge sums soon to kick‐start their economies and create millions of jobs. “The nation is asking for action now,” said Franklin Roosevelt when he took office in 1933 and launched the New Deal. Today the global economy – the planet itself – is asking for the same thing (Dickey and McNicoll, 2008, p.22)’. 8. What in a national and regional context in New Zealand is the evidence for climate change and its effects? Evidence for climate change in New Zealand – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change The evidence for climate change in New Zealand and its effects can be found in Chapter 11 of the Fourth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Hennessy et al, 2007, pp.507‐540). The evidence gathered in this report shows: •
mean air temperatures in New Zealand have increased by 1.0°C since 1855 and by 0.4°C since 1950, •
sea temperatures have risen by 0.7°C since 1871. •
over the period 1951‐1996 the number of cold nights and frosts declined by 10‐20 days per year, 49
•
sea level rise has averaged 1.6 mm/yr since 1900 (1.4mm/yr at Auckland), •
rainfall has decreased in the north‐east of New Zealand and increased in the south‐
west. The observed impacts on species and natural systems in New Zealand include: •
a decrease in ice volume of glaciers from 100km3 to 53 km3 over the last century and a loss of ¼ of glacier mass since 1950, •
earlier egg laying in the welcome swallow, •
increased seed production in native beech relating to warming during flower development, •
a westward shift of Chilean jack mackerel in the Pacific and entry to New Zealand waters associated with increasing El Nino frequency. Projections for New Zealand – Ministry for the Environment The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) has adapted the projections from the IPCC and estimates the following impacts for New Zealand over the next century: •
higher temperatures, particularly in the North Island, though the increase will likely be less than the global average, •
rising sea levels – an average rise of between 18 and 59 cm by 2100 from 1990 levels, compared to a rise of between 10 and 20 cm in the 20th century, •
more frequent and intense extreme weather events such as droughts (especially in the eastern parts of New Zealand), landslides, storm surges and floods, •
more rainfall in the west but a drier east, •
warmer winters with fewer frosts, and rising snowlines (MfE, 2008e). 50
Figure 8: Projected changes in annual mean temperature relative to 1990 based on "A1B" emission scenario (intermediate level of warming) (Ministry for the Environment, 2008a). Figure 9: Projected changes in annual mean rainfall relative to 1990 based on "A1B" emission scenario (intermediate level of warming) (MfE, 2008a) 51
The effects of climate change will be mixed: •
people will experience milder winters but increased summer temperatures will mean greater risks of heat stress and the warmer average annual temperatures may lead to the introduction of new subtropical diseases •
increased risk of erosion and saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels •
infrastructure and people’s homes will be at risk from more frequent and intense extreme weather events •
agricultural productivity is expected to increase in some areas, but there is the risk of drought and spreading pests and diseases •
retreating snowlines and glaciers are expected to change water flows in major South Island rivers, and may also affect the skiing industry •
New Zealand’s native flora and fauna may come under threat due to habitat loss, both on land and in our waterways and oceans (MfE, 2008e). In terms of water resources, the climate change will likely lead to: •
greater water demand, particularly during hot, dry summers, •
longer summers with higher temperatures and lower rainfall that will reduce soil moisture and groundwater supplies, •
lower river flows in summer but higher flows in winter, •
reduced water quality due to higher temperatures and lower flows in summer (MfE, 2008b). Specifically in relation to Auckland, the MfE predicts the following changes: ‘The Auckland region has a sub‐tropical climate with warm humid summers and mild winters. A change in our climate as a result of global warming and other influences means we need to think about how we are going to plan for and manage the projected impacts of climate change in Auckland and New Zealand. But we also need to take appropriate action to reduce our share of greenhouse gas emissions responsible for global warming and climate change impacts. Some of the predicted impacts of a moderate rate of climate change for Auckland include changes in average temperature, sea level rise and rainfall patterns. In general, Auckland, like much of the north of New Zealand, is likely to become warmer but there will probably be little change in Auckland's average rainfall. 52
Climate scientists estimate that Auckland's temperature could be up to 3°C warmer over the next 70‐100 years. This compares to a temperature increase in New Zealand during last century of about 0.7°C. To put this in perspective, the 1997/98 summer, which many New Zealanders remember as particularly long, hot and dry, was only about 0.9°C above New Zealand's average for the 1990s. Flooding could become up to four times as frequent by 2070. At the same time, long drier summer spells will put pressure on the water supply system. The effects of climate change may bring significant costs to the community. If extreme weather events become more frequent or severe, the costs and damages associated with them are also likely to increase. The cost of dealing with stock losses, replacing or repairing damaged roads, bridges, houses and stormwater drains, and dealing with increased soil erosion and loss of soil nutrients can be formidable. Recent extreme weather events such as the Marlborough and Canterbury droughts, Cyclone Bola, the "weather bomb" in the Waikato/Coromandel area, and coastal flooding during the Waitangi Day storm, have shown how vulnerable our society and economy is to the weather and climate (MfE, 2008d).’ In other papers it has prepared, the MfE predicts temperature increases of 0.9°C for Auckland by 2040 (from 1990 levels) and 2.1°C by 2090. The prediction on precipitation is that Auckland will be slightly drier and the Waikato Region will be slightly wetter (MfE, 2008a). The Coastal Hazards and Climate Change Guidance Manual, published by the MfE, recommends planning for a 0.5m base value sea level rise relative to the 1980‐1999 average and an assessment of the consequences of greater rises including at least a rise of 0.8m from the 1980‐1990 average. It is also recommended that for planning decisions beyond 2100 an additional rise of 10mm/year be considered. Accompanying the sea level rise will be an increased risk of coastal inundation, both directly as a result of the rise itself and through changes to the magnitude and intensity of storms leading to higher storm surges (MfE, 2008c). 9. What are other water utility businesses doing about climate change with regards to mitigation and adaptation? United Kingdom In contrast to the New Zealand situation, some water utility businesses are included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Thames Water, for example, has five sites that are captured by this scheme (Thames Water, 2008b). This scheme places limits on allowable emissions from certain installations. If the limits are exceeded there are financial penalties. Water utilities are also likely to be included in future policy changes such as the 53
Climate Change Bill, which will seek emission reductions to 60% of 1990 levels by 2050, and the Carbon Reduction Commitment, a UK‐run ETS (Thames Water, 2008b). Given these policy changes, water utilities are giving serious consideration to their greenhouse gas emissions, as well as adapting to the effects of climate change. Further, the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) requires water utility businesses to measure carbon emissions), although this excludes “short‐cycle” carbon from organic material as it is considered to be carbon neutral (Ofwat, 2008). Thames Water currently generates 14% of its own electricity needs, has a target of 18% by 2010 and has developed a Carbon Management Strategy to address the impacts of climate change. Thames Water has also estimated their carbon footprint for each megalitre of treated water and wastewater treated: •
Net greenhouse emissions per megalitre of treated water was 300 kg of CO2‐eq. •
Net greenhouse emissions per megalitre of sewage treated was 350 kg of CO2‐eq (Thames Water, 2008a). A graphic summary of climate change impacts on Thames Water is shown below. Figure 10: The anticipated impacts of climate change on Thames Water (Thames Water, 2008b) Anglian Water are seeking to reduce their carbon footprint by 20% by 2010 through reducing energy use by 6% and reducing another 14% by generating their own electricity from wind and biogas. Additionally, they are working with their suppliers to help calculate their carbon emissions, items usually only included in greenhouse gas inventories as Scope 3 items (Anglian Water, 2008). 54
USA The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has developed a comprehensive Climate Change Assessment and Action Plan detailing the ongoing work of the DEP Climate Change Task Force. This plan sets out the potential impacts of climate change on New York City and sets out both the adaptation and mitigation actions the DEP will undertake. These include: •
developing more comprehensive models to understand the impacts of climate change on: o drinking water quality, supply, and demand, and o drainage, wastewater treatment processes and infrastructure, and harbour water quality; •
improving the knowledge of system vulnerabilities and tracking extreme weather events; •
adding climate change as a factor in DEP’s Risk Prioritization project; •
assess and cost a range of adaptation strategies for mitigating the impacts of climate change on drainage, wastewater management facilities, and harbour water quality; •
identify wastewater treatment plants and pump stations that are vulnerable to flood damage and integrate flood prevention measures into the capital upgrade cycle; •
incorporate potential climate change impacts into the decision making process by creating a methodology for the City Environmental Quality Review; •
develop a procedure to ensure infrastructure can continue to be operated during extreme storm events; •
develop an emissions inventory and a process for annual updates; •
develop a GHG management plan and integrate it with the capital improvement program; •
review construction and equipment replacement contracts to identify opportunities for energy efficiency improvements; •
improve methane capture and increase energy generation at wastewater treatment plants; 55
•
continue to support the Bureau of Legal Affairs and the New York City Law Department in their efforts to seek judicial and administrative relief from injuries to the City caused by uncontrolled emissions of GHGs nationally and the resulting climate change (DEP, 2008). Los Angeles is responsible for emitting about 0.2% of global CO2 from fossil fuel consumption. The city has an action plan for reducing GHG emissions and making the city more sustainable. This plan considers a range of sectors and specifically in relation to Water aims to reduce carbon emissions by and become more sustainable by: •
meeting all additional water demand from population growth from existing supply through water conservation and recycling; and •
reducing per capita water demand by 20%. It is notable that current water use in Los Angeles remains the same today as it was 25 years ago; this is despite a population increase of nearly 1 million and has been achieved through the implementation of a range of demand management tools. The city has a goal of achieving a 35% reduction of total annual CO2 emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels; it already has achieved a 4% reduction. This is primarily due to greater use of renewable energy sources (City of Los Angeles, 2007). The City of Chicago has established the Climate Change Task Force, a multi‐stakeholder group, tasked with producing the Chicago Climate Action Plan with targets and methods for responding to climate change. This group recommended a target of an 80% reduction below the city’s 1990 GHG emissions by the year 2050, with an initial goal of a 25% reduction by 2020. In relation to the water and wastewater sectors, the group recommended increased water conservation measures to reduce energy requirements. The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago is increasing the utilisation of digester gas from 81% to over 95% at its wastewater treatment plants and investigating solar power to offset the purchase of electricity and natural gas (City of Chicago and Climate Change Task Force, 2008). Australia It is likely that Australia will be more severely affected by climate warming than New Zealand, however the planning undertaken by the water utilities there gives good guidance in preparing for climate change and perhaps this work can be adapted to the New Zealand 56
context in terms of the adaptation challenges ahead. Currently, the most significant effects of climate change that utilities are expecting are: •
reduced supplies of fresh water (less rain, lower stream flows), •
increased risk of bushfires in catchments, leading to poorer quality and less run‐off, •
increased algal blooms in dams, •
increased risk of pipe corrosion and odours (due to increased waste concentration), •
more extreme storms with consequences for wastewater treatment plant inflows and wastewater network overflows, •
sea level rise creating a flood risk for low‐lying coastal assets, •
changes to the structure and stability of soils leading to greater risk of pipe failure (drier soil), •
disruption to electricity supplies from increased storm activity or excessive demand during heatwaves, •
increased salinity levels in recycled water due to rising seawater levels resulting in increased infiltration to wastewater network and treatment plant (Melbourne Water). (Melbourne Water, 2005; Sydney Water, 2007). In terms of reducing emissions, the Australian Government is considering introducing an emission trading scheme in 2010. While the impact of this is uncertain, it is likely to increase electricity costs for water utilities. Many of the major Australian water utilities are adopting a strategy to reduce their emissions, and these are typically based on the following Carbon Management Hierarchy: 1. Avoid causing emissions; 2. Reduce existing emissions; 3. Capture emissions and recover waste energy; and finally 4. Purchase renewable energy and offsets (Kelly and Rouse, 2008). 57
The following case studies illustrate the steps the major Australian Water Utilities are undertaking in managing their emissions: Sydney Water has made a commitment to be carbon neutral by 2020 (Kelly and Rouse, 2008. The company is a significant user of power in NSW, consuming approximately 1% of electricity produced in the state. It is estimated that this will involve eliminating or offsetting over 400,000 tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions each year. To achieve this Sydney Water plans to reduce emissions through (note the similarity to the Carbon Management Hierarchy): 1. avoiding energy use and adopting energy efficiency measures; 2. considering GHG emissions over the full lifecycle for major projects and new facilities; 3. cogeneration or purchase of renewable energy; 4. generating about 20% of electricity through hydro‐generation and biogas by 2009; and 5. offsetting remaining emissions with carbon credits, initially through internally generated carbon credits (from demand management programs and renewable energy projects), with all remaining offsets being externally sourced. SA Water has targeted pump improvements, mini‐hydro schemes, biogas capture at the wastewater treatment plants and revegetation to reduce its emissions. Pumping is responsible for 46% of the carbon emissions, therefore there are potentially significant reductions in their carbon footprint to be made by focussing on pumping (Kelly and Rouse, 2008). SA Water propose to limit their emissions to 108% of 1990 levels, in line with Australian Kyoto target, and then reduce emissions to 60% of 1990 levels by 2050. Further, the company is aiming to ensure new infrastructure is carbon neutral, both in terms of construction and ongoing operations. The Western Australian‐centred Water Corporation has a target of carbon neutrality by 2030. It intends to achieve this through: •
using a wind farm to power a desalination plant, •
co‐generation from WWTP, •
buying renewable energy, 58
•
utilising mini hydro where effective, •
improving pump efficiency, •
water demand management, and •
bio‐sequestration on landholdings (Young, 2008). Brisbane Water has a goal of 45% greenhouse gas reduction from 1990 levels by 2010, and along with the Brisbane City Council they have a goal of carbon neutrality by 2026. To achieve this goal it is targeting renewable energy sources, including co‐generation at several of their sites. Brisbane Water is also strengthening the energy component of new assets into its planning profile (Young, 2008). New Zealand The MfE, in their guide for local government, suggest breaking down the effects of climate change into manageable parts and dealing with these on a case by case basis. Given that there is considerable uncertainty into the exact effects and impacts of climate change, the MfE advise planning for a range of scenarios to best develop a robust adaptation strategy. This scenario analysis is supported by a risk assessment process. The MfE ultimately recommend the adoption of a precautionary approach to planning for climate change (MfE, 2008a). Auckland Although now slightly dated, in 2001 North Shore City Council commissioned a report on the impact of climate change on their wastewater system. This assessed climate change impacts on the North Shore to 2050. The report forecasts more frequent intense rainfall and runoff, for example, overflows associated with the 1 year Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) overflow containment standard under 2050 conditions are likely to occur at the same frequency as that of the current 6 monthly ARI (North Shore City Council et al, 2003). The effects of climate change are considered in the Three Waters Strategic Plan. This document draws on the MfE projections for rainfall variation and air temperature change to the late 21st century. This document also uses information from the North Shore City Council study outlined above, with regards to increased occurrence of wastewater overflows. The strategy considers that planning for water infrastructure should be based on resilience for current extreme events, rather than longer term projected climatic changes (Three Waters Strategic Planning Programme, 2008). 59
Part 3: Conclusion This literature review has drawn on a range of sources. It has included peer‐reviewed publications in a number of disciplines. It has encompassed also more general studies involving interviews with experts in different areas of climate change, or accounts of meetings in which they have participated. The principles of selection have focussed on two things: the trends in the latest literature and also how the analyses point towards answers to nine questions. Reports from the IPCC and the Stern Review served as a significant baseline. Their strengths were highlighted, and their weaknesses noted. The first change in scientific understanding that has taken place related to the connection between the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and likely average global temperature rises. Earlier it had been assumed that more than a 2°C rise in temperature in relation to pre‐industrial levels could be prevented if the concentration of greenhouse gases were restricted to 550 ppm CO2‐eq. That is no longer the case. Even a concentration of 450 ppm CO2‐eq will be hard‐pushed to prevent a 2°C rise. The second change is about sea level rises. The 2007 IPCC reports estimated a rise of 18 to 59 cm by 2100, but did not consider 59 cm as an upper bound. Also they indicated that warming caused by human activities could lead to climate impacts that are abrupt or irreversible. Positive feed‐back loops, climate surprises, or abrupt climate changes could initiate tipping points that lead to several metres rise in sea levels. More recent empirical data has raised scientific concerns about what is happening with Arctic Ocean ice cover, Greenland’s ice shelf and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. This suggests a shorter time frame and higher sea level rises than those anticipated in the IPCC models. The third issue in the latest literature points to climate change as a global emergency that requires emergency action, because of the serious threat it poses to our planet. It is therefore not sensible to have responses that involve marginal additions to business as usual. Parallels are drawn with wartime and the rapid deployment of economic resources, the placing of economies on a war footing, and the engagement of whole societies through measures including rationing to achieve a common purpose, in this case to reduce global warming. This is consistent with the call of Ban Ki‐Moon, The Secretary‐General of the UN on 10 November 2007: ‘This is an emergency, and for emergency situations we need emergency action.’ In this study we have posed nine questions. The answers to them have varying degrees of certainty attached to them. The first two reflect a virtual scientific consensus, with disagreement around the margins. 60
Global warming and climate change are occurring. Human activities are contributing significantly to them through greenhouse gas emissions. According to the IPCC in 2007 this is 90 per cent certain. There is a similar range of agreement about the effects of different levels of temperature increase, that have been outlined in detail. These will lead to human life on earth becoming increasingly intolerable as the twenty‐first century unfolds. There is a growing agreement that a target for the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a maximum of 450 ppm CO2‐eq along with a 2°C temperature increase against a pre‐industrial baseline. More are now arguing that those targets need to be lower to achieve a safe climate zone. The Stern Review was employed to provide a framework to assess international and national mechanisms to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Stern suggested that effective policy in this area needed to be credible, flexible and predictable. Climate change was essentially a global externality. Those who were producing greenhouse gas emissions were bringing about climate change and imposing costs on the world and on future generations; they did not, however, have to face directly the full consequences of the costs of their actions. For this reason the Stern Review drew on economic theory to identify three appropriate ways of dealing with a global externality: tax, regulation and markets. It then provided a detailed assessment of international collective action on climate change including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and partnerships, networks and organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA). Mention was also made of regional initiatives in the EU, China, and California, along with the Clinton Climate Initiative, the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group and a range of large private sector corporations. Walker and King added their voice to Stern. In the period leading up to the December 2009 meeting in Copenhagen where a new post‐Kyoto agreement will be formulated, four issues will need to be considered: •
A global target on temperature rise. •
National targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions and how they should be divided among developed and developing nations and against what baseline date. •
A firm mechanism to encourage nations to meet their targets, and provide sanctions if they don’t. •
A mechanism to transfer a flow of resources including technology and funds from the richest countries to the developing world. 61
It has been argued that ethical frameworks that go beyond consequentialism and welfare economics were needed: rights, protection from harm, freedom and justice, as well as principles of sustainability, polluter pays, stewardship and responsibility. These should be applied to the ends sought as well as the means to achieve them. It as maintained that in spite of flaws and ambiguities in the Kyoto mechanisms, they were informed by ethical assumptions. Good examples were Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Emission Trading Schemes (ETS). Five principles were singled out for special mention. Four of them originated from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: •
The Precautionary Principle. •
The Principle of Sustainable Development. •
The Polluter Pays Principle. •
The Principle of Equity‐International and Intergenerational. •
The No Regrets Principle. It was noted that principles were not in short supply. What was needed was to implement them. That required an exercise of will and of political will in particular. That, however, went to the heart of politics: the responsible use of power. It was suggested that both bottom‐up and top‐down strategies were required to deal with climate change. That meant getting the balance right between the public sector, business, and local communities down to the household level. Part of the answer included working with people, rather than simply for them. In essence this called for a community development strategy. This was identified as: •
A problem solving tool for dealing with strategic issues like climate change that require a people‐centred approach and changes in our behaviour, rather than engineering and technical solutions alone. •
A means of building relationships in the medium and long term to encourage increased respect for the dignity of difference and greater social cohesion. •
A way of encouraging the participation of individuals, groups and communities in the public arena to help create a flourishing local democracy. •
A means of building stronger communities, more effective networks, and trust at different levels of the city and region. 62
•
A method linking community services, community education and community empowerment. Detailed questions were listed to assist with the formulation of the strategy. Accounts of the economics of mitigation and adaptation in relation to climate change have varied. The Stern Review argued that the annual cost of stabilising greenhouse gases at between 500 and 550 ppm CO2‐ eq were around 1% of global GDP if we start now. If we leave it till later, estimates of damage could rise to 20% of global GDP each year. The debate among economists has centred around the latter figure. There has been more agreement around the current costs, which were regarded as affordable. The focus has been on whether the discounting level applied by Stern was the right one. But the key question, as Walker and King maintained was not about the cost if we don’t pay to stop global warming now, but whether we could afford to pay now if we do take this step. The literature review has also explored the conceptual difficulties of putting a price on climate change. What price can be placed on human life and suffering? Or on the extinction of other species? Or on the loss of biodiversity? Or on the loss of irreplaceable ecological services? Present in these deliberations was the problem of incommensurability. Qualitative dimensions, it was maintained, could not be assessed with a strictly quantitative ruler. It was noted that there were three issues that gave rise to a cautious optimism. First there were a range of investments that were going to have to be made anyway, irrespective of climate change. How could these be directed to a low carbon form of development? Secondly, there were both costs and benefits to mitigating and adapting to the effects of global warming. Two tables were included from the IPCC to illustrate this point. Thirdly, the international financial and economic crisis has given rise to moves by world leaders to call for a “Green New Deal”. Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, Ban Ki‐Moon and Taro Aso (the Prime Minister of Japan) have displayed considerable unity in their call for a clean energy economy. Attention was then turned to the evidence for climate change and its effects in a New Zealand setting. The evidence collated in 2007 IPCC sources indicated: •
Mean air temperatures in New Zealand have increased by 1°C since 1855 and by 0.4°C since 1950. •
Sea temperatures have risen by 0.7°C since 1871. •
Over the period 1951‐1996 the number of cold nights and frosts declined by 10‐20 days per year. 63
•
Sea level rise has averaged 1.6 mm/yr since 1900. •
Rainfall has decreased in the north‐east of New Zealand and increased in the south‐west. New Zealand’s Ministry for the Environment has adapted projections from the IPCC to the end of the century. •
Higher temperatures particularly in the North Island, though the increase will likely be less than the global average. •
Rising sea levels – an average rise of between 18 and 59 cm by 2100 from 1990 levels, compared with the rise of between 10 and 20 cm in the 20th century. •
More frequent and intense extreme weather events such as droughts (especially in eastern parts of New Zealand), landslides, storm surges and floods. •
More rainfall in the west but a drier east. •
Warmer winters with fewer frosts and rising snowlines. The MfE concluded that the effects of climate change would be mixed: •
People will experience milder winters, but increased summer temperatures will mean greater risks of heat stress and the warmer average temperatures may lead to the introduction of new subtropical diseases. •
Increased risk of erosion and saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels. •
Infrastructure and peoples homes will be at risk from more frequent and intense extreme weather events. •
Agricultural productivity is expected to increase in some areas, but there is the risk of drought and spreading pests and diseases. •
Retreating snowlines and glaciers are expected to change water flows in major South Island rivers, and may also affect the skiing industry. •
New Zealand’s native flora and fauna may come under threat due to habitat loss, both on land and in our waterways and oceans. Projections were also offered for Auckland. The MfE also included recommendations for planning for future development. 64
One proviso should be noted. The Ministry for the Environment has relied on the IPCC 2007 reports. They did not incorporate the latest data that could indicate positive feedback loops, climate surprises and tipping points with exponential rather than linear implications. For this reason the MfE’s projections of climate change effects in New Zealand could also be said to err on the side of conservatism. It was considered useful to investigate what other water utility businesses were doing (internationally) to mitigate and adapt to climate change. There was strong evidence of major initiatives in this area. In the United Kingdom there was a prospect of water utilities being included in the Climate Change Bill. This would seek emission reductions to 50% of 1990 levels by 2050 (this goal has been increased to 80% as noted earlier). Inclusion was also being considered in the Carbon Reduction Commitment, a UK run ETS. The Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT) also requires water Utilities to measure their carbon emissions. In the USA the major initiatives undertaken in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago were described. Most striking was the detailed planning and development in New York. This encompassed a comprehensive Climate Change Assessment and Action Plan which detailed the ongoing work of the city’s Department of Environmental Protection through its Climate Change Task Force. In Australia it was clear that a strong approach has been taken to climate change by water utilities. Their planning work might be use for New Zealand, especially because of the greater global warming effects starting to be experienced by our neighbours across the Tasman. It was noted that an Australian ETS was in the offing and that detailed plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were already being implemented by water utilities. These included Sydney Water, Melbourne Water, South Australian Water, the Western Australian‐centred Water Corporation and Brisbane Water. Numbers have targeted dates in the future for carbon neutrality or significant and quantified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Of particular interest was the Carbon Management Hierarchy utilised: 1. Avoid causing emissions. 2. Reduce existing emissions. 3. Capture emissions and recover waste energy. 4. Purchase renewable energy and offsets. 65
No conclusion on climate change and its effects should end with a whimper. This conclusion is no exception. It ends with a call for action from Al Gore, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize recipient: ‘We must make the rescue of the environment the central organising principle for our civilisation… the environment is much more than a policy position to me; it is a profoundly moral obligation. We have only one earth. And if we do not keep it healthy and safe, every other gift we leave our children will be meaningless.’ 66
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Pearce, Fred (2006), The Last Generation: How Nature Will Take Her Revenge for Climate Change, London: Eden Project Books. Pearce, Fred (2006a), When the Rivers Run Dry: What Happens When our Water Runs Out?, London: Eden Project Books. Porritt, Jonathon (2006), Capitalism as if the World Matters, London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan. Renowden, Gareth (2007), Hot Topic, Auckland: AUT Media. Romm, Joseph (2007), Hell and High Water: Global Warming – the Solution and the Politics – and what we should do, New York: William Morrow. Severn Trent Water. (2008). Corporate Responsibility: Climate Change. Retrieved 15 October, 2008, from Severn Trent Water website: http://www.stwater.co.uk/server.php?show=ConWebDoc.2201 Smit, B., Burton, I., Klein, R.J.T., and Wandel, J.(2000). An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability. Climate Change, 45, 223‐251. Socolow, Robert and Pacala, Stephen (2004), ‘Stabilisation wedges: solving the climate problem for the next 50 years with current technologies,’ Science, vol. 205, pp. 968‐72. August 13. Spratt, David and Sutton, Phillip (2008), Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Actoin, Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe. Summers, Deborah and Carrington, Damian (2008), ‘Government pledges to cut carbon emissions by 80% by 2050’, The Guardian Weekly, October 16. Stern, Nicholas (2007), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stern, Nicholas (2009), A Blueprint for a Safer Planet, The Bodley Head : London. Sydney Water (2007), Climate Change Strategy: Low carbon, high water security, NSW: Sydney Water. Thames Water (2008a), Climate Change: Managing our contribution. Retrieved 15 October, 2008, from Thames Water Website: http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xchg/SID‐
70846112‐1A2FC122/corp/hs.xsl/3780.htm Thames Water, (2008b), Corporate Responsibility Report 2007/08, Reading; Thames Water Utilities Limited. 71
Three Waters Strategic Planning Programme (2008), Three Waters Draft Strategic Plan: Discussion Version, Auckland: Three Waters Programme. Tickell, Oliver (2008), Kyoto2. How to manage the global greenhouse, Zed Books: London and New York. von Ruhland, Catherine (2008), Living with the Planet: Making a Difference in a Time of Climate Change, Oxford: Lion Hudson. Walker, Gabrielle and King, David (2008), The Hot Topic: How to Tackle Global Warming and Still Keep the Lights On, London: Bloomsbury. Ward, Peter and Brownlee, Donald (2002), The Life and Death of Planet Earth: How Science Can Predict the Ultimate Fate of Planet Earth, New York: Times Books. Ward, Peter (2007), Under a Green Sky: Global Warming, the Mass Extinctions of the Past, and what they can tell us about our Future, New York: Smithsonian Books. Young, Ross (2008), Initiatives being undertaken by WSAA Members in dealing with carbon accounting issue, Sydney: Presentation to the AWA Conference – Accounting for Carbon in Water Industry. 72
Useful Websites To calculate your carbon footprint: http://www.carbonfootprint.com/ Energy saving / emissions reductions http://www.energywise.org.nz/calculator/ http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/ http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/ Carbon emission offsetting: http://cdmgoldstandard.org/ Information on latest climate change science: www.nature.com/climate/index.html http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/climate‐change/ http://www.realclimate.org/ www.metoffice.com/research/hadleycentre Hadley Centre www.ucar.edu University Corporation for Atmospheric Research www.ucar.edu/governance/members/institutions.shtml www.giss.nasa.gov NASA Goddard Space Flight Centre www.gfdl.noaa.gov/research/climate National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Dynamics and Prediction Group www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo NOAA Paleoclimatology Programme www.pewclimate.org Pew Centre on Global Climate Change www.copenhagenclimatecouncil.com The Copenhagen Climate Council 73
Climate Change News www.grist.org www.heatisonline.org/main.cfm www.independent.co.uk www.guardian.co.uk www.nytimes.com www.realclimate.org http://www.climateark.org FAQ’s and answers about climate change http://gristmill.grist.org/skeptics http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn11462 Information about important international organisations involved in climate change: http://www.iea.org/ International Energy Agency http://unfccc.int/2860.php United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change http://www.ipcc.ch/ International Panel on Climate Change http://www.wmo.ch/pages/index_en.html World Meteorological Organisation http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/ Ministry for the Environment, NZ climate change information http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/ NZ climate change information 74
Elements of the Climate Change Strategy
1. Recognise the seriousness of climate change and its effects and continue to
improve on the 87% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions achieved since 1990.
2. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change with
particular reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and tipping
points.
3. Monitor also the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning
legislation and evaluate its implications for Watercare.
4. Set clear targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions and/or carbon neutrality
with dates and milestones set in relation to a carbon management hierarchy:
i. avoiding causing emissions;
ii. reducing existing emissions;
iii. capturing emissions and recovering waste energy; and
iv. purchasing renewable energy and offsets.
5. Include an assessment for sustainability and climate change in capital expenditure
planning and future project development with particular reference to the creation
of assets with a long life.
6. Review existing water, wastewater and stormwater infrastructure in order to
establish policies, planning and expenditure involving adaptation to climate
change.
7. Apply climate change criteria as part of procurement policies in relation to the
selection of materials, goods and services for capital and operating expenditure.
8. Develop a robust risk management programme to ensure more sustainable water
practices along with sound mitigation and adaptation strategies.
9. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of workshops
aimed at analysing and mitigating the risks, and determining and reducing levels
of uncertainty in relation to the impacts of climate change on the operation and
development of Watercare’s business.
10. Continue with initiatives to reduce effective demand for water in order to
encourage water conservation and a lower use of energy required for pumping
operations.
11. Incorporate in energy policy consideration of climate change, in order to reduce
energy use, encourage the current positive trend towards greater self-sufficiency
in energy, including hydro-electricity, co-generation, and the use of other
renewable sources, as a modification to the present systems based approach.
12. Focus on implementation with clear milestones, regular reviews of progress and
built in responsiveness to emerging changes, based on principles of credibility,
flexibility and predictability, as defined in the Stern Review.
13. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working in
partnership with Local Network Operators and other governmental and nongovernmental organisations to build relationships with different sectors including
agriculture, horticulture, forestry, transport, commerce, industry, energy,
education, construction, housing and households in order to achieve further
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
14. Adopt a community development approach to work with and not simply for
others, to establish better links between the public sector, business, and
communities down to household level, and to use sustainable water practices as a
key to encourage care for the environment and greenhouse gas emission
reductions.
15. Develop joint policies, programmes and projects to deal with global warming in
terms of an agreed framework negotiated with partners on a co-operative and
equal basis with an emphasis on getting things done and outcomes.
1. Recognise the seriousness of climate change and its effects and continue to
improve on the 87% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions achieved since
1990.
The seriousness of climate change and its effects is underlined by the Stern
Review:
o an overwhelming body of scientific evidence now clearly indicates that
climate change is a serious and urgent issue;
o most climate models show that a doubling of pre-industrial levels of
greenhouse gases is very likely to commit the earth to a rise of between
2° and 5°C in global mean temperatures;
o this level of greenhouse gases will probably be reached between 2030
and 2060;
o some impacts of climate change itself may amplify warming further by
triggering the release of additional greenhouse gases and create a real
risk of even higher temperature changes;
o warming is likely to intensify the water cycle reinforcing existing
patterns of water scarcity and abundance and increasing the risk of
droughts and floods;
o as the world warms, the risk of abrupt and large-scale changes in the
climate system will rise (Stern Review, 2007, p.3).”
Watercare has achieved a significant reduction of 87% in greenhouse gas
emissions since 1990. That figure will change to 95% when two capital
expenditure projects at the Mangere Wastewater Treatment Plant, which are
listed in the Company’s current Asset Management Plan, are completed.
The high quality sustainable environmental design that informed Project
Manukau has been the major contributor to this situation. It has placed
Watercare in a strong position to build on in the future.
2. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change
with particular reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and
tipping points.
International scientific understanding and policy approaches on climate
change are evolving rapidly. Early indications of positive feedback loops,
climate surprises, tipping points and risks of abrupt and far-reaching changes
require careful monitoring. This is because alterations in the climate system
can lead to exponential rather than linear developments.
Average sea level rises, for example, will be influenced by how quickly the
Greenland ice sheet disintegrates and the impacts on this process of an earlier
than anticipated loss of Arctic sea ice. At the other end of the earth what
happens in particular to the West Antarctic ice sheet is causing concern.
While it contains only one-tenth of the total Antarctic ice volume the impact
of its disintegration would be dramatic.
3. Monitor also the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning
legislation and evaluate its implications for Watercare.
The election of new governments in New Zealand and Australia has led to
changes in policy on climate change, the environment and planning. This is
reflected in the introduction of a new emissions trading scheme in Australia,
and a review of New Zealand’s comparable legislation passed by the last
government.
In addition the country’s Resource Management Act has one hundred
proposed changes which will be enacted this year. Also the recommendations
of the Royal Commission on Auckland’s Governance and the extent to which
they are adopted will reshape boundaries in the region in which the provisions
of the Local Government Act 2002 will be applied.
Prospects of a vertically integrated water industry and a comparable transport
organisation with a new scope of responsibilities and accountabilities, both
have implications for Watercare.
In this situation careful monitoring is required and the contribution of
Watercare’s experience, understanding of what works and what doesn’t, and
its practices will serve as a valuable resource for the region.
4. Set clear targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions and/or carbon
neutrality with dates and milestones set in relation to a carbon management
hierarchy:
i. avoiding causing emissions;
ii. reducing existing emissions;
iii. capturing emissions and recovering waste energy; and
iv. purchasing renewable energy and offsets.
The purpose of obtaining ISO14064-1 accreditation for Watercare is to get
independent confirmation of the integrity of the company’s measurements of
greenhouse gas emissions and the acceptability of the conceptual assumptions
underlying that process.
It also serves as a reliable base to set clear targets for future greenhouse gas
emission reductions and/or carbon neutrality. These targets to be realistic
need to take into account diminishing marginal returns on expenditure, as
picking the metaphorical low-hanging fruit produces easier gains than come
from picking the higher-hanging fruit from the metaphorical climate change
tree.
The positive side of this is that the range of options open to Watercare to
achieve those reductions is increased. There is more than one way to achieve
an effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through Watercare’s
expenditure.
Crucial to this task is the adoption of a carbon management hierarchy such as
the one drawn here from the Australian literature. It sets out in order of
priority a series of steps. These can be modified to fit the actual circumstances
and can be implemented at different times as part of an actual plan, provided
that they are understood as essential to the plan as a whole:
o
o
o
o
avoiding causing emissions;
reducing existing emissions;
capturing emissions and recovering waste energy; and
purchasing renewable energy and offsets.
This hierarchy does not prescribe the means to be used in implementing the
plan. It is consistent with policies involving greenhouse gas emission
reductions and creating or enhancing carbon sinks.
Nor should Watercare fear voluntary offsets or carbon credits. They can
increase the flexibility of the company to achieve more than one thing at
once, and cement relationships at the same time. Where iwi, for example,
have gifted a water resource and expressions of reciprocity are desirable,
enhancing carbon sinks through more riparian planting could prove to be
of mutual benefit.
5. Include an assessment for sustainability and climate change in capital
expenditure planning and future project development with particular
reference to the creation of assets with a long life.
One of the characteristics of the water industry is that assets it constructs last
for a long time. Decisions made today have an effect on the long term future.
Capital expenditure now has impacts that reach into the 2050’s and beyond.
Project development and capital expenditure are not arbitrary responses, but
are products of planning frameworks and experience. Given growing
recognition of the connections between the science of climate change, the
effects of development tracks, and climate and other policies, it is prudent to
incorporate in project development and capital expenditure decision making
and assessment for sustainability/sustainable development and climate change.
As is acknowledged by the IPCC Working Group III's 2007 report on
mitigation of climate change (IPCC, 2007, pp.691-743) there is a two-way
relationship between climate change and sustainable development. Climate
change policy is not simply a part of a sustainable development approach. Nor
can sustainable development policy be reduced without remainder to a climate
change approach.
“The notion is that policies pursuing sustainable development and
climate change mitigation, can be mutually reinforcing (IPCC, 2007,
p.696).”
Climate change policy can influence the choice of particular development
pathways generated by sustainable development approaches. Different
development pathways also have different effects on climate change and the
content of climate change policies. Once a move is made from a higher and
more general level to greater specificity, the relationship between the two
perspectives becomes clearer.
What this means is that climate policies alone will not solve the climate
problem. More sustainable development paths can make a significant
contribution to climate goals.
“Climate outcomes are influenced not only by climate specific policies
but also by the mix of development choices made and the development
paths that these policies lead to. There are always going to be a variety
of development pathways that could possibly be followed and they
might lead to future outcomes at global, national and local levels. The
choice of development policies can, therefore, be as consequential to
future climate stabilization as the choice of climate-specific policies
(IPCC, 2007, p.700).”
The three lessons drawn from this understanding of a two-way mutually
reinforcing relationship are:
o development paths as well as climate policy determine GHG
emissions;
o new global scenario analyses confirm the importance of development
pathways for climate change mitigation;
o development paths can vary by regions and countries because of
different priorities and conditions (IPCC, 2007, p.701).
A good New Zealand example is Meridian Energy’s Mokihinui Hydro
proposal for a hydro dam on the Mokihinui River on the South Island’s West
Coast. Meridian is New Zealand’s largest renewable energy generator. With
a total capacity of 2496 MW, it generates more than 30 percent of New
Zealand’s electricity using only renewable energy resources. Meridian is also
New Zealand’s only certified carboNZero electricity supplier.
From a climate change perspective the hydro proposal is clearly a preferable
use of a renewable resource compared with an alternative development
pathway that would be created by a new coal-fired power station designed to
match the cost and security elements in the Mokihinui hydro dam. It would
also help Meridian retain its clean green status as an electricity supplier.
From a sustainable development perspective, however, there are a range of
issues and impacts generated by the hydro proposal that are linked to the
nature, history, and functions of, and the intrinsic and extrinsic values
associated with the site. Among other things these involve questions of
biodiversity, water, aquatic ecology including the importance of fisheries,
bird-life, recreational uses, the relationship of people to the land, the presence
of archaeological sites and wahi tapu, construction and construction effects.
It is right in a two-way relationship to give weight to both sustainable
development and climate change perspectives, to allow one to enhance the
other, and arrive at an eventual decision according to the processes of the
RMA which are based in part on a determination of how to achieve the
sustainable management of resources.
The two-way relationship and the mutually reinforcing roles of sustainable
development and climate change policies are the reason for supporting the
inclusion of an assessment for sustainability and climate change in capital
expenditure planning and future project development for Watercare.
6. Review existing water, wastewater and stormwater infrastructure in order to
establish policies, planning and expenditure involving adaptation to climate
change.
One of the difficulties facing climate change policy is that the effects of
climate change will increase over time. As an issue it is here to stay, but
climate change will continue into a long term future. It is both intergenerational and intra-generational. It is a global challenge but its impacts are
not uniform throughout the world.
These features of climate change as an issue makes it hard to generate public
support when the effects of global warming will be more significant for our
children and grandchildren than for us. If sustainable development and
climate change policy are to become integral to political and commercial
business as usual, support is required not just from governments and markets,
but from civil society reaching down into cities, districts, local communities,
families and individuals.
This provides not only challenges but opportunities. There is still sufficient
lead time to develop planned responses over a number of years to adapt water,
wastewater and stormwater infrastructure to the specific local and regional
impacts of climate change.
The first step is to review that infrastructure to reduce the effects locally and
regionally of climate change on the security of the provision of water,
wastewater and stormwater services. As with capital expenditure planning
and project development, mitigation was the primary reason. Here policies,
planning and expenditure are a sensible approach to adapt existing assets and
the delivery of services to the longer term effects of global warming on
Auckland.
7. Apply climate change criteria as part of procurement policies in relation to
the selection of materials, goods and services for capital and operating
expenditure.
Watercare is in a position to exercise responsible leverage in relation to the
businesses it procures materials, goods and services from (including
sustainable design assistance) in its everyday business operations.
It could, for example, introduce sustainability and climate change criteria into
its procurement policies.
Firms providing cement, pipes and chemicals could be asked to account for
their greenhouse gas emissions and for their commitments in relation to
reducing them. This could be a factor taken into account in according
preference to one firm over another, where questions of price, ability to deliver
in a timely way, and reliability were equal.
8. Develop a robust risk management programme to ensure more sustainable
water practices along with sound mitigation and adaptation strategies.
The growing importance of more sustainable water practices and sound
mitigation and adaptation strategies is linked with a trend in the Watercare
Board to place more emphasis on robust risk management.
Risk management has a key role in the normal activities of Watercare as a
utility company and is a good indicator of the quality of its management.
Removing unsustainable water practices, and the mitigation of and adaptation
to climate change need to be an integral part of Watercare’s management of
risk.
This is highlighted, particularly when there is an international financial crisis
slowing activity in the real economy and where attempts to kick-start
economies are emphasising investment in low carbon development pathways.
A climate change strategy is less likely to success if it is not integrated through
line management to deal with the increasing number of risks facing the
company.
9. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of
workshops aimed at analysing and mitigating the risks, and determining and
reducing levels of uncertainty in relation to the impacts of climate change on
the operation and development of Watercare’s business.
A practical way of managing and reducing risks and of determining and
reducing levels of uncertainty in relation to the impacts of climate change on
the operation and development of Watercare’s business is to undertake
scenario-based planning exercises.
The IPCC uses scenario planning extensively. Its SRES (Special Report on
Emission Scenarios) serves as a key planning tool. A scenario is defined as a
plausible description of how the future may develop based on a coherent and
internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces (eg rate of
technological change, prices) and relationships. Scenarios are neither
predictions nor forecasts, but are useful to provide a view of the implications
of developments and actions (IPCC, 2007, p.820).
Scenario-based planning by analysing key drivers and key relationships and
their interactions within a specified scenario can generate an understanding of
the cumulative effects of events, developments and actions. An essential
ingredient of the exercises is an extensive and empirically based knowledge of
Watercare’s infrastructure, strategic thinking and present and proposed
activities.
The exercises need to work with key personnel and sections of the company.
In this way insights and understanding derived from scenario planning become
embedded in different levels of the company’s structure.
As noted by the MfE the effects of climate change will be mixed in New
Zealand. Different mixes can be incorporated in a range of scenarios. These
may include the following:
o higher temperatures;
o rising sea levels;
o more frequent and intense extreme weather events such as droughts,
landslides, storm surges and floods;
o more rainfall in the west but a drier east;
o warmer winters with fewer frosts, and rising snowlines.
In terms of water resources climate change will likely lead to:
o greater water demand particularly during hot dry summers;
o longer summers with higher temperatures and lower rainfall that will
reduce soil moisture and groundwater supplies;
o lower river flows in summer but higher flows in winter;
o reduced water quality due to higher temperatures and lower flows in
summer.
10. Continue with initiatives to reduce effective demand for water in order to
encourage water conservation and a lower use of energy required for
pumping operations.
The April 2008 Three Waters Draft Strategic Plan, sponsored by Watercare
has a central theme: a strong emphasis on water demand management.
It is proposed to reduce the gross per person demand for water by 15% of
2004 levels by 2025. A further 10% of total demand will be met by beneficial
use of stormwater and treated wastewater for industrial purposes and of
stormwater for non potable household purposes over the same period.
These targets are achievable. The plan suggests that the targets are likely to be
achieved by a combination of some or all of a range of initiatives.
o Beneficial use of treated wastewater for non-potable industrial
purposes;
o Beneficial use of stormwater, using a combination of rain tanks and
aquifer recharge for subsequent water supply abstraction purposes;
o Water audits of larger users;
o Leakage reduction programmes;
o Pressure management programmes;
o Regional land use policy, including the promotion of sustainable urban
design and low impact design methods;
o Water conservation through communication and education
programmes;
o Promotion of water efficient appliances and systems;
o Seasonal irrigation; and
o Pricing mechanisms (Three Waters Draft Strategic Plan, 2008, p.6).
More work needs to be done on education and pricing mechanisms as two key
components of effective water demand management. The encouragement of
water conservation can also lead to lower energy use in relation to pumping
operations.
Volumetric user charges for wastewater are still a significant community and
political issue, especially in areas of the region where there are larger number
of households on lower incomes. While their introduction is essential they
need to be linked with innovative compensation approach to limit their effects
on the most vulnerable members of the community.
11. Incorporate in energy policy consideration of climate change, in order to
reduce energy use, encourage the current positive trend towards greater selfsufficiency in energy, including hydro-electricity, co-generation, and the use
of other renewable sources, as a modification to the present systems based
approach.
It is not surprising in a company that transports water, wastewater and
stormwater and has a variety of pumping activities, that energy use is
important financially and a potentially significant source of greenhouse gas
emissions.
Watercare has 10 dams, 6 water treatment plants, and is involved in water and
wastewater reticulation, with 51 wastewater pump stations and the wastewater
treatment plant at Mangere.
The Project Manukau upgrade at Mangere with the move to land-based
treatment and the removal of the oxidation ponds led to a large reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions. Also increased biogas utilisation to power the
Wastewater Treatment Plant through co-generation made it more than 50%
self-sufficient in energy.
On the water side five of Watercare’s ten dams have hydro-electric generators.
There are also a number of special projects funded from government grants to
increase self-sufficiency in energy.
At present Watercare has a sophisticated system for prioritising the sources of
water for supply to different parts of the region. It is based on security of
supply (so that water stored in particular dams is not lowered beneath prudent
levels) and more expensive sources of water are used last.
This system has functioned well. This part of the climate change strategy
simply injects an additional factor for consideration: a climate change
criterion, which, builds on the financial and sustainability thinking that is
already integral to the system’s operations.
So far the elements of the climate change strategy have been linked with line
management responsibilities.
These have included areas of capital
expenditure and future project development planning, existing water,
wastewater and stormwater infrastructure in relation to adaptation,
procurement policies and practices, risk management, pricing and other
policies aimed at reducing effective demand for water.
Energy policies are the final ingredient of this overall approach. The aim of
the line management strategy is to ensure that climate change and sustainable
development are not considered special and unrelated concepts but are built in
to everyday practices and the actual culture of the company.
12. Focus on implementation with clear milestones, regular reviews of progress
and built in responsiveness to emerging changes, based on principles of
credibility, flexibility and predictability, as defined in the Stern Review.
Strategies because of their necessary generality and degree of abstraction can
be placed on the shelf, gather dust, and even be used on occasions to suggest
that a company is doing better than it really is.
This is neither the culture nor the practice of Watercare in which
implementation is seen as an essential part of the process. Experience
indicates that we can have an excellent or impressive strategy, but the devil is
always in the detail.
This is why an action plan is the next part of the proposed climate change
strategy. Clear milestones, regular reviews of progress, responsiveness to
emerging changes and the application rather than the articulation of principles
are the next part of the journey.
The Stern Review maintains that effective policy requires three things:
credibility, flexibility and predictability. Credibility is about the belief that the
policy will endure and be enforced. Flexibility is about the ability to change
the policy in response to new information and changing circumstances.
Predictability is about setting out the circumstances and procedures under
which the policy will change (Stern Review, 2007, p.369).
The wisdom of working on an action plan is indicated by the dramatic changes
that have taken place while our team has been developing an overall climate
change strategy for the company. There has been:
o an international melt-down of the financial system that has spread into the
real economy and created a major international recession which promises
to get worse before it gets better.
o international moves to kick-start economies through tax cuts, increased
public expenditure, and significant borrowing. Similar approaches are
present in varying degrees in Australia and New Zealand.
o a growing recognition that the increased investment required, much of
which would have occurred anyway, needs to be linked to low carbon
developments aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate change.
13. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working in
partnership with Local Network Operators and other governmental and nongovernmental organisations to build relationships with different sectors
including agriculture, horticulture, forestry, transport, commerce, industry,
energy, education, construction, housing and households in order to achieve
further reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
The elements in this strategy so far have concentrated largely on how different
parts of the Watercare organisation can be harnessed as part of an integrated
strategy to contribute to continuing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
While questions of leverage have been introduced, for example, in relation to
procurement policies, the general focus has been on internal relations.
The last three elements in the strategy have to do with the company’s external
relations, and how it can build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence
through critical partnerships in order to help achieve further reductions in the
region’s greenhouse gas emissions.
This takes Watercare into new areas of activity where its strategic role as the
regional wholesale provider of water and wastewater services gives it largely
indirect relationships with different sectors of the economy including
agriculture, horticulture, forestry, transport, commerce, industry, energy
education, construction, housing and households. For each of these sectors
water is a precious and indispensable resource which is used in more or less
sustainable ways, but where considerable improvements are practicable.
At present Watercare’s relationships with the sectors are mediated through a
range of other institutions: local network operators, units of central and local
government, and non-governmental and community based organisations.
Hence the need for a strong partnership approach.
If a vertically integrated water industry emerges as a result of decisions
coming from the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Auckland’s
Governance, the regional water company will exercise more direct influence.
Partnership with owners in regional and local governmental and nongovernmental institutions, and with communities and households will be even
more important.
Again the IPCC Working Group III’s 2007 report on mitigation of climate
change provides useful guidance. It deals in detail with opportunities at the
sectoral level to change development pathways towards lower emissions
through development policies (IPCC, 2007, pp 717-726). It notes that there
are a multiplicity of plausible development paths in which low emissions are
not necessarily associated with low economic growth. It concludes that:
“...the vast literature on governance indicates that changing
development pathways can rarely be imposed from the top: it requires
the co-ordination of multiple actors at multiple scales... (IPCC, 2007,
p.717).
14. Adopt a community development approach to work with and not simply for
others, to establish better links between the public sector, business, and
communities down to household level, and to use sustainable water practices
as a key to encourage care for the environment and greenhouse gas emission
reductions.
How are we going to move from statements of ideals, values and principles to
encourage a commitment and resolve to act in effective ways at different
levels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Three general approaches
commend themselves:
o Work with and not simply for others through a community development
approach;
o Make better links between the public sector, business and communities
down to household level to develop bottom-up as well as top-down
strategies;
o Use sustainable water practices as a key to encourage care for the
environment and emission reductions.
The IPCC Working Group III provides one framework for thinking about
effective strategic action in terms of the state, markets and civil society
working together:
“The three key institutional sectors – government, market and civil
society – have begun to work in closer collaboration, partnering with
each other in multiple and diverse ways when their goals are common
and their comparative advantages are differentiated... While the roles,
responsibilities, and powers assigned to the respective actors remains a
hotly contested subject, it is widely acknowledged that responsibility
for the environment and sustainability has become a much broader
project. It is no longer primarily the preserve of governments, but
involves civil society, private sector and the state... (IPCC, 2007,
pp.708-709).”
What has this to do with a community development strategy? Working with
rather than simply for others? Community development is:
(a) A problem solving tool for dealing with strategic issues that require a
people-centred approach and changes in our behaviour, rather than
engineering and technical solutions alone.
(b) A means of building relationships in the medium and long term to
encourage increased respect for the dignity of difference and greater social
cohesion.
(c) A way of encouraging the participation of individuals, groups and
communities in the public arena to help create a flourishing local
democracy.
(d) A means of building stronger communities, more effective networks, and
trust at different levels of cities and regions.
(e) A method linking community services, community education and
community empowerment.
The ingredients of a strategy include:
o identifying and encouraging political commitment and the exercise of
leadership in public and private sectors and in civil society;
o utilising the energy generated through bi-cultural approaches, ethnic
diversity and different faith communities to deal with climate change;
o assisting the development of an informed public constituency as a means
of encouraging more responsive governance and greater business
involvement;
o increasing understanding of the way in which global warming affects and
will affect actual people and their relationship with other people and with
the world of nature, through appealing to their imagination, capacity for
empathy and encouraging them to participate actively;
o identifying the kinds of partners needed for viable collective action;
o encouraging networks, alliances, institutions and groups in the three
sectors to engage in this process, contribute time, resources or money and
take joint ownership and responsibility for getting things done and the
results;
o analysing gaps in institutional capacity and helping create new and
improved capacity;
o setting targets and timeframes for action remembering that early successes
can contribute to later successes and that momentum and tipping points in
public acceptance are critical;
o Beguiling, deflecting, harnessing and restraining self-interest, individual
and collective for the sake of the community and the earth that sustains our
life.
15. Develop joint policies, programmes and projects to deal with global warming
in terms of an agreed framework negotiated with partners on a co-operative
and equal basis with an emphasis on getting things done and outcomes.
Partners, participation based on equality, negotiated agreements, and the use
of consensus decision-making (as much as possible) are essential components
of successful alliances and getting the best results. This requires more
powerful partners moderating their influence and using consensus as one way
of achieving that. The quality of partnership is an important key to the quality
of outcomes.
Because partners come from different sectors of community, market and state
the practical advice of Michael Edwards is relevant:
o be clear and transparent about why you are promoting certain patterns of
associational life, and take responsibility for the results;
o focus on the conditions in which associations can shape themselves and
their relationships, not a predetermined view of which forms you think are
more important;
o think of associational life as an ecosystem and look for components that
are weak or disconnected;
o provide resources for as broad a range as possible of groups to come
together and articulate their own visions of the future;
o promote indigenous roots and accountability as the key to effective
resource generation, independence and effectiveness (Edwards, 2004,
p.109).
These insights need to be drawn on and contextualised in terms of a
partnership approach to global warming. Watercare now (and even more in the
future) straddles the three sectors: the public sector, business and civil society.
Watercare is rooted in the public sector with its regionally focused local
government ownership. It is a business among other businesses. It has impacts
on people, their relationships and their communities. These are poised to
become more directly attributable to the company rather than mediated
through other institutions.
This political, economic and social location will present Watercare or its
successor with major challenges. It will also bring critical opportunities to
promote the four well-beings in more sustainable and enduring ways while
dealing with climate change with a spirit of innovation and creativity.
Action Plan - Summary
1. Establish a climate change implementation team with special responsibility for
recommending the setting and alteration of future targets for the enhancement of carbon
sinks, greenhouse gas emission reductions, and/or carbon neutrality.
2. The starting point for the climate change implementation team is the reduction by the
2007-08 year of about 87% in greenhouse gas emissions which has been achieved since
1990, the base year for the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change with particular
reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and tipping points.
4. Monitor the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning legislation and
evaluate its implications for Watercare.
5. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of workshops aimed at
analysing and mitigating the risks and determining and reducing levels of uncertainty in
relation to the impacts of climate change on the operation and development of Watercare’s
business.
6. Discussions should be initiated with second and third tier management about how to
incorporate in a practical way consideration of climate change in the everyday business of
the company’s planning and operations.
7. The line management and other management areas identified above should incorporate
consideration of climate change mitigation and adaptation as an integrated feature of
business as usual.
8. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working with key partners to
build relationships with different sectors of the economy and establish better links
between the public sector, business, and communities down to household level to
encourage greenhouse gas emission reductions.
1
Action Plan
1. Establish a climate change implementation team with special responsibility for
recommending the setting and alteration of future targets for the enhancement of
carbon sinks, greenhouse gas emission reductions, and/or carbon neutrality.
It would take into account a carbon management hierarchy involving:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Avoiding causing emissions;
Reducing existing emissions;
Enhancing carbon sinks;
Capturing emissions and recovering waste energy; and
Purchasing renewable energy and offsets.
It would monitor the implementation of Watercare’s overall climate change strategy and
the contribution being made by line management and other areas of management to its
practical application in the company’s ordinary business activities.
The implementation team would establish clear milestones, regular reviews of progress
and ensure built-in responsiveness to emerging changes in the wider environment. This
would take into account principles of credibility, flexibility and predictability as defined
in the Stern Review.
Credibility is about the belief that the policy will endure and be endorsed. Flexibility is
about the ability to change the policy in response to new information and changing
circumstances. Predictability is about setting out the circumstances and procedures under
which the policy will change.
The team would also be responsible for preparing background material for annual reports
and commissioning ISO 14064-1 accreditation to provide independent confirmation of
the integrity of the company’s greenhouse gas emission measurements and of the
resilience of the assumptions underpinning them.
In recognition of the need to promote bottom-up as well as top-down strategies and of an
awareness that development pathways can rarely be imposed from the top, Watercare
should build on and extend its sphere of influence through an exercise of its corporate
responsibility to encourage further reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the region
and nationally. This will require the development of partnerships with other bodies to
build relationships with different sectors of the economy including agriculture,
horticulture, forestry, the wine industry, transport, commerce, industry, energy,
education, the construction industry, housing and households.
While at present these relationships are mediated through other institutions (eg local and
regional government and the Local Network Operators as water retailers), this situation
will change when a vertically integrated water industry emerges as a result of decisions
emanating from the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Auckland
Governance.
Water retailers have established relationships already with some of these sectors.
Manukau Water has been working, for example, with Housing New Zealand Corporation
to incorporate more sustainable water practices in their new housing stock.
2
Units of local government such as Auckland City Council, North Shore City Council,
Rodney District and Waitakere City Council have opted for rebates for developers for the
installation of dual use rainwater tanks or have provided subsidies for their installation.
This is part of a demand management approach that has implications for energy use.
To establish better links between the public sector, business and communities down to
household level Watercare should apply a community development approach to these
relationships. This would involve using sustainable water practices, the essential role of
water in the maintenance of life and the provision of goods and services, and the lessons
learned from the development of its climate change strategy to encourage care for the
environment and greenhouse gas emission reductions in the wider community.
Watercare is rooted in the public sector with its regionally focussed local government
ownership. It is a business among businesses. It has impacts on people, their
relationships and their communities. These are poised to become more directly
attributable to the company rather than mediated through other institutions.
For this reason Watercare is well placed to develop joint policies, programmes and
projects to deal with global warming in terms of an agreed framework negotiated with
partners on a co-operative and equal basis with an emphasis on getting things done and
outcomes.
Participation based on equality, negotiated agreements, and the use of consensus decisionmaking (as far as possible) are essential components of successful alliances, getting the
best results, and co-ordination of multiple actors at multiple scales. This requires more
powerful partners, such as Watercare to moderate their influence and use consensus as
one way of achieving that. The quality of the partnerships is an important key to the
quality of the outcomes.
Watercare’s implementation team would have a role in advising on and monitoring the
contribution and effectiveness of the company in the establishment of these partnerships
and relationships and the practical achievement of the shared goals adopted. It would
also assist Watercare to determine:
(a) The extent to which it wishes to make a difference on climate change;
(b) The limits it wishes to impose on its contributions; and
(c) How decisions on both of these matters will contribute to the company’s broader
reputation as a leader and innovator in relation to issues associated with global
warming.
The composition of the climate change implementation team is important. Sponsorship
or leadership should draw on second-tier management to ensure that the involvement of
senior levels of authority in the company indicates the importance placed on global
warming and its implications.
Line managers should also be represented in the team along with the Watercare members
of the team that developed the overall climate change strategy.
Skills are also needed in the area of community development in relation to the public
sector, business and local communities down to household level. This requires the ability
3
to tap into existing networks (including political networks), to build alliances, to identify
possible partners and supporters, and create an active public constituency.
2. The starting point for the climate change implementation team is the reduction by
the 2007-08 year of about 87% in greenhouse gas emissions which has been achieved
since 1990, the base year for the Kyoto Protocol.
This figure is underpinned by three assumptions:
(a) Carbon dioxide emissions from the wastewater treatment process have been
excluded as these are short cycle emissions from biological material in a
similar time frame. The biological carbon cycle is a rapid process compared
with the geological carbon cycle which operates on a time scale of millions of
years. It removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through photosynthesis,
turns it into carbohydrates (sugars). Plants and animals use these carbohydrates
through a process called respiration. This releases the energy contained in
sugars for use in metabolism and changes carbohydrate fuel back into carbon
dioxide, which in turn is released back into the atmosphere.
This approach to short cycle renewable carbon is in keeping with that
recommended by the IPCC (2006) Vol.5, Chapter 6.1, Introduction,
Wastewater Treatment and Discharge. ‘Carbon dioxide emissions from
wastewater are not considered in the IPCC Guidelines because these are of
biogenic origin and should not be included in national total emissions.’ It is
also the approach taken by Ofwat (2008) ‘Preparing for the future – Ofwat’s
climate change policy statement’. Emissions of methane and nitrous oxide are,
however, included owing to the greater global warming potential of these
gases. Ofwat and Australian sources.
(b) Since 1 July 2006, almost all of the externally produced electricity consumed
by Watercare has been supplied by Meridian Energy, which is carbon neutral.
The related values were therefore removed from the energy related greenhouse
gas emissions. This argument is justified as the Meridian carboNZero status
has been verified on the carboNZero website. Nor are the core activities of the
New Zealand water industry covered by the existing emissions trading scheme
(the implementation of which is subject at present to delay).
(c) The emissions from chemicals, concrete, the manufacture of concrete pipes and
the activities of contractors and sub-contractors are also excluded from
Watercare’s greenhouse gas inventory. This is based on a view of what should
be attributable to whom in a regional and national context.
Those who produce greenhouse gas emissions directly through their economic
activities in the production of goods and services, rather than those who use
them indirectly, should bear responsibility for them. This is one way of dealing
with the issue of embedded carbon. Who embeds the carbon? It is the
producers of the cement, the concrete pipes, and the chemicals who are directly
accountable. Who embeds the carbon in the process of construction? The
contractors and sub-contractors who do the work.
4
This categorisation is important for three reasons. First those who produce the
emissions directly are in a better position practically to account for them.
Second, it embeds responsibility for emissions firmly in the greenhouse gas
emissions chain. Third, it avoids the prospect of double-counting in regional
and national frameworks and contexts, which would be clearly counterproductive.
There are further opportunities over the next five years for Watercare to reduce
its greenhouse gas emissions further. Additional capital expenditure, signalled
in the Asset Management Plan, to put sealed roofs on the digesters and provide
new gas storage facilities at the wastewater treatment plant promise to push the
current 87% to about 95%.
Achieving this level of emissions reduction is within reach. To go further and
close the 5% gap to achieve carbon neutrality involves taking into account
diminishing marginal returns on expenditure.
However, there are also some promising research avenues being explored in
relation to biosolids. Typically biosolids have about 3% inorganic carbon. If
this carbon never biodegrades there is potential for biosolids to function as a
carbon sink if they are properly covered. The one proviso is that as they
decompose they do not release quantities of methane into the environment
through the cover. Preliminary investigations indicate that this is not the case.
The advantages associated with creating or enhancing permanent carbon sinks
is that they have the potential to move Watercare towards being carbon
negative, rather than simply carbon neutral.
3. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change with
particular reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and tipping points.
This can be done in-house given the expertise that has been built-up in the climate change
team. The Climate Change Literature Review, completed as part of this project, can serve
as a base-line. The monitoring of international scientific and policy approaches needs to
continue but a summary review should take place every two years.
The literature review should be placed on the company’s website and copies printed for
distribution to secondary schools and tertiary educational institution to encourage an
informed public opinion.
4. Monitor the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning legislation and
evaluate its implications for Watercare.
This can be done by a member or members of the implementation team with a planning
background, and, if necessary, reviewed legally. A base-line needs to be put in place over
the next year. This may encompass links between the emissions trading schemes in
Australia and New Zealand, changes to our RMA, results springing from the
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, and any
amendments to the Local Government Act 2002 emanating from the government.
5
5. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of workshops
aimed at analysing and mitigating the risks and determining and reducing levels of
uncertainty in relation to the impacts of climate change on the operation and
development of Watercare’s business.
A scenario is defined as a plausible description of how the future may develop based on a
coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces and
relationships. Scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, but are useful to provide a
view of the implications of developments and actions.
Scenario based planning by analysing key drivers and key relationships within a specified
scenario can generate an understanding of the cumulative effects of events, developments
and actions. An essential ingredient of the exercises is an extensive and empirically based
knowledge of Watercare’s infrastructure, strategic thinking and present and proposed
activities.
The exercises need to involve key personnel and sections of the company. In this way
insights and understanding derived from scenario planning become embedded in different
levels of the company’s structure. It would also be useful to include representatives from
the Local Network Operators in these exercises in anticipation of their operations being
incorporated into Watercare.
As MfE has noted the effects of climate change will be mixed in New Zealand. Different
mixes can be incorporated in a range of scenarios. These may include the following:
o Higher temperatures;
o Rising sea levels;
o More frequent and intense extreme weather events such as droughts, storm surges and
floods;
o More rainfall in the west but a drier east; and
o Warmer winters with fewer frosts and rising snowlines.
In terms of water resources, climate change will likely lead to:
o Greater water demand particularly during hot dry summers;
o Long summers with higher temperatures and lower rainfall that will reduce soil
moisture and groundwater supplies;
o Lower river flows in summer but higher flows in winter; and
o Reduced water quality due to higher temperatures and lower flows in summer.
Scenario planning should be undertaken early in the piece. It provides a variety of
scenarios that can be linked with an overall climate change strategy for the company as a
whole. It can alert line management to issues affecting the business which have
implications for the exercise of responsibilities at different levels of the company’s
structure.
These scenario planning exercises should be undertaken and completed by the end of
October 2009.
6
6. Discussions should be initiated with second and third tier management about how to
incorporate in a practical way consideration of climate change in the everyday
business of the company’s planning and operations.
There are resources within the company which can be drawn on to achieve this.
Areas that need to be covered include:
o Capital expenditure planning and future project development with emphasis on the
creation of assets with a long life;
o Policies, planning and expenditure relating to water, wastewater and stormwater
infrastructure involving adaptation to climate change;
o Procurement policy and implementation in relation to the selection of materials,
goods and services for capital and operating expenditure;
o Risk management;
o Energy policy;
o The reduction of effective water demand;
o The prioritisation of initiatives in the Three Waters Strategic Plan which was
developed under the sponsorship of Watercare.
These discussions should take place as soon as possible but would benefit from exposure
to the scenario based planning exercises. Ideally it would help build momentum in
relation to the climate change strategy, if implementation commenced for the year
beginning 1 July 2009.
7. The line management and other management areas identified above should
incorporate consideration of climate change mitigation and adaptation as an
integrated feature of business as usual.
In this way dealing with climate change (along with sustainability) will not be seen as
something special that transcends everything else, but instead will be part of ordinary
business practice. It will be integral to operations and become embedded in institutional
practice.
8. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working with key
partners to build relationships with different sectors of the economy and establish
better links between the public sector, business, and communities down to household
level to encourage greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Before implementing the “external relations” section of the strategy and applying a
community development approach to the tasks this entails, it would be prudent to examine
the report of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance and the government’s
decisions on its recommendations. There is likely to be a period of uncertainty and flux
between the time political decisions on local and regional governance are announced and
the creation of new structures and institutions.
This should be viewed as a time of opportunity for action rather than a reason for delay
and inaction. This interim period can be utilised to set the scene for joint action in the
future and agreement about directions. Watercare can also use the time to ensure that the
experience, relationships and local links in Manukau and Waitakere are retained for the
7
vertically integrated company. The proposed legislative requirement for demand
management has strong local and community components as does the recommended
IWRM (integrated water resource management ) emphasis.
While the general strategies in this area are for the key partners to determine collectively,
Watercare can be an initiator and interim co-ordinator. One of the virtues of community
development approaches is that they are people intensive rather than capital intensive.
What does Watercare need to do in working with others?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Identify key partners who will contribute to viable, co-operative and collective
action on climate change.
Encourage networks, alliances, institutions and groups in the three sectors to
engage in this process, contribute time, resources and/or money, and take joint
ownership and responsibility for getting things done and the results.
Set targets and timeframes for action, remembering that early successes can
contribute to later successes and that building momentum and tipping points in
public acceptance are critical.
Analyse gaps in institutional capacity and help create new and improved capacity.
Identify and encourage political commitment and the exercise of leadership in
public and private sectors and in civil society on global warming.
Assist the development of an informed public constituency as a means of
encouraging more responsive governance and greater business involvement.
Increase understanding of the way in which climate change affects and will affect
people and their relationships with other people and with the world of nature,
through appealing to their imagination, capacity for empathy and encouraging
them to participate actively.
Utilise the energy generated through bi-cultural approaches, ethnic diversity and
different faith communities to deal with global warming and its effects.
Beguile, deflect, harness and restrain individual and collective self-interest and its
market expressions, for the sake of the community and the earth that sustains our
life.
Develop and implement an effective communication and educational strategy.
8
Climate Change Strategy and Watercare Services Limited: the work of
its climate change strategy team.
Dr Bruce Hucker
2011
Introduction
In 2008 Watercare Services Limited (“Watercare”), New Zealand’s largest publiclyowned water company, established a multi-disciplinary team to prepare a climate
change strategy. It performed this task during 2008 and 2009. Its core membership
came from Watercare’s environmental planning unit and from its energy and control
system sections. The team undertook its work under the aegis of senior
management and was led by an independent planning academic with considerable
political experience in local and regional government.
Adoption of a community development approach
Early in the piece the team adopted a community development approach and
utilised it to work and build relationships with those with line management
responsibilities in the company. This was to allow Watercare to harness different
line management resources as part of a broader company-wide climate change
strategy.
The line management responsibilities included capital expenditure and future
programme planning, risk management, procurement policies, and energy policies.
In addition there was a focus on policies, planning and expenditure relating to water,
wastewater and stormwater infrastructure. The reduction of effective water
demand and the prioritisation of initiatives in the Watercare sponsored Three
Waters Strategic Plan were also covered (Three Waters, 2008).
The aim was to ensure that the consideration of issues of climate change and
sustainable development were built into everyday practices and the actual culture of
the company rather than being relegated to the realm of the special and the
exceptional.
A similar approach of working with others rather than simply for them was applied
to Watercare’s external relations. The team embodied this in the links it built with
the public sector with government ministries, local authorities, regional council
committees, and local network operators (the retail sector of Auckland’s water and
wastewater services).
It did not follow traditional consultation practices but debated and tested ideas. It
shared work in progress with those it met with, learned from the encounters,
improved the quality of its analysis, and prepared the way for future partnerships
through exposing its preliminary thinking to criticism, and reducing the element of
surprise in the future.
Why a community development approach?
A strategic community development approach was warranted because of the nature
of climate change itself and the range of responses required if mitigation,
adaptation, and a reduction of human suffering are to occur. The building of
enduring, resilient, and long term relationships at different levels, in relation to
different places, different time scales, and different social and economic sectors is
essential if effective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stocks is to take
place.
As an issue climate change is here to stay. It will continue into a long term future.
Its effects will increase over time. It involves risks and uncertainties. It has intergenerational and intra-generational dimensions. It is a global challenge, but its
impacts are and will be spread unevenly both among nations and within them (IPCC,
2007a).
A community development approach fits well where a combination of top-down and
bottom-up strategies are necessary parts of an integrated whole and are pursued
together. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III in its
2007 report on mitigation concluded:
‘The vast literature on governance indicates that changing development
pathways can rarely be imposed from the top: it requires the coordination of
multiple actors at multiple scales (IPCC, 2007b, 717)’.
In other words imposing from the top doesn’t work unless it is part of a double
movement that includes starting from the bottom as well.
A community development approach also encompasses building relationships
among key sectors: the public sector, markets, and civil society. The same IPCC
working group provides a framework for showing how these sectors working
together can achieve effective strategic results:
2
‘The three key institutional sectors- government, market and civil societyhave begun to work in closer collaboration, partnering with each other in
multiple and diverse ways when their goals are common and their
comparative advantages are differentiated…. While the roles, responsibilities,
and powers assigned to the respective actors remains a hotly contested
subject, it is widely acknowledged that responsibility for the environment
and sustainability has become a much broader project. It is no longer
primarily the preserve of governments, but involves civil society, private
sector and the state… (IPCC, 2007b, 708-709)’.
These three general insights underpinned the approach the team adopted in relation
to its more specific tasks:
•
the understanding of climate change as a phenomenon and as an
issue;
•
the recognition that top-down and bottom-up strategies need to be
pursued together;
•
the perception that the building of relationships between the public
sector, markets, and civil society was a key to effective action.
Features of a community development approach.
The Watercare team applied a broadly based community development strategy to its
work. It took into account an understanding of community development as:
•
a problem-solving tool for dealing with strategic issues that require a peoplecentred approach and changes in our behaviour, rather than engineering and
technical solutions alone;
•
a means of building relationships in the medium and long term to encourage
respect for the dignity of difference and greater social inclusion;
•
a way of encouraging the participation of individuals, groups and
communities in the public arena to help create a flourishing local democracy;
•
a means of building stronger communities, more effective networks, and
trust at different levels of the city and region; and
•
a method linking community services, community education and community
empowerment (Hucker, 2009, 69).
3
These multidimensional features informed both the way the team went about its
task, and the substantive content of the climate change strategy and the action plan
it developed.
How the iterative process worked.
There were six components of the iterative and integrated process employed. It
began with regular meetings of the core team. At these the members set out on a
journey which involved their educating themselves about global warming and
climate change, reading widely, clarifying the key issues, and reflecting on how these
related to the company and its context. One of the members with an engineering
background described the learning that occurred as “like being in a high quality
graduate seminar”. Over time a social stock of knowledge formed as well as a group
capacity for critical analysis of the issues. During the project other Watercare staff
attended the meetings and made themselves familiar with the work of the team.
Generally they had line management responsibilities in the company. They added
their own critical perspectives and enabled the team to understand the fit between
broader strategic considerations and how line managers might contribute to them as
they went about their duties.
The second component involved establishing links with public sector organisations.
Members of the team met with others from outside Watercare itself. These
included groups drawn from government ministries, CEOs of local authorities and
specialist staff, regional council committees and their consultants, and the chief
executives and senior professionals from the local network operators who together
constituted the retail sector of Auckland’s water and wastewater industry.
The third and fourth components provided the evidence base utilised in the iterative
process. Estimates of the company’s greenhouse gas emissions were being carried
out because of Watercare’ early adoption of sustainability frameworks. For this
reason the ‘Watercare Greenhouse Gas Report 2007-8’ was available on request
from the public. It concluded that Watercare had achieved a significant reduction of
86% in greenhouse gas emissions since 1990, the baseline date for the Kyoto
Protocol. The summary of the GHG quantities was published annually in association
with the Watercare Annual Report and was accessible on the company’s website.
The purpose of the report was to measure the annual GHG emissions and compare
them with the GHGs emitted in 1990. The report format was based on ISO 14064-1
Greenhouse gases-Part1: Specification with guidance at the organisational level for
quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and removals, ISO, 2006.
The data was reported for the whole of Watercare as one organisation and under
4
the scopes recommended in The GHG Protocol- A Corporate Accounting and
Reporting Standard, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2004.
The 1990 baseline date was significant. At that time the major redevelopment of the
Mangere Wastewater Treatment Plant had not yet got fully underway. The GHG
emissions were therefore at a much higher level. The fixed growth reactors were
demolished in 2002. The same year saw the decommissioning of the sludge
dewatering lagoons, the sludge drying beds, and the oxidation ponds. These factors
alone formed the the greater part of the 86% reduction in emissions that occurred
post 1990.
These annual Watercare Greenhouse Gas reports served as part of the empirical and
evidential base for the team. They were supplemented by a fourth component: the
Climate Change Literature Review. This was researched and written largely by the
team leader with assistance from a team member of Watercare’s environmental
planning unit.
This literature review drew on a range of sources. It included peer-reviewed
publications from a number of disciplines. It encompassed also more general studies
involving interviews with experts in different areas of climate change, or accounts of
meetings in which they had participated.
The principles of selection focused on two things: the trends in the latest literature
and also how the analyses pointed towards answers to nine questions. Reports from
the IPCC and the Stern Review served as a significant baseline. The Stern Review had
been commissioned by the Cabinet Office-HM Treasury and was published by
Cambridge University Press in 2007. Their strengths were highlighted, and their
weaknesses noted.
The first change in scientific understanding that had taken place since their
publication related to the connection between the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and likely average global temperature rises. Earlier it had
been assumed that a more than 2°C rise in temperature in relation to pre-industrial
levels could be prevented if the concentration of greenhouse gases were restricted
to 550 ppm CO2-eq. That is no longer the case. Even a concentration of 450 ppm
CO2-eq will be hard-pushed to prevent a 2°C rise (Walker and King, 2008).
The second change was about sea level rises. The 2007 IPCC reports estimated a rise
of 18 to 59 cm by 2100, but did not consider 59 cm as an upper bound. Also they
indicated that warming caused by human activities could lead to climate impacts
that are abrupt or irreversible. Positive feed-back loops, climate surprises, or abrupt
climate changes could initiate tipping points that lead to several metres rise in sea
levels. More recent empirical data has raised scientific concerns about what is
5
happening with Arctic Ocean ice cover, Greenland’s ice shelf and the West Antarctic
Ice Sheet. This suggests a shorter time frame and higher sea level rises than those
anticipated in the IPCC models.
The third issue in the latest literature pointed to climate change as a global
emergency that requires emergency action, because of the serious threat it poses to
our planet. It is therefore not sensible to have responses that involve marginal
additions to business as usual. Parallels are drawn with wartime and the rapid
deployment of economic resources, the placing of economies on a war footing, and
the engagement of whole societies through measures including rationing to achieve
a common purpose, in this case to reduce global warming. This is consistent with
the call of Ban Ki-Moon, The Secretary-General of the UN on 10 November 2007:
‘This is an emergency, and for emergency situations we need emergency
action.’ (Spratt and Sutton, 2008, p.1)
The Climate Change Literature Review posed nine questions:
1.Are global warming and climate change occurring and how are human
activities contributing to them through greenhouse gas emissions?
2.What are the implications of different levels of temperature increases against
a pre-industrial baseline?
3.What are the desirable international targets in terms of ppm CO2
equivalents?
4.What are the international and national mechanisms to achieve significant
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions?
5.What are the ethical assumptions embedded in these mechanisms and what
principles should govern climate change policy?
6.How are we going to encourage individuals, families, businesses and
communities to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions?
7.What are the economics of mitigation and adaptation measures?
8.What in a national and regional context in New Zealand is the evidence for
climate change and its effects?
9.What are other water utility businesses doing about climate change with
regards to mitigation and adaptation?
The answers to them have varying degrees of certainty attached to them. The first
two reflect a virtual scientific consensus, with disagreement around the margins.
6
Global warming and climate change are occurring. Human activities are contributing
significantly to them through greenhouse gas emissions. According to the IPCC in
2007 this is 90 per cent certain.
There is a similar range of agreement about the effects of different levels of
temperature increase, that have been outlined in detail. These will lead to human
life on earth becoming increasingly intolerable as the twenty-first century unfolds
(Friedman, 2008).
There is a growing agreement that a target for the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere is a maximum of 450 ppm CO2-eq along with a 2°C
temperature increase against a pre-industrial baseline. More are now arguing that
those targets need to be lower to achieve a safe climate zone (c.f. Pearce 2006,
Spratt and Sutton 2008, Walker and King 2008).
The Stern Review was employed to provide a framework to assess international and
national mechanisms to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Stern
suggested that effective policy in this area needed to be credible, flexible and
predictable. Climate change was essentially a global externality. Those who were
producing greenhouse gas emissions were bringing about climate change and
imposing costs on the world and on future generations; they did not, however, have
to face directly the full consequences of the costs of their actions.
For this reason the Stern Review drew on economic theory to identify three
appropriate ways of dealing with a global externality: tax, regulation and markets. It
then provided a detailed assessment of international collective action on climate
change including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and partnerships, networks and organisations such as
the International Energy Agency (IEA). Mention was also made of regional initiatives
in the EU, China, and California, along with the Clinton Climate Initiative, the Large
Cities Climate Leadership Group and a range of large private sector corporations.
Walker and King added their voice to Stern (Walker and King, 2008). In the period
leading up to the December 2009 meeting in Copenhagen where a new post-Kyoto
agreement was to be formulated, four issues needed to be considered:
•
A global target on temperature rise.
•
National targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions and how they
should be divided among developed and developing nations and
against what baseline date.
•
A firm mechanism to encourage nations to meet their targets, and
provide sanctions if they don’t.
7
•
A mechanism to transfer a flow of resources including technology and
funds from the richest countries to the developing world.
It has been argued that ethical frameworks that go beyond consequentialism and
welfare economics were needed: rights, protection from harm, freedom and justice,
as well as principles of sustainability, polluter pays, stewardship and responsibility
(Stern, 2007, pp. 46-49.). These should be applied to the ends sought as well as the
means employed to achieve them.
It was maintained that in spite of flaws and ambiguities in the Kyoto mechanisms,
they were informed by ethical assumptions.
Good examples were Joint
Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Emission
Trading Schemes (ETS).
Five principles were singled out for special mention. Four of them originated from
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
•
The Precautionary Principle.
•
The Principle of Sustainable Development.
•
The Polluter Pays Principle.
•
The Principle of Equity-International and Intergenerational.
•
The No Regrets Principle.
It was noted that principles were not in short supply. What was needed was to
implement them. That required an exercise of will and of political will in particular.
That, however, went to the heart of politics: the responsible use of power.
It was suggested that both bottom-up and top-down strategies were required to
deal with climate change. That meant getting the balance right between the public
sector, business, and local communities down to the household level.
Part of the answer included working with people, rather than simply for them. In
essence this called for a community development strategy. Detailed questions were
listed to assist with the formulation of such a strategy.
Accounts of the economics of mitigation and adaptation in relation to climate
change have varied. The Stern Review argued that the annual cost of stabilising
greenhouse gases at between 500 and 550 ppm CO2- eq was around 1% of global
GDP if we start now. If we leave it till later, estimates of damage could rise to 20% of
global GDP each year. Stern later revised the 1% figure to 2% (Stern, 2009).
8
The debate among economists has centred around the latter figure. There has been
more agreement around the current costs, which were regarded as affordable. The
focus has been on whether the discounting level applied by Stern was the right one.
But the key question, as Walker and King maintained was not about the cost if we
don’t pay to stop global warming now, but whether we could afford to pay now if we
do take this step (Walker and King, 2008).
The literature review also explored the conceptual difficulties of putting a price on
climate change. What price can be placed on human life and suffering? Or on the
extinction of other species? Or on the loss of biodiversity? Or on the loss of
irreplaceable ecological services? Present in these deliberations was the problem of
incommensurability. Qualitative dimensions, it was maintained, could not be
assessed with a strictly quantitative ruler.
It was noted that there were three issues that gave rise to a cautious optimism. First
there were a range of investments that were going to have to be made anyway,
irrespective of climate change. How could these be directed to a low carbon form of
development?
Secondly, there were both costs and benefits to mitigating and adapting to the
effects of global warming. Two tables were included from the IPCC to illustrate this
point.
Thirdly, the international financial and economic crisis has given rise to moves by
world leaders to call for a “Green New Deal”. Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, Nicolas
Sarkozy, Ban Ki-Moon and Taro Aso (the Prime Minister of Japan) have displayed
considerable unity in their call for a clean energy economy (Dickey and McNicoll,
2008).
Attention was then turned to the evidence for climate change and its effects in a
New Zealand setting. The evidence collated from 2007 IPCC sources indicated:
•
Mean air temperatures in New Zealand have increased by 1°C since
1855 and by 0.4°C since 1950.
•
Sea temperatures have risen by 0.7°C since 1871.
•
Over the period 1951-1996 the number of cold nights and frosts
declined by 10-20 days per year.
•
Sea level rise has averaged 1.6 mm/yr since 1900.
•
Rainfall has decreased in the north-east of New Zealand and
increased in the south-west.
9
New Zealand’s Ministry for the Environment (MfE) used downscaled projections
from the IPCC to the end of the century:
•
Higher temperatures particularly in the North Island, though the
increase will likely be less than the global average.
•
Rising sea levels – an average rise of between 18 and 59 cm by 2100
from 1990 levels, compared with the rise of between 10 and 20 cm in
the 20th century.
•
More frequent and intense extreme weather events such as droughts
(especially in eastern parts of New Zealand), landslides, storm surges
and floods.
•
More rainfall in the west but a drier east.
•
Warmer winters with fewer frosts and rising snowlines (MfE, 2008).
The MfE concluded that the effects of climate change would be mixed:
•
People will experience milder winters, but increased summer
temperatures will mean greater risks of heat stress and the warmer
average temperatures may lead to the introduction of new
subtropical diseases.
•
Increased risk of erosion and saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels.
•
Infrastructure and peoples homes will be at risk from more frequent
and intense extreme weather events.
•
Agricultural productivity is expected to increase in some areas, but
there is the risk of drought and spreading pests and diseases.
•
Retreating snowlines and glaciers are expected to change water flows
in major South Island rivers, and may also affect the skiing industry.
•
New Zealand’s native flora and fauna may come under threat due to
habitat loss, both on land and in our waterways and oceans ( MfE,
2008).
One proviso should be noted. The MfE has relied on the IPCC 2007 reports. They did
not incorporate the latest data that could indicate positive feedback loops, climate
surprises and tipping points with exponential rather than linear implications.
For this reason the MfE’s projections of climate change effects in New Zealand could
also be said to err on the side of conservatism.
10
It was considered useful to investigate what other water utility businesses were
doing (internationally) to mitigate and adapt to climate change. There was strong
evidence of major initiatives in this area.
In the United Kingdom there was a prospect of water utilities being included in the
Climate Change Bill. This would seek emission reductions to 50% of 1990 levels by
2050 (this goal has been increased to 80% as noted earlier). Inclusion was also being
considered in the Carbon Reduction Commitment, a UK-run ETS. The Water Services
Regulation Authority (OFWAT) also requires water utilities to measure their carbon
emissions (Ofwat, 2008).
In the USA the major initiatives undertaken in New York, Los Angeles and Chicago
were described. Most striking was the detailed planning and development in New
York. This encompassed a comprehensive Climate Change Assessment and Action
Plan which detailed the ongoing work of the city’s Department of Environmental
Protection through its Climate Change Task Force (NYCDEP, 2008).
In Australia it was clear that a strong approach has been taken to climate change by
water utilities. Their planning work might be of use for New Zealand, especially
because of the greater global warming effects starting to be experienced by our
neighbours across the Tasman. It was noted that an Australian ETS was in the offing
and that detailed plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were already being
implemented by water utilities.
These included Sydney Water, Melbourne Water, South Australian Water, the
Western Australian-centred Water Corporation and Brisbane Water. Numbers have
targeted dates in the future for carbon neutrality or significant and quantified
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (c.f. Melbourne Water, 2005; Sydney Water,
2007).
Of particular interest was the Carbon Management Hierarchy utilised:
1. Avoid causing emissions;
2. Reduce existing emissions;
3. Capture emissions and recover waste energy; and
4. Purchase renewable energy and offsets. (Kelly and Rouse, 2008)
The Climate Change Literature Review interrogated a wide range of literature to
determine general answers to the nine questions asked. It ended with a call for
action from Al Gore, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize recipient:
‘We must make the rescue of the environment the central organising
principle for our civilisation… the environment is much more than a policy
11
position to me; it is a profoundly moral obligation. We have only one earth.
And if we do not keep it healthy and safe, every other gift we leave our
children will be meaningless.’
So far the first four components of the iterative process have been described: the
sessions of the Watercare climate change team itself which also involved on a
number of occasions those with line management responsibilities within the
company; meetings with those outside the company; the Greenhouse Gas Inventory
in Watercare’s Annual Reports; and the Climate Change Literature Review.
The fifth component built on all of these and involved the development of the
elements of the climate change strategy. This document listed fifteen actions for the
company:
1. Recognise the seriousness of climate change and its effects and continue to
improve on the 86% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions achieved since
1990.
2. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change
with particular reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and
tipping points.
3. Monitor also the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning
legislation and evaluate its implications for Watercare.
4. Set clear targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions and/or carbon
neutrality with dates and milestones set in relation to a carbon management
hierarchy:
i. avoiding causing emissions;
ii. reducing existing emissions;
iii. capturing emissions and recovering waste energy; and
iv. purchasing renewable energy and offsets.
5. Include an assessment for sustainability and climate change in capital
expenditure planning and future project development with particular
reference to the creation of assets with a long life.
6. Review existing water, wastewater and stormwater infrastructure in order to
establish policies, planning and expenditure involving adaptation to climate
change.
12
7. Apply climate change criteria as part of procurement policies in relation to
the selection of materials, goods and services for capital and operating
expenditure.
8. Develop a robust risk management programme to ensure more sustainable
water practices along with sound mitigation and adaptation strategies.
9. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of
workshops aimed at analysing and mitigating the risks, and determining and
reducing levels of uncertainty in relation to the impacts of climate change on
the operation and development of Watercare’s business.
10. Continue with initiatives to reduce effective demand for water in order to
encourage water conservation and a lower use of energy required for
pumping operations.
11. Incorporate in energy policy consideration of climate change, in order to
reduce energy use, encourage the current positive trend towards greater
self-sufficiency in energy, including hydro-electricity, co-generation, and the
use of other renewable sources, as a modification to the present systems
based approach.
12. Focus on implementation with clear milestones, regular reviews of progress
and built in responsiveness to emerging changes, based on principles of
credibility, flexibility and predictability, as defined in the Stern Review.
13. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working in
partnership with Local Network Operators and other governmental and nongovernmental organisations to build relationships with different sectors
including agriculture, horticulture, forestry, transport, commerce, industry,
energy, education, construction, housing and households in order to achieve
further reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
14. Adopt a community development approach to work with and not simply for
others, to establish better links between the public sector, business, and
communities down to household level, and to use sustainable water practices
as a key to encourage care for the environment and greenhouse gas emission
reductions.
15. Develop joint policies, programmes and projects to deal with global warming
in terms of an agreed framework negotiated with partners on a co-operative
and equal basis with an emphasis on getting things done and outcomes.
These fifteen elements of a climate change strategy were then expanded and
backfilled. The aim was to include further content to allow a fuller understanding of
13
what needed to be done in practice and to include a coherent justification for each
of the elements before proceeding with implementation.
It also enabled the Watercare team to deal with particular issues that had arisen in
the course of their work. For example questions were raised whether a climate
change strategy was simply a subset of sustainability and a sustainable development
approach and was therefore not really necessary to pursue on its own. The team
drew on peer-reviewed literature which indicated that there was a two way
relationship between climate change and sustainable development strategies.
Climate change policies were not simply a part of sustainable development
approaches. Nor could sustainable development policy be reduced without
remainder to a climate change approach. Instead policies pursuing sustainable
development and climate change mitigation could be mutually reinforcing. The
expanded climate change strategy document cited the literature on which this
conclusion was based.
The sixth component of the iterative process was the development of an action plan.
This had been preceded by continuing and more extensive analysis of the company’s
greenhouse gas emissions and the assumptions underlying their measurement. It
also drew on all of the other components of the iterative process. It allowed for
decisions to be made about the level of priority to be given by Watercare to climate
change as an issue. It involved explicit connections with the climate change strategy
developed in the previous stage of the team’s work. It suggested that the proposed
implementation team seek ISO 14064-1 accreditation in order to provide
independent confirmation of the company’s greenhouse gas emission
measurements. It made more specific what needed to be done, how it should be
done and who might do it.
The action plan centred around eight summary points:
1. Establish a climate change implementation team with special responsibility
for recommending the setting and alteration of future targets for the
enhancement of carbon sinks, greenhouse gas emission reductions, and/or
carbon neutrality.
2. The starting point for the climate change implementation team is the
reduction by the the 2007-08 year of about 88% in greenhouse gas emissions
which has been achieved since 1990, the base year for the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Monitor international scientific and policy approaches on climate change
with particular reference to positive feedback loops, climate surprises and
tipping points.
14
4. Monitor the evolution of climate change, environmental and planning
legislation and evaluate its implications for Watercare.
5. Undertake scenario based planning exercises and conduct a series of
workshops aimed at analysing and mitigating the risks, and determining and
reducing levels of uncertainty in relation to to the impacts of climate change
on the operation and development of Watercare’s business.
6. Discussions should be initiated with second and third tier management about
how to incorporate in a practical way consideration of climate change in the
everyday business of the company’s planning and operations.
7. The line management and other management areas identified above should
incorporate consideration of climate change mitigation and adaptation as an
integrated feature of business as usual.
8. Build on and extend Watercare’s sphere of influence through working with
key partners to build relationships with different sectors of the economy and
establish better links between the public sector, business, and communities
down to household level to encourage greenhouse gas emission reductions.
The new starting point of an 86% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was
underpinned by three assumptions. Firstly, carbon dioxide emissions from the
wastewater treatment process were excluded as they were part of a renewable
biological carbon cycle. The action plan cited IPCC sources that indicated that
carbon dioxide emissions from wastewater should not be considered as they were of
biogenic origin and should not be included in national emissions (IPCC, 2006,
Chapter 6). Emissions of other greenhouse gases of biogenic origin, such as methane
and nitrous oxide, were included because of their greater global warming potential
than carbon dioxide.
Secondly since 1 July 2006 almost all of the externally produced electricity consumed
by Watercare had been supplied by Meridian Energy, which was carbon neutral. The
related values were therefore removed from the energy related greenhouse gas
emissions. This was justified because Meridian’s carboNZero status was verified on
the carboNZero website. Nor were the core activities of the New Zealand water
industry covered by the the national emissions trading scheme.
Thirdly the emissions from chemicals, concrete, the manufacture of concrete pipes
and the activities of contractors and sub-contractors were also excluded from
Watercare’s greenhouse gas inventory. This was based on a view of what should be
attributable to whom in a regional and national context.
15
It was argued that those who produced greenhouse gas emissions directly through
their economic activities in the production of goods and services, rather than those
who use them indirectly, should bear responsibility for them. One way of dealing
with the issue of embedded carbon was to ask who embeds the carbon. A plausible
answer is that it is the producers of the cement, the concrete pipes, and the
chemicals who are directly accountable. Who embeds the carbon in the process of
construction? The contractors and subcontractors who do the work.
This categorisation was justified on the following grounds. Those who produce the
emissions directly are in a better position practically to account for them. It embeds
responsibility firmly in the greenhouse gas emission chain. It avoids the prospect of
double counting in regional and national frameworks and contexts. This would be
clearly counter-productive.
It was also noted that additional capital expenditure, signalled in the company’s
asset management plan, to put sealed roofs on the digesters and provide new gas
storage at the wastewater treatment plant promised a further reduction in
emissions. This along with some promising research avenues in relation to biosolids
and carbon sinks indicated further potential gains. Typically biosolids contain about
3% inorganic carbon. If this carbon never biodegrades there is potential for biosolids
to function as a carbon sink if they are properly covered. The one proviso is that as
they decompose they do not release methane into the environment through the
cover. Preliminary investigations have indicated that this is not the case. That is
why establishing and enhancing carbon sinks is critical.
The action plan observed that Watercare was well placed to improve relationships
between the public sector, business, and communities down to household level. It
was rooted in the public sector through its ownership. It was a business among
businesses. It had impacts on people, their relationships, and their communities.
These were to become more direct and extensive with the implementation of the
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance. These
included the abolition of Auckland’s water retail sector and the integration of its
functions and roles under an expanded Watercare.
Conclusion
The work of Watercare’s climate change strategy team has contributed to the
capacity of the company to respond to climate change issues effectively. When it
undertook its task Watercare was the bulk regional wholesaler of water and
wastewater services to the Auckland region. Its annual turnover in 2009/2010 was
$198 million and its assets were valued at $2.4 billion (Watercare Services Ltd ,
2010).
16
From 1 November 2010 Watercare, as part of the Auckland governance reforms,
integrated the assets and services of the region’s local network operators into its
operations. It gained close to 430,000 new customers as it took over almost the
entire retail sector of Auckland’s water industry. Its assets are in excess of $6 billion,
its projected turnover exceeds $500 million, and it employs 650 staff (Watercare
Services Ltd, 2011).
While as a result of the vertical integration the most recent measurement of the
company’s greenhouse gas emissions has indicated some change, the new figure has
been estimated at a 75% reduction in emissions in relation to a 1990 base. This still
constitutes a significant drop.
The work of the climate change team, then, has achieved three things. It has raised
the level of literacy in the company on global warming and climate change and its
implications for future action. It has generated new initiatives such as the
development of a draft strategy for the company on adaptation to climate change
involving what needs to be done to protect its key assets. It has also placed it in a
good position to contribute to the strategic goal of the Auckland Council to reduce
the amount of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2031 based on
1990 emission levels.
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17
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Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to Nicholas Woodley for his assistance with references and checking
for accuracy.
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