How Majority Rule Undermines
Collective Truth-Finding
Jan Lorenz
www.janlo.de
Department of Psychology and Methods, Focus Area Diversity
Jacobs University Bremen
Symposium “Exploring Ignorance”
Graduate School of Decision Sciences
Konstanz
May 20, 2016
582287
research-article2015
RAP0010.1177/2053168015582287Research & PoliticsLorenz
Research Article
Majoritarian democracy undermines
truth-finding in deliberative committees
Research and Politics
April-June 2015: 1­–10
© The Author(s) 2015
DOI: 10.1177/2053168015582287
rap.sagepub.com
Jan Lorenz1, Heiko Rauhut2 and Bernhard Kittel3
Abstract
The aggregated judgments of many usually outperform individual estimates of vaguely known facts. Communication among
individuals may, however, undermine this wisdom-of-crowd effect because it makes judgments mutually dependent.
Deliberative democratic theory, on the other hand, suggests that communication promotes correct decisions. We
investigate this puzzle about the positive and negative consequences of consensus formation on the wisdom of crowds
using experimental methods. Subjects in small deliberative committees had to communicate and thereafter judge vaguely
known facts. We varied the agreement rules in groups and compared the groups’ change of performance from initial
to final estimates. Interestingly, groups’ performance worsened on average when they had to reach a majority decision.
Groups came on average closer to the truth if they had to decide unanimously or if they did not have any restrictions to
reach agreement. The low performance under majority rule is robust against different knowledge questions, group sizes
and communication types. The majority rule may be worst because it makes people too focused to reach a majority so
that valuable minority opinions are disregarded or not even voiced. This implies that majoritarian democracy may be less
suitable for truth-finding than less or more restrictive quorum rules.
Keywords
collective judgment, experimental political science, voting, deliberation, wisdom of crowds
Jan Lorenz, Heiko Rauhut, and Bernhard Kittel (2015b). Majoritarian Democracy Undermines Truth-Finding in
Deliberative Committees. Research & Politics (2) (2), 1–10
Various aggregation
methods Majoritarian
of individual beliefs are
Jan Lorenz, Heiko Rauhut,
and Bernhard Kittel (2015a). Experimental
Data:
Democracy undermines
Introduction
used in such committees. For example, the preparation of
truth-finding in deliberative
committees.
UNF:5:LLNmZiLTHF9hnvl7dHVG+A==
Dataverse Network
Understanding
the interplay between
collective decisions the IPCC reports has recently been describedHarvard
as a “bazaar”
collective intelligence is as important for small expert of studies where actors “bargain” about the expected rise of
[Distributor] V3 [Version]and
committees as it is for large democratic societies. The design
2 / 28
the sea level (Bojanowski, 2011), and pooling of expert
of discussion rules and quorums critically shape the way assessments has been used for truth-finding (Bamber and
groups find agreement and converge towards correct deci- Aspinall, 2013). Such often chaotic political deliberation
sions. Advisory boards and expert committees are increas- processes needs to be better informed by investigations
ingly part of political decision making. Such committees about the interplay of collective decisions and collective
make decisions on issues ranging from expected economic
growth and tax estimates to estimates on the sea level in
2050 and 2100 (task of the “Intergovernmental Panel on
1Jacobs University,
2024/2-1
(Jan Lorenz)
Focus Area Diversity and Bremen International
Climate Change” (IPCC)). By definition ofProject
their task,LO
comSchool
for Collective
Social Sciences (BIGSSS),
Bremen, Germany
Opinion
Dynamics
and
Decisions:
mittee members share the same preference
of correctly
2Universität Zürich, Soziologisches Institut, Zürich, Switzerland
Procedures,
Behavior
and Systems Dynamics
assessing the state of the world. Disagreement
is limited to
3Universität Wien, Department of Economic Sociology, Wien, Austria
different beliefs about this state. Because of the presupposi-
http://janlo.de
Wisdom-of-Crowd Field Experiment1
Question (N=1,226 responses)
How many lots will be sold at the end of the festival?
1
3 / 28
Bremen, Viertel-Fest 2008, Tombola “Haste mal ’nen Euro”
http://janlo.de/wp/2010/06/22/die-weisheit-der-bremer
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
The Wisdom of the Crowd
Situation
A question about an unknown fact of metric nature
and estimates from many individuals.
Wisdom-of-Crowdab Effect
The aggregate of estimates is close to
the true value
although most are far away from.
Conclusion
If you know and believe in the WoC-Effect:
Ask many independently and take the median!
(... and the law of large numbers ensures collective intelligence.)
a
F. Galton (1907b). Vox populi. Nature 75 (1949), 450–451.
J. Surowiecki (2004). The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter
than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies,
and nations. Doubleday Books.
b
4 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Aggregation by the median
Galton: The median is “democratic”.
“One Vote, one Value!”2
The mean is not good, because “it
gives voting power to the cranks
proportional to their crankiness”.
Mean:
2
5 / 28
Median:
F. Galton (1907a). One vote, one value. Nature 75 (1948), 414.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Aggregation by the median
Galton: The median is “democratic”.
“One Vote, one Value!”2
The mean is not good, because “it
gives voting power to the cranks
proportional to their crankiness”.
Mean:
2
5 / 28
Median:
F. Galton (1907a). One vote, one value. Nature 75 (1948), 414.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
The spatial model of democratic decision
Assumptions
I
Possible policies are on a 1d scale
I
Voters have single-peaked
preferences
I
Always 2 proposals compete for a
majority of votes
I
New proposals can be set up and
voted against the status quo
Single-peaked utility functions
Duncan Black (1948). On the Rationale of
Group Decision-making. Journal of Political
Economy 56 (1), 23
Median Voter Theorem
I
6 / 28
The median voter is unbeatable in
pairwise polls.
http://janlo.de
Distribution of voters ideal points
Anthony Downs (1957). An Economic Theory
of Democracy. Harper & Row Publishers, New
York
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Theoretical Conclusion
Premise 1:
The median of many judgments is closest to correct
Premise 2:
Majoritarian Democracy elicits the median as outcome.
⇒ Majoritarian Democracy elicits the wisdom of the crowd!
7 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Theoretical Conclusion
Premise 1:
The median of many judgments is closest to correct
Premise 2:
Majoritarian Democracy elicits the median as outcome.
⇒ Majoritarian Democracy elicits the wisdom of the crowd!
Practical Question:
Is it a good mechanism for expert committees?
Experimental evidence today:
Not in deliberative groups.
7 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Application: Expert committees
I
Expert committees shall
I
I
I
Example: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
I
I
I
3
4
8 / 28
find the best possible predictions
deliver a common opinion
Shall predict sea level 2050 and 2100.
Described as “bazaar” where future sea level is “negotiated”.3
Discusses its internal report and decision structures.4
Klimarat feilscht um Daten zum Meeresspiegel-Anstieg, Axel Bojanowski, Spiegel Online, 14.07.2011
Experten drängen auf Umbau des Weltklimarats, Axel Bojanowski, Spiegel Online, 30.08.2010
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Practical questions on expert committees
If you want to establish an expert committee
9 / 28
I
Should the experts discuss which each other?
Experimental results:
No clear answer, it can reduce but also increase bias
I
Should you force the committee to decide on one
judgment?
Experimental results:
Not necessarily, but if you do, better not majority rule!
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Wisdom-of-Crowd under Communication and Collective
Decision Laboratory Experiment
Group task in experimental lab:
I
Factual Questions. Example:
What percentage of the World’s population lives in
Africa?
I
Incentivize correct answers
Deviation Payment
≤ 1.5%
e4
≤ 3%
e2
≤ 6%
e1
≤ 12%
e 0.5
larger
e0
I
10 / 28
−0.12
−0.06
0
Strong incentive to come closer to the truth!
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
0.06
0.12
Wisdom-of-Crowd under Communication and Collective
Decision Laboratory Experiment
Group task in experimental lab:
I
Factual Questions. Example:
What percentage of the World’s population lives in
Africa?
I
I
Incentivize correct answers
Deviation Payment
≤ 1.5%
e4
≤ 3%
e2
≤ 6%
e1
≤ 12%
e 0.5
larger
e0
I
10 / 28
15 %
−0.12
−0.06
0
Strong incentive to come closer to the truth!
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
0.06
0.12
Laboratory Experiment
I
Invited for 6 sessions with 24 participants each
I
In each session: 9 rounds with 9 questions
I
In each round: two groups of 9, two groups of 3 members
I
In each group: Communication interface
a. Communication by numbers
b. Chat communication
I
After communication: Decision rules
1. Individual rule: payoff based on individual decision
2. Majority rule: payoff for all based on majority decision
(one with 21)
(from a pool of 19 questions)
No payoff for groups where a majority is not reached.
3. Unanimity rule: payoff for all based on majority decision
No payoff for groups where consensus is not reached.
11 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Chat interface all-to-all, free text
12 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Number interface (“My current estimate”)
13 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Example: Majority rule
Turnout EU parliament DK 1984 (32.6%)
75
b
50
c
a
private
0
14 / 28
http://janlo.de
0
e0
d
decision
25
Possible motivation
a state private opinion
b try to pull group up
c decide for blue’s opinion
d agree for majority’s sake
e4
Estimate (%)
100
1
2
3
deliberation time (min)
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Example: Individual rule
Mass of aluminium in earth crust (8.1%)
75
50
25
e 0.5
Estimate (%)
100
e4
15 / 28
http://janlo.de
0
1
2
deliberation
time (min)
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
decision
private
0
Example: Unanimity rule
Turnout Bundestag DE 2009 (70.9%)
75
50
e4
e0
Estimate (%)
100
25
16 / 28
http://janlo.de
0
1
deliberation
time (min)
decision
private
0
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Example: Majority rule
Water on earth surface (70.8%)
75
e 0.5
e4
Estimate (%)
100
50
25
17 / 28
http://janlo.de
0
1
2
deliberation time (min)
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
decision
private
0
Data on four questions
Q6: Initial Estimate
Votes USA at World Bank
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
20 40
20
40
60
80
100
100
12
0
20
40
60
80
100
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
60
80
100
20
40
60
80
100
20
40
60
80
100
40
60
80
100
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
10 20
0
10
20
20
Q8: Decision Unanimity
0
0
0
Q6: Decision Unanimity
0 4 8
15
0
0
100
Q8: Decision Majority
30
Q4: Decision Unanimity
80
0
40
0
0
20
Q2: Decision Unanimity
20
Q6: Decision Majority
10 20
30
15
0
0
0
Q4: Decision Majority
60
25
80
40
0 10
60
10 20
40
0
0 5
20
20
Q8: Decision Individual
6
15
0
0
Q2: Decision Majority
0
Q6: Decision Individual
15
30
0
0
Q4: Decision Individual
20
40
10
20
0
10 20
0
0 20
0
Q2: Decision Individual
Q8: Initial Estimate
Use of own oil Saudi Arabia
10 20
Q4: Initial Estimate
Workers in agriculture
50
Q2: Initial Estimate
Water on earth surface
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Legend: Black vertical lines = Truth
Shades of Gray = Payment Zones
Shades of Colors: Half Tone = Number Communication, Full Tone = Chat
18 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
0.6
●
●
0.3
0.0
●
−0.3
Individual
Majority
Unanimity
change in group certainty (1−6)
change in group performance (EUR)
Change in Performance and Confidence
0.6
0.5
●
0.4
0.3
●
0.2
●
0.1
0.0
Individual
Majority
Error bars are adjusted 95% confidence intervals.
19 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Unanimity
0.8
●
0.4
●
●●
●
●
0.0
●
−0.4
●●
−0.8
all groups
small groups (3 individuals)
large groups (9 individuals)
Individual
Majority
Unanimity
change in group performance (EUR)
change in group performance (EUR)
Impact of Group Size and Mode of Communication
0.8
0.4
●
●●
●
●
●
0.0
●
●
●
−0.4
−0.8
all groups
chat communication
communication by numbers
Individual
Majority
Unanimity
Error bars are adjusted 95% confidence intervals.
I
I
20 / 28
Larger groups make effect slightly more drastic, esp.
individual-rule groups perform better.
Unanimity-rule (and majority-rule) groups seem to benefit
from chat communication instead of numbers only.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
change in group performance (EUR)
Impact of the Question
2
●
1
●
●
●
●
●
0
●
●
●
●
I
21 / 28
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
−1
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Q1 Share of people in Asia/Americas/Africa
Q2 Water on earth surface
Q3 Mass aluminium/silicium/iron in earth crust
Q4 Workers in agriculture
Q5 Turnout EU parliament DK/UK/FR 1984
Q6 Votes USA at World Bank
Q7 Water content tomato/onion/cucumber
Q8 Use of own oil Saudi Arabia
Q9 Turnout Bundestag DE 1998/2005/2009
●
●
Individual
I
●
●
Majority
Unanimity
Worse performance under majority rule is a robust pattern.
The question seems to determine to a large extend if typically
groups worsen or improve.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Robustness check: Final performance
4
1.5
●
●
1.0
●
0.5
3
●
●
2
1
Individual
I
Majority
Unanimity
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0
Individual
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.0
22 / 28
group performance (EUR)
group performance (EUR)
2.0
Majority
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Q1 Share of people in Asia/Americas/Africa
Q2 Water on earth surface
Q3 Mass aluminium/silicium/iron in earth crust
Q4 Workers in agriculture
Q5 Turnout EU parliament DK/UK/FR 1984
Q6 Votes USA at World Bank
Q7 Water content tomato/onion/cucumber
Q8 Use of own oil Saudi Arabia
Q9 Turnout Bundestag DE 1998/2005/2009
●
●
●
Unanimity
Worse performance under majority rule is a robust pattern.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Robustness check: Final distance to truth
18
30
16
25
●
●
distance to truth
distance to truth
●
14
12
10
20
15
10
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
5
●
●
●
●
8
23 / 28
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Q1 Share of people in Asia/Americas/Africa
Q2 Water on earth surface
Q3 Mass aluminium/silicium/iron in earth crust
Q4 Workers in agriculture
Q5 Turnout EU parliament DK/UK/FR 1984
Q6 Votes USA at World Bank
Q7 Water content tomato/onion/cucumber
Q8 Use of own oil Saudi Arabia
Q9 Turnout Bundestag DE 1998/2005/2009
●
●
●
0
Individual
I
●
●
Majority
Unanimity
Individual
Majority
Unanimity
Worse performance under majority rule is a robust pattern.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Possible explanation
In our experiment:
24 / 28
I
Epistemic motivation under majority rule may be lower,
because minority opinions can be overruled and thus ignored.
I
At the same time strong prosocial motivation to agree “for
the sake of majority”.
I
Fact: 3/4 of all majority groups ended up in full agreement.
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Conclusion
Majority rule seems to be a bad mechanism for groups with
epistemic tasks to elicit collective intelligence because
• Majority decisions were often worse than the median of initial
estimates. Communication made it worse!
• Unanimity rule and no quorum rule often enabled groups to find
decisions better than the median of initial estimates.
Communication made it better!
• Moreover, majority rule triggers the most increase of confidence
in the quality of the decision.
25 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
582287
research-article2015
RAP0010.1177/2053168015582287Research & PoliticsLorenz
Research Article
Majoritarian democracy undermines
truth-finding in deliberative committees
Research and Politics
April-June 2015: 1­–10
© The Author(s) 2015
DOI: 10.1177/2053168015582287
rap.sagepub.com
Jan Lorenz1, Heiko Rauhut2 and Bernhard Kittel3
Abstract
The aggregated judgments of many usually outperform individual estimates of vaguely known facts. Communication among
individuals may, however, undermine this wisdom-of-crowd effect because it makes judgments mutually dependent.
Deliberative democratic theory, on the other hand, suggests that communication promotes correct decisions. We
investigate this puzzle about the positive and negative consequences of consensus formation on the wisdom of crowds
using experimental methods. Subjects in small deliberative committees had to communicate and thereafter judge vaguely
known facts. We varied the agreement rules in groups and compared the groups’ change of performance from initial
to final estimates. Interestingly, groups’ performance worsened on average when they had to reach a majority decision.
Groups came on average closer to the truth if they had to decide unanimously or if they did not have any restrictions to
reach agreement. The low performance under majority rule is robust against different knowledge questions, group sizes
and communication types. The majority rule may be worst because it makes people too focused to reach a majority so
that valuable minority opinions are disregarded or not even voiced. This implies that majoritarian democracy may be less
suitable for truth-finding than less or more restrictive quorum rules.
Keywords
judgment, experimental
science, voting, deliberation,
wisdom (2015b).
of crowds
Jan Lorenz, Heikocollective
Rauhut,
andpolitical
Bernhard
Kittel
Majoritarian
Democracy Undermines Truth-Finding in Deliberative Committees. Research
Various aggregation methods of individual beliefs are
Introduction
& Politics (2) (2),
1–10
used in such committees. For example, the preparation of
Understanding the interplay between collective decisions the IPCC reports has recently been described as a “bazaar”
collective intelligence is as important for small expert of studies where actors “bargain” about the expected rise of
Jan Lorenz, Heikoand
Rauhut,
and
Bernhard
Kittel
(2015a).
Experimental Data:
committees as it is for large democratic societies. The design the sea level (Bojanowski,
2011), and pooling of expert
of discussion rules and quorums critically shape the way assessments has been used for truth-finding (Bamber and
groups find agreement
and converge towards correct
deci- Aspinall, 2013). Such often
Majoritarian Democracy
undermines
truth-finding
in
deliberative
chaotic
political deliberation committees.
sions. Advisory boards and expert committees are increas- processes needs to be better informed by investigations
ingly part of political decision making. Such committees about the interplay of collective decisions and collective
UNF:5:LLNmZiLTHF9hnvl7dHVG+A==
Harvard Dataverse Network
make decisions on issues ranging from expected economic
growth and tax estimates to estimates on the sea level in
2050 and 2100 (task of the “Intergovernmental Panel on
[Distributor] V3 [Version]
Climate Change” (IPCC)). By definition of their task, com1Jacobs
University, Focus Area Diversity and Bremen International
School for Social Sciences (BIGSSS), Bremen, Germany
26 / 28
mittee members share the same preference of correctly 2Universität Zürich, Soziologisches Institut, Zürich, Switzerland
assessing the state of the world. Disagreement is limited to 3Universität Wien, Department of Economic Sociology, Wien, Austria
different beliefs about this state. Because of the presupposiProject LO 2024/2-1
(Jan Lorenz)
Corresponding
author:
tion that a correct answer exists, the government and the Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen International Graduate School of
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
public often expect experts to deliver consensual answers on Social Sciences (BIGSSS), Campus Ring 1, 28759 Bremen, Germany.
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
which policy decisions and investments can be based.
Email: [email protected]
http://janlo.de
Backup: Average Performance in numbers over time
e 0.66
1
e 1.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deliberation period
Measure of group performance:
Payment for the median initial/intermediate estimate and the
payment for the median final decision.
27 / 28
http://janlo.de
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
decision
private
0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deliberation period
decision
decision
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deliberation period
1.3
e 0.85
Average group
performance (e )
e 1.04
1
0.5
private
0.5
Unanimity
1.3
private
1
Average group
performance (e )
Majority
e 1.28
e 0.84
Average group
performance (e )
Individual
1.3
Preliminary: Content analysis of chat protocol statements
# Statement
Informational
Procedure
Resignation
Relative Uncertainty
Total Uncertainty
Relative Certainty
Total Certainty
Ask for Argument
Proposal Rejection
Do What Majority Does
28 / 28
http://janlo.de
Individual
1287
12.2%
4.3%
0.2%
8.7%
4.1%
0.5%
0.1%
3.8%
1.2%
0.1%
Majority
1631
8.6%
5.3%
1.0%
4.0%
2.3%
0.6%
0.7%
3.0%
2.1%
0.4%
Project LO 2024/2-1 (Jan Lorenz)
Opinion Dynamics and Collective Decisions:
Procedures, Behavior and Systems Dynamics
Unanimity
1685
5.6%
4.5%
0.4%
4.0%
2.4%
0.7%
0.2%
1.4%
1.2%
0.6%