CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the Study Economic growth and development processes affect and are affected by migration of people. In traditional viewpoint, people migrate when they are both pushed by lack of opportunities at home and pulled by the hope of economic gains elsewhere. Thus, the hope that migration will help associate migrants more closely with available economic opportunities, employment and services elsewhere is a major incentive for migration. Arguably, migration is necessarily a part of a family strategy to raise income, obtain new funds for investment, and insure against risks. It is not surprising therefore that thousands of African workers with relevant skill endowments leave their home country yearly to pursue better economic prospects within or outside Africa. However, migration of skilled workers could potentially hurt the sending countries if not well managed by appropriate policies. As populations in advanced countries continue to age, shortage of labour in sectors such as health care continue to attract relatively cheap but qualified labour from these developing countries of Africa. Migration of skilled workers in this sense contributes to the economic growth of receiving countries by responding to real labour needs in receiving countries. In addition, migrant workers help fulfill unmet labour requirements in many lower-pay and lowskill jobs such as those associated with domestic and agricultural work in developed countries. Migrants also contribute to the scientific and technological development of host countries. These factors partly provide the necessary impetus for international migration flows to continue to increase, 1 and for the process of globalization and the interdependence of nations to continue to deepen. While the positive aspects of migration can lead to economic gains for the receiving countries, it can also lead to “unintended consequences” in both the sending and receiving countries. Some of these consequences include an outright deprivation of vital human resources in sending countries, and by implication the adverse impact of migration of skilled workers on the brain drain phenomenon in sending countries. Such deprivation of vital human resources is rather very alarming given that the United Nations predicts that the net number of migrants from developing to developed countries will increase by 2.2 million people annually, from 191 million or 3 per cent of the world population in 2005 (United Nations, 2004). This problem is even further compounded when the long gestation period for training skilled workers is taken into account by the migrant sending countries of Africa. There are also the issues of cultural conflicts in receiving countries, human trafficking, economic exploitation of migrants, sending country dependency patterns, delayed economic growth in sending countries, etc. In this case, a vicious cycle is easily perpetuated. The emigration of people with scarce skills, such as entrepreneurs, scientists, technicians and health professionals reduces both the stock of human capital and the overall labour productivity of developing countries. However, if these highly skilled migrants return, they bring with them experience, knowledge contacts and capital, which have a positive impact on development. Thus, gains and losses from migration depend on whether it is temporary or permanent (Rena, 2008). In essence, African countries stand to benefit from 2 migration through the African Diaspora1 expertise, knowledge, technology, professional capacity building and a great potential for trade and investment links. The migrant sending countries of Africa can also benefit economically from migration through the inflow of workers’ remittances. Given these possibilities, migration is increasingly being regarded as an important instrument for growth and development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Migrant remittances seem to have contributed to poverty reduction throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased household investments in education, entrepreneurship and health. At the household level, remittances are spent primarily on general consumption items in local communities which can contribute to local economies by supporting small businesses. This in general, has its employment generation implications in these critical services sectors. In addition to supporting domestic consumption, remittances can also promote investments in real assets including building schools and clinics. Remittances flow is directly to households and they are widely distributed in small amounts throughout the economy. This makes remittances capable of having a much broader effect on home country economies than either FDI or official development assistance. Official data on remittances inflow to Sub-Saharan Africa reveal that, the flow of remittances to the region has been far more stable than official aid flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). Besides, remittances do not decline even in conditions of instability and poor governance. Hence, remittance flows represent one of the least volatile sources of foreign exchange earnings. 1 The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin that are living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality. 3 They are also more evenly spread among developing countries than capital flows. Workers’ remittances represent one of the largest private sources of external finance for developing countries; thus, remittances are the main transmitter of migration’s development benefits to sending country economies. Workers’ remittances are inter-household transfer of money within or across national boundaries. According to Reinke and Patterson (2005), workers’ remittances cover current transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and are considered residents there. Workers’ remittances flow has steadily increased since the mid 1980s. Officially recorded remittances were an estimated US$206 billion in 2006, compared to US$19.6 billion in 1985 (World Development Indicators 2006). Remittances have been the second most important source of external finance for developing countries, being twice the size of Official Development Aid (ODA) and almost as large as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). World Bank (2009) reports that recorded remittances to developing countries in 2008 were estimated to have reached US$305 billion. This is equivalent to nearly two percent of aggregate developing country GDP and well over half of estimated FDI inflows (US$490 billion). The 2008 estimated remittances to developing countries are over twice as large as official development aid of US$119 billion received by developing countries. In absolute terms, big developing countries like India, China, Mexico and the Philippines receive the largest shares of remittances in the world. However, in relative terms, small and poor countries tend to be much more dependent on remittances. For many countries with large Diasporas, workers’ remittances often amount to at least, 15% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Tonga for example had a share of remittances to GDP of 39% and Haiti and Lesotho of 27% in 2003. Actual figures are even higher than this, because unrecorded 4 remittances in cash or kind are often brought by migrants themselves or sent through third parties, and are not declared when entering the country. Remittance receipt in relative terms is expressed as a percentage of GDP for the top 25 recipients in SSA in 2008 and is reported in figure 1.1. Figure 1.1: Sub-Saharan Africa: top 25 recipients of remittances in 2008 Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009). Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1.1 shows that Lesotho tops remittance recipients in SSA with remittance inflow amounting to about 27.5 percent of GDP. This is followed closely by Comoros with about 25 percent of GDP. Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire are the least in terms of relative importance of remittances with about 1 percent of GDP in each of the countries. 5 When considered as a share of GDP, workers’ remittances can in fact be conveniently regarded as a vital source of finance for many developing countries. These flows contribute to the poverty reduction process by enhancing the living standards of the beneficiaries. Workers’ remittances can also contribute to the poverty reduction process through the multiplier effects of flows which create additional demand, employment and income. Page and Adams (2003) estimate that a 10% increase of remittances per capita would lead to a decline of the poverty head count by 3.5%, due to multiplier effects on GDP growth. Despite their positive impact on poverty rates, the way in which remittances contribute to economic growth and development is still an open question. Even if we take account of multiplier effects, poverty reduction through remittances is, in principle, a one-time effect. From a development perspective the question must be whether remittances have, beyond their immediate impact on poverty, an effect on the long-term growth of a country. Most remittances are made in the form of cash rather than as goods. Therefore, remittances are financial flows made up of private and unilateral transfers of money by a migrant worker resident in a foreign country (host country) to a person (most often a family member of the migrant) living in the migrant’s country of origin (home country). In principle, there are three ways of measuring remittance inflows in countries. According to Addison (2004), the first approach is the balance of payments (BOP) estimates. Other methodologies include micro or household surveys of recipients of such flows e.g. inference from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS). The third method is through banks or financial institutions in origin countries i.e. focusing on resource transfer institutions. In terms of relative accuracy and level of coverage, the micro or household surveys of recipients approach is likely to be the least. The obvious explanation 6 will be the problems of non-disclosure by respondents and general costs associated with micro or household surveys respectively. The BOP approach tends to be most reliable for macro studies since aggregated data are usually compiled and reported by the various monetary authorities under this approach. Thus, the size of the remittances flows employed in this study are based on BOP estimates reported by the various central banks of the IMF member countries. For obvious reasons, the cross–country nature of this study demands that relevant data are drawn from a common source to allow for uniformity of measurement standard as well as easy comparism. The World Bank Africa Development Indicators satisfactorily meets these requirements. The importance of remittances for some countries in the SSA region can be best illustrated by expressing them as a ratio to GDP, while in others the absolute total of per-capita value of remittances flows are more revealing. Remittance flows is widely believed to be much more sustainable as a source of development finance to many countries around the world. Two major forces are expected to ensure the growth and sustenance of these flows: Globalization and the aging populations (Olayiwola et al, 2008 and Olayiwola, 2010). Globalization and the aging of developed economy populations will ensure that demand for migrant workers remains robust for years to come. Consequently, the volume of remittances will most likely continue to grow, since migrants will continue to support the elderly and other dependants in their countries of origin. However, challenges remain in determining how best to channel the flow of remittances through formal financial institutions to promote economic growth and development in sending countries (Chami, Barajas, Cosimano, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel, 2008). This study empirically examines this challenge, and sheds more light on several possible options open to some 7 selected SSA countries in the effort to harness maximum societal benefits from workers’ remittances inflow. 1.2 Statement of the Problem The major research issue in this study bothers on the determination of the nature of relationship between remittances and economic growth in SSA. There is so far no conclusive answer in the literature to the question of whether workers’ remittances constitute at the aggregate level, a vital source of development finance to the developing countries of the Sub-Saharan African region. The literature on the potential developmental impact of remittances in an economy is quite vast but mixed and can be divided into two separate strands. One strand takes a microeconomic approach and examines the causes and uses of remittances using household surveys and aggregate data (Taylor, 1999). The other strand focuses on the effects of remittances and uses macroeconomic models (that are not based on individual maximizing behavior) to estimate the impact of remittances. While the micro dimension of remittances is often closely associated with the “dependency framework”, the macro dimension is often associated with the “developmental framework”. In other words, workers’ remittances seen from the perspective of individual to individual transfers often connote a relationship between two parties that allows for regular financial support from one party. Such support is often to meet the consumption, medical and/or education needs of the dependant party. However, when workers’ remittances is taken from the perspective of group to group transfers, it connotes an arrangement that allows for group or societal support often to meet the developmental needs of the benefiting party. The 8 likely negative impact of remittances associated with the dependency framework is that it may engender a culture of dependency among the economically active population that benefit from remittances flows. Workers’ remittances may on the other hand generate a number of important positive contributions to economic growth and development. In particular, remittances tend to reduce poverty and inequality in recipient countries, as well as increase aggregate investment and growth. Moreover, when perceived to behave counter – cyclically, remittances may significantly reduce growth volatility and help countries adjust to external and macroeconomic policy shocks. At the microeconomic level, remittances allow poor recipient households to increase their savings, spend more on consumer durables and human capital, and improve children’s health and educational outcomes. Consequently, the net impact of workers’ remittances is that it is beneficial to the recipient party if properly managed. Workers’ remittances are important source of finance and foreign exchange for many African countries. They help the countries to stabilize irregular incomes and also assist communities to build human and social capital. Remittances receivers in many cases are typically or financially better off than their peers who lack this source of income (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). In this sense, remittances are private and family funds, which may be construed as constituting some form of familial support that does not create any future liabilities such as debt servicing or profit transfer for the recipient. These transfers have been a critical means of financial support to many poor families in developing economies for generations and have helped them significantly in confronting the plague of poverty. Thus, remittances reduce the problem of income inequality in many societies. Within this perspective, there 9 are at least four identifiable motives for remittances in the literature; these include (i) altruism (ii) self interest (iii) implicit family contract: - loan repayment, and (iv) implicit family contract: - co-insurance (Solimano, 2003). At the macroeconomic level, remittances have a substantial positive effect on the balance of payments and on foreign exchange revenues. This however may not be true for net remittances. More importantly, remittance inflows, unlike oil windfalls do not weaken institutional capacity. This is because remittances are widely dispersed with the great bulk allocated in small amounts to the recipients while the governments are precluded from playing the role of “middlemen”. The role of workers’ remittances in economic growth and development continues to be an important issue for researchers and policymakers. One strand of studies relates to the understanding of the determinants and factors that shape the transfer of funds by migrants. It also explains the amount, frequency, volume, and duration of such transfers (Lee, Bokkerink, Smallwood, and Hermandez-Coss, 2005). The other strand concentrates on the causes and or uses of remittances while only a few made efforts to directly address the macroeconomic effects of remittance transfers (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah , 2003). This limited research effort did not give Africa, and particularly SSA, much attention on the issue of remittances (Sander 2003). This development is traceable to the relatively low share of remittances going to the African continent (15 percent of total flows to developing countries) and the even lower share going to Sub-Saharan Africa (5 percent), and by the relatively small number of international migrants from Africa, as well as their greater dispersion, compared to migrants from other developing regions (sander and Maimbo, 2003). 10 Workers’ remittances to Africa are nevertheless an important financial flow— with perhaps, significant developmental effects. As shown in figure 1.1, workers’ remittance as a percentage of GDP in many SSA countries is quite significant averaging about 8 percent for these countries. Thus, these realities make a study on the subject worth embarking on. Moreover, their level is probably much higher than official data indicates (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). Anecdotal reports support the fact that many transactions go unrecorded or unreported, this in large part is because financial systems and services are weak in much of Africa. The weakness of financial systems brings about the problem of remittance leakages as it creates obstacles for the efficient transfer of remittances through formal money transfer services and limits the potential of remittances to contribute to development (Gupta, Pattilo and Wagh, 2007). The weak financial systems and services in Africa has been a major stimulus for the sustenance of the informal transfer systems which includes personal carriage of cash or goods by migrants, their relatives, their friends, or trusted agents. Other informal services operate as a side business to an import-export operation, retail shop, or currency dealership. Most of them keep little paper or electronic documentation. Transactions are communicated by phone, fax, or email to a counterpart who will make the payment (El-Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson, 2002). The best known of the informal services are hawala and hundi, which operate in a similar fashion. The terms can be used interchangeably, but hawala is typically used in the context of the Middle East and Arab countries and their migrant populations, whereas hundi is usually connected with South Asia especially Bangladesh (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). Workers’ remittances as a potential source of external development finance for many developing countries provide a much more stable source of foreign exchange than other foreign currency flows to developing countries. This is 11 especially relevant to SSA, where official aid flows have fluctuated over the years. The increasing attention is also due to the growing volume of official financial remittances to low income countries and their potential contribution to the development of the receiving regions. But despite the large interest in remittances, their role in economic growth and development remains unclear. First, it is extremely difficult to gather accurate data on remittances. This is because many remittances are not channeled through the payment system and are left outside the official statistics. In addition, most studies on workers’ remittances flows to Africa tend to be on a single country or one migrant group at a time and this does not allow for any form of general inference. At the macro level, the economic growth and developmental impact of remittances on the economy attracts two opposing views in the literature. Within the first perspective, remittances often provide a significant source of foreign currency, increase national income, finance imports and contribute to the balance of payments. Remittances also contributed to the expansion of wire transfer and courier companies as well as money exchanges (Russell 1986; Keely and Tran 1989; Massey 1992; Taylor et al. 1996a and 1996b). Other studies with contrary views believe that remittances decrease the likelihood of an improved economy. Their argument is that, the inflow of funds can be deceptive if it creates dependence among the recipients, encourages the continued migration of the working age population and decreases the likelihood of investment by the government or foreign investors because of an unreliable workforce (Pastor and Rogers 1985; Pastor 1989). Another possible negative effect of remittances is the possibility that they produce a “Dutch disease” effect. For countries that receive important sums of remittances, there is a tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate, penalizing non- 12 traditional exports and hampering the development of the tradable goods sector (Solimano, 2003). Remittances can also be countercyclical or procyclical with the GDP in recipient countries. On the one hand, remittances motivated largely by altruism, are argued to have a tendency to move counter-cyclically with the GDP in recipient countries. The reasoning here is that migrant workers are expected to increase their support to family members during down cycles of economic activity back home. This expectedly will compensate the remittances beneficiaries for lost family income due to unemployment or other crisisinduced reasons. However, remittances conceived as procyclical with output in recipient countries may act as a destabilizing force. In this case, procyclical remittances increase the capacity of swings in remittance flows to produce additional fluctuations in output or current account balances, with serious macroeconomic effects (Sayan, 2004). It is quite obvious from the foregoing that, despite the increasing importance of remittances in total international capital flows, the direct or indirect relationship between remittances and economic growth and development has not been adequately studied. This study sheds additional insight into the inconclusive debate on the remittance – growth nexus by exploring the macroeconomic impact of remittances on economic growth and development in some selected SSA countries. It does this within the extended neoclassical growth framework using a balanced panel data set spanning from 2000 to 2007 for twenty one SSA countries. 13 1.3 Research Questions Given the various issues relating to the growth and developmental role of workers’ remittances flows to SSA, a number of research questions arise as follows: (i) What are the roles or contributions of remittances to output growth within the SSA? (ii) What is the contribution of remittances to private investment? (iii) To what extent do remittances contribute to foreign trade balance? (iv) What are the various policy options that can be adopted to better manage the macroeconomic effects of remittances in SSA? Any research effort that provides satisfactory answers or at the least, shed some meaningful insights into the above questions represents a valuable guide to the understanding of the economic growth and development role of workers’ remittances inflows to SSA. Therefore, in this empirical study, no effort is spared in providing meaningful answers to the above questions. 1.4 Objectives of the Study The overall objective of this study is to investigate the economic growth and developmental role of workers’ remittances in selected Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The specific objectives are to: (i) Determine the contributions of remittances to output growth in SSA (ii) Analyze the importance of remittances to the level of domestic investment in SSA (iii) Investigate the effects of remittances on trade balance in SSA. 14 1.5 Statement of Research Hypotheses The following testable hypotheses which are implied in the research questions are considered appropriate for this study and are therefore subjected to empirical investigation. These hypotheses are stated in their null context as follows: 1. Workers’ remittances do not significantly promote economic growth in selected SSA countries. 2. Workers’ remittances do not significantly impact positively on domestic investment in selected SSA countries. 3. Workers’ remittances inflow has no significant impact on foreign trade balance in the selected SSA countries. 1.6 Scope of the Study The study employs data covering a period of eight years (2000-2007). The choice of this period is explained by the availability of data across the selected countries as well as the fact of a dramatic rise in recorded remittance flows to the region over this period. The study is limited to the twenty one SSA countries that reported inward remittances receipts for the period- 2000 and 2007. These countries are: Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda. Remittance flows will be restricted to inter-household unilateral and unrequited transfer of cash earnings, meaning that such transfer is void of any form of quid pro quo terms, across national boundaries only. The implication is that remittances in forms of material transfers by migrant workers to their home 15 countries, compensation of employees, or unrequited inter-household cash transfers within each economy under investigation, are not covered in this study. It is important to clarify here that the study is restricted to the macroeconomic impact of remittances on the receiving economies and not on their microeconomic impact. 1.7 Justification of the Study A common theme motivating much of the research on remittances is the better understanding of their role as promoter of economic growth and development. This also includes the question of how remittances flows can be channeled into productive investments by appropriate policies. Black (2003) noted that despite the glaring evidence on the extent of the flow of remittances, gaps still remain in the understanding of how remittances are or can be used to promote growth and development, especially given that existing policy incentives are not generally considered as having been very effective in channeling remittances towards economic growth. The study is considered important to SSA countries in several ways as follows: the SSA region is widely regarded least among remittances recipients in the world. A good knowledge of the growth and developmental role of remittances will help encourage regional and national policies that will further boost the inflow of this very important source of foreign exchange to the region. In other words, this study helps policymakers in the various SSA countries to better understand the phenomenon of remittances flows to the region and how best to manipulate related policies to optimize these flows. This hopefully will help loosen the foreign exchange constraint that has so far weakened the capacity of most of these African economies to operate effectively in the international market. 16 The literature on remittances is replete with inadequacies regarding an appropriate measure of remittances. Many researchers make use of an aggregate measure of remittances and this at best exhibit characteristics that are different from those which they intend to study. According to Chami et al (2008), the category ‘workers’ remittances’ in the balance of payments best represents what economists have in mind when modeling remittances. The properties of this series differ significantly from those of ‘employee compensation’ and ‘migrants’ transfers’, so combining these three items into a single measure of remittances, as is common practice in the literature, can lead to invalid conclusions about the properties of remittances and, in turn, suboptimal policy decisions. Again, effort is made in this study to correct this inadequacy by isolating data on workers’ remittances from the aggregate measure commonly used in the remittances literature. The resource-gap syndrome is more pronounced in SSA countries than anywhere else in the world. As a consequence, the region is often not able to meet up with its foreign exchange requirements for imports. A stable remittances inflow can reasonably fill the foreign exchange gap in SSA. There is however the need to properly channel remittances into growth and development. The overall understanding of remittances and economic development is inadequate given the importance of this economic phenomenon. The debate on the growth and development impact of migrants’ remittances, which is based largely on evidence from proximate economies, is rather inconclusive. Sub-Saharan Africa has unfortunately been grossly underresearched in this respect. Situating the SSA countries properly on the growth and development impact of remittance inflows remains a major gap in the literature. This study is an attempt to further close this identified gap. The study therefore is a contribution to the inconclusive debate on the growth and 17 developmental role of workers’ remittances and it provides empirical evidence based on data from Sub-Saharan Africa which hopefully will further clarify the issues. 1.8 Structure of the Study The study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with general introduction, and the second chapter focuses on patterns of economic growth, investment, foreign trade and remittances in SSA. The third chapter is the review of the theoretical literature, the empirical literature, and methodological issues in the literature. The fourth chapter comprises of the theoretical framework and methodology. The fifth chapter is model estimation and analysis of results. Chapter six comprises of the summary of findings, recommendations, conclusion, as well as limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 18 CHAPTER TWO PATTERNS AND TRENDS OF REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SSA 2.0 Introduction This chapter provides background information on patterns and trend of economic growth, investment, trade and remittance flows to SSA. The focus here is to determine the existence of any pattern, distribution and trend in the identified variables that characterize the SSA region. Such characterization helps in the identification of necessary links among the variables of interest within the SSA economies. The chapter is also aimed at helping the reader form expectations on the various relationships among the variables of choice and across the study group. 2.1 Patterns and Trends of Economic Growth in SSA Recent trends in growth rates in SSA suggest that a large majority of the countries in the region experienced significant improvements in their overall growth performance since year 2000. However, growth performance across the SSA countries selected for this study exhibits substantial disparities over this period. Economic growth rates for each of the sampled countries and for each of the years within the scope of this study are presented in table 2.1. These values are compared using the average values for SSA as a benchmark value for each year. 19 Table 2.1: GDP Growth Rate in Selected SSA Countries Country/Year 2000 SSA 4 Benin 6 Percent of SSA (%) 150 Botswana 8 Percent of SSA (%) 200 Cameroon 4 Percent of SSA (%) 100 Cape Verde 7 Percent of SSA (%) 175 Djibouti 0 Percent of SSA (%) 0 Ethiopia 6 Percent of SSA (%) 150 Gabon -2 Percent of SSA (%) -50 Ghana 4 Percent of SSA (%) 100 Guinea 2 Percent of SSA (%) 50 Kenya 1 Percent of SSA (%) 25 Lesotho 5 Percent of SSA (%) 125 Malawi 2 Percent of SSA (%) 50 Mali 3 Percent of SSA (%) 75 Namibia 3 Percent of SSA (%) 75 Niger -1 Percent of SSA (%) -25 Nigeria 5 Percent of SSA (%) 125 Senegal 3 Percent of SSA (%) 75 Seychelles 4 Percent of SSA (%) 100 Sierra Leone 4 Percent of SSA (%) 100 Togo -1 Percent of SSA (%) -25 Uganda 6 Percent of SSA (%) 150 2001 4 5 125 5 125 5 125 4 100 2 50 8 200 2 50 4 100 4 100 4 100 3 75 -5 -125 12 300 1 25 7 175 3 75 5 125 -2 -50 18 450 0 0 5 125 2002 3 5 167 3 100 4 133 5 167 3 100 2 67 0 0 4 133 4 133 1 33 2 67 -4 -133 4 133 5 167 3 100 2 67 1 33 1 25 27 900 4 133 6 200 2003 4 4 100 6 150 4 100 6 150 3 75 -2 -50 2 50 5 125 2 50 3 75 4 100 6 150 7 175 4 100 4 100 10 250 7 175 -6 -150 9 225 3 75 6 150 2004 2005 6 6 3 3 50 50 7 5 117 83 4 2 67 33 -1 7 -16.7 117 4 3 67 50 14 12 233 200 1 3 16.7 50 6 6 100 100 3 3 50 50 5 6 83 100 5 1 83 16.7 6 3 100 50 2 6 33 100 12 3 200 50 -1 7 -16.7 117 11 5 183 83 6 6 100 100 -3 7 -50 117 8 7 133 117 3 1 50 16.7 7 6 117 100 2006 6 4 67 3 50 3 50 11 183 4 67 11 183 1 16.7 6 100 2 33 6 100 8 133 8 133 5 83 7 117 6 100 6 100 2 33 8 133 7 117 4 67 11 183 2007 6 5 83 4 67 3 50 7 117 4 67 11 183 6 100 6 100 2 33 7 117 5 83 9 150 3 50 4 67 3 50 6 100 5 83 7 117 7 117 2 33 9 150 Source: Author’s calculation based on data from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online 20 Overall, SSA recorded a 4 percent growth rate in 2000, 2001 and 2003. The lowest growth rate of 3 percent was recorded for the region in 2002. Growth rate rose in 2004 to 6 percent for the region and this was sustained till 2007. For the year 2000, Botswana recorded the highest growth rate of 8 percent representing 200 percent of SSA average for that year. In sharp contrast, Gabon, Niger, and Togo all reported negative growth rates for the same year. Gabon however had the worst growth rate of -2 percent which represented -50 percent of the SSA average for that year. The year 2001 was by no means less dramatic in terms of recorded GDP growth rates for the selected SSA countries. For example, Sierra Leone just recovering from long years of civil war topped the study group at 18 percent growth rate. This figure represented 450 percent of the average growth rate for SSA in that year. Malawi and Seychelles reported negative GDP growth rates for 2001. But Malawi was at the bottom as she had a negative growth rate of -5 percent which was -125 percent of SSA average for the year. Sierra Leone continued to be the best performer in 2002 among the study group as the country again recorded a spectacular growth rate figure of 27 percent representing 900 percent of SSA average for that year. Malawi again was in the negative region with a -4 percent GDP growth rate for the year 2002 which represented -133 percent of the SSA average for the year. Surprisingly, Malawi was the only country within the study group that actually reported a deceleration in GDP growth rate for year 2002. Nigeria was at the top in the year 2003 with a GDP growth rate of 10 percent representing 250 percent of the SSA average for that year. Seychelles came out worst performer in 2003 with a recorded deceleration of GDP growth rate of -6 percent representing 150 percent of the SSA average for the year. 21 The impressive performances of majority of the SSA economies continued in 2004 with Ethiopia taking the lead position for the year. The Ethiopian economy grew at 14 percent representing 233 percent of the SSA average for the year. Seychelles unfortunately could not catch up with the momentum of growth across the region as the country again was confined to the bottom position with a recorded negative GDP growth rate of -3 percent which represented -50 percent of the SSA average for that year. Economic growth figures for year 2005 revealed impressive economic performances across the sampled SSA countries. The Ethiopian economy was again in the lead with a growth rate of 12 percent representing 200 percent of the SSA average for the year. Lesotho and Togo on the other hand, trailed every other country within the sampled group as each of these countries recorded a growth rate of 1 percent in 2005. This represented 16.7 percent of the SSA average for the year. In 2006, three countries, Cape Verde, Ethiopia and Uganda tied in the lead with each recording a growth rate of 11 percent for the year. This value stood at 183 percent of the average growth rate for the SSA region in 2006. At the bottom was Gabon with a 1 percent growth rate for 2006 which represented a meager 16.7 percent of the SSA average for the same year. In 2007, the Ethiopian economy maintained its leading role at 11 percent growth rate and this amounted to 183 percent of the SSA average economic performance for the year. During the same year, Guinea and Togo tied in the bottom position as each of the two countries recorded a 2 percent growth rate representing 33 percent of the SSA average for the year. A quick remark here is to observe that on the average, economic performance remained robust in SSA over the study period. In view of this fact, Rena (2008) pointed out that growth in most of SSA was driven essentially by production and exports of primary commodities. This unfortunately exposes 22 the continent to external shocks which consequently compels growth policies that encourages economic diversification in the continent. Moreover, it is also noted here that those economies that initially recorded negative growth rates began to pick up by year 2005 and no SSA economy within the study group reported a negative growth rate between 2005 and 2007. 2.2 Patterns and Trends of Domestic Investment in SSA The difficulties in raising domestic savings to support rapid capital accumulation and growth account for the inability of SSA to provide the basic needs for their population. Within sustainable growth framework, appropriate policies are needed especially in raising saving rate. In some countries, sizeable increases in domestic savings cannot be expected to take place as a pre-condition for acceleration of investment and growth, (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2001). Capital accumulation is very vital for a sustainable process of economic growth. It is note-worthy that though considerable productivity gains could be attained by more intensive and efficient use of existing resources, such gains would be one-off and may not lead to rapid and sustained growth unless translated into investment in productive capacity, including physical and human infrastructure. Every economy (including those of SSA) therefore makes investment in productive capacity a major policy goal for all time. Table 2.2 captures the trend of domestic investment in SSA between the periods 2002 and 2007. 23 Table 2.2: Domestic Investment in Selected SSA Countries (US$’ billion) Country/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SSA 58.07 57.08 58.67 78.64 98.63 115.22 138.46 168.64 Benin 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.67 0.74 0.84 0.00 0.00 Percent of SSA (%) 0.74 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.73 0.00 0.00 Botswana 2.16 2.40 2.42 3.46 4.01 3.70 3.30 5.01 Percent of SSA (%) 3.72 4.20 4.12 4.40 4.07 3.21 2.38 2.97 Cameroon 1.68 1.95 2.15 2.38 2.98 3.16 3.02 3.58 Percent of SSA (%) 2.89 3.42 3.66 3.03 3.02 2.74 2.18 2.12 Cape Verde 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.35 0.37 0.45 0.58 Percent of SSA (%) 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.34 Djibouti 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.32 Percent of SSA (%) 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.19 Ethiopia 1.66 1.75 1.86 1.87 2.56 2.83 3.67 4.84 Percent of SSA (%) 2.86 3.07 3.17 2.38 2.60 2.46 2.65 2.87 Gabon 1.11 1.21 1.21 1.45 1.75 1.85 2.34 3.03 Percent of SSA (%) 1.91 2.12 2.06 1.84 1.77 1.61 1.69 1.80 Ghana 1.19 1.41 1.21 1.75 2.52 3.21 3.87 5.10 Percent of SSA (%) 2.05 2.47 2.06 2.23 2.56 2.79 2.80 3.02 Guinea 0.61 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.58 Percent of SSA (%) 1.05 0.82 0.73 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.31 0.34 Kenya 2.21 2.44 1.99 2.46 2.75 3.17 4.04 5.44 Percent of SSA (%) 3.81 4.27 3.39 3.13 2.79 2.75 2.92 3.23 Lesotho 0.40 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.44 Percent of SSA (%) 0.69 0.58 0.51 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.27 0.26 Malawi 0.24 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.53 0.67 0.72 0.93 Percent of SSA (%) 0.41 0.46 0.00 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.55 Mali 0.60 0.82 0.62 1.06 1.02 1.20 1.34 1.60 Percent of SSA (%) 1.03 1.44 1.06 1.35 1.03 1.04 0.97 0.95 Namibia 0.67 0.79 0.62 0.96 1.26 1.43 1.82 1.83 Percent of SSA (%) 1.15 1.38 1.06 1.22 1.28 1.24 1.31 1.09 Niger 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.39 0.42 0.77 0.00 0.00 Percent of SSA (%) 0.36 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.67 0.00 0.00 Nigeria 6.78 7.26 7.65 9.29 11.0 13.0 15.7 19.9 Percent of SSA (%) 11.6 12.7 13.0 11.8 11.1 2 11.3 5 11.3 1 11.8 5 Senegal 0.96 0.90 0.92 1.43 1.67 2.58 2.64 8 2 4 1 7 3 5 3.49 3 Percent of SSA (%) 1.65 1.58 1.57 1.82 1.69 2.24 1.91 2.07 Seychelles 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.25 0.30 Percent of SSA (%) 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.18 Sierra Leone 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.22 Percent of SSA (%) 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.13 Togo 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.00 0.00 Percent of SSA (%) 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.34 0.00 0.00 Uganda 1.21 1.13 1.25 1.39 1.60 2.07 2.11 2.63 Percent of SSA (%) 2.08 1.98 2.13 1.77 1.62 1.80 1.52 1.56 Source: Author’s calculation based on data from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online 24 Sub-Saharan Africa recorded some sizeable domestic investment between 2000 and 2007 as shown in table 2.2. The figures ranged from approximately US$58.07 billion in 2000 to US$168.64 billion in 2007 representing a change in domestic investment level of about 190.4 percent. However, another look at individual country investment levels for each year reveals that improvement in private investment was driven mainly by some few countries within the sampled group. Notable among these countries (in alphabetic order) were Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. Nigeria for instance remained on top of all other economies within the study group throughout the study period. This is in terms of capacity of the economy to mobilize private investment internally. The country recorded a total of US$6.78 billion domestic investment in year 2000 and this represented about 11.6 percent of total domestic investment in SSA for that year. This figure steadily grew to US$7.26 billion representing 12.7 percent of SSA average in 2001, US$7.65 billion representing 13.0 percent of SSA average in 2002, US$9.29 billion representing 11.0 percent of SSA average in 2003, US$11.0 billion representing 11.1 percent of SSA average in 2004, US$13.0 billion representing 11.3 percent of SSA average in 2005, US$19.9 billion representing 11.3 percent of SSA average in 2006, and US$7.26 billion representing 11.8 percent of SSA average in 2007. Sierra Leone appeared to be in the rear for the greater part of the period under review. This of course is not surprising considering the fact that this country is just recovering from a civil war that lasted for many years. What is surprising is the high economic growth rate recorded by the country during the same period covered by this study. The question here is what could have driven this growth outside of domestic investment in the economy? Precisely, domestic investment figures for Sierra Leone range from US$0.04 billion in 2000, to 25 US$0.05 billion in 2001, US$0.09 billion in 2002, US$0.14 billion in 2003, US$0.11 billion in 2004, US$0.21 billion in 2005, US$0.22 billion in 2006, and US$0.22 billion in 2007. These figures represented 0.07 percent, 0.09 percent, 0.15 percent, 0.18 percent, 0.11 percent, 0.18 percent, 0.16 percent, and 0.13 percent of the SSA average for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. A good number of the selected SSA countries never recorded up to US$1.00 billion for any year during the study period. Though most of these economies are small by most standards, it is equally disturbing that private investment drive does not occupy any priority place in these countries. These details are also indicative of the predicament of resource gap among SSA economies and probably policy misdirection for the region in its drive for sustainable growth through investment in productive capacity. 2.3 Patterns and Trends of Foreign Trade in SSA Export growth supports investment because it helps to earn foreign exchange needed for capital goods imports and advanced technology. Investment supports exports by providing the basis for productivity growth and increased competitiveness. Investment also allows for production to be shifted towards products with high income elasticity, thereby helping to avert terms of trade losses. Successful examples of industrialization and growth are thus underpinned by rising rates of savings, investment and exports. While African countries have in the past experienced surges of investment and growth, they have not in general been able to establish a virtuous circle of investment, savings and exports (UNCTAD, 2001). Pattern of trade are captured for all countries within the study by each country’s real external balance and this can be seen in table 2.3. 26 Table 2.3: Real External Balance in Selected SSA Countries (US$’ billions) Country/Year SSA Benin Percent of SSA (%) Botswana Percent of SSA (%) Cameroon Percent of SSA (%) Cape Verde Percent of SSA (%) Djibouti Percent of SSA (%) Ethiopia Percent of SSA (%) Gabon Percent of SSA (%) Ghana Percent of SSA (%) Guinea Percent of SSA (%) Kenya Percent of SSA (%) Lesotho Percent of SSA (%) Malawi Percent of SSA (%) Mali Percent of SSA (%) Namibia Percent of SSA (%) Niger Percent of SSA (%) Nigeria Percent of SSA (%) Senegal Percent of SSA (%) Seychelles Percent of SSA (%) Sierra Leone Percent of SSA (%) Togo Percent of SSA (%) Uganda Percent of SSA (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 10.28 1.30 -3.65 -4.17 3.95 13.76 21.26 13.65 -0.29 -0.30 -0.39 -0.46 -0.52 -0.54 0.00 0.00 -2.84 -23.12 10.71 10.96 -13.06 -3.94 0.00 0.00 1.17 0.98 0.68 0.72 0.98 1.81 2.47 1.28 11.3 74.79 -18.65 -17.20 24.7 13.1 11.6 9.42 0.36 8 -0.12 -0.09 0.04 -0.07 4 -0.17 7 0.37 3 0.17 3.52 -9.53 2.33 -1.07 -1.72 -1.23 1.73 1.23 -0.18 -0.18 -0.23 -0.28 -0.36 -0.33 -0.39 -0.51 -1.75 -14.09 6.17 6.60 -9.11 -2.39 -1.86 -3.71 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.82 -3.72 0.84 1.37 -2.90 -0.53 -0.63 -1.25 -0.98 -0.96 -1.09 -1.21 -1.68 -2.51 -3.44 -3.77 -9.50 -73.47 29.85 28.92 -42.45 -18.23 -16.19 -27.60 1.84 1.22 0.95 1.47 2.17 3.21 3.14 3.33 17.93 93.94 -25.94 -35.21 54.86 23.33 14.75 24.43 -0.92 -1.04 -0.75 -1.21 -1.87 -2.68 -3.14 -3.96 -8.93 -79.73 20.66 29.12 -47.32 -19.52 -14.78 -29.04 -0.13 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -1.29 -3.11 3.48 2.05 -3.97 -0.64 -0.42 -0.75 -1.29 -1.31 -0.71 -0.89 -1.01 -1.40 -2.22 -3.02 -12.51 -100.44 19.35 21.29 -25.50 -10.16 -10.46 -22.14 -0.52 -0.41 -0.42 -0.55 -0.63 -0.71 -0.70 -0.83 -5.02 -31.13 11.45 13.25 -15.94 -5.15 -3.31 -6.10 -0.17 -0.19 -0.66 -0.53 -0.48 -0.70 -0.76 -0.75 -1.65 -14.66 18.14 12.65 -12.12 -5.09 -3.56 -5.51 -0.31 -0.45 -0.25 -0.48 -0.60 -0.62 -0.48 -0.67 -2.97 -34.23 6.72 11.44 -15.29 -4.51 -2.24 -4.92 -0.14 -0.23 -0.07 -0.45 -0.15 0.01 0.31 -0.16 -1.40 -17.68 1.91 10.75 -3.79 0.07 1.46 -1.20 -0.14 -0.15 -0.19 -0.25 -0.30 -0.31 0.00 0.00 -1.38 -11.48 5.29 6.00 -7.69 -2.27 0.00 0.00 10.09 5.14 -0.41 1.53 11.33 17.39 22.12 17.42 98.21 394.12 11.10 -36.71 286.83 126.41 104.05 127.68 -0.44 -0.44 -0.56 -0.83 -1.04 -1.35 -1.64 -2.53 -4.24 -33.81 15.21 19.92 -26.29 -9.84 -7.70 -18.55 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.19 -0.17 -0.32 -0.20 -10.25 0.23 -1.89 0.35 -1.39 -0.82 -2.35 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.17 -0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.12 -1.31 -11.27 4.69 4.18 -3.03 -1.16 -0.51 -0.90 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.28 -0.36 -0.43 -0.51 -2.58 -19.78 7.25 5.72 -7.03 -2.59 -2.04 -3.76 -0.73 -0.74 -0.88 -0.94 -0.83 -1.02 -1.35 -1.65 -7.13 -56.91 24.15 22.57 -21.03 -7.43 -6.37 -12.08 Source: Author’s calculation based on data from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online 27 Table 2.3 shows the real external balance on goods and services for all selected SSA countries for this study. With the exception of Botswana, Gabon and Nigeria, none of these countries performed impressively well as they all remained in the negative region for most years within the study period. On the average, SSA also performed well having negative entries for just two (2002 and 2003) of eight years covered by this study. The positive outlook of real external balance for the overall SSA economy is undoubtedly as a result of the overwhelming size of the Nigerian economy within the region. A comparism of the figures in Table 2.3 reveals the predominance of the Nigerian economy throughout the period under review. In a number of cases, the real external balance (REB) for the country was higher than the net figures for SSA as a region. In year 2000, REB for the country stood at US$10.09 billion or 98.21 percent of the net value for SSA. The year 2001 was US$5.14 billion or 394 percent of the net value for SSA. Year 2002 figures were in the negative for the country at -US$0.41billion, but the economy still stood above the SSA average at 11.1 percent. Interestingly, REB for all the selected SSA countries (except Botswana) were the negative for this year meaning that it was a particularly bad year for trade in the region. Nigeria’s REB picked again in 2003 standing US$1.53billion, US$11.33 billion in 2004, US$17.39 billion in 2005, US$22.12 billion in 2006, and US$17.42 billion in 2007. These figures represented -36.71 percent, 286.83 percent, 126.41 percent, 104.05 percent, and 127.68 percent of the net REB for SSA in the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Benin, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda all had negative real external balance figures for all the years covered by this study. What this means is that each of these countries simply imported much more than they 28 exported during each year throughout the period under review. Again this is indicative of the poor health of most Sub-Saharan African economies. 2.4 Patterns and Trends of Workers’ Remittances flow to SSA Remittances flows are important and stable source of external finance for many countries and constitute a substantial part of financial inflows for countries with a large migrant labour force. Officially recorded remittances received by developing countries are estimated to have exceeded US$93 billion in 2003 and have since increased dramatically totaling an estimated US$167 billion in 2005, according to World Bank (2006) estimates. Remittance flows to SSA region have grown steadily from US$4.62billion in 2000 to US$4.66billion in 2001. The figures stood at US$5.03billion in 2002 and US$6.00billion in 2003. It rose to US$8.05billion and US$9.41billion in 2005. And finally remittance flows to SSA further rose to US$12.6billion in 2006 and US$18.6billion in 2007. The explanations for this dramatic rise in remittance flows to SSA are quite obvious. First, remittances through informal channels are being subjected to greater scrutiny since the events of September 11, 2001. The discovery of the large size of these flows has prompted governments worldwide to improve the recording efforts. Second, reduction in remittance costs and expansion of remittance networks have increased migrants’ disposable incomes and their incentives to remit. Third, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar has raised the value of remittances from Europe and Japan. The appreciation of the Euro relative to the U.S. dollar may account for some 7 percent of the increase in remittances to developing countries during 2001–2005 (Mohapatra and others, 2006). Finally, growth in migrant stocks (due to falling travel costs and 29 increased globalization) and an increase in migrant incomes have also contributed to higher remittances. Table 2.4 provides details of remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. 30 Table 2.4: Remittance Flows to Selected SSA Countries, (US$ billions) Country/Year SSA Benin Percent of SSA (%) Botswana Percent of SSA (%) Cameroon Percent of SSA (%) Cape Verde Percent of SSA (%) Djibouti Percent of SSA (%) Ethiopia Percent of SSA (%) Gabon Percent of SSA (%) Ghana Percent of SSA (%) Guinea Percent of SSA (%) Kenya Percent of SSA (%) Lesotho Percent of SSA (%) Malawi Percent of SSA (%) Mali Percent of SSA (%) Namibia Percent of SSA (%) Niger Percent of SSA (%) Nigeria Percent of SSA (%) Senegal Percent of SSA (%) Seychelles Percent of SSA (%) Sierra Leone Percent of SSA (%) Togo Percent of SSA (%) Uganda Percent of SSA (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 4.62 0.08 1.74 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.09 1.85 0.001 0.02 0.05 1.15 0.002 0.05 0.03 0.70 0.00 0.03 0.05 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.07 1.50 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 1.39 30.1 0.18 1 3.88 0.003 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.34 0.24 5.15 4.66 0.08 1.67 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.08 1.71 0.001 0.02 0.02 0.39 0.001 0.03 0.05 0.98 0.01 0.19 0.05 1.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.88 0.08 1.76 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.30 1.17 25.02 0.26 5.57 0.002 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.05 1.11 0.34 7.34 5.03 0.07 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.08 1.68 0.001 0.02 0.03 0.66 0.001 0.02 0.04 0.87 0.02 0.30 0.06 1.14 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.58 0.13 2.51 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.17 1.21 24.0 0.30 3 5.90 0.002 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.09 1.72 0.42 8.36 6.00 0.05 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.01 0.11 1.81 0.003 0.05 0.05 0.78 0.004 0.06 0.07 1.09 0.11 1.85 0.07 1.10 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.50 0.14 2.32 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.19 1.06 17.7 0.45 3 7.48 0.005 0.08 0.03 0.43 0.13 2.14 0.31 5.11 8.05 0.05 0.67 0.05 0.63 0.10 1.22 0.11 1.40 0.003 0.04 0.13 1.66 0.001 0.02 0.08 1.02 0.04 0.52 0.38 4.67 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.14 1.72 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.53 2.27 28.2 0.56 5 7.00 0.007 0.08 0.02 0.31 0.15 1.91 0.31 3.86 9.41 0.14 1.46 0.08 0.88 0.07 0.71 0.14 1.45 0.003 0.03 0.17 1.84 0.001 0.02 0.10 1.05 0.04 0.44 0.42 4.52 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.15 1.63 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.48 3.33 35.3 0.72 9 7.62 0.012 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.16 1.75 0.32 3.42 12.6 0.19 5 1.47 0.08 0.62 0.12 0.93 0.14 1.07 0.004 0.03 0.17 1.34 0.001 0.01 0.11 0.83 0.04 0.33 0.57 4.51 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.19 1.52 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.39 3.33 26.3 0.85 2 6.73 0.013 0.10 0.05 0.37 0.20 1.58 0.41 3.25 18.6 0.19 2 1.00 0.08 0.43 0.15 0.83 0.14 0.74 0.004 0.02 0.36 1.91 0.001 0.01 0.12 0.63 0.02 0.08 0.65 3.47 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.32 1.74 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.26 1.79 9.64 1.11 5.95 0.011 0.06 0.15 0.79 0.20 1.07 0.45 2.43 Source: Author’s calculation based on data from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online 31 A breakdown of the SSA remittance figures in Table 2.4 shows that flows to Nigeria top the list of recipients within the study group throughout the study period. The country recorded a total of about US$1.39billion in 2000, US$1.17billion in 2001, US$1.21billion in 2002, US$1.06billion in 2003, US$2.27billion in 2004, US$3.33billion in 2005, US$3.33billion in 2006 and US$1.79billion in 2007. These figures represent 30.1 percent, 25.02 percent, 24.0 percent, 17.7 percent, 28.2 percent, 35.3 percent, and 9.64 percent of the SSA total for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Remittance flows to most of the countries covered in this study are actually very small in when compared to the big recipients such as Nigeria. A further examination of figures in table 2.4 reveals that a number of these countries never received up to 1 percent of the recorded remittance flows to SSA at any given year throughout the study period. Included in this group are: Botswana, Djibouti, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Seychelles and Sierra Leone. Despite the small amount flowing to these countries over the years, it is often not surprising to see that these flows are quite significant when measured as a ratio to receiving country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Such realities provide the necessary impetus to encourage remittance flows with relevant policy measures in these SSA countries. 2.5 Trends in Workers’ Remittances and Growth Indicators in SSA Workers’ remittances may exhibit trends and patterns with key development and economic growth indicators such as output growth, investment and foreign trade or real external balance. Such trends can help in predicting the path or direction of any of these variables and this in turn can be a useful guide in 32 appropriate policy formulation. Figure 2.1 below shows trends in workers’ remittances, economic growth, investment and real external balance in SSA between 2000 and 2007. US$' Billions Figure 2.1: Trends in Workers’ Remittances and Selected Economic Growth Indicators in SSA 1000 900 800 700 600 GDP 500 INV 400 REB 300 Remittances 200 100 0 -100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online Figure 2.1 suggests that investment and economic growth in SSA countries have similar patterns of growth over the study period. A similar behavioural pattern cannot be concluded for remittances on the one hand, and domestic investment or economic growth on the other hand. No single pattern between 33 real external balance and the other three variables is observed throughout the period covered by the study. These results are however not sufficient to prescribe any policy direction for the SSA economies as they only indicate some patterns in behaviour of the selected variables over time. It will require a cause-effect analysis to determine the exact nature of relationships among these variables. 2.6 Sources and Destination of Remittance Flows Remittances flow to Africa represents the least in terms of relative share of flows to the different regions of the world. Table 2.5 below provides estimates of the regional distribution of remittances flow by sources and destination in year 2000. Table 2.5: Estimated flows of remittances by region, 2000. US$ billions Sending Region Receiving Region Latin America & North Africa Asia Europe Caribbean America Africa 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 Asia 3.4 3.4 0.5 0.2 31.5 Europe 2.6 3.2 0.4 0.4 9.5 Latin America & Caribbean 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 1.1 North America 0.7 7.9 5.7 14.2 0.9 Oceania 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 Total 10.4 43.4 19.6 16.2 1.6 Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 Bold figures indicate flows between countries in the same region. Source: Harrison (2004). Adapted from Carling (2005) Evidence from the above table reveals that about one third of global remittances are estimated to flow between Asian countries. This places the Asian region on top of all other regions in terms of intra-regional remittance flows. Within Europe, intra-regional remittances flow is also quite substantial 34 Total 4.2 39.0 16.2 1.8 29.6 0.8 91.5 making this region the second largest. When inter-regional flows are considered, North America to Latin America and the Caribbean top the list while North America to Asia follows. Table 2.5 also shows that African countries receive more remittances from elsewhere in Africa than they do from other continents. However, the largest inter-continental sources are from Asia, Europe and North America in that order. The relative dominance of Asia as number one source region of remittance flow to Africa has since changed in favour of North America. Fadayomi (2009: 15) stated that “almost ¾ of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 were sent from the United States and Western Europe, while the rest were sent Gulf States, other developed countries and developing countries”. 2.7 Country Level Analysis of Distribution of Remittance Flows to SSA At the country level, distributions of remittance flows to SSA countries are not easily determined owing to the non-existent or scanty nature of available data. In terms of volume and value of remittance flows to SSA, evidence from available data show that no sub-region in SSA is left out from remittance flows. However, the West and East African sub-regions dominate in terms of concentration of remittance inflows while Central and Southern African subregions are barely represented with two and three countries respectively reporting data on remittances for most of the periods covered in this study. Details of volume and value of remittance flows to SSA by sub-region and by country are presented in Table 2.6. 35 Table 2.6: Volume and Value of Remittance Flows to SSA by Sub-Region and by Country Sub-region Remittances Sub-region Remittances and and US$ million % of GDP US$ million % of GDP Country Country 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 Eastern Africa Western Africa Burundi Benin* 80.48 186.19 3.57 4.03 Comoros Burkina Faso 62.47 2.39 Djibouti* 0.72 3.66 0.13 0.48 Cape Verde* 85.69 135.83 16.13 11.30 Eritrea Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia* 53.16 169.18 0.65 1.12 Gambia 62.87 12.38 Kenya* 584.85 570.46 4.61 2.54 Ghana* 32.40 105.25 0.65 0.83 Madagascar Guinea* 1.17 41.64 0.04 1.30 Malawi* 3.62 17.17 0.21 0.54 Guinea Bissau Mauritius Liberia Mozambique 15.83 0.22 Mali* 69.18 192.73 2.86 3.29 Rwanda 3.62 17.17 0.21 0.61 Niger* 4.55 49.06 0.25 1.35 Seychelles* 2.98 13.08 0.49 1.35 Nigeria* 1391.79 3328.69 3.03 2.27 Somalia Senegal* 179.2 850.58 3.82 9.08 2 Uganda* 238.10 411.00 3.84 4.13 Sierra 7.13 47.35 1.12 3.33 Leone* Tanzania 8.99 0.06 Togo* 15.71 199.95 1.18 9.01 Central Africa Southern Africa Cameroon* 11.85 117.65 0.12 0.66 Angola CA Botswana* 0.35 78.74 0.01 0.72 Republic Chad Lesotho* 0.14 4.46 0.02 0.29 DR Congo Namibia* 4.49 6.54 0.11 0.08 Eq. Guinea South Africa Gabon* 2.26 1.48 0.04 0.02 Swaziland São Tomé Zambia and Zimbabwe Príncipe Source: Author’s Computations based on Data from Africa Development Indicators online, 2010 *indicate countries included in this study An effort to determine how much of remittance flows can be associated with productive activities or economic growth in recipient economies of SSA necessarily begins with the identification of top remittance recipients from the 36 four sub-regional blocks in SSA. Available data reveal that Nigeria tops in the West African sub-region, Kenya tops in East Africa; Botswana tops the list in Southern Africa sub-region and Cameroon occupies that position in the central Africa sub-region. An annual classification (covering the study period, 2000 2007) of remittances and other major growth indicators for the identified top remittance recipients are presented in Table 2.7. 37 Table 2.7: Major Growth Indicators of Sub-Regional Top Remittance Recipients in SSA (US$’Million) Country year 2000 2001 Nigeria 2002 2003 (West 2004 Africa) 2005 2006 2007 2000 2001 Kenya 2002 (East 2003 2004 Africa) 2005 2006 2007 2000 2001 Botswana 2002 (Southern 2003 2004 Africa) 2005 2006 2007 2000 2001 Cameroon 2002 (Central 2003 2004 Africa) 2005 2006 2007 GDP 45983.6 47999.78 59116.85 67656.02 87845.42 112248.6 146869 165920.9 12691.28 12986.52 13149.26 14903.63 16091.63 18769.01 22478.65 26950.31 6177.184 6033.253 5933.281 8277.572 9827.417 10512.51 11006.46 12323.81 10075.04 9598.224 10879.78 13621.81 15775.36 16587.86 17956.99 20691.56 INV 9317.43 11563.31 12249.57 13910.33 16261.06 21071.68 25370.21 25370.21 2210.071 2440.211 1990.564 2456.439 2750.309 3169.203 4038.904 5437.966 2160.083 2397.494 2416.915 3455.007 4007.657 3699.524 3299.392 5010.711 1684.636 1949.526 2153.019 2383.246 2983.054 3163.024 3019.452 3582.002 REB 10092.99 5138.631 -405.57 1530.907 11326.93 17388.16 22123.33 17424.52 -1286.12 -1309.52 -707 -888.053 -1007.05 -1398 -2223 -3022 1169.572 975.1013 681.4528 717.251 976.8438 1811.447 2471.827 1284.973 361.8344 -124.231 -85.2043 44.62519 -67.8614 -168.54 368.2258 168.3954 WR 1391.79 1166.628 1208.94 1062.84 2272.701 3328.694 3328.694 17945.94 584.8543 50.91443 57.14348 65.8453 375.8113 424.991 570.4593 645.1811 0.352816 0.359518 0.015803 0.022223 50.82159 82.35632 78.74315 80.0393 11.84716 6.78832 14.14916 60.55743 98.38632 67.12822 117.648 154.0269 Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online, 2010 38 An inspection of data in Table 2.7 reveals a steady rise in values of all variables observed between 2000 and 2007. The only exception here has to do with data on the variable - external balance which have mixed signs across periods and countries. The observed relationships are further captured in separate figures below for each of the top remittance recipients. This is to allow for additional insights regarding the existence of any unique characterization of remittance flows into SSA. US$'Billions Figure 2.2: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Nigeria (2000 – 2007) 180 160 140 120 100 GDP Investment 80 External Balance 60 Remittances 40 20 0 -20 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 The volume of remittance flows to Nigeria continued to remain below the investment and aggregate output (GDP) curves throughout the period under review. However, remittances to Nigeria remained in the positive region and 39 exhibited an upward trend over time. Remittances flow to Nigeria continued to grow as GDP and domestic investment rises. This pattern is particularly so from the period 2004 and 2007. External balance, which captures the external trade sector, failed to demonstrate a similar relationship with the other variables over time. What is observed with this variable is a pattern of cycles the investment and remittance curves throughout the study period. The same set of variables is examined below in Figure 2.3 for Kenya which represents the east African region. This is to verify whether a similar pattern of behaviour exists among the four sub-regions. US$'Billions Figure 2.3: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Kenya (2000 – 2007) 30 25 20 GDP 15 Investment External Balance 10 Remittances 5 0 -5 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 40 Relationships among the variables GDP, domestic investment, external balance and remittance receipts for Kenya between 2000 and 2007 are shown in figure 2.3. One major contrasting observation in the figure from the case of Nigeria is the behaviour of the variable, external balance which remained predominantly in the negative region and maintains a downward trend throughout the study period. Remittances remain in the positive region throughout the study period but with some downward trend observed between 2000 and 2003. Remittances however rose sustainably between 2003 and 2007. Investment and GDP on the average remained positive and upward sloping. One very interesting pattern noticed here is the period 2003 upward. GDP, investment and remittances all exhibited very similar swings during this period. This behaviour is quite similar to what was noticed in the case of Nigeria. But can a similar relationship hold for Botswana in southern Africa? Figure 2.4 below reveals the answer. 41 US$'Billions Figure 2.4: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Botswana (2000 – 2007) 14 12 10 GDP 8 Investment External Balance 6 Remittances 4 2 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 The case of Botswana appears quite interesting with all variables exhibiting a marked difference from the case Kenya. Here, none of the variables appeared in the negative region. Of particular note is the variable external balance which is substantially positively sloped contrasting sharply the cases of Nigeria and Kenya. This is indicative of a relatively healthy economy. While GDP, investment and external balance on the average, grew in the same upward direction from 2002, the variable external balance started fading in the downward direction from the period 2006. Remittances inflow though positive, remained minimal slightly rising above the horizontal axis from throughout the study period. Cameroon in central Africa is next examined below in figure 2.6. 42 US$'Billions Figure 2.5: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Cameroon (2000 – 2007) 25 20 15 GDP Investment 10 External Balance Remittances 5 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 -5 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Indicator, Online, 2010 The average pattern in the case of Cameroon is again different from the other three top remittance recipients in SSA. While GDP and investment curves are continuously upward sloping from the period 2001, remittances curve averages out the eternal balance curve. Although both curves remained substantially in the positive region, both were barely above the horizontal axis indicating a rather negligible value for these variables. The remittances curve interestingly is very similar to the case of Botswana which was stable throughout the period under review around the horizontal axis meaning that inflows are minimal. 43 It is also compelling at this juncture to consider the least remittance recipients from each of the SSA sub-regions in order to obtain a more balanced and fair picture. The overall idea here is to probe for the presence of similar characterizations of remittance flows to SSA among these least remittance recipients. Data on major growth indicators and remittances for the four least remittance recipients are presented in Table 2.8. 44 Table 2.8: Growth Indicators of least Sub-Regional Remittance Recipients in SSA (US$’Million) Country year GDP INV REB WR 2000 3112.363 613.2339 -132.777 1.166455 2001 3039.157 468.2449 -40.5415 8.71587 2002 3208.305 431.5194 -127.189 15.16 Guinea 2003 3619.436 368.5984 -85.68 111.046 (West 2004 3938.328 447.3895 -156.784 41.64 Africa) 2005 3260.598 458.0511 -88.4114 41.64 2006 3203.923 427.4501 -89.4554 41.64 2007 4563.586 575.8159 -102.179 15.07 2000 551.2309 48.45854 -84.4807 0.72023 2001 572.4174 45.0487 -48.5199 0.708976 2002 591.122 59.40604 -30.6098 0.787752 Djibouti 2003 622.0447 89.6557 -56.9657 2.909054 (East 2004 666.0721 143.2864 -114.553 2.970949 Africa) 2005 708.8436 134.4804 -73.2384 2.993456 2006 760.6529 227.2663 -134.115 3.657418 2007 817.6805 317.8634 -170.104 3.544882 2000 783.1093 395.5415 -515.861 0.138586 2001 711.0866 325.8268 -405.828 1.300182 2002 669.718 300.0478 -418.334 9.772631 Lesotho 2003 994.2572 323.4153 -552.491 11.46537 (Southern 2004 1289.785 404.1968 -629.386 14.37744 Africa) 2005 1375.998 401.0849 -707.811 6.948424 2006 1517.512 378.1838 -703.336 4.461993 2007 1669.564 442.8817 -832.964 12.87145 2000 5067.839 1109.961 1842.789 2.258502 2001 4712.84 1211.642 1224.853 1.23868 2002 4931.504 1208.803 947.9257 1.156404 Gabon 2003 6054.886 1450.454 1468.341 3.805917 (Central 2004 7178.136 1750.973 2166.439 1.431046 Africa) 2005 8665.739 1846.705 3209.592 1.478762 2006 9545.985 2340.1 3135.111 1.478762 2007 11567.59 3028.015 3333.316 1.478762 Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators online, 2010 45 For the purpose of providing additional insight, data covering the study period (2000-2007), on all variables and for each of the four countries listed in Table 2.8 are plotted in the figures below as was done earlier on, in the cases of top remittance recipients. These figures are presented and discussed in turn. US$'Billions Figure 2.6: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Guinea (2000 – 2007) 5 4 3 GDP INV 2 REB WR 1 0 -1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 GDP trend for Guinea in West Africa follows a cyclical pattern in the period under review while domestic investment and external balance curves, although in the positive region are slightly negatively sloped. External balance curve is completely in the negative region meaning that this country was never able to meet its trading obligations to her trading partners during the period under 46 review. Remittances flow is stable, positive and minimal around the horizontal axis. Djibouti in East Africa is considered in figure 2.7 below. Again the goal here is to examine whether behaviour similar to those of Guinea is exhibited. US$'Billions Figure 2.7: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Djibouti (2000 – 2007) 1 0.8 0.6 GDP 0.4 INV REB 0.2 WR 0 -0.2 -0.4 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 Evidence from Djibouti reveals that GDP and domestic investment exhibited upward trend from 2000 up until 2007. Remittances again remained stable around the horizontal axis demonstrating little or no improvement over time. External balance variable is disturbingly in the negative region and negative sloping all through the 47 period of the review again indicating the inability of this country to settle its trading obligations with her trading partners. What is rather striking in these behaviours is the extremely weak nature of these least remittance recipients as revealed by their negative external balances. What remains is to see whether Lesotho and Gabon will also exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Figure 2.8 reveals the case of Lesotho. US$'Billions Figure 2.8: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Lesotho (2000 – 2007) 2 1.5 1 GDP INV 0.5 REB WR 0 -0.5 -1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 Apart from GDP and investment which are largely in the positive region and upward sloping, the other growth indicators for Lesotho are most unimpressive as shown in 48 figure 2.8. The variable - eternal balance exhibited predominantly downward trends and remained in the negative region throughout the study period. One surprising observation is the fact that the period of GDP and investment growth (2002) unfortunately coincides with the period of further decline in external balance meaning that the observed growth in GDP and investment did not translate into a healthy foreign trade sector. The negative values observed for the variable - external balance further add to the curiosity on whether any systematic link exists between a weak foreign trade sector and low remittance inflows. An examination of the case of Gabon in figure 2.9 below will shed more light on these relationships. US$'Billions Figure 2.9: Remittance Receipts and other Growth Indicators in Gabon (2000 – 2007) 14 12 10 GDP 8 INV REB 6 WR 4 2 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Plotted by author based on data from African Development Online, 2010 49 All growth indicators for Gabon exhibit a more impressive pattern of behaviour than the other three least remittance recipient economies in SSA. As can be seen, these variables including remittances are in the positive region. GDP, investment, and external balance clearly demonstrate upward trends on the average and this is indicative of a much more healthy economy than the other three least remittance recipient economies of SSA. Remittances itself though positive and stable around the horizontal axis is quite minimal. The evidence provided by data on Gabon makes the exact nature of relationship among remittances and growth indicators included in this study rather unclear and inconclusive. This therefore calls for further investigation. 50 CHAPTER THREE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3.1 Conceptual and Measurement Issues Remittances are defined by the World Bank (2007) as “the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers”. The main sources of official data on migrants' remittances are the annual balance of payments records of countries, which are compiled in the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is therefore most logical to examine the definition of remittances as provided by the IMF. The IMF Balance of Payments Manual 5 (BMP5) does not define workers or migrants. According to the Balance of Payments Textbook, “workers’ remittances consist of goods or financial instruments transferred by migrants living and working in new economies to residents of the economies in which the migrants formerly resided”. It further states that workers’ remittances are “transfers made by migrants who are employed by entities of economies in which the workers are considered residents” and that transfers of self-employed migrants “are not classified as workers’ remittances but as current transfers”. This distinction is necessary since “workers’ remittances, according to the balance of payments convention, arise from labour and not from entrepreneurial income”. Remittances may also be viewed as transfers of money, goods and diverse traits by migrants or migrant groups back to their countries of origin or citizenship. The notion of remittances often conjures only monetary aspect; however, remittances embrace monetary and non-monetary flows, including social remittances. Social remittances are defined as ideas, practices, mindsets, world views, values and attitudes, norms of behaviour and social capital 51 (knowledge, experience and expertise) that the diasporas mediate and either consciously or unconsciously transfer from host to home communities (NorthSouth Centre of the Council of Europe, 2006 cited in Oucho, 2008). There are divergent views regarding the concept of remittances on the part of data users. Reinke and Patterson (2005) pointed out that studies of (Adams and Page, 2003; Harrison, 2003; Migration Policy Institute, 2003) treated remittances as certain transactions that are initiated by individuals living or working outside their country of birth or origin and related to their migration. In general, data on remittances are available from three items in Balance of Payments (BOP) reports at country level as compiled in the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook: a) “Workers’ remittances” (money sent by workers residing abroad for more than one year); b) “Compensations of employees” (gross earnings of foreigners residing abroad for less than a year; c) “Migrant transfer” (net worth of migrants moving from one country to another) (Gammeltoft, 2002). In the balance of payments framework, compensation of employees is a component of income while workers’ remittances are a component of current transfers; both are part of the current account. Migrants’ transfers are a component of capital transfers, which is part of the capital account. The definitions of these components, according to the BPM5, are: Compensation of employees comprises wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by Individuals—in economies other than those in which they are residents—for work performed for and paid for by residents of those economies. 52 Workers’ remittances cover current transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and considered residents there. A migrant is a person who comes to an economy and stays there, or is expected to stay, for a year or more. Workers’ remittances often involve related persons. Migrants’ transfers are contra-entries to the flow of goods and changes in financial items that arise from the migration of individuals from one economy to another. The concept of residence for households and individuals is based on their center of economic interest. If a resident household member leaves the economic territory where the household is based and returns to the household after a limited period of time (of less than one year), the individual continues to be a resident even if he or she makes frequent journeys outside the economic territory. Individuals leaving their country with the intention of living in a new economy for a year or longer will be considered residents of the new economy (with a few exceptions, notably students, medical patients, diplomats and military personnel). BPM5 does not specify a definition of migrants. Transfers are offset entries in the balance of payments to the provision of a resource (such as grants and gifts in kind or financial form) without a quid pro quo. Depending on the nature and use of the resource, transfers are recorded as current transfers in the current account or as capital transfers in the capital account component of the capital and financial account (Reinke, 2007). There are a number of conceptual limitations of remittance definitions in the BMP5 which obviously create certain conceptual difficulties. For example; there are currently two questions arising from the focus on employment and lack of clarity of migration as emphasized by Reinke and Patterson (2005) 53 • First, with increasing international mobility and the breakdown of traditional employment models, the focus on workers may be difficult to maintain. The basic issue for consideration should the focused perhaps on all migrants, regardless of status of employment and source of income? • Second, there is no clear guidance on migrants, since the BPM5 distinguishes only residents and nonresidents (visitors). Is a clear definition of migrants needed, as the originating unit of remittances? As a result, should workers’ remittances be renamed migrants’ remittances? These questions are currently being addressed in the context of on-going work on the Balance of Payments Manual and in coordination with other fora, such as the UN Technical Sub-Group on the Movement of Natural Persons—Mode 4. The lack of an acceptable official definition of remittances and the lack of clarity surrounding statistical compilation of a corresponding data series in the balance of payments has been noted for some time and led to a call by the G-8, during their 2004 meetings on Sea Island, to clarify the meaning of remittances and improve the accuracy of measuring remittance flows. This in turn led to the creation of a working group composed of the World Bank, IMF, and other international financial institutions that was tasked with clarifying the definition of remittances, offering guidance on how to collect and estimate remittance statistics, and providing assistance on how to develop an inflow-outflow matrix for tracking remittance flows. A technical subgroup of the United Nations reported its findings to the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics and the Advisory Expert Group on National Accounts. According to Reinke (2007), the results of this process is included in the revision of the BPM5 and the update of System of National 54 Accounts, 1993, both of which are scheduled for completion in 2008. The proposed changes will include the introduction of four new categories related to remittances, conceptual changes to the use of migration and residence status, and the elimination of the use of migrants’ transfers in the reporting of balance of payments flows. As discussed in Reinke (2007), the changes 2 include several items of importance: (i) “Personal Transfers” to replace “Workers’ Remittances” Personal transfers will replace the existing workers’ remittances item in the balance of payments, and will include all current transfers in cash or in kind between resident households and non-resident households. Unlike workers’ remittances, the new concept is based neither on employment nor migration status and thus resolves inconsistencies associated with the previous concept. (ii) Creation of a new item, “Personal Remittances” Personal remittances will be defined as current and capital transfers in cash or in kind between resident households and non-resident households, and “take-home” compensation of employees earned by persons working in economies where they are not resident. (iii) Creation of a new item, “Total Remittances” This will include “Personal Remittances” and social benefits. Intuitively, it includes all household income obtained from working abroad. (iv) Creation of a new item, “Total Remittances and Transfers to Nonprofit Institutions serving Households”. This will include all components of “Total Remittances” as well as both current and capital transfers to nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISHs). 2 This proposed change is yet to be implemented as at April 2010 and so does not affect this study. 55 (v) Removal of the concept of “migrants’ transfers” from the balance of payments framework. Instead of recording changes of assets and liabilities resulting from individuals moving their residence from one economy to another in the capital account, they will be recorded as “other changes of assets and liabilities”. The movement of personal effects that accompany a migrant will be excluded from import and export data. (vi) Abolition of the concept of “migrant” in the balance of payments framework. Since the concepts of personal transfers and remittances are based on the concept of residence rather than migration status, the concept of migrant is no longer relevant. This is consistent with the use of residence criteria elsewhere in the balance of payments and national accounts frameworks. (vii) Reporting of remittance flows to and from major partner countries in balance of payments data. This is a lower priority request of data users compared to accurate reporting of aggregate remittance flows, but reporting of bilateral flows will be encouraged. Personal transfers are expected to be a standard item in the revised balance of payments framework. All new definitions—i.e., personal remittances, total remittances, and total remittances and transfers to nonprofit institutions serving households—are expected to be supplementary items that compiling countries are encouraged but not required to compile. It should be noted that they cut across standard categories (income and transfers) and may entail asymmetries between transacting countries due to sector allocation. Chami, et al (2008) noted that the proposed changes to the balance of payments and system of national accounts frameworks are welcome developments regarding the true specification of remittances. The new category personal transfers captures periodic, recurring, unrequited current 56 transfers between residents of different countries. Any prior confusion arising from the distinction between transfers out of wage income and those out of other income, or from the concept of migrant status, which led to grey areas between the previous definitions of workers’ remittances and employee compensation, are eliminated in this proposed version. The main focus from a balance of payments perspective is to capture and record transfers between persons in different countries, which coincides with the generally accepted definition of remittances. The elimination of the concept of migrants’ transfers and the inclusion of employee compensation in a supplementary item are also welcome. As evidenced by the data, migrants’ transfers and employee compensation have characteristics more closely akin to those of private capital flows than to those of personal transfers and as such should be classified as items separate from workers’ remittances. As already noted, the new category “personal transfers” captures periodic, recurring, unrequited current transfers between residents of different countries; this proposed changes constitute a useful guide in this study as data on workers’ remittances corresponds to personal transfers. This component is therefore isolated from migrants’ transfer and employee compensation and is employed in this study. 3.2 Review of Theoretical Issues The overriding essence of discussing the theoretical literature on remittances here is to provoke, or at the least, motivate an empirical exercise which ultimately will assist in the choice of empirical model(s) that can be employed to analyze the macroeconomic effects of remittances. Many researchers have 57 informally suggested theories describing the role of remittances in the economy in order to motivate an empirical exercise. Rapoport and Docquier (2005) suggest that until the end of the 1980s the research on remittances focused on their short run effects, that is, on its impact on domestic output and prices. However, attention has shifted to the long run effects since the early 1990s by analyzing how remittances could alter the growth pattern of the receiving country. Approaches to the theory of remittances identified and described various costs and benefits to remitting and these are well summarized in Russell (1986). Stark and Bloom (1985) identify the family as the appropriate unit of analysis in migration and remittance questions. This is because the entire family is involved in sharing, and trading off, the costs and benefits of remitting. The recent theoretical literature on the role of remittances has therefore focused on the possible roles that the family or family relationships can play in shaping remittance choices. While Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) mention altruistic motivations for remittances, Lucas and Stark (1985: 902) state that "certainly the most obvious motive for remitting is pure altruism- the care of a migrant for those left behind. Indeed, this appears to be the single notion underlying much of the remittance literature." Some theories also focus on the idea that there can be self-interested reasons for remitting as well, which nevertheless center on the family. These self-interested theories of remittances are still based on the family because they view the family as a business or as a nexus of contracts that enables the members to enter into Pareto-improving arrangements (Chami et al, 2003). Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that migrants may have investments that need to be tended while they are away, so they will use other family members as their agents. In 58 cases like this, the remittances sent by the migrant are used to care for the migrant's interests, but they certainly will also include some compensation for the agents. The family may also play the role of financial intermediary in the remittances arrangement. Stark (1991), as well as Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) and Gubert (2002), assert that the family can function as an insurance company that provides members with protection against income shocks by diversifying the sources of income. Poirine (1997) and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) differ slightly by modeling the family as a bank that finances migration for some members. The borrowers remit funds in order to repay the loans, which are put toward more loans to further the interests of other individual family members. Based on altruistic motive, Olayiwola et al (2008) and Olayiwola (2010) also found remittances as a major source of old-age support in Ghana. In contrast, Chami and Fisher (1996) show that altruism can be a mechanism by which independent agents find partners with whom to enter into risksharing arrangements. They pointed out that even if the remittance arrangements are truly self-interested, the self-enforcing mechanism on which they depend may actually be altruism-that is, the migrant will live up to her obligations because she cares about the family members who are the counterparties to the agreement. This idea is explored in Stark and Lucas (1988). The important point here is that, although the motivations to remit are doubtlessly complex, altruism between family members appears to be the overwhelming motivation for remittances and hence, a good benchmark to use when modeling the interaction of causes and effects of remittances. These models built on altruism, and which focus on the family as the relevant unit of analysis in the migration process, attempt to analyze in a 59 unified framework the motivations that drive remittances and the economic effects that these are likely to produce in the recipient country. Chami et al. (2005) motivate remittances on the basis of altruism on the part of the migrant. Altruism is modeled introducing in the utility function of the migrant the expected utility of the remittee, discounted by a factor, alongside with the utility that the migrant derives from her own consumption. The remittee is employed in the domestic production process, whose output level is influenced by the (unobservable) work effort expended by the employees; domestic firms differentiate wages according to actual output levels. Remittances are driven by the desire to protect the relative from adverse income shocks, and their optimal level is inversely related to the recipient labour income in the bad state of nature. But the model predicts that remittances induce moral hazard in the behaviour of the remittee, as they create an incentive to substitute work effort, and hence labour income, with remittance income. Even though domestic firms increase the dispersion of wages among different output levels to induce greater work effort in risk averse workers, they are not able to fully overcome the moral hazard introduced by remittances, and domestic production falls. Chami et al. (2005) further suggest that workers’ remittances are compensatory transfers, that are likely to smooth household consumption, but that could depress production in the home country. The conclusion of their model reminds the implication of the early pessimistic view about remittances, as remittances are predicted to create a dependency culture in the receiving economy, which is induced to increase its reliance on the remittance inflow. Moreover, remittances are expected to fluctuate countercyclically, as the need for compensatory transfer increases as economic 60 activity in the home country declines. Remittances might also have significant indirect effect in the long run; IMF (2005) argues that “banking the unbanked” could be one of the beneficial side effect produced by workers’ remittances. The high profitability of the remittance business that is currently reflected by the high costs charged by private money transfer operators (MTOs), is driving banks’ attempts to widen their market share (Solimano, 2003b). Banks are signing international agreements whose aim is to increase the use of banking channels by the remitters and the remittees, offering bank accounts that can be accessed in both the host and home country. Thus, “remittances have the potential to bring a larger share of the population into contact with the formal financial system, expanding the availability of credit and saving products such as education loans, mortgages, and savings accounts.” (IMF, 2005a). In the short run, the main direct effect of remittances is to increase private consumption expenditure, thus stimulating aggregate demand. This is the unique stylized fact derived from micro surveys on remittees’ behaviour that is included in the macroeconomic analysis of short run effect of remittances. In a Keynesian framework, in the absence of supply constraints, the demand stimulus that is created by workers’ remittances induces a multiplier effect on domestic output. In the presence of slack productive capacity, remittances can thus contribute to raise capacity utilization. The overall effect depends on the propensity to consume out of remittances and on the import content of consumption. Life-cycle theories of consumption suggest that the propensity to consume depends on the remittees’ perception about the future flow of remittances; if these are not expected to be a long lasting source of income, then the theory predicts that households will not fully adjust current consumption levels to the increase in current income. Thus, Keynesian models 61 suggest that it is the propensity to consume out of remittances that raises domestic production. The Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy stresses that the impact of remittances depends crucially on the exchange rate regime and on the degree of capital mobility. Theoretically, a flexible exchange rate regime considerably insulates the domestic economic system from an external shock. The argument here is that the flow of remittances leads to an appreciation of the local currency and this reduces foreign demand of domestic goods, thus it counteracts the stimulus on national expenditure stemming from remittances. The implication of this is that the domestic level of economic activity is not altered by the flow of remittances. On the other hand, with a fixed exchange rate regime, the positive demand shock can be transmitted over to the domestic economy, and this may produce an increase in output coupled with an increase in domestic prices. The inflow of remittances leads to an increase in the money supply, and this monetary expansion consequently accommodates the increase in domestic demand brought about by remittances themselves. When the short-run analysis is conducted within models that depart from the assumption of a single composite goods, the focus shifts on how remittances affect the sectoral distribution of resources. The Dutch Disease described in Corden and Neary (1982) has been often recalled to describe the potential adverse effects of aid inflows to developing countries, and has also been used to interpret possible drawbacks of workers’ remittances. The increase in demand coming from remittances is applicable to both tradable and non tradable goods. However, the supply of the latter is usually constrained by the availability of domestic resources. If factors are already fully employed - or 62 supply is not able to react to the demand stimulus, prices of non tradable goods can be expected to increase to absorb excess demand. Tradable goods prices are determined in the world markets and hence, are not altered by domestic demand, which consequently causes a worsening in the trade balance. Thus the excess demand for non tradable goods results in an increase of the domestic price level. This - coupled with a possible nominal appreciation of domestic currency due to remittance inflow - determines an appreciation of the real exchange rate, that affects negatively the export and import competing sector, drawing resources towards the non tradable sector. The analysis of short run macroeconomic effects of remittances suggests that it is actually the increase in private consumption that might trigger investments, and thus possibly foster long run economic growth. Firms can also benefit from the “extension of investment credit allowed by the increase in the liquidity of banks from remittance deposits” (Glytsos, 2001). Hence, short run effects depend crucially on the expected response of domestic supply: while a lack of reaction of the latter would dissipate the remittance-induced demand stimulus through inflation and import increase, there is a chance that remittances might raise the level of domestic activity. A bridge between short and long run effects is laid by structuralist growth models that stress the interplay between current demand and future growth prospects. In demand-led growth models, current demand influences the level of capacity utilization, that is one of the determinants of investments. An expansion of capital can be hindered by an insufficient level of domestic demand; the increase in private consumption that remittances generate can thus induce firms to undertake new investments. When the focus of the economic analysis shifts from the short to the long-run, the literature 63 still presents a considerable diversity of interpretations about the effects of workers’ remittances, though a predominant view about a positive development impact of remittances emerges. It is interesting to observe that a significant part of the analysis also becomes remittance-specific, as models tend to incorporate some characteristics that differentiate remittances from other foreign exchange flows to developing countries. The two-gap model proposed by Chenery and Bruno (1962) stresses the critical role that is played by foreign transfers in determining the actual level of investment in developing countries. Domestic investments have fixed import content, and thus their level is limited by the amount of foreign exchange that can be derived from exports and capital inflows, net of factor payments to abroad. Remittances contribute to fill the foreign exchange gap that is the shortfall of available foreign currency to the level that would be required to undertake the investments allowed by the level of domestic savings. The foreign exchange gap is presented as the binding constraint for investments whenever output is below its potential level. This suggests that remittances are likely to foster economic growth, as they expand receiving country’s capacity to import capital goods. The short run increase in imports that is brought about by remittance inflow is a precondition for subsequent growth. 3.3 Review of Methodological and Empirical Issues The question of whether remittances promote economic growth has not been conclusively answered by any theoretical or empirical study. Unarguably, remittances lead to an increase in the level of income in the recipient country and plausibly help reduce poverty (Gupta et al., 2007), but it is not at all 64 obvious that remittances increase output and promote long-term economic growth. Based on household survey data from various African countries, few empirical studies have investigated the role of remittances in reducing poverty (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Adams, 1991; Sander, 2004; Azam and Gubert, 2005; Adam, 2006). The macroeconomic impacts of remittances in Africa have not been sufficiently explored by researchers for at least two reasons. One theoretical strand suggests that workers’ remittances are mainly used for consumption purposes and, hence, have minimal impact on investment. In other words, remittances are widely viewed as compensatory transfers between family members who lost skilled workers due to migration. Nevertheless, Stahl and Arnold (1986) argue that the use of remittances for consumption may have a positive effect on growth because of their possible multiplier effect. Moreover, remittances respond to investment opportunities in the home country as much as to charitable or insurance motives. Many migrants invest their savings in small businesses, real estate or other assets in their own country because they know the local markets better than their host countries, or probably expecting to return in the future. In about two-thirds of developing countries, remittances are mostly profit-driven and increase when economic conditions improve back home. There are a number of channels through which Workers’ remittances can positively affect growth. At the household level, remittances may ease credit constraint of households and encourage entrepreneurial activity and private investment (Yang, 2004; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2004). Many households in developing countries have very limited access to credit markets. Remittance inflows could help such households to set up their entrepreneurial activity. Apart from physical investment, remittances could also be used to finance 65 education and health, which are also key variables in promoting economic growth. At the aggregate level, remittances could improve a country’s creditworthiness and thereby enhance its access to international capital markets. In the view of World Bank (2006), the calculation of country credit ratings by major international creditors depends in part on her volume of remittance flows. The higher the volume of remittance flows the better the credit rating rank the country could reach. Unarguably, access to more international credit potentially could increase both physical and human capital investment in a country, thereby enhancing economic growth. Rempel and Lobdell (1978) use household survey data from rural Kenya and conclude that remittances from rural-to-urban migrants have little impact on the development of the region of origin. By contrast, Collier and Lal (1984) show in the case of rural Kenya again, that remittances enable the recipient families to hold more productive capital than the others. They thus bring out the role of migration and remittances as a means to overcome capital market imperfection, and to bring home some capital for funding productive investment. This fact had also been described to some extent by Bates (1976), in the case of Zambian migrants. This effect is emphasized even more strongly in Collier and Lal (1986), in the case of rural Kenya again. Poirine (1997) provides some further analysis of “remittances as an implicit family loan arrangement”, emphasizing both the collective organization of the financial flows within the family. Remittances are then viewed as absorbing random shocks, like bad crops or illness, thus providing some informal insurance services (e.g. Gubert, 2002). It is fair to say that the empirical literature on migration and remittances has devoted more attention to income distribution issues. In his early study of migration from Kasumpa village in Zambia, Bates (1976) shows that households earning lower incomes in the 66 village receive more remittances from town than richer ones, after controlling for demographic composition. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) show that this type of transfers reduces income inequality in a Mexican village having migrants in the USA, but suggest that the poorest are excluded from migrating. Banerjee and Kanbur (1981) and Faini and Venturini (1993) conclude, by different routes, that migration benefits more the middle income classes of the society of origin than the two extremes of the distribution, in India and Southern Europe respectively. By contrast, Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) conclude that poverty in Lesotho would go up by about 15% were the flow of transfers sent by the migrants working in the mines in South Africa to stop. Azam and Gubert (2004) show that this issue is probably more subtle than it looks, as the correlation between poverty and low measured (earned) income can be misleading. Lucas and Stark (1985) analyze various potential motivations explaining why migrants transfer some income to their relatives remained in the village, for testing various forms of altruistic or egoistic behaviour. Using survey data on Botswana, they conclude that mixed motivations of moderate altruism or enlightened egoism seem to prevail. Their empirical analysis supports the view that the migrants do provide some insurance services, by transferring more money when a drought threatens the livestock. They also show that wealthier families receive more than poorer ones, suggesting that the migrants are defending their inheritance rights or their ability to come back to the village with dignity. Hoddinott (1992) gets a similar result using a household survey conducted in Kenya. Azam and Gubert (2005) in their paper on migrant remittances and economic development in Africa emphasized that migration cannot be understood as an individual decision, but must be regarded as a collective decision made by the 67 extended family or the village. The study also noted that remittances are to a large extent a contingent flow, aimed at buttressing the family’s consumption in case of adverse shock. However, this insurance system involves some moral hazard, as those remaining behind tend to exert less effort to take care of themselves, knowing that the migrants will compensate any consumption shortfall, with a high probability. Their result was able to provide insight into a puzzle that bugged the remittances-development literature for nearly three decades: the rich families are more likely to send some migrant away, and thus get more remittances, while they earn less income in the village, because of moral hazard. Wealth makes them lazy, while low income does not make them poor. Quartey (2006) investigated the impact of migrant remittances on household welfare in Ghana. The study employed micro data based on the Ghana Living Standard Survey (1 to 4) and found that remittances improve household welfare and help to minimize the effects of economic shocks to household welfare. This study was limited to the individual beneficiary of remittances income and this can hinder generalization. A considerable measure of aggregation will be required for these findings to be able to provide adequate guide for macroeconomic policy direction on the subject of remittances. Empirical evidence from outside Africa reveals that remittances have a potential, positive, impact as a development tool for the recipient countries. In a study that relies on a definition of remittances that includes workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, Solimano (2003) noted that the development effect of remittances can be decomposed into effects on savings, investment, growth, consumption, and poverty and income distribution. The impact on growth of remittances in receiving economies is likely to act through savings and investment as well as short-run effects on aggregate demand and 68 output through consumption. The total saving effect of remittances comes from the sum of foreign savings and domestic savings effects. Workers’ remittances are a component of foreign savings and they complement national savings by increasing the total pool of resources available to investment. The direct effects of remittances on investment are bound to be on small community projects. According to Buch et al (2002), remittances can influence economic growth directly or indirectly. However, the degree of the latter channel strongly depends on supporting governmental policies and a supporting economic environment for investment activities. Glytsos (2005) analyzes the effect of remittances on investment, consumption, imports and output. The author uses a sample of five countries and estimates short and long run multipliers of remittances. He finds that the effect of reducing remittances would be greater than the effect of raising them. Ziesemer (2007) proposes a savings channel that relates remittances with growth. He finds that remittances have a positive impact on growth, due to the ability to increase saving rates in countries with a per capita income of less than US $1200. Funkhouser (1992) as well as Woodruff and Zenteno, (2004) identified a number of channels through which remittances could raise economic growth and these include: when an increase in remittances raises investment, remittances could be expected to affect growth positively. If this effect is large enough, then remittances could alleviate the credit constraints faced by most people in developing countries. The implication of this result is that the positive effect of remittances on investment or on economic growth is likely to be larger for countries where the financial system is relatively underdeveloped. This position of possible substitutability between remittances and financial development is supported 69 empirically by other studies (for example, Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007, and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). Singh, Haacker and Lee (2009) found an overall effect is negative and significant. This result is consistent with the finding of Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003) regress per capita real growth on investment, change in remittances, and net private capital inflows as well as regional dummy variables; they obtain positive coefficients for both investment and net private capital inflows, but the coefficient of remittances comes out negative. They therefore suggest that remittances are unlikely to promote economic growth because of a moral hazard problem (i.e., reduced labour market participation), as well as other factors. They therefore questioned whether remittances can be a source of development capital. Chami et al. (2009) found evidence supporting the notion that remittance flows provide a stabilizing influence on output. If remittances are predominantly consumed rather than invested, any growth effects through higher investment could be subdued. Even in this case, however, remittances could foster investment by reducing the volatility of consumption and contributing to a more stable macroeconomic environment. Giuliano and ruiz-Arranz (2005) provide evidence of the positive effects of remittances on the growth of less developed countries. In a cross sectional study of 37 African countries, Fayissa and Nsiah (2008) explored the aggregate impact of remittances on economic growth and found that remittances boost growth in countries where the financial systems are less developed by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints. Similarly, Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) found that remittances have a positive and significant effect on the growth of Latin American Countries where the financial systems are less developed by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints. Most of the 70 empirical works have focused on migrant-exporting countries with rather similar characteristics; however, the debate about the impact of remittances is still ongoing. Chami et al (2005) report a negative effect of remittances on growth and productivity using cross-country panel data. Their argument here is that migration deprives the economy of the most productive workers, or that remittances have adverse effects on those staying behind, or both. Different researchers are not in agreement about whether or not remittances serve as an important source of investment capital. The basic principle is that either directly or through the process of intermediation and leverage, remittances will tend to increase investment, thus increasing potential growth. Durand, Kandel, Parrado, Massey (1996) noted that, in the case of Mexico, under the right circumstances (a high-paying US job, secure attachment to the US labour force, access to complementary resources in Mexico), the odds of productive investment of remittances rise substantially. Ratha (2003) cites positive effects of remittances on investment in receiving countries such as Mexico, Egypt, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these countries, remittances have financed the building of schools, clinics and other infrastructure. In addition, return-migrants bring fresh capital that can help finance investment projects. The relationship between household investment and workers’ remittances in developing countries are found to be positive in a number of studies. For example, Brown (1994) relying on a micro-level analysis of the use of remittances by households, investigates the relationship between remittances, savings and investment in Tonga and Samoa. The study found that remittances make a significant contribution to savings and investment in the island economies. Mesnard (2004) examines impacts of remittances on Tunisia using a life-cycle model. The study reveals that workers who have limited access to the financial market tend to invest their remittances 71 receipts. Yang (2004) finds that remittances lead to improved child schooling, reduce child labour, increased education expenditure, and facilitate investment. The major role of remittances in receiving countries is to stimulate consumption and investment in those countries, help relax foreign exchange constraints and contribute to poverty alleviation (Adams, 2007). Their contribution to development depends on their macroeconomic impact and how they are used in receiving countries. There is evidence that they are more directed to consumption than investment, which perhaps explains why no link between them and long-term growth has been found (IMF, 2005: chapter 2). The focus of the recent remittances literature is therefore toward the macro and micro implications of remittance flows. Acosta et al (2007), finds that in addition to the usual nominal exchange rate channel, remittances result in a shrinkage of, and resource re-allocations away from, the tradable sector through (i) increasing prices in the non tradable sector, and (ii) reducing the labour supply to, and thereby increasing the production costs of, the otherwise labour-intensive non tradable sector. Using micro data from Morocco, Van Dalen et al (2005) find that remittances have a potential to stimulate further migration among the family members left behind. These studies in all are quite emphatic on the possibility that the benefits of remittances, if any, could be less pronounced. Remittances also finance consumption; thus, private savings will increase less than proportionally than an increase in income from external remittances. Bendixen and others (2003) in a study of remittances for Ecuador shows that around 60 percent of remittances in Ecuador are spent on food, medicines, house rents and other basic commodities. The study shows that less than 5 percent of remittances are used in the acquisition of residential property. The 72 combined effects of remittances on investment and consumption can increase output and growth. The sustainability of this effect is an open discussion. If remittances are a response to recent migration, remittances may be transitory and thus their effects on investment, consumption and growth can be more of a temporary basis. In contrast, if migrants form associations and their commitment to their home country becomes “institutionalized” then, their positive developmental effects of remittances may become more permanent. The impact of remittances on growth in cross country studies is inconclusive. Studies that focus on the labour supply response of recipient households find that remittances lower growth (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2003; Azam and Gubert, 2005). However, Fajnzylber and López (2008) in a cross-country study of Latin American countries found evidence which suggests that indeed, remittances are more effective in raising investment and enhancing growth in countries with higher levels of human capital, strong institutions, and good policy environments. They also found that increases in remittances apparently have more of an investment and growth impact in countries with less developed financial sectors. In general, studies that link remittances to investment, where remittances either substitute for or improve financial access, tend to conclude that remittances stimulate growth (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005; Toxopeus and Lensink, 2006). While the evidence on the contemporaneous impact of remittances on growth may be mixed, it is likely that remittances can affect long-term growth by fostering financial deepening. Stark, (2004), and Mountford, (1997) highlight the positive impact of remittances to include its impact on human capital development in home countries, which often is linked to increased demand for and access to education among those left behind. The positive impact of remittances is 73 broadened to include technology and knowledge transfer and other benefits of brain circulation, and the potential benefits deriving from Diaspora links. Docquier and Rapoport (2004:27) summarize the main effects of the successful experience of migrants abroad: “successive cohorts adapt their education decisions, and the economy-wide average level of education partly… or totally catches up, with a possible net gain in the long run” and “the creation of migrants’ networks that facilitate the movement of goods, factors and ideas between migrants’ host and home countries”. It must be emphasized here that the existence of a positive impact on countries of origin rests on the assumption that a significant number of graduates of new courses and new schools, who initially enrolled with the aim of going abroad eventually had a change of orientation, thus, end up contributing to the provision of a higher value of goods and services to the domestic economy. Remittances can be expected to cause a widening of the external trade account deficit (including services as travel), or a narrowing of the current account surplus. As remittances increase purchasing power in the receiving country they augment domestic demand. Bouhga-Hagbe found that in the case of Morocco, “remittances almost cover the trade deficit and have contributed to the recent surpluses of the external current account, as well as the overall BOP. The BOP surpluses have contributed to the strengthening of Morocco’s external position through the accumulation of reserves, which now cover the external public debt (Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004). The impact of remittances on the real exchange rate and export competitiveness, and the Dutch disease effect, is another area of debate. In countries receiving remittances the currencies could appreciate, which might be harmful to their long-run economic growth (a Dutch disease effect). As in 74 the case of any other transfer (for instance, official aid), the effect depends on the proportion of such flows spent on domestic goods, in particular nontradables (Gupta, et al, 2006). Since remittances are private transfers dispersed over a large number of poor households it has been argued that their impact on domestic demand differs from that of donor-funded infrastructure projects (World Bank, 2006). Remittances may in fact be self-correcting as an overvalued currency deters remittances, and hence Dutch disease effects are not sustained (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). However, studies in Latin America (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004) and Cape Verde (Bourdet and Falck, 2006) have found evidence that remittances do have Dutch disease effects on the competitiveness of the tradable sector. In countries where remittances inflows are large compared to the size of the economy, where supply constraints are a significant hindrance to the expansion of the nontradables sector, and where a significant portion of remittances are spent on domestic goods policymakers will need to be alert to the possibility of a Dutch disease phenomenon. Moreover, remittances may reduce the labour supply or labour market participation of recipients. If these negative factors dominate, remittances could be detrimental to economic development in SSA (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2003). Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) present a detailed theoretical review and insightful analysis of the literature on the causes of immigrant remittances, which applies well to all remittances. They divide this literature into two main strands: the "endogenous migration" approach, and the "portfolio" approach. The endogenous migration approach is based on the economics of the family, which include but not limited to motivations based on altruism. The portfolio approach isolates the decision to remit from the decision to migrate, and likewise avoids issues of family ties. In this view, the migrant earns income 75 and decides how to allocate savings between host country assets and home country assets. Remittances are a result of deciding to invest in home country assets. The portfolio view, therefore, is an informal theory of remittances that supports the view that remittances behave like other capital flows. The rates of return on various assets, or return differentials are regarded as important decision variables affecting remittances in the portfolio view. The variables often included in such studies are interest rate differentials on comparable deposit accounts offered in the host and home (labour-sending) countries, incentive interest rates offered on home country deposits, black market exchange premium (if any), the return on real estate in the home country, inflation rates, and other returns. In addition, political risk and uncertainty may also affect the decision to remit. The endogenous migration approach and the portfolio approach are the most prominent approaches employed to perform empirical estimations of remittance determination. Wahba (1991) introduced a dichotomy by dividing remittances into "fixed" remittances, which go toward family support, and "discretionary" remittances, which are investment flows. The fixed remittances depend essentially on demographic and economic factors including family characteristics such as size and income level, and therefore may be explained by the endogenous migration view. In general, empirical analyses include some demographic variables such as the stock of migrants in the host country (or family characteristics in studies that use micro data), economic variables such as wages or income, and financial variables such as interest rates. The demographic and income variables tend to be significant in nearly all 76 estimations, while the financial variables’ significance varies depending on the sample and specification. Chami et al (2003) pointed out that this is probably the most reliable stylized fact to come out of the empirical literature on the causes of remittances. While most papers have found evidence consistent with altruistic behavior, only a few papers such as Lucas and Stark (1985) and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) have tested altruism against alternate family arrangements. Lucas and Stark (1985) find evidence in favor of self-interested behavior in Botswana, while Agarwal and Horowitz find evidence in favor of altruism in Guyana. Chami, et al (2003) conducted panel regressions of growth in real GDP per capita on both the workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio and the change in that ratio, conditioned on the investment rate, the rate of inflation, regional dummies, and the ratio of net private capital flows to GDP. The study found that domestic investment and private capital flows were positively related to growth, the workers’ remittances–to–GDP ratio either was not significant or were negatively related to growth. The IMF (2005) performed cross-country growth regressions on a set of 101 countries measured over the 1970–2003 period. IMF (2005) used an aggregate remittance variable, or the sum of workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrant transfers; a measure of remittances which captures behavior not associated with workers’ remittances. The IMF study also used two instruments for remittances: distance between the migrants’ home and main destination country, and a dummy measuring whether the home and main destination country shared a common language. Because the instruments did not vary over time, panel estimation techniques could not be used. The IMF (2005) found no statistically significant effect of total remittances on economic growth. Faini (2006) estimated cross-sectional growth regressions on a set of 68 77 countries in which the dependent variable is the average annual per capita GDP growth rate from 1980 to 2004. Faini (2006), like the IMF (2005), used an aggregate measure of remittances obtained by summing workers’ remittances, employee compensation, and migrant transfers. The estimated coefficient on the total remittances–to–GDP ratio in Faini’s ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression was positive and significant, both when average and when initial remittances were used in the total remittances–to–GDP variable. Faini also conducted instrumental variables estimation, using distance from the migrants’ main destination countries as the instrument for remittances. In this estimation, the coefficient on total remittances remained positive but lost its significance. 3.4 Modeling Issues in the Remittances Literature Modeling issues bothering on appropriate and adequate estimation of models in cross country studies have also received considerable attention in the literature. Models have to be estimated by methods that handle the problems afflicting each model. For example, a constant coefficients model with residual homogeneity and normality can be estimated with ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). As long as there is no groupwise or other heteroskedastic effects on the dependent variable, OLS may be used for fixed effects model estimation (Sayrs, 1989). For OLS to be properly applied, the errors have to be independent and homoskedastic. Those conditions are so rare that it is often unrealistic to expect that OLS will suffice for such models (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Heteroskedastic models are usually fitted with estimated or feasible generalized least squares (EGLS or FGLS). Heteroskedasticity can be assessed with a White or a Breusch-Pagan test. For the most part, fixed effects models 78 with groupwise heteroskedasticity cannot be efficiently estimated with OLS. If the sample size is large enough and autocorrelation plagues the errors, FGLS can be used. Random sampling and maximum likelihood iterated by generalized least squares have also been used (Greene, 2002). Beck and Katz (1995) reportedly found that if the sample size is finite or small, the total number of temporal observations must be as large as the number of panels; moreover they reportedly found that OLS with panel corrected errors provided more efficient estimation than FGLS (Greenberg, 2003; STATA, 2003). If the model exhibits autocorrelation and/or moving average errors, first differences (Wooldridge, 2002) or GLS corrected for ARMA errors can be used (Sayrs, 1989). Hausman and Taylor (1981) have used weighted instrumental variables, based only on the information within the model, for random effects estimation to be used when there are enough instruments for the modeling. The instrumental variables, which are proxy variables uncorrelated with the errors, are based on the group means. The use of these instrumental variables allows researchers to circumvent the inconsistency and inefficiency problems following from correlation of the individual variables with the errors. For dynamic panels with lagged dependent variables, Arellano, Bond, and Bover have used generalized methods of moments (GMM), which are asymptotically normal (Wooldridge, 2002). With greater numbers of moment conditions, they are able to handle some missing data and they can attain gains in efficiency as long as there are three or four periods of data (Greene, 2002). The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is another estimation procedure which requires that the number of explanatory variables in each cross-section is the same. In the SUR approach, variables are transformed with a form of 79 Cochrane-Orchutt correction to model the autocorrelation. Feasible generalized least squares is used to estimate a covariance matrix. If there are enough temporal observations, they can use either the lagged levels or lagged differences as instruments, while the other variables serve as their own instruments in an extension. Robust estimation, when one has heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, or outliers to contend with, may be performed with the generalized methods of moments and combination of White and Newey-West estimators to obtain robust panel standard errors. GMM models tend to be robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and nonnormality. The GMM based estimation techniques is considered quite appropriate in cases involving the estimation of a dynamic panel data models. 80 CHAPTER FOUR THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 4.1 Theoretical Framework In the standard Neo-Classical Growth Model (Solow 1956, Barro and SalaiMartin 1995), economic growth derives from the capital accumulation per capita and technology progress jointly in the transitional period, and solely comes from the technology growth in the steady state. Thus, we can reasonably predict that there are two channels through which the development in the financial sector may affect economic growth: the accumulation rate of physical capital and total factor productivity growth (Spiegel 2001). On capital accumulation, well functioning of financial system affects the rate of capital formation either by altering the saving rate or by raising the investment rate. In the transitional period, higher saving (investment) rate accelerates the economy’s growth rate approaching to its steady state at a higher level of real per capita income. This study attempts to address the issue of finance-growth channels by following an extended neo-classical growth model proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). It introduces remittances into the model and then, empirically tests the impacts of remittance flows on economic growth and development through above-mentioned channels in a dynamic panel data model. Specifically, this study evaluates whether remittance flow is a significant determinant of growth when it is integrated into the neo-classical growth model. The study further investigates whether remittances exert a more fundamental impact on capital accumulation within the sample group. 81 The basic theoretical framework for this study is adapted from Chami et al (2008). The first step in analyzing the macroeconomic effects of remittances is to take a position about what drives remittance flows. This issue has serious implications for results and could generate controversies empirically. The question therefore is on how best to think about the factors driving these flows. Assuming here that remittance flows are determined by altruistic motives on the part of migrants, the utility of the recipients enters the remitters’ utility function. To be concrete, let us suppose that migrants value the welfare of the recipients as much as they do their own. The implication of this is that a change in remittances must be caused by a change in some exogenous variable. In any case, the arrival of remittances is first considered a basic input in the economy whose impact may be viewed in terms of its micro or macro dimension. The reasoning here is that such impact may be directly on income when motivated by altruism, it may be on the level of domestic investment when it occurs as a disguised capital flow, and it may even be on the trade balance when it reduces the foreign trade competitiveness of the receiving economy. Overall, the consequences will be evident in the rate of economic growth, the level of domestic investment, and the foreign trade competitiveness of a country’s exports as highlighted in figure 4.1. 82 Figure 4.1: Schematic analysis of the remittances-development nexus Remittances Input Basic Form Strands Nature and Impact Expected Result Initial Output Remittances Inflow Microeconomic Strand Remittances inflow motivated by altruism Expected impact is directly on income in the recipient economy Remittances Outflow Macroeconomic Strand Remittances inflow as disguised capital flow Expected impact is directly on domestic investment in the recipient economy Remittances inflow reducing recipient country’s trade competitiveness Expected impact is directly on the trade balance in the recipient economy Smoothen consumption expenditure of recipient Increases per capita income in the recipient economy Boost output in receiving economy Enhances domestic investment in the recipient economy Helps close the investment-saving gap in recipient economy Strengthens the real effective exchange rate of the recipient economy May weaken the current account balance position of the recipient economy Output Growth Domestic Investment Depressed Trade Balance Overall Output Economic Growth Source: Author’s compilations based on hypothesized relationships among related variables 83 Figure 4.1 is a schematic analysis of the remittances-development nexus that may be examined within the following transmission mechanism. First, the arrival of workers’ remittances may affect the recipient economy in one of two ways typically thought of under the microeconomic or macroeconomic strand. Whether this happens depends on how remittance receipts are used and the motives driving remittance flows. Second, remittances motivated primarily by altruistic considerations tend to be countercyclical in its effects on the receiving economy. In periods of economic boom, less remittances is likely to be received and in periods of economic downturn more remittances will be received to compensate loved ones of loss in income and general wellbeing. Within this context, remittances flow is likely to smoothen consumption expenditure of recipient households at all times, increase per capita income and boost aggregate output in the receiving economy. Overall, the occurrence of remittance receipts motivated by altruism will positively impact on economic growth as well as the economic development of the receiving economy Third, remittances motivated essentially by migrant’s self interest will tend to flow as disguised capital into the receiving economy. The overall assumption here is that remittances flow responds to real investment opportunities in migrants’ country of origin. Thus, it represents direct investments by migrants in the receiving economy. The consequence here is that remittances as disguised capital flow will enhance domestic investment in the recipient economy and help close the investment-saving gap in recipient economy. Overall, the occurrence of remittance receipts motivated by self interest will positively impact on domestic investment as well as the economic development of the receiving economy. 84 Fourth, remittances inflow may be so significant in volume as to result in an artificial appreciation of the real exchange rate of the receiving economy. In this case, remittances inflow may reduce the foreign trade competitiveness which in turn, weakens the real external balance and by implication, the current account balance position of the recipient economy. Consequently, remittances in this context halt the receiving country’s trade balance via a reduction in exports of traded goods. Overall, the occurrence of remittance receipts in volumes that reduce the foreign trade competitiveness of the receiving economy, will adversely impact on the trade balance as well as the economic development of the receiving economy. 4.1.1 Remittances and Growth This section examines the channels through which remittance receipts may affect an economy’s growth. Remittance receipts can in principle affect growth through three channels: Their effects on the growth of the economy’s technological capacity; Their effects on the rate of accumulation of productive assets (i.e., the level of domestic investment); and Their effects on the efficiency of the allocation of new capital. A familiar channel through which the arrival of workers’ remittances can affect the rate of growth of an economy’s technological capacity is through Dutch disease effects—that is, effects that operate through the influence of remittances on the real exchange rate. Suppose, for example, that the rate of growth of domestic technological capacity is at least partly a function of the share of domestic traded goods production in GDP. This could be the case if production in some 85 component of the traded goods sector—for example, nontraditional manufactures intended for export—increases the technological capacity of other firms in the economy. This could come about as the result of training, learning by doing, demonstration effects, “self-discovery,” or similar dynamic production externalities. Since these externalities are positive on firms outside the traded goods sector, in the absence of corrective policy intervention the presence of such externalities creates a distortion that renders the domestic traded goods sector sub-optimally small. The arrival of (or an increase in) workers’ remittances can affect the severity of this distortion. To the extent that an increase in remittance receipts results in an appreciation of the economy’s equilibrium real exchange rate and causing a contraction in traded goods production. Since the traded goods sector would in any case have been suboptimally small even without remittance inflows, the addition of workers’ remittances aggravates a pre-existing distortion, reducing the rate of growth of the economy’s technological capacity. This is precisely the phenomenon that has come to be known as Dutch disease. However, it is important to emphasize that this outcome is not a necessary implication of the appreciation of the real exchange rate and contraction of the traded goods sector associated with the arrival of (or an increase in) remittances. There is no “disease” if there are no distortions, because the real exchange rate appreciation is optimal in that case. 4.1.2 Remittances and Domestic Investment The presence of workers’ remittances may affect the rate of investment in the 86 recipient economy. Whether this happens depends on how remittance receipts are used. In turn, the disposition of remittance receipts depends on the motives driving remittance flows. The overall assumption here is that remittances flow as disguised capital flows, representing direct investments by migrants in the receiving economy. Besides, the analysis of short run macroeconomic effects of remittances suggests that it is actually the increase in private consumption that might trigger investments, and thus possibly foster long run economic growth. Firms can also benefit from the “extension of investment credit allowed by the increase in the liquidity of banks from remittance deposits” (Glytsos, 2001). Hence, short run effects depend crucially on the expected response of domestic supply: while a lack of reaction of the latter would dissipate the remittance-induced demand stimulus through inflation and import increase, in this case, there is a chance that remittances might raise the level of domestic activity. Aside from their effects on the level of investment, remittance flows may affect the efficiency of investment in the receiving country, both in the short run and in the long run. In the short run, remittance flows can have an effect on investment efficiency if remittances are transfers with a merit good component, that merit good happens to be an investment good (e.g., education for the children, residential investment), and the migrant can indeed enforce his or her preferences on the recipient. Under these circumstances, remittance flows may affect the efficiency of investment if the migrant is either more or less well informed about relative rates of return among competing projects in the domestic economy than is the recipient. To the extent that remittances represent a disguised capital inflow, replacing other flows that would have been intermediated differently in the domestic economy (e.g., through the domestic banking system), they tend to have effects on the efficiency of 87 investment depending on whether the individual investing the funds on behalf of the migrant is a more or less efficient intermediary than the alternative intermediary in the domestic financial system. 4.1.3 Remittances, Real Exchange Rate, and Dutch Disease López, Molina, and Bussolo (2008) provide a very useful discussion on the channel through which remittances, real exchange rate, and Dutch disease may be linked. According to them, workers’ remittances can be viewed as a capital inflow, and therefore the theory of the Dutch disease phenomenon associated with a surge in inflows (perhaps because of the discovery of new natural resources) can also be applied in this context. In order to isolate the specific channels transmitting remittances shocks through the economy, consider first a small open economy model with no leisure-consumption trade-off. In this setup, an increase in remittances is equivalent to a (permanent) increase in incomes of the households. Assuming that non-tradables are normal goods, the positive remittances income shocks result in extra spending on both tradables and non-tradables. Because most SSA countries are price takers in international markets, growing demand does not raise the prices of tradables. However, because the prices of non-tradables are determined in the domestic economy, they increase due to additional demand, or the so-called spending effect. There is also a “resource movement effect.” The relative price change between tradables and non-tradables makes production of the latter more profitable. Output growth in the non-tradable sectors will push up factor demands, especially for those factors used intensively in these sectors. Increased factor demand by the expanding sectors will be accommodated by factors released 88 from other sectors (the resource movement effect) and, depending on the behavior of total supply of the factor, will normally result in higher factor returns in the final equilibrium. The price shift and resource reallocation in favor of non-tradables erode the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors and hurt import-competing sectors. The final result of this real exchange rate appreciation is normally increased import flows and lower export sales. When the above assumption of no consumption-leisure trade-off in the household utility function is removed, the above effects are exacerbated. Without this assumption, an increase in non-labour income, as is the case with remittances, influences household decisions to supply labour—namely, individuals can now consume more of both goods and leisure (that is, the income effect dominates), and thus their labour supply is reduced. In turn, reduced labour supply implies rising wages, and this additional pressure on wages intensifies the effects of real exchange rate appreciation described earlier. There are a number of connected macroeconomic effects that can result from a real exchange rate appreciation associated with remittances flows. They include: • Adverse effects on the tradable sector of the economy. Although remittances flows are likely to lead to an expansion of the nontradable sector (as a result of the increase experienced in domestic demand), both export- and importcompeting industries (that is, the tradable sector of the economy) would be adversely affected by real exchange rate appreciation and the associated loss of international competitiveness. The negative impact of remittances on the tradable sector may be reinforced if they also fuel inflation and higher prices result in higher economy wide wages. This effect would be further magnified if remittances also reduce the labour supply. In these circumstances, the nontradable sector may be in the position of passing some of the wage 89 pressures on to prices, but this is likely to be much more difficult for a tradable sector facing international competition, which, as a result, will lose competitiveness. • Widening of the current account deficit. In principle, it is difficult to justify that an increase in domestic demand will be passed in full to the non-tradable sector. So, to the extent that some of the remittances induced consumption is directed toward tradable goods, there will be an increase in the demand for imports. This, coupled with the loss of international competitiveness for domestic firms mentioned in the previous paragraph, would likely result in deteriorations of the external position. • Weaker monetary control, inflationary pressures, and the sectoral allocation of investment. If remittances flows do not leave the country (at least in full) through a widening of the current account, large flows will push up monetary aggregates, potentially derailing inflation targets. Experience also indicates that prices of financial assets, and particularly of real estate, can rise rapidly following a surge in remittances, something that in turn may introduce significant distortions in the economy and affect the sectoral allocation of investment and lead to overinvestment in some sectors (for example, real estate). 4.2 The Empirical Models The empirical models of the study are derived from the analytical framework discussed in section 4.1. Using a cross-country approach to look at the development-remittances nexus, care is taken to correct for reverse causality and other sources of endogeneity in remittance flows. As a starting point, it is 90 important to emphasize that macro-econometric modeling aims at explaining the empirical behaviour of an actual economic system. Such models will be systems of inter-linked equations estimated from either time-series data, cross sectional data, or even a combination of the two using appropriate statistical or econometric techniques. Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is in this case employed to deal with problems of endogeneity that are often associated with systems of inter-linked equations. The use of these instrumental variables allows researchers to circumvent the inconsistency and inefficiency problems following from correlation of the individual explanatory variables with the errors. In addition, emphasis is placed on the fact that many economic relationships are dynamic in nature and that one of the advantages of panel data is that they allow the researcher to better understand the dynamics of adjustment within these economic relationships. Model specification begins with a set of structural equations made up of three models of system equations. Each of these systems of structural equations is thereafter linked respectively to a specified linear dynamic panel data model to be estimated. These models account for major economic growth indicators which include OutputRemittances Model (Model 1), Investment-Remittances Model (Model 2), and Trade Balance-Remittances Model (Model 3). Data analysis are done using STATA 10.1 statistical software which is a very recent version of the software that is widely reputed for dealing with the problems that are unique to crosssectional and panel data studies. 91 4.2.1 Model 1: The Output-Remittances Model The essential assumption in these relationships is that remittances are motivated primarily by altruism and hence will most often exhibit countercyclical characteristics. In line with Chami et al (2008) as discussed in section 4.2, a positive productivity shock in the recipient economy will give rise to an increase in domestic output and help transfer some of the resulting benefits to the remitter by inducing him or her to reduce the amount remitted periodically and to increase his or her own consumption and vice versa. The assumption of altruistically motivated remittances is adequately captured within a system of equations characterized by three endogenous variables in three equations namely: growth rate of output (YGR), workers’ remittances (WR), and per capita income (PCI). The first equation is a neoclassical production function of the Cobb-Douglas form in which output (GDP) is specified as a function of labour (L), capital (K), workers’ remittances, and a technological factor or efficiency parameter (A). Two basic assumptions of the neoclassical production function of the Cobb-Douglas form are: 1. Positive and diminishing returns to private inputs. For all K > 0 and L > 0, the production function exhibits positive and diminishing marginal products with respect to each input such that: dF dF , 0; dK dL d 2F 0; d ( LK ) and d 2F d 2F , 0 dK 2 dL2 Thus, the neoclassical technology assumes that, holding constant the levels of technology and labour, each additional unit of capital delivers positive additions to output, but these additions decrease as the number of machines rises. The same property is assumed for labour. 92 2. Inada conditions. The second defining characteristic of the neoclassical production function is that the marginal product of capital (or labour) approaches infinity as capital (or labour) goes to 0 and approaches 0 as capital (or labour) goes to infinity: F F lim lim K 0 K L 0 L and F F lim lim 0 K K L L This equation can be written explicitly as follows: GDP f ( A, L, K ,WR, PCI ) (1a) Where A is the technological factor of the efficiency factor within the system and relation (1a) can be re-written even in more explicit terms as: GDP AL K (1 )WR, PCI (0 1) Where α is the relative share of labour in total output and (1-α) is the relative share of capital in total output. On a priori ground, the following are expected: GDP GDP GDP PCI , , , 0 L K WR WR In turn, the second equation endogenizes PCI as a function of REER, INF, INV and the one period lag values of growth (𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ) as follows: PCI f (YGRt 1 , REER, INF , INV ) The a priori expectations are: (1b) PCI PCI PCI PCI , 0 and , 0 YGRt 1 INV INF REER 93 The structural forms of Equations (1a – 1b) are rewritten in their linear forms as shown below. 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿12𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿13𝑖 𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿14𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (2𝑎) 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿21𝑖 + 𝛿22𝑖 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿24𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿25𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 (2𝑏) 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 21 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠); 𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,8 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) The labour and capital input variables in equation (2a) are now in their log forms. Model 1 is intended to capture the role played by remittances in the economic growth of the remittances recipient economy as well as the distributional effect of previous period growth levels on the economy. By substituting equation (2b) into equation (2a), a single equation of the linear dynamic panel data model type is obtained in equation (3) as follows: Substitute equation (2b) into equation (2a) to obtain the following: 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿12𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿13𝑖 𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿14𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 (𝛿21𝑖 + 𝛿22𝑖 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿24𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿25𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (2c) Equation (2c) may be expanded to obtain the following: 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿21𝑖 ) + 𝛿12𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿13𝑖 𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿14𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 (𝛿22𝑖 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛿15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) 𝛿23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿24𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿25𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 ) + (2d) Rearrange equation (2d) to obtain the following: 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿22𝑖 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿12𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿13𝑖 𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿14𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿24𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿25𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + {(𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿21𝑖 ) + (𝛿15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} (2e) From equation (2e), the following dynamic panel data model may be obtained 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋1 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖.𝑡−1 + π′2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋3′ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (3) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 𝜋1 = 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿22𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 94 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = {(𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿21𝑖 ) + (𝛿15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} = (vi + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) (4) 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 𝑣𝑖 = (𝛿11𝑖 + 𝛿15𝑖 𝛿21𝑖 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝛿15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates which include the following variables: 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ = (𝐿𝐾, 𝐿𝐿, 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝐼𝑁𝑉)′ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 on the other hand, is a vector of endogenous and predetermined covariates which include the following variables: 𝑊𝑖𝑡′ = (𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 , 𝑊𝑅)′ 𝜋𝑖 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. The assumption of altruistically motivated remittances is thus adequately captured within the resulting linear dynamic panel data model in equation (3). 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the usual error component decomposition of the error term; 𝑣𝑖 are unobserved individual-specific effects; 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the observation-specific (idiosyncratic) errors; 𝜋𝑖 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. The individual-specific effects, 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals, {𝐸(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 ) = 0; ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗} and with the disturbance of any individual at all leads and lags {𝐸(𝑣𝑖 𝑒𝑗 ) = 0; ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗}, but may be correlated with the explanatory variables {𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑗 ) = 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛, ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡}. The mean of 𝑣𝑖 is zero 2 {𝐸(𝑣𝑖 ) = 0, ∀𝑖} and its variance (𝜎𝑣𝑖 ) may differ across individuals. The observation-specific disturbance has mean zero {𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝑡} and is uncorrelated across individuals and {𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑗𝑠 ) = 0 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠}. In general, 2 ) may differ across both individuals and periods. The initial its variance (𝜎𝑒𝑖𝑡 95 observation 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖0 is uncorrelated with the disturbance of any individual for all periods {𝐸(𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖0 𝑒𝑗𝑡 ) = 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡} but may be correlated with the individual effects {𝐸(𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖0 𝑣𝑗 ) = 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 ∀𝑖, 𝑗}. The autoregressive parameter satisfies |𝛿1 | < 1 (dynamic stability). The vector xit may include lags of explanatory variables. It may also include covariates that are fixed over time for a given individual, and/or covariates that vary over time but are shared by all individuals. All 𝑋𝑖𝑡 variables are defined as follows: 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒; 𝐿𝐾 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘; 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 𝐼𝑁𝑉 = 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑡 variables on the other hand are defined as follows: 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑌𝐺𝑅 𝑊𝑅 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 In order to get a consistent estimate of δ as N →∞ with T fixed, equation (3) may be rewritten in first differenced notations. This also eliminates the individual effects as follows: 𝐷. 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1 𝐷. 𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑖.𝑡−1 + δ′2 𝐷. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + δ′3 𝐷. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (5) The implication of transforming equation (3) into (5) is that the unobserved individual-level effects, 𝑣𝑖 has disappeared from the differenced equation (5) 96 because it does not vary over time. In this way, differencing has successfully dealt with the issue of country or individual specific effect also known as fixed effect. The Ds are the first difference operators. 4.2.2 Model 2: Investment-Remittances Model The assumption of assumption of altruistically motivated remittances in model 1 is now modified to accommodate a new working assumption that remittances are motivated by self interest. In other words, remittance flows is viewed here as disguised capital flows, representing investments by migrants in the receiving economy. The focus here is not to investigate the role remittance plays in the relationship between growth and investment (which ordinarily can be captured using the conventional growth model). The emphasis rather is to verify empirically whether remittances exhibit a crowding-out effect on domestic investment in recipient economies of SSA. The very essence of this model stems from recent theories which have focused on the idea that there can be self-interested reasons for remitting as well. This according to Chami et al (2003) nevertheless center on the family. These self-interested theories of remittances are still based on the family because they view the family as a business or as a nexus of contracts that enables the members to enter into Pareto-improving arrangements. Several different types of businesses or contracts are possible, which has led to various self-interested models of remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that migrants may have investments that need to be tended while they are away, so they will use other family members as their agents. The remittances sent by the migrant are used to care for the migrant's interests, but they also contain some compensation for the agents. In 97 what follows, the study examines the impact of remittance inflows on the overall level of domestic investment in the recipient economies. The assumption of remittances inflow motivated by self interest is again captured in a system of equations comprising of two endogenous variables which include INV and aggregate output (GDP) in two equations. The first equation expresses domestic investment as a function of its hypothesized determinants which include WR, interest rate (INT), and INF. INV f (WR, INT , FD, GDP) (6a) These variables are expected on a priori grounds to be signed as follows: INV INV INV INV , 0 and , 0 FD GDP WR INT The second equation in turn endogenizes output (GDP) which is expressed as a function of its hypothesized determinants including: INF and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 . GDP f ( INF , INVt 1 ) (6b) On the basis of a priori expectation, the sign of the explanatory variables are as follows: GDP 0 and INF GDP 0 INVt 1 The explicit forms of the relations in model 2 are provided below: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂13𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂14𝑖 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (7a) 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂21𝑖 + 𝜂22𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂23𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 (7b) 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 21 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠); 𝑡 = 1, 2, … ,8 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) 98 Without any loss of generality, equations (7a and 7b) may now be transformed, again by simple substitution, into a single linear dynamic panel data model to be estimated using the system GMM estimation technique to obtain equation (8) as follows: Substitute equation (7b) into equation (7a) to obtain the following: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂13𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂14𝑖 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂15𝑖 (𝜂21𝑖 + 𝜂22𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂23𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (7c) Equation (7c) may be expanded to obtain the following: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = (𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂21𝑖 ) + 𝜂12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂13𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂14𝑖 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂22𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂23𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝜂15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) (7d) Rearrange equation (7d) to obtain the following: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂23𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂13𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂14𝑖 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂22𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + {(𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂21𝑖 ) + (𝜂15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} (7e) From equation (7e), the following dynamic panel data model may be obtained. 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖.𝑡−1 + γ′2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + γ′2 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (8) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 𝛾1 = 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂23𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = {(𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂21𝑖 ) + (𝜂15𝑖 𝜀 2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} = (vi + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 𝑣𝑖 = (𝜂11𝑖 + 𝜂15𝑖 𝜂21𝑖 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝜂15𝑖 𝜀 2𝑖𝑡 (9) + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates (ones dependent on neither current nor past 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); such that: 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ = (𝐼𝑁𝑇, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝐹𝐷)′ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a vector of predetermined covariates (which may include the lag of INV) and endogenous covariates, all of which may be correlated with the 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑊𝑖𝑡 comprises of: 99 𝑊𝑖𝑡′ = (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1 , 𝑊𝑅)′ 𝛾𝑖 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the usual error component decomposition of the error term; 𝑣𝑖 are unobserved individual-specific effects; 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the observation-specific (idiosyncratic) errors; The variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are defined as follows: 𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡; 𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 𝐹𝐷 = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔; Variables in 𝑊𝑖𝑡 on the other hand are defined as follows: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1 = 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝑊𝑅 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 In order to get a consistent estimate of 𝛾 as N →∞ with T fixed, equation (8) may be rewritten in first differenced notations as follows: 𝐷. 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖.𝑡−1 + γ′2 𝐷. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + γ′2 𝐷. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (10) The unobserved individual-level effects, 𝑣𝑖 again has disappeared from the differenced equation (10) because it does not vary over time. The Ds are the first difference operators. This effectively has once again removed the fixed effect elements from the model. 100 4.2.3 Model 3: Trade Balance-Remittances Model The overall development impact of remittances via the external sector is examined in this model following the Mundell-Flemming model of small open economies. The underlying assumption here is that remittances may be positively correlated with real exchange rate appreciation in the recipient economy and thereby hindering the external foreign trade competitiveness of the recipient economy. Significant inflows of remittances may result in the artificial appreciation of the real exchange rate of the receiving economy and consequently penalize the traded goods sector (since its exportables now become more expensive and less competitive) in the other economies. The model is made up of a system of equations comprising of two endogenous variables, which are: real external balance (REB) and INF in two equations. The first equation is an attempt to verify empirically whether remittances inflow brings about an improvement in the real external balance (REB) which is the endogenous variable in this equation. The regressors in this relation are trade openness (OPEN), WR, INTR and INF. The specification follows. REB f (WR, OPEN , INT , INF ) (10a) The a priori expectations in this case are: REB REB REB REB , 0 and , 0 WR OPEN INT INF In what follows, inflation rate (INF) now appears as the endogenous variable in the second equation and the objective here is to address possible macroeconomic stabilizing role of the external sector proxied by lag period levels of real external balance, in the recipient economies. The regressors 101 included in this equation are current account balance (CAB), REER and first period lagged levels of real external balance (𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ). INF f (CAB, REER, REBt 1 ) (10b) The related a priori expectations are: INF INF INF , 0 and 0 CAB REBt 1 REER The structural form of the relations in model 3 is provided below. 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆13𝑖 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆14𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (11𝑎) 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆21𝑖 + 𝜆22𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆24𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 (11b) 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … ,21 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠) 𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, … ,8 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) Equations (11a and 11b) are further transformed as in previous cases by simple substitution into a single equation of the linear dynamic panel data model form and this equation is an attempt to verify empirically whether remittances inflow brings about an improvement of the external real external balance (REB) as follows: Substitute equation (11b) into equation (11a) to obtain the following 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆13𝑖 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆14𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆15𝑖 (𝜆21𝑖 + 𝜆22𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆24𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 (11c) Equation (11c) may be expanded to obtain the following 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = (𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆21𝑖 ) + 𝜆12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆13𝑖 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆14𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆15𝑖 (𝜆22𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆24𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + (𝜆15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) (11d) Rearrange equation (11d) to obtain the following 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆24𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆12𝑖 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆13𝑖 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆14𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆22𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆23𝑖 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + {(𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆21𝑖 ) + (𝜆15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} (11e) From equation (7e), the following dynamic panel data model may be obtained 102 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖.𝑡−1 + β′2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + β′3 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (12) 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 𝛽1 = 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆24𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = {(𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆21𝑖 ) + (𝜆15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 )} = (vi + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) 𝐹𝑜𝑟: 𝑣𝑖 = (𝜆11𝑖 + 𝜆15𝑖 𝜆21𝑖 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝜆15𝑖 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 ) 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates (ones dependent on neither current nor past 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); and may be written as: 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ = (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, )′ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a vector of predetermined covariates (which may include the lag of REB) and endogenous covariates, all of which may be correlated with the 𝑣𝑖 . These include: 𝑊𝑖𝑡′ = (𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑡−1 , 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅, 𝑊𝑅, 𝐶𝐴𝐵)′ 𝛽𝑖 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the usual error component decomposition of the error term; 𝑣𝑖 are unobserved individual-specific effects; 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the observation-specific (idiosyncratic) errors; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 comprises variables that are defined as follows: 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡; 𝐼𝑁𝐹 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑖𝑡 on the other hand comprises variables that are defined as follows: 𝑅𝐸𝐵 = 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 103 𝑊𝑅 = 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐴𝐵 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 Equation (12) may be rewritten in first differenced notations in order to get a consistent estimate of 𝛽 as N →∞ with T fixed as follows: 𝐷. 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐷. 𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑖.𝑡−1 + β′2 𝐷. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + β′3 D. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (13) The unobserved individual-level effects, 𝑣𝑖 again has been eliminated from the differenced equation (13) in line with the earlier argument that it does not vary over time. The Ds are the first difference operators. 4.3 Model Estimation Technique There are at least two sources of endogeneity that may bias estimates of how the explanatory variables in equations (3) and (8) and (12) affect the dependent variable in each of the three specified models: first is the unobservable heterogeneity (which arises if there are unobservable factors that affect both the dependent and explanatory variables) and, second is simultaneity (which arises if the independent variables are a function of the dependent variable or expected values of the dependent variable). One other likely important source of endogeneity often overlooked in most empirical researches arises because of the fact that the relations among individual’s or country’s (in this case) observable characteristics are likely to be dynamic. That is, a country’s current performance will affect her future realizations, which will in turn affect her future performance. Working within the context of remittance flows, current country remittance realizations will affect future economic performance and this may, in turn, 104 affect future country remittance realizations. Thus, giving rise to what may be termed as “dynamic endogeneity”. The argument here centers on the fact that cross-sectional variation in observed country economic structures is driven by both unobservable heterogeneity and the country’s history. As such, any attempt to explain the role of remittance flows or its effect on economic performances of selected countries that does not recognize these sources of endogeneity may be biased. The emphasis on unobservable heterogeneity in the literature as the major source of endogeneity often accounts for the widespread use of panel data and fixed-effects estimator. However, traditional fixed-effects (or “within”) estimates that eliminate unobservable heterogeneity are only consistent under the assumption that country characteristics or structures are strictly exogenous. That is, that they are purely random observations through time and are unrelated to the country’s history. This is a strong assumption that is unlikely to hold in practice. So, while OLS estimation may be biased because it ignores unobservable heterogeneity, fixed-effects estimation may be biased since it ignores dynamic endogeneity. The problem of endogeneity that is often associated with the use panel data analysis are thus resolved in this study by the choice of the System GMM Estimator to estimate the relation between remittance flows and country economic performance in three different Dynamic Panel Data Model framework. This methodology not only eliminates any bias that may arise from ignoring dynamic endogeneity, but also provides theoretically based and powerful instruments that accounts for simultaneity while eliminating any unobservable heterogeneity. Dynamic panel estimation is most useful in situations where some unobservable factor affects both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, and some explanatory variables are strongly 105 related to past values of the dependent variable. This is likely to be the case in regressions of remittance flows on economic performance. This is because remittance flows tend to exert a strong, immediate and persistent effect on economic performance. The dynamic panel data regression models described in equations (3) and (8) and (12) are in fact characterized by another source of persistence over time. That is the problem of autocorrelation which is due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors. There are also two major and important complications arising from efforts to estimate models (3, 8 and 12) using macroeconomic panel data: first, the presence of endogenous and/or predetermined covariates, and second, the small time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of the typical panel data set. These identified complications may be addressed using the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (usually called standard first-differenced GMM estimator) or the augmented version proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), known as (system GMM estimator). The dynamic structure of equations 3, 8 and 12 suggests that the OLS estimator will be upward biased and inconsistent, this is because the lagged level of income is correlated with the error term. The problem will not be solved even if the within transformation is applied owing to a downward bias (Nickell, 1981) and inconsistency. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique turns out to be the possible solution. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when α (the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic model) approaches one, so that the dependent variable follows a path close to a random walk, the Differenced–GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) has poor finite sample properties and it is downwards biased, especially when T is small. Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) argue that this is likely to 106 be a serious issue for autoregressive models like equations 3, 8 and 12. Therefore, the Blundell and Bond (1998) System–GMM — derived from the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments) becomes a more viable estimator. As emphasized by Bun and Windmeijer (2009), the good performance of the system GMM estimator relative to the difference GMM estimator in terms of finite sample bias and root mean square error, has made it the estimator of choice in many applied panel data settings. In multivariate dynamic panel models, the System–GMM estimator is also shown to perform better than the Differenced–GMM when series are persistent (α close to unity) and there is a dramatic reduction in the finite sample bias due to the exploitation of additional moment conditions (Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer, 2000). In the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, the two-step System–GMM uses a consistent estimate of the weighting matrix, taking the residuals from the one-step estimate (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). Though asymptotically more efficient, the two-step GMM presents estimates of the standard errors that tend to be severely downward biased. However, it is possible to solve this problem using the finite-sample correction to the two– step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005), which can make twostep robust GMM estimates more efficient than one-step robust ones, especially for System–GMM (Roodman, 2006). Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) provide a useful insight in the GMM estimation of dynamic growth models, arguing that the pooled OLS and the LSDV estimators should be considered respectively as the upper and lower bound. As a result, whether the Differenced–GMM coefficient is close to or 107 lower than the within group one; this is likely a sign that the estimates are biased downward (maybe because of a weak instrument problem). Thus, if this is the case, the use of System– GMM is highly recommended and its estimates should lie between OLS and LSDV. Unarguably, there is evidence that the System GMM produces results that: (1) lies between the upper and lower bound represented by OLS and LSDV, (2) shows an efficiency gain, and (3) has valid instrument set (see: Presbitero, 2006). The first-differenced GMM estimator simply transforms the original model to eliminate the unobserved effects and rely on limited serial correlation in the transformed error process to obtain valid moment conditions or instrumental variables. The extended GMM (system GMM) estimators incorporate additional moment conditions for the untransformed equations in levels, and it relies on instrumental variables that are orthogonal to the individual-specific effects. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that an additional mild stationarity restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system GMM estimator that uses lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of dependent variable as instruments for equations in first differences (Baltagi, 2005). 108 4.4 Definition of Variables and Data Sources The summary of definition of variables employed in the study and data sources are presented in the Table 4.1. Table 4.1: Summary of Definition of Variables and Data Sources Variable Real Gross Definition The broadest quantitative measure of a Source of Data World Bank domestic nation’s total economic activity. It (2010), Africa product (GDP) measures, in constant (2000 US dollars) development prices, the value of economic activity indicators online within a country’s geographic borders, including all final goods and services produced over a period of time (usually a year). Growth rate of This is the annual percentage change in real GDP (YGR) the value of the real GDP. World Bank (2010), Africa development indicators online 109 Labour Force Total labour force, also called the World Bank (L) economically active population, (2010), Africa "comprises all persons of either sex who development furnish the supply of labour for the indicators online production of economic goods and services." Labour force includes people ages 15 and older who meet the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of the economically active population. Stock of Stock of physical capital input per World Bank physical capital worker. The proxy for this variable is the (2010), Africa input (K) development gross fixed capital formation indicators online Workers’ Workers’ remittances received comprise World Bank remittances of current transfers by migrant workers. (2010), Africa (WR) It is measured as a ratio of GDP development indicators online Investment Gross Domestic Investment also known World Bank (INV) as Gross Capital Formation. This is the (2010), Africa total change in the value of fixed assets development plus change in stocks. indicators online African Countries Real effective Real effective exchange rate index World Bank exchange rate represents the relative importance of (2010), Africa (REER) each selected currency to all other development currencies. indicators online Countries 110 Inflation rate This is the annual percentage change in World Bank (INF) consumer price index (CPI) (2010), Africa development indicators online Trade openness The sum of imports and exports of goods World Bank (OPEN) and services divided by GDP in constant (2010), Africa 2000 prices development indicators online Financial The degree of financial deepening deepening (FD) variable is the ratio of broad money World Bank (2010), Africa supply (M2) to GDP. It is a measure of development the size of the banking sector rather than indicators online the overall performance. Real Interest Real interest rate is the lending interest World Bank rate (INT) rate adjusted for inflation as measured by (2010), Africa the gross domestic product (GDP) development deflator. indicators online Real external Exports minus imports or the difference World Bank balance (REB) between free on board exports and cost, (2010), Africa insurance, and freight imports of goods development and service indicators online Current Account Current account balance is the sum of net World Bank Balance (CAB) exports of goods and services, net (2010), Africa income, and net current transfers. development indicators online 111 CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 5.1 Introduction Three sets of empirical results are presented in this chapter. These results are the outcome of the estimation exercises involving models (3), (8) and (12) using the system GMM estimation technique. The ordinary least square (OLS) and the least square dummy variable (LSDV) results are also presented in each model. The goal here is to verify the position of Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) that the pooled OLS and the LSDV estimators should be considered respectively as the upper and lower bound for the system GMM coefficients. The first set of results is on the remittances-growth nexus and it involves measuring the impact of remittances and other control variables on the economic growth of the 21 selected SSA countries. The second set of results is on the remittances-investments nexus and it involves measuring the impact of remittances and other control variables on domestic investment in the 21 selected SSA countries. Finally, the third set of results is on the remittancestrade balance nexus and it involves measuring the impact of remittances and other control variables on foreign trade balance in the 21 selected SSA countries. STATA 10.1 statistical software was used for the data analysis. The XTABOND2 command was engaged in the implementation of the model estimation. The empirical results for each model estimated are presented in turn after interpreting the one presented. The discussion of results places much emphasis on the system GMM using the one-step and two-step options. The idea here is to draw from the strength of the two-step GMM estimates since in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the two-step System–GMM uses a 112 consistent estimate of the weighting matrix. This usually is done by taking the residuals from the one-step estimate (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). For one-step estimation, the robust estimator of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates yield a resulting standard error estimates that are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels. In two-step estimation, the standard covariance matrix is already robust in theory; but typically yields standard errors that are downward biased. Thus, though the two-step GMM estimates may be asymptotically more efficient; extreme caution must be exercised here since this option often presents standard errors that tend to be severely downward biased. Fortunately, Roodman (2006) has clarified that it is possible to solve this problem using the finite-sample correction to the two–step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005), which interestingly can make the twostep robust GMM estimates more efficient than the one-step robust ones, especially for System–GMM. Time dummies are included in all model estimates because the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors assume no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time dummies make this assumption more likely to hold (Roodman, 2006). Country dummies are also included in the case of LSDV models. The country dummies are however absorbed in the presented results so as to allow for space and easy estimation. Considerable attention is given to the various specifications and diagnostic test results in the interpretation of results. This is deliberately so since only satisfactory specifications and diagnostic test results will give credibility to whatever coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics and standard errors that are obtained. In addition, results of each coefficient estimate may never make complete sense without an alignment of empirical findings with 113 practical realism. In view of this fact, effort is made to identify possible transmission mechanism within the economy in each case of interpreted results. Implications of findings for policy are also dealt with in this chapter. 5.1 Presentation of Estimated Empirical Results in the GrowthRemittances Model Dynamic panel data model estimation results for equation 3 in model 1 are presented in appendices 1 through 6 and are reported in table 5.1. This includes four separate results in columns 1 to 4 of the table. Column 1 comprises the OLS estimated results, column 2 has the one-step system GMM results and column 3 includes the two-step system GMM results. Column 4 is made up of the results for the LSDV estimated model. An underlying advantage of the dynamic system GMM estimation is that all variables from the regression that are not correlated with the error term (including lagged and differenced variables) can be potentially used as valid instruments (Greene, 2008). Optimal set of internal instruments were utilized by engaging the collapse option in the system GMM results. All estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. This is irrespective of whether they are considered under OLS, system GMM, or LSDV. In this model specification, lagged YGR and WR are predetermined and endogenous variables respectively. Hence, I control for the endogeneity of these variables in its lagged form as regressors by using internal instruments; namely, lagged levels of the standard differenced equation (equation 5) and lagged differences of the levels equation (equation 3). The list of these internal instruments can be found in appendices 1 and 3. As an additional check of potential endogeneity problems I investigate the correlation coefficients (see 114 appendix 2) between residuals from the base regression and independent variables. The coefficients of correlations suggest that none of the independent variables is highly correlated with predicted residuals. 115 Table 5.1: Estimated Empirical Results in the Output-Remittances Model (Model 1) Dependent Variable: YGR OLS SYSTEM-GMM LSDV One-Step Two-Step Instrument Weight collapsed collapsed Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) YGR(-1) 0.33958** 0.26652** 0.26529* 0.03141 (0.136) (0.105) (.064) (0.129) Log(labour) 0.64111*** 0.67894*** 0.74795* -9.40942 (0.361) (0.362) (0.199) (19.829) Log(capital) -1.68758*** -2.04399 -1.87093*** -0.81266 (0.911) (1.352) (0.983) (1.643) REER -0.00026 1.12000 0.0003 0.00389 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) INF -0.09096** -0.10451** -0.10773* -0.15324* (0.035) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) INV 0.00111** 0.00146*** 0.0015** 0.00117 (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) WR -0.00026 -0.00001 -0.00112 0.00034 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) Constant 13.162 15.41628 14.2918** 19.06527 (5.678) (7.948) (5.746) (22.631) Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Country Dummy No No No Yes Observations 133 133 133 133 No. of countries 19 19 19 19 Instrument count 18 18 F-stat (Wald χ2 ) 4.24 43.10 158.89 3.45 F-stat (p-value) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0002] AR(2) [0.394] [0.411] AR(3) [0.231] []0.220 Sargan Test (OIR) [0.930] [0.930] Hansen Test (OIR) [0.870] [0.870] Notes: Robust standard errors, consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels are reported in curly brackets. Robust standard errors are with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix P-values are reported in square brackets * indicates significant at 1 percent level ** indicates significant at 5 percent level *** indicates significant at 10 percent level 116 An examination of results in Table 5.1 begins with some specification or diagnostic tests. As a starting point, the system GMM estimators assume that the idiosyncratic errors 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated for consistent estimations. The presence of autocorrelation will indicate that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in fact endogenous, thus bad instruments. Arellano and Bond develop a test for this phenomenon that would potentially render some lags invalid as instruments. Of course, the full disturbance 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is presumed autocorrelated because it contains fixed effects, and the estimators are designed to eliminate this source of trouble. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is applied to the differenced residuals in order to purge the unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated idiosyncratic errors. These results are reported as AR(2) and AR(3) in the lower portion of table 5.1. The null hypothesis here that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 , ∆𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 ) = 0 for k = 1, 2 and 3 is rejected at a level of 0.05 if 𝑝 < 0.05. If 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated, then the null of no serial correlation will be rejected at order 1 but not at higher orders. This indeed is the case with results in columns 2 and 3. Here, it can be concluded that there is no evidence of serial correlation at the five percent level of significance. Given this results, the estimates can be regarded as consistent. The next specification test is a test of overidentifying restrictions of whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. This test of instrument validity has to do with a comparism of the number of instruments used in each case and the related number of parameters. It is implemented by the Sargan and Hansen J tests. For one-step, non-robust estimation, the Sargan statistic which is the minimized value of the one-step GMM criterion function, is applicable. The Sargan statistic in this case is however not robust to autocorrelation. So for 117 one-step, robust estimation (and for all two-step estimation), the xtabond2 command also reports the Hansen J statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, and is robust to autocorrelation. In addition, xtabond2 still reports the Sargan statistic in these cases because the Hansen J test has its own problem: it can be greatly weakened by instrument proliferation. Only the respective p-values are reported for this test results in the lower part of table 1. Here, the null hypothesis that the population moment condition is valid is not rejected if 𝑝 > 0.05. The summary statistics in columns 2 and 3 indicate that the one-step and two-step system GMM dynamic panel models of the selected 21 SSA countries have 18 instruments and 14 parameters each. This represents a total of 4 overidentifying restrictions in each case. In both specifications, the Hansen–J statistic does not reject the Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR), thus confirming that the instrument set can be considered valid. The F-statistic is the small-sample counterpart of the Wald (Chi Squared) statistic and it is a measure of the overall significance of the estimated models and the values here in each of the specifications are considerably satisfactory with level of significance being one percent in each case. This of course is indicative that all the exogenous variables jointly explained significantly, the economic growth process across the sampled SSA countries over the study period. Results on the control variables are broadly and satisfactorily consistent with theoretical expectations. The Blundell–Bond (system-GMM) robust estimates (in specifications 2 and 3) indicate that growth dynamics are crucial and significant across the sampled SSA countries. An inspection of these results reveals that past realizations of economic growth produced some contemporaneous positive impact on economic growth. Precisely, a 100 118 percent increase in the past realizations of growth explained positively, about 27 percent of current growth levels. This is irrespective of whether the one-step or two-step collapsed instruments options is considered. In both cases therefore, it cannot be concluded that growth dynamics do not retard economic growth in the study group over the study period. This finding clearly agrees with that of Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009). Size of labour force also produced some very meaningful and interesting results in the Blundell–Bond robust estimates. One striking observation here is that labour input produced a contemporaneous positive impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. This variable is also highly significant at the one percent level in the two–step system GMM option. In more definitive terms, a one hundred percent increase in size of labour force under the two –step system GMM estimates, explains about 74.80 percent of the increase in economic growth across the study group. This result is not surprising since labour supply is in relative abundance in most of the SSA countries. It is therefore expected that the average production function in these economies will be characterized by enormous labour intensity. The transmission mechanism here is such that additional labour input in any of the selected SSA countries will directly impact on output growth. However, this argument will only hold as long as these economies operate within the positive region of the production function (that is before diminishing returns set in). The implication of this result for theory is that economic growth inducing role of labour input is mostly applicable in the selected SSA economies. Surprisingly, capital input is negatively signed and weakly significant at the ten percent level when the two-step system GMM with collapsed instrument option is considered. This result indicates that a one hundred percent increase in capital input in these SSA economies will explain about 187 percent 119 reduction in economic growth rate for these sampled economies. Capital input in this sense turns out not to be a major consideration in driving economic growth in the sampled SSA economies. This fact may not be unconnected with the relative dominance of the labour intensive sectors in most SSA economies. Real effective exchange rate (REER) is found to be insignificant as an explanatory factor of economic growth in SSA. This of course is not unexpected given the small size of the foreign trade sector in most SSA economies. The foreign traded goods in SSA countries are dominated by imports of consumption goods which in the long-run do not bring about much economic growth. Inflation rate variable should attract some comments as it explains economic growth in the sampled group over the study period significantly at the one percent level. This variable under the two-step system GMM with collapsed instrument option specifications produced a contemporaneous negative impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. As can be seen, a 100 percent increase in inflation rate explains about 108 percent reduction in economic growth in the selected SSA economies. A negatively signed coefficient for the variable, inflation rate is of course not unexpected as can be explained by the following transmission mechanism. It is well known that borrowers benefit from major episodes of inflation, but lenders of loanable funds (that also double as profit maximizers) do counter the tide of inflation to minimize loss from the phenomenon. They achieve this by frequently adjusting the rate of interest upward probably to compensate themselves for loss of value in loaned funds and to keep track with the trend of inflation. The consequence of this kind of behaviour is that rising interest rate will constitute a disincentive to investment in these SSA economies and of 120 course lead to a decline in economic growth. Theoretically, this result confirms that while some mild inflation rate may be consistent with the goal of economic growth, persistently high inflation rate definitely will impede economic growth. Given the two-step collapsed instruments option in the Blundell–Bond estimates, the domestic investment variable has a significant (at the five percent level) contemporaneous positive impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. Precisely, a 100 percent increase in domestic investment will explain about 0.15 percent increase in economic growth. The very low nature of share of economic growth explained by domestic investment may actually be explained by the high dependence on, and of course, the dominance of foreign investment component of total investment in many of the SSA economies. Overall, this relationship is not unexpected from the viewpoint of theory as investment remains a traditional driver of economic growth in every economy. This finding is similar to those of Chami et al (2003) and Faini (2006) who also found that domestic investment and private capital flows were positively related to growth. However, the workers’ remittances variable has an insignificant contemporaneous negative impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. What this finding suggests is that a significant proportion of remittances inflow to SSA is directed (intentionally or otherwise) at some economically unproductive uses. This result is in agreement with findings in Chami et al (2005). It is however in contrast with Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009). The relatively small volume of workers’ remittances inflows to SSA countries could actually be the explanation for the insignificant result obtained for this variable. In terms of basis for comparism of the two works, Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009) used the Blundell and Bond GMM on a set of 121 dynamic panel models while Chami et al (2003) employed panel data methodology or the fixed effect estimation procedure. On grounds of data type, the outcomes of the two works may be comparable but this may not be true in the case of estimation techniques. The policy implication of this result is that for now, workers’ remittances inflows may not be effectively relied on in driving economic growth in these SSA economies. 5.2 Presentation of Estimated Empirical Results in the InvestmentRemittances Model Dynamic panel data model estimation results for equation 8 in model 2 are presented in appendix 5 to 8 and reported in Table 5.2. The system GMM estimator is categorized into the one-step and two-step option, and is reported in columns 2 and 3 respectively. The OLS estimates and the LSDV estimates are reported in columns 1 and 4 respectively. All estimations are again in this case robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. This is irrespective of the option under which the estimates are considered. Details of these results are in appendices 7 to 11. The related predetermined and endogenous variables on the right hand side of this specification include the lagged INV and WR respectively. To control for endogeneity of these variables that appear as regressors, internal instruments are again utilized; and these include the lagged levels of the standard differenced equation (equation 10) and lagged differences of the levels equation (equation 8). The list of these internal instruments are included in the results output and can be found in appendices 7 and 9. Correlation coefficients (see appendices 8 and 10) between residuals from the base regression and independent variables were computed as an additional check of potential 122 endogeneity problems. An investigation of these coefficients of correlations suggests that none of the independent variables is highly correlated with predicted residuals. Table 5.2: Estimated Empirical Results in the Investment-Remittances Model (Model 2) Dependent Variable: INV OLS SYSTEM-GMM LSDV One-Step Two-Step Instrument Weight collapsed collapsed Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) INV(-1) 1.49215* 1.59850* 1.52204* 1.66606* (0.067) (0.079) (0.079) (0.112) WR -2.04091* -2.21179* -2.09074* -2.19928* (0.103) (0.124) (0.135) (0.093) INTR -17.550 -22.14462 -4.80923 3.64175 (11.838) (26.458) (22.0004) (10.959) INF 3.81952 -1.51909 0.95473 3.78888 (6.265) (4.505) (3.862) (5.518) FD 1.07333* 1.33819** 0.87714*** -0.24794 (0.262) (0.639) (0.484) (0.299) Constant -225.1606 -131.8035 -70.604 -476.703 (106.741) (162.038) (178.967) (150.954) Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Country Dummy No No No Yes Observations 147 147 147 147 No. of countries 21 21 21 21 Instrument count 13 13 F-stat (Wald χ2 ) 95.80 2378 260.57 108.82 F-stat (p-value) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] AR(2) [0.146] [0.196] AR(3) [0.127] [0.225] Sargan Test (OIR) [0.000] [0.000] Hansen Test (OIR) [0.262] [0.262] Notes: Robust standard errors, consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels are reported in curly brackets. Robust standard errors are with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix P-values are reported in square brackets * indicates significant at 1 percent level ** indicates significant at 5 percent level *** indicates significant at 10 percent level 123 Some specification tests are again examined as a starting point to determine the reliability of coefficient estimates reported in Table 5.2. The working assumption that the idiosyncratic errors 𝑣𝑖𝑡 in the system GMM estimators are serially uncorrelated for consistent estimations is retained. The assumption that the full disturbance 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is autocorrelated because it contains fixed effects is not relaxed hence; the system GMM estimator remains the most appropriate tool to eliminate this source of trouble. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation are reported as AR(2) and AR(3) in the lower portion of table 5.2. The p-values are greater than 0.05 in the one-step and two-step system GMM estimates indicating that there is no evidence of serial correlation at the five percent level of significance. Given these results, the estimates can be regarded as consistent and the instruments are not endogenous. The test of overidentifying restrictions of whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous is implemented by the Sargan and Hansen J tests. Here the Hansen J statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step system GMM criterion function, and is robust to autocorrelation, is of tremendous importance. Only the respective p-values are reported for this test results in the lower part of table 5.2. of course, the null hypothesis that the population moment condition is valid is not rejected if 𝑝 > 0.05. In columns 2 and 3, the summary statistics indicate that the system dynamic panel model of the selected 21 SSA countries has 13 instruments and 12 parameters in both the one-step and two-step system GMM options. This represents a total of 1 overidentifying restrictions in each case. Thus, the Hansen–J statistic does not reject the Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR), thus confirming that the instrument set can be considered valid. The F-statistic which measures the overall significance of all regressors in the estimated model is satisfactorily significant at the one percent level. This of course is indicative of the fact that 124 all the exogenous variables, in each estimated result, jointly explained significantly, the systematic variations in domestic investment across the sampled SSA countries over the study period. A look at the control variables reveals the coefficient estimates are sufficiently consistent with theoretical expectations. The Blundell–Bond robust estimates of lagged domestic investment are positively signed. As can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of table 5.2, past realizations of domestic investment positively impact on its contemporaneous levels. These domestic investment dynamics are significant at the 1 percent level in these specifications. In specific terms, a 10 percent increase in domestic investment dynamics will explain about 15.98 percent and 15.22 percent of the increase in the contemporaneous realizations of domestic investment within the sampled SSA countries. This of course is when the one-step and two-step collapsed instruments options are considered respectively. Domestic investment dynamics suggest here that domestic investment in SSA has a way of feeding on its past values. Workers’ remittance variable also has highly significant results in both the one-step and two-step system GMM robust estimates. In all, this set of results for both specifications produced a contemporaneous negative impact on domestic investment across the sampled countries over the study period. The levels of significance here are all one percent. In more definitive terms, a 10 percent increase in workers’ remittances under the Blundell–Bond estimates, will explain negatively about 20.9 percent, of the changes in domestic investment across the study group. This is suggestive of the possibility of a crowding-out of domestic investment role for remittances in the selected SSA economies. The negative nature of this relationship is suggestive of the fact 125 that remittances flow to SSA is basically a financial flow and does not necessarily double as capital flows. Financial deepening variable has some significant results ranging from the five percent to the ten percent levels. Given the collapse option in the one-step and two-step system GMM, a 10 percent increase in financial deepening will produce about 13.38 percent and 8.77 percent increase in domestic investment respectively. Given this finding, it can be remarked here that policies which encourage banks to increase provision of financial services that have wider choice of services geared to all levels of society will help attract more remittances to Africa. Remittances related banking products or services will be immensely useful in this regards. 5.3 Presentation of Estimated Empirical Results in the Trade BalanceRemittances Model Dynamic panel data model estimation results for equation 13 in model 3 are reported in Table 5.3. The results of the Blundell–Bond system GMM estimator as in previous cases are reported in columns 2 and 3 of the table. In addition to the system GMM estimator, the OLS and the LSDV estimators are also reported in columns 1 and 4 of the table respectively. The complete results are presented in appendices 9 to 12. As usual, all estimations are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Details of these results are in appendices 9 to 12. The related predetermined and endogenous variables on the right hand side of this specification include the lagged REB on the one hand, and REER, CAB as well as WR on the other hand respectively. As in previous two cases, I control 126 for endogeneity of these variables that appear as regressors by utilizing internal instruments that include the lagged levels of the standard differenced equation and lagged differences of the levels equation. The list of these internal instruments can be found in appendices 14 and 16. Correlation coefficients (see appendices 15 and 17) between residuals from the base regression and independent variables were computed as an additional check of potential endogeneity problems. An investigation of these coefficients of correlations suggests that none of the independent variables is highly correlated with predicted residuals. 127 Table 5.3: Estimated Results in the Trade Balance-Remittances Model (Model 3) Dependent Variable: REB OLS SYSTEM-GMM LSDV One-Step Two-Step Instrument Weight collapsed collapsed Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) REB(-1) 0.54847* 0.32606* 0.33445* 0.36634* (0.093) (0.055) (0.056) (0.093) WR -0.44741* -0.20740** -0.22063* -0.22396** (0.101) (0.074) (0.072) (0.102) CAB 0.60073* 0.63834* 0.63423* 0.65873* (0.072) (0.019) (0.026) (0.064) INTR -22.0679*** -20.4288 -9.8458 7.78239 (11.175) (11.842) (10.463) (8.989) OPEN -13.9869 54.7389 -82.0211 147.7737 (69.580) (177.83) (131.248) (265.901) REER 0.07964 0.090 0.03815 -0.60125 (0.124) (0.210) (0.1548) (0.433) Constant 57.036 -301.372 -184.3704 -171.851 (124.148) (291.56) (273.769) (169.054) Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Country Dummy No No No Yes Observations 146 146 146 146 No. of countries 21 21 21 21 Instrument count 19 19 F-stat (Wald χ2 ) 135.08 5881.31 3994.26 60.27 F-stat (p-values) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] AR(2) [0.277] [0.378] AR(3) [0.146] [0.267] Sargan Test (OIR) [0.000] [0.000] Hansen Test (OIR) [0.219] [0.219] Notes: Robust standard errors, consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels are reported in curly brackets. Robust standard errors are with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix P-values are reported in square brackets * indicates significant at 1 percent level ** indicates significant at 5 percent level *** indicates significant at 10 percent level Relevant specification tests results are first examined in Table 5.3. The working assumption that the idiosyncratic errors 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated 128 for consistent estimations under the system GMM estimators is still retained. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation AR(2) and AR(3), are reported in the lower portion of Table 5.3. Interestingly from these results, there is no evidence of serial correlation at the five percent level of significance. This provides sufficient basis to conclude that the coefficient estimates can be regarded as consistent. The p-values of the Hansen J tests statistic indicate that the system dynamic panel of the selected 21 SSA countries has 19 instruments and 13 parameters. This represents a total of 6 overidentifying restrictions in each of the options in columns 2 and 3 of table 5.3. Consequently, the Hansen– J statistic does not reject the Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR), thus confirming that the instrument set can be considered valid. The F-statistic is highly significant at the one percent level. This result is indicative of the fact that all the regressors jointly explained significantly, the systematic variations in real external balance (REB) across the sampled SSA countries over the study period. The control variables in the estimated results are next considered. These figures reveal some impressive and striking results which are largely significant and sufficiently consistent with theoretical expectations. The Blundell–Bond two-step system GMM robust estimate of lagged real external balance is positively signed and significant at the one percent level. As can be seen, this result indicates that past realizations of real external balance positively impact on its contemporaneous levels. In specific terms, a 10 percent increase in real external balance dynamics will explain about 3.34 percent increase in the contemporaneous realizations of real external balance within the sampled SSA countries. The applicable level of significance here is one percent. And the collapsed instruments option was utilized. 129 Workers’ remittances variable produced a highly significant result in the Blundell–Bond system GMM two-step robust estimates. A particularly striking thing about this result is that it is negatively signed and significant at the one percent level. This clearly suggests that workers’ remittances inflow depresses foreign trade balance in SSA. Contemporaneously, real external balance in the selected SSA countries decline by about 2.21 percent as workers’ remittance inflows into SSA rise by 10 percent. This finding suggests that the bulk receipts from workers’ remittances flows to SSA may actually be channeled into the consumption of imported goods. This gives the impression that workers’ remittances flows are potentially harmful to the economies of the receiving SSA countries if deliberate policies to channel such flows into productive uses are not formulated and enforced. Current account balance (CAB) is another variable that is positively signed and highly significant at the one percent level. Interestingly, this result is not unexpected since a positive CAB is largely indicative of healthy domestic economy which provides a platform for a favourable trade balance. In more definitive terms, real external balance will increase by about 6.34 percent for every 10 percent rise in current account balance. By implication, policies aimed at boosting the current account balance of SSA economies will also assist in boosting the trade balance of these economies. The interest rate variable is negatively signed and insignificant even at the ten percent level. The meaning of this is that every rise in the domestic interest (lending) rate in the SSA economies increases the cost of production and by implication reduces competitiveness of all exported goods. The direct consequence of this will be a depressed trade balance for these SSA economies. Trade openness and real effective exchange rate variables are also insignificant explanatory factors of the changes in real external balance. This is 130 not surprising given the very low size of the external sector and the preponderance of primary products in the total exports of most SSA economies. However, the negative signs of the openness variable in two out of the four specifications call for some form of guided deregulation in SSA economies seeking to completely open up to the rest of the world economies. A quick remark that must be made regarding the results in the three estimated models is the failure of the system GMM coefficient estimates in some cases, to lie within the boundaries created by the OLS and LSDV estimates as prescribed by Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001). In checking for the source of this discrepancy, the validity of all instruments used in the model estimation was examined and found to be satisfactory. The only logical explanation for the failure of the Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) simulation prescription to apply to the analysis in this work is the possibility that the simulation exercise is very likely sensitive to data employed. This openly calls to question the validity of the position of Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) regarding the boundaries created by OLS and LSDV estimates for the system GMM estimates. 5.4 Policy Implications of Findings A number of policy issues naturally arise from the empirical findings in this thesis. First, the positive role of labour in the economic growth process is highlighted in the results. The relative abundance of labour supply in most SSA economies can be taken advantage of as a viable demographic dividend or surplus to accelerate the process of economic growth in these countries. Relevant authorities can in this wise embark on policy measures that tackles the recurring low economic growth problem in SSA through sustained 131 investment human capital. This will hopefully harness the abundant labour resource and boost the human capital base of these economies. This policy option will consequently raise the productivity of labour in these economies. Overall, this will help address the concern for non-inclusive growth (by increasing local content of employee within the industry in SSA) and also drive a sustained economic growth agenda for SSA countries. The cycles of persistent inflation which tend to discourage domestic investment and consequently economic growth in the SSA region is another area requiring policy attention. The monetary authorities as well as the rest of the financial sector in the SSA countries must exercise greater caution in matters involving money supply and interest rates respectively. The long term economic goals of these economies should regularly be the overriding consideration on decisions involving money supply and interest rates. This implies constantly subjecting the exigencies of time to the long term economic vision of the countries. A situation whereby the banking system freely adjust the rate of interest on account of market realities should as a matter of policy be regarded as unacceptable in these economies. Given the significant positive relationship between investment and economic growth, investment in both physical asset and human capital must officially be recognized as a major driver of economic growth in the SSA countries. This calls for policies that encourage private sector participation in the formation of physical assets and human capital for greater efficiency. The governments must withdraw from areas of investment she has failed over the course of time to demonstrate unarguable managerial competencies. At the same time, she must provide total incentive for private sector participation in such areas of the economy. Typical examples include the establishment and/or management of banks, factories, farms, etc. The involvement of government in these areas 132 should be limited to the provision of a conducive policy framework or environment, and occasionally some form of subsidies to encourage optimal production. Workers’ remittances flow to SSA is found to negatively impact on economic growth in the selected SSA countries over the study period suggesting that most remittance receipts are not channeled into productive uses. Policy measures must therefore be put in place to enhance tracking of these flows and to encourage its channeling into more economically productive uses. This could be achieved by enacting laws that require mandatory documentation of all remittances flows at the point of collection by recipients. Such documentation should require information on share of receipts for specific uses such as: investment in stocks, education, health, feeding, housing/rent, building or construction activities, social or community projects, etc. With this policy in place, all remittances flow through formal channels will be adequately tracked. A policy that enables the banking system to use current and future remittances flow as security in extending credit facilities to potentially enterprising remittance recipients will encourage channeling of remittances into more economically productive uses. In the alternative, SSA monetary authorities should design a policy that guarantees loan facility to every regular remittances recipient who indicates interest to use such credit for investment purposes only. Such recipients must of course demonstrate convincing viable business ideas to the participating banks (in the credit guarantee scheme) and the stream of flows to the beneficiary must have been regular and stable over a specified minimum period of time. It has been shown from the empirical results that remittances flow to SSA countries is predominantly financial flows rather than capital flows. This means that the African Diaspora has not demonstrated sufficient interest in 133 investment opportunities back home. To stimulate the commitments of the African Diaspora to invest at home, policies that encourage them to invest directly without passing through third parties should be put in place. This will hopefully guide against the recurring problem of information asymmetries and associated moral hazards problems in transactions of this nature. The full advantage of modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure must be explored in implementing this policy. For example, the various SSA countries could establish agencies to coordinate a one-stop, regularly updated, online shop where all investment opportunities in the region are showcased. This online shop should be freely accessible to all and participation in all investment offers must be facilitated through a simplified and secured software programme that enhances confidence in the system. This call for an aggressive investment drive from remittances inflow to the SSA region is further necessitated by the finding that remittances crowd-out domestic investment in SSA and by the potential of workers’ remittances flow to contribute meaningfully to the growth of SSA economies. Policies aimed at attracting workers’ remittances may not be relied on to enhance the trade balance of the SSA economies. This is in view of the finding that workers’ remittances depress trade balance in these economies. To ensure that workers’ remittances flow to SSA becomes more useful in promoting trade balance, policy that encourage beneficiaries to productively engage these flows must first be implemented. On the other hand, policies aimed at improving the current account balance as well as trade balance in SSA will be largely complementary and mutually beneficial. 134 CHAPTER SIX SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Summary Workers’ remittances are unarguably a vital source of finance for many individuals and families in developing countries. Remittances recipients in comparism with their peers, who do not receive such flows, have a higher living standard. It is a common belief that workers’ remittances contribute to the reduction of poverty, either when the poor receive remittances directly or through multiplier effects which create additional demand, employment and income. However, a number of researchers hold divergent views on the question of whether remittances also constitute, at the aggregate level, a vital source of development finance to many developing countries that attract significant workers’ remittances flow. This study sheds new light on this question by examining the economic growth consequences of workers’ remittances in some selected Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries using the macroeconomic approach. The thesis is a cross-country study comprising of a panel of 21 countries within the SSA region and the data cover the period 2000 to 2007. The study examines three vital aspects of the research problem. These include the remittances – output nexus, remittances – investment nexus, and remittances – trade balance nexus. The overall goal of course is to determine the existence any unique link between remittances flow and the above indicators of economic growth taking the affected SSA countries as a group with similar characteristics. The dynamic panel data modeling technique was engaged in the study and it uses the Blundell-Bond (1998) system Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) estimator to provide additional insight into the problem. The 135 dynamic panel data model has a number of estimation problems which are readily overcome by the above estimators. The major empirical findings are quite striking and they suggest that the central objective of this thesis has been empirically explored. For instance, the results revealed that; Workers’ remittances have a significant contemporaneous negative impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. This finding suggests that a significant proportion of remittances inflow to SSA is directed (intentionally or otherwise) at some non-economically productive uses. By implication, policy incentives designed to attract more workers’ remittances to SSA countries are not likely to help in promoting economic growth in these economies except such flows are deliberately channeled into economically productive ventures. Past realizations of economic growth overall produced some contemporaneous positive impact on economic growth itself thereby indicating no empirical evidence that growth dynamics retard economic growth within the study group over the study period. By implication, this finding suggests that economic growth policies in SSA should of necessity be guided by the integrated growth theory. This theory postulates that previous period growth largely explains current period growth and current period growth again explains next period growth and so on. Contemporaneously, labour force has a positive impact on economic growth suggesting that policies that are aimed at harnessing the abundant labour supply in SSA countries will directly boost economic growth in the selected SSA economies. A further implication of this 136 finding is that failure on the part of policy makers to develop capacity of available labour force will directly hurt the economies of SSA countries. In view of this, Ike (2000:149) cautioned that “the proportion of non-workers to workers has important economic and social repercussions” for any economy. Inflation rate has a contemporaneous negative impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. This is suggestive of the possible role of high inflation rate as a disincentive to investment in these SSA economies which in turn leads to a decline in economic growth. As a consequence, the effectiveness of any policy measure to encourage rapid domestic investment will partly depend on the satisfactory performance of policies that counter high inflation rate in SSA countries. Expectedly, domestic investment has a significant contemporaneous positive impact on economic growth across the sampled countries over the study period. This is quite consistent with theoretical prediction and is interestingly, a reassertion of the role of investment as a traditional source of economic growth in every economy. Capital and real effective exchange rate variables are insignificant explanatory factors of economic growth in the SSA region considering all available specifications. Workers’ remittance variable has a significant contemporaneous negative impact on domestic investment across the sampled countries over the study period. The negative nature of this relationship is suggestive of the fact that remittances flow to SSA is in the form of financial flows rather than capital flows. Financial deepening variable is a significant explanatory factor of variations in domestic investment. This means that banks can help 137 attract more remittance flows to SSA by providing additional banking products in the SSA economies. Workers’ remittances have a negative and highly significant impact on real external balance. This means that workers’ remittances inflow depresses or weakens trade balance in SSA countries. The variable current account balance is positively signed and significantly impact on real external balance. This means that as the economies of SSA countries become healthier, trade balance also improves in these economies. Policy options for governments and relevant monetary authorities were suggested on the basis of each of the above empirical findings. It is believed that the identified negative impact of workers’ remittances inflow on economic growth will be reversed if these policy options are embraced by the various SSA economies. 6.2 Conclusion The question of whether workers’ remittances constitute at the aggregate level, a vital source of development finance to a selected developing countries within the Sub-Saharan African region has been extensively explored in this study. The application of the system GMM estimators to a set of dynamic panel data models in investigating the research problem has proved quite intuitive and immensely suitable. The empirical study sheds new light on the growthremittances nexus that are useful in the design of macroeconomic policies in the SSA region and also provide the basis on which the policies can be evaluated. 138 The results of this study clearly highlight the role of workers’ remittances in the growth of the economies of the selected SSA countries and the policy options available to the governments of these countries. The study also shows the role of “integrated growth theory” in explaining economic growth within the selected countries. And workers’ remittances may not be relied upon for now to promote economic growth in the SSA region. Besides, it also reveals that workers’ remittance inflows depress the external trade balance of the recipient SSA economies. Another striking finding in this study is the fact that workers’ remittance inflows to SSA exist only in the form of financial flows considering its significant negative contribution to domestic investment in the region. The sustenance of workers’ remittances inflows and the productive use of all such flows to SSA region, demand a central role for governments and monetary authorities in terms of the provision of relevant policy direction. Every related policy measure therefore should be targeted towards the reorientation of senders and recipients of remittances so as to ensure that these flows are regularly engaged productively. Moreover, it will not be out of place if policy incentives are given a sectoral focus such that remittances are used productively in sectors that are of greatest interest to the recipients. This will hopefully allow for a stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the SSA region. 6.3 Recommendations Over the years, governments across countries have introduced a number of policy measures to affect migrants' decisions to maximize the flow of remittances back to the labour-sending country and to direct these flows to 139 socially and economically optimal ends. A major difficulty with implementation of these policy measures is that remittances are essentially private transfers, and so policy measures on these transfers must most often take the form of incentives, rather than mandatory requirements. Given this understanding and on the basis of findings in this study, the following recommendations are considered necessary. The need to engage all remittances recipients for enhanced data gathering and management system is recommended. To this end, the various monetary authorities in SSA should set up data gathering desk in every bank serving as a remittance payment outlet within the region. The policy should compulsorily require every remittance recipient to declare and document the expected expenditure details of amount received. Such details should include information on share of receipts for specific uses such as: investment in stocks, education, health, feeding, housing/rent, building, construction activities, social or community projects, etc. The establishment of a credit guarantee scheme by the individual monetary authorities in SSA is recommended. This policy should be designed to divert remittances receipt into more productive uses. To ensure this objective is achieved, every regular remittances recipient who indicates interest to use such credit for investment purposes only should be extended the facility. Such recipients must however demonstrate convincing viable business ideas to the participating banks (in the credit guarantee scheme) and the stream of remittances flows to the beneficiary must have been regular and stable over a specified minimum period of time. 140 The joint venture approach to financing community development projects by all of SSA is strongly recommended. Such joint venture should be between individual government and the Diaspora and may be coordinated by various leaders in the benefiting communities. The idea here is that this strategy will encourage migrants and the beneficiaries to use a proportion of remittances to fund community development projects, with joint-financing provided in the form of public subvention by the government. Development of unique Banking Products for Migrants. Banks can design ‘Real Estate Investment Products’ that are attractive to migrants in their country of origin. The real estate market hopefully will constitute the main investment niche for migrants in their country of origin. The governments of SSA countries should embark on policies that facilitate investment by migrants in enterprise creation in labourexporting countries. One way this can be done is through the creation of an investment opportunities directory for SSA countries. Governments can make it a responsibility to regularly update this directory which must be made available on the internet for ease of access. This will hopefully create job opportunities to absorb the surplus labour. The various commercial banks should develop banking products that will encourage migrants to maintain bank accounts in the labourexporting country. Such accounts should be denominated in applicable foreign currency of choice to the migrant and must be made operational in the migrant’s country of residence through the use of modern information and communication technology. 141 The option of using Diaspora bonds to raise needed vital foreign exchange for development in these SSA economies may be considered by the various governments. However, this option will only be attractive to the Diaspora if the issues of good governance, transparency, the rule of law, etc are made sacrosanct by the various SSA governments. 6.4 Limitations of the Study The limitations encountered in the course of the study relate to the observed difficulties encountered by the author and are considered sufficient to alter the findings in this study in terms of outcome or timing if they were never encountered. These limitations are outlined below. The study would have been much more robust and encompassing if it could be extended to cover the current global economic and financial crisis vis-à-vis workers’ remittances flow to SSA. Many of the SSA countries covered in this study do not promptly report remittances inflow data to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for compilation. Consequently, this non availability of data up to the very recent time greatly limited inclusion of this potentially interesting and important aspect of the study. The study could have been expanded to cover the expenditure pattern of remittance receipts by recipients, as well as obstacles to free flow of workers’ remittances in order to adequately capture the possible economic benefits of flows. The requirement of a field survey involving all sampled countries to accomplish this task was clearly 142 outside the scope of this thesis and hence constituted a limitation to the study. Inadequate funding also constituted a major limitation to this study. For instance the inability of the researcher to acquire in time relevant econometric software and other related manuals for data analysis delayed the scheduled or timely completion of this PhD thesis. The reliability of results in this study is limited by the accuracy of data employed in the empirical analysis. The author’s role here is only to ensure that to all intents and purposes, all secondary data employed for the empirical analysis were sourced from well established and internationally recognized credible sources. 6.5 Suggestions for Future Researches A study on the impact of the current global economic and financial crisis on workers’ remittances flow either to any of the individual SSA countries or SSA as a group is suggested. Such study should address the role of motives for remitting in sustaining remittances flow during periods of global economic or financial crisis. This however is subject to availability of the most recent data on workers’ remittances. There is the need to investigate further the determinants of workers’ remittances flow to SSA at the micro level. Such study should also account for the motives for remitting that are peculiar to SSA countries from the perspective of the remitter as well as the recipient. This suggestion is in view of the finding suggesting that only those remittances recipients that are able to demonstrate adequate capacity to manage current receipts satisfactorily can guarantee future flows. 143 A study on the expenditure pattern of remittances flow to individual SSA countries will be a most important and interesting study. It is therefore suggested that a study dedicated to this subject and based on a field survey at both individual and household level be conducted in future researches. This study should necessarily shed more light and additional insights on the developmental roles and potentials of remittances receipts in SSA at the micro level. A study on labour force growth, labour productivity and remittance flows in any specific SSA country is suggested. This of course will be at the micro level and should further explore the finding suggesting that labour force growth contribute positively to economic growth perhaps through workers’ remittances. 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To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 18 F(13, 18) = 158.89 Prob > F = 0.000 ygr Coef. ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons .2652887 .7479525 -1.870935 .0002908 -.1077338 .0014758 -.0011254 -.1041676 -.6190384 -.5167044 .440047 -.2591498 .9251511 14.29186 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max Corrected Std. Err. .0640402 .1994866 .9835047 .0013007 .0369841 .0006263 .0013628 1.272746 .9749005 .6135131 .862063 .7781206 .5866291 5.746709 t 4.14 3.75 -1.90 0.22 -2.91 2.36 -0.83 -0.08 -0.63 -0.84 0.51 -0.33 1.58 2.49 P>|t| 0.001 0.001 0.073 0.826 0.009 0.030 0.420 0.936 0.533 0.411 0.616 0.743 0.132 0.023 = = = = = 133 19 7 7.00 7 [95% Conf. Interval] .1307452 .3288467 -3.937202 -.0024419 -.1854345 .00016 -.0039885 -2.778109 -2.667228 -1.805648 -1.37108 -1.893921 -.307311 2.218477 .3998322 1.167058 .1953315 .0030234 -.0300331 .0027916 .0017377 2.569773 1.429152 .7722387 2.251174 1.375621 2.157613 26.36525 Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(ll lk inv inf reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L2.(ygr L.ygr wr) collapsed Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons ll lk inv inf reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) DL.(ygr L.ygr wr) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = Pr > z = Pr > z = Pr > z = 0.009 0.411 0.220 Prob > chi2 = 0.930 Prob > chi2 = 0.870 Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(1) = 0.05 Prob > chi2 = Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) = 1.20 Prob > chi2 = 0.830 0.753 Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 0.86 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 1.25 can be weakened by many instruments.) -2.60 0.82 -1.23 161 APPENDIX 2: Correlation Coefficients for the Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (YGR) . correlate (obs=133) resid l.ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr yr* resid resid ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr 1.0000 0.0734 -0.0387 -0.0540 -0.0282 0.0323 -0.0661 0.0108 . -0.0044 -0.0084 -0.0056 -0.0348 0.0274 0.0247 0.0011 1.0000 0.0966 0.0257 -0.0287 -0.0941 0.1004 0.1135 . -0.1485 0.0153 -0.0411 -0.0186 0.0436 0.0210 0.1283 1.0000 0.5340 0.0620 0.1537 0.4077 0.3662 . -0.0238 -0.0159 -0.0078 0.0001 0.0079 0.0156 0.0239 1.0000 -0.1640 -0.0137 0.8616 0.4227 . -0.1762 -0.1519 -0.0657 0.0163 0.0748 0.1145 0.1882 1.0000 -0.1631 -0.2448 -0.1362 . 0.0816 0.0674 0.0233 0.0061 0.0074 0.0070 -0.1928 1.0000 0.0124 -0.1257 . -0.0574 0.0482 -0.0872 -0.0252 0.0275 0.0849 0.0092 1.0000 0.4120 . -0.1572 -0.1592 -0.0895 -0.0082 0.0503 0.1042 0.2595 1.0000 . -0.1475 -0.1198 -0.0822 -0.0077 0.0378 0.1095 0.2099 yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 1.0000 162 APPENDIX 3: One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (YGR) . xtabond2 ygr l.ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr yr*, gmm(ygr l.ygr wr, lag(2 2) collapse equation > (both)) iv( ll lk inv inf reer yr*) small robust artests(3) Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 18 F(13, 18) = 43.10 Prob > F = 0.000 ygr Coef. ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons .2665238 .6789443 -2.043988 1.12e-06 -.1045146 .0014578 -.000013 -.1284378 -.6871525 -.5309716 .1960627 -.0095523 1.13749 15.41628 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max Robust Std. Err. .1045137 .3622308 1.352894 .0017436 .0404259 .0007404 .0019914 1.223976 1.129847 .7044212 .98732 .7414303 .6897335 7.948597 t 2.55 1.87 -1.51 0.00 -2.59 1.97 -0.01 -0.10 -0.61 -0.75 0.20 -0.01 1.65 1.94 P>|t| 0.020 0.077 0.148 0.999 0.019 0.065 0.995 0.918 0.551 0.461 0.845 0.990 0.116 0.068 = = = = = 133 19 7 7.00 7 [95% Conf. Interval] .0469486 -.0820743 -4.886312 -.003662 -.1894463 -.0000977 -.0041967 -2.699915 -3.060873 -2.010906 -1.87822 -1.56724 -.3115868 -1.283102 .486099 1.439963 .7983367 .0036642 -.0195828 .0030133 .0041707 2.44304 1.686569 .9489623 2.270345 1.548135 2.586566 32.11566 Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(ll lk inv inf reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L2.(ygr L.ygr wr) collapsed Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons ll lk inv inf reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) DL.(ygr L.ygr wr) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = Pr > z = Pr > z = Pr > z = 0.014 0.394 0.231 Prob > chi2 = 0.930 Prob > chi2 = 0.870 Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(1) = 0.05 Prob > chi2 = Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) = 1.20 Prob > chi2 = 0.830 0.753 Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 0.86 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(4) = 1.25 can be weakened by many instruments.) -2.45 0.85 -1.20 163 APPENDIX 4: Correlation Coefficients for the One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (YGR) . correlate resid l.ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr yr* (obs=133) resid resid ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr 1.0000 0.0966 1.0000 0.0257 0.5340 1.0000 -0.0287 0.0620 -0.1640 1.0000 -0.0941 0.1537 -0.0137 -0.1631 0.1004 0.4077 0.8616 -0.2448 0.1135 0.3662 0.4227 -0.1362 . . . . -0.1485 -0.0238 -0.1762 0.0816 0.0153 -0.0159 -0.1519 0.0674 -0.0411 -0.0078 -0.0657 0.0233 -0.0186 0.0001 0.0163 0.0061 0.0436 0.0079 0.0748 0.0074 0.0210 0.0156 0.1145 0.0070 0.1283 0.0239 0.1882 -0.1928 1.0000 0.0124 -0.1257 . -0.0574 0.0482 -0.0872 -0.0252 0.0275 0.0849 0.0092 1.0000 0.4120 . -0.1572 -0.1592 -0.0895 -0.0082 0.0503 0.1042 0.2595 1.0000 . -0.1475 -0.1198 -0.0822 -0.0077 0.0378 0.1095 0.2099 yr6 yr7 yr8 1.0000 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 1.0000 0.0681 0.0004 -0.0095 -0.0100 0.0287 -0.0332 -0.0196 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 yr1 yr2 yr3 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 yr4 yr5 . 164 APPENDIX 5: LSDV Linear Regression Result (YGR) . areg ygr l.ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr yr*, absorb(countryid) robust (dropping yr1 because it does not vary within category) Linear regression, absorbing indicators ygr Coef. ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons .0314063 -9.40942 -.8126612 .0038955 -.1532422 .0011784 .0003433 (dropped) -2.040307 -1.913353 -1.905739 -.9680189 -.8609837 .4679434 (dropped) 19.06527 countryid absorbed Robust Std. Err. Number of obs F( 13, 101) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE t P>|t| = = = = = = 133 3.45 0.0002 0.4772 0.3167 3.0981 [95% Conf. Interval] .1292819 19.82997 1.642863 .003133 .0412981 .0007783 .0028244 0.24 -0.47 -0.49 1.24 -3.71 1.51 0.12 0.809 0.636 0.622 0.217 0.000 0.133 0.904 -.2250541 -48.74675 -4.07166 -.0023195 -.2351664 -.0003656 -.0052597 .2878667 29.92791 2.446338 .0101105 -.0713179 .0027224 .0059462 2.910312 2.122244 1.887166 1.651482 1.18654 .9945623 -0.70 -0.90 -1.01 -0.59 -0.73 0.47 0.485 0.369 0.315 0.559 0.470 0.639 -7.813583 -6.123314 -5.649368 -4.244114 -3.21476 -1.505001 3.732969 2.296608 1.83789 2.308076 1.492793 2.440887 22.63085 0.84 0.402 -25.82824 63.95879 (19 categories) 165 APPENDIX 6: OLS Linear Regression Result (YGR) . reg ygr l.ygr ll lk reer inf inv wr yr*, robust Linear regression Number of obs F( 13, 119) Prob > F R-squared Root MSE ygr Coef. ygr L1. ll lk reer inf inv wr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons .3395813 .6411125 -1.687579 -.0002664 -.0909555 .0011134 -.0002634 (dropped) (dropped) -.7256122 -.4956724 .2135507 -.0372017 1.136257 .0324898 13.16178 Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| = = = = = 133 4.24 0.0000 0.2774 3.3555 [95% Conf. Interval] .1359736 .3606137 .9112346 .0018056 .0350804 .0005007 .0016269 2.50 1.78 -1.85 -0.15 -2.59 2.22 -0.16 0.014 0.078 0.067 0.883 0.011 0.028 0.872 .0703399 -.0729387 -3.491914 -.0038418 -.1604182 .000122 -.0034848 .6088227 1.355164 .1167568 .0033089 -.0214928 .0021048 .002958 1.32397 1.066972 1.288655 1.083236 1.074868 1.003711 5.677946 -0.55 -0.46 0.17 -0.03 1.06 0.03 2.32 0.585 0.643 0.869 0.973 0.293 0.974 0.022 -3.347204 -2.608384 -2.338115 -2.182116 -.9920885 -1.954959 1.918876 1.89598 1.617039 2.765216 2.107713 3.264603 2.019939 24.40468 166 APPENDIX 7: Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (INV) . xtabond2 inv l.inv wr intr inf fd yr*, gmm( inv l.inv wr, lag(3 3) collapse equation(level > )) iv( intr inf fd yr*) small robust twostep artests(3) Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 13 F(11, 20) = 260.57 Prob > F = 0.000 inv Coef. inv L1. wr intr inf fd yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons 1.522043 -2.09074 -4.809234 .9547287 .8771388 -204.5687 -302.9658 -56.01824 -57.57085 -208.501 -218.9 -70.6041 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max Corrected Std. Err. .0799817 .1346747 22.00037 3.861875 .4840851 136.043 149.0769 119.1201 115.592 170.9897 133.9801 178.967 t 19.03 -15.52 -0.22 0.25 1.81 -1.50 -2.03 -0.47 -0.50 -1.22 -1.63 -0.39 P>|t| 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.807 0.085 0.148 0.056 0.643 0.624 0.237 0.118 0.697 = = = = = 147 21 7 7.00 7 [95% Conf. Interval] 1.355205 -2.371666 -50.7012 -7.101001 -.1326449 -488.3494 -613.9347 -304.4984 -298.6915 -565.1793 -498.3776 -443.9228 1.688882 -1.809813 41.08274 9.010458 1.886923 79.21205 8.003134 192.4619 183.5498 148.1772 60.57767 302.7146 Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) DL3.(inv L.inv wr) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(1) = 26.49 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(1) = 1.26 can be weakened by many instruments.) -0.59 -1.29 -1.21 Pr > z = Pr > z = Pr > z = 0.554 0.196 0.225 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.262 167 APPENDIX 8: Correlation Coefficients for the Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (INV) . correlate resid l.inv wr intr inf fd yr* (obs=147) resid resid inv L1. wr intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. inv wr intr inf fd yr1 yr2 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1040 -0.0204 -0.1034 -0.0404 0.0617 . 0.0180 -0.0687 -0.0682 0.0039 0.1097 0.0017 0.0035 1.0000 0.7618 0.2224 0.1835 -0.1983 . -0.0745 -0.0537 -0.0509 -0.0193 0.0208 0.0678 0.1099 1.0000 0.0970 0.0331 -0.0551 . -0.0558 -0.0523 -0.0502 -0.0269 -0.0087 -0.0011 0.1950 1.0000 0.6208 0.0035 . 0.1672 0.0618 0.0355 -0.0247 -0.0285 -0.1000 -0.1113 1.0000 -0.0978 . -0.0654 0.0672 -0.0923 -0.0198 0.0547 0.0713 -0.0157 1.0000 . -0.0183 -0.0097 0.0001 0.0049 0.0541 -0.0179 -0.0132 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 1.0000 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 168 APPENDIX 9: One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (INV) . xtabond2 inv l.inv wr intr inf fd yr*, gmm( inv l.inv wr, lag(3 3) collapse equation(level > )) iv( intr inf fd yr*) small robust artests(3) Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 13 F(11, 20) = 2378.62 Prob > F = 0.000 inv Coef. inv L1. wr intr inf fd yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons 1.598502 -2.211787 -22.14462 -1.51909 1.338188 -118.2094 -376.0929 -145.5531 -58.18054 -71.65533 -275.3189 -131.8035 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max Robust Std. Err. .07937 .1239623 26.45814 4.505236 .6378451 146.5662 155.3274 142.1335 104.0838 207.0516 138.2551 162.038 t 20.14 -17.84 -0.84 -0.34 2.10 -0.81 -2.42 -1.02 -0.56 -0.35 -1.99 -0.81 P>|t| 0.000 0.000 0.413 0.739 0.049 0.429 0.025 0.318 0.582 0.733 0.060 0.426 = = = = = 147 21 7 7.00 7 [95% Conf. Interval] 1.432939 -2.470368 -77.33532 -10.91685 .0076665 -423.9411 -700.1002 -442.0384 -275.2955 -503.5575 -563.714 -469.8089 1.764065 -1.953207 33.04609 7.878668 2.66871 187.5223 -52.08567 150.9322 158.9344 360.2468 13.07615 206.2019 Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) DL3.(inv L.inv wr) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(1) = 26.49 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(1) = 1.26 can be weakened by many instruments.) -0.98 -1.45 -1.53 Pr > z = Pr > z = Pr > z = 0.326 0.146 0.127 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.262 169 APPENDIX 10: Correlation Coefficients for the One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (INV) . correlate resid l.inv wr intr inf fd yr* (obs=147) resid resid inv L1. wr intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. inv wr intr inf fd yr1 yr2 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.2338 -0.0253 -0.0057 0.0271 0.0185 . 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000 0.7618 0.2224 0.1835 -0.1983 . -0.0745 -0.0537 -0.0509 -0.0193 0.0208 0.0678 0.1099 1.0000 0.0970 0.0331 -0.0551 . -0.0558 -0.0523 -0.0502 -0.0269 -0.0087 -0.0011 0.1950 1.0000 0.6208 0.0035 . 0.1672 0.0618 0.0355 -0.0247 -0.0285 -0.1000 -0.1113 1.0000 -0.0978 . -0.0654 0.0672 -0.0923 -0.0198 0.0547 0.0713 -0.0157 1.0000 . -0.0183 -0.0097 0.0001 0.0049 0.0541 -0.0179 -0.0132 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 1.0000 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 1.0000 1.0000 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.1667 170 APPENDIX 11: OLS Linear Regression Result (INV) . reg inv l.inv wr is intr inf fd yr*, robust Linear regression Number of obs F( 12, 134) Prob > F R-squared Root MSE inv Coef. inv L1. wr is intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons 1.492146 -2.040912 .1690263 -17.55043 3.819515 1.073328 (dropped) (dropped) -251.7033 -6.962524 81.52272 81.68152 -100.1055 55.34653 -225.1606 Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| = = = = = 147 95.80 0.0000 0.9721 601.43 [95% Conf. Interval] .0672773 .1030068 .0526384 11.83806 6.265001 .2620202 22.18 -19.81 3.21 -1.48 0.61 4.10 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.141 0.543 0.000 1.359083 -2.244642 .0649168 -40.96405 -8.571565 .5550982 1.625209 -1.837183 .2731358 5.863192 16.2106 1.591559 145.1386 134.8978 100.377 204.77 160.4065 138.3133 106.7409 -1.73 -0.05 0.81 0.40 -0.62 0.40 -2.11 0.085 0.959 0.418 0.691 0.534 0.690 0.037 -538.7622 -273.7669 -117.0055 -323.3178 -417.3617 -218.2132 -436.2754 35.35552 259.8418 280.051 486.6808 217.1507 328.9062 -14.04577 171 APPENDIX 12: LSDV Linear Regression Result (INV) . areg inv l.inv wr is intr inf fd yr*, absorb(countryid) robust (dropping yr1 because it does not vary within category) Linear regression, absorbing indicators inv Coef. inv L1. wr is intr inf fd yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons 1.66606 -2.199281 .2287761 3.64175 3.78888 -.2479393 (dropped) (dropped) -248.3985 1.684435 73.07941 45.9227 -217.4991 -17.93526 -476.7028 countryid absorbed Robust Std. Err. Number of obs F( 12, 114) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE t P>|t| = = = = = = 147 108.82 0.0000 0.9805 0.9750 544.96 [95% Conf. Interval] .1124533 .093338 .095027 10.9598 5.517684 .2997467 14.82 -23.56 2.41 0.33 0.69 -0.83 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.740 0.494 0.410 1.443291 -2.384183 .0405284 -18.06952 -7.141609 -.8417352 1.88883 -2.014379 .4170239 25.35302 14.71937 .3458566 148.9315 148.7504 99.2898 174.4334 157.3187 154.8281 150.9538 -1.67 0.01 0.74 0.26 -1.38 -0.12 -3.16 0.098 0.991 0.463 0.793 0.170 0.908 0.002 -543.4306 -292.989 -123.6129 -299.6285 -529.1462 -324.6486 -775.7411 46.6336 296.3579 269.7717 391.4739 94.14808 288.778 -177.6644 (21 categories) 172 APPENDIX 13: Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (REB) . xtabond2 reb l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr*, gmm(l.reb wr cab, lag(. 2) collapse equatio > n(both)) iv( intr reer open yr*) small robust twostep artests(3) Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 19 F(12, 20) = 3994.26 Prob > F = 0.000 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max = = = = = 146 21 6 6.95 7 Corrected Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] .3344472 .055633 6.01 0.000 .2183989 .4504955 -.220629 .6342295 -9.845849 -82.02106 .0381551 220.0341 165.0725 153.8099 161.446 104.2631 128.1684 -184.3704 .0725187 .0260773 10.46355 131.248 .1548049 203.2634 153.4548 115.6127 111.203 88.58727 89.07543 273.769 -3.04 24.32 -0.94 -0.62 0.25 1.08 1.08 1.33 1.45 1.18 1.44 -0.67 0.006 0.000 0.358 0.539 0.808 0.292 0.295 0.198 0.162 0.253 0.166 0.508 -.3719003 .5798331 -31.67243 -355.7995 -.2847622 -203.966 -155.0285 -87.35405 -70.5193 -80.52671 -57.63964 -755.4425 -.0693577 .6886259 11.98073 191.7574 .3610724 644.0342 485.1735 394.9739 393.4113 289.0529 313.9765 386.7017 reb Coef. reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(intr reer open yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/2).(L.reb wr cab) collapsed Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons intr reer open yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.(L.reb wr cab) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = Pr > z = Pr > z = Pr > z = 0.330 0.378 0.267 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.219 Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(3) = 6.38 Prob > chi2 = Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) = 1.88 Prob > chi2 = 0.094 0.597 Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(6) = 203.17 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(6) = 8.26 can be weakened by many instruments.) -0.97 -0.88 1.11 173 APPENDIX 14: Correlation Coefficients for the Two-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (REB) . correlate resid l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr* (obs=146) resid resid reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. reb wr cab intr open reer yr1 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 0.2648 0.0001 0.0862 -0.0760 0.0969 0.0035 . 0.0239 -0.0336 -0.0038 0.0384 -0.0086 0.0065 -0.0227 1.0000 0.8083 0.7850 0.1471 0.0319 -0.0298 . 0.0468 -0.0053 -0.0518 -0.0448 0.0273 -0.0730 0.0993 1.0000 0.7270 0.0894 -0.0447 -0.0202 . -0.0510 -0.0475 -0.0453 -0.0217 -0.0032 -0.0353 0.2033 1.0000 0.1746 0.0157 -0.0351 . -0.0440 -0.0539 -0.0324 0.0430 0.0908 -0.0654 0.0606 1.0000 -0.0202 -0.1734 . 0.1694 0.0638 0.0374 -0.0229 -0.0267 -0.1136 -0.1097 1.0000 -0.2851 . -0.0024 0.0047 0.0016 -0.0162 -0.0077 -0.0191 0.0387 1.0000 . 0.0760 0.0625 0.0205 0.0047 0.0076 0.0089 -0.1801 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1633 1.0000 174 APPENDIX 15: One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (REB) . xtabond2 reb l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr*, gmm(l.reb wr cab, lag(. 2) collapse equatio > n(both)) iv( intr reer open yr*) small robust artests(3) Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. yr1 dropped due to collinearity yr8 dropped due to collinearity Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM Group variable: countryid Time variable : year Number of instruments = 19 F(12, 20) = 5881.31 Prob > F = 0.000 Number of obs Number of groups Obs per group: min avg max = = = = = 146 21 6 6.95 7 Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] .3260587 .0550705 5.92 0.000 .2111836 .4409338 -.2074022 .6383358 -20.42885 54.7389 .0900303 334.3751 180.5206 205.9587 264.3118 137.9955 181.4249 -301.3717 .0739689 .0196731 11.84277 177.831 .2102059 209.6102 198.7275 144.034 144.1988 127.7382 106.9296 291.5617 -2.80 32.45 -1.73 0.31 0.43 1.60 0.91 1.43 1.83 1.08 1.70 -1.03 0.011 0.000 0.100 0.761 0.673 0.126 0.374 0.168 0.082 0.293 0.105 0.314 -.3616985 .5972985 -45.13244 -316.2101 -.3484516 -102.8641 -234.0176 -94.49102 -36.48155 -128.4617 -41.62634 -909.5588 -.0531058 .6793732 4.27474 425.6878 .5285122 771.6144 595.0589 506.4084 565.1052 404.4527 404.4761 306.8153 reb Coef. reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 _cons Instruments for first differences equation Standard D.(intr reer open yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8) GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) L(1/2).(L.reb wr cab) collapsed Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons intr reer open yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) D.(L.reb wr cab) collapsed Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.22 Pr > z = 0.223 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = -1.09 Pr > z = 0.277 Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z = 1.45 Pr > z = 0.146 Sargan test of (Not robust, Hansen test of (Robust, but overid. restrictions: chi2(6) = 203.17 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 but not weakened by many instruments.) overid. restrictions: chi2(6) = 8.26 Prob > chi2 = 0.219 can be weakened by many instruments.) Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: GMM instruments for levels Hansen test excluding group: chi2(3) = 6.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.094 Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3) = 1.88 Prob > chi2 = 0.597 175 APPENDIX 16: Correlation Coefficients for the One-Step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (REB) . correlate resid l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr* (obs=146) resid resid reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 L. reb wr cab intr open reer yr1 1.0000 -0.2851 1.0000 . . -0.0024 0.0760 0.0047 0.0625 0.0016 0.0205 -0.0162 0.0047 -0.0077 0.0076 -0.0191 0.0089 0.0387 -0.1801 . . . . . . . . 1.0000 0.2701 -0.0008 0.0849 0.0135 0.0091 -0.0090 . 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0011 1.0000 0.8083 0.7850 0.1471 0.0319 -0.0298 . 0.0468 -0.0053 -0.0518 -0.0448 0.0273 -0.0730 0.0993 1.0000 0.7270 0.0894 -0.0447 -0.0202 . -0.0510 -0.0475 -0.0453 -0.0217 -0.0032 -0.0353 0.2033 1.0000 0.1746 0.0157 -0.0351 . -0.0440 -0.0539 -0.0324 0.0430 0.0908 -0.0654 0.0606 1.0000 -0.0202 -0.1734 . 0.1694 0.0638 0.0374 -0.0229 -0.0267 -0.1136 -0.1097 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 -0.1680 yr7 yr8 1.0000 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 1.0000 -0.1633 -0.1633 -0.1633 1.0000 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1680 -0.1633 1.0000 176 APPENDIX 17: OLS Linear Regression Result (REB) . reg reb l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr*, robust Linear regression Number of obs F( 12, 133) Prob > F R-squared Root MSE reb Coef. reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons .5484697 -.4474112 .6007272 -22.06792 -13.98695 .079638 (dropped) (dropped) -85.90667 8.837841 98.45347 -91.45896 4.528824 -154.7017 57.0378 Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| = = = = = 146 135.08 0.0000 0.9606 530.29 [95% Conf. Interval] .0928024 .1011547 .0724322 11.17454 69.58047 .1236633 5.91 -4.42 8.29 -1.97 -0.20 0.64 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.841 0.521 .3649102 -.6474913 .457459 -44.17074 -151.6144 -.1649632 .7320293 -.2473311 .7439954 .0348897 123.6405 .3242392 187.8241 107.8441 123.1865 130.3115 156.0889 188.431 124.1483 -0.46 0.08 0.80 -0.70 0.03 -0.82 0.46 0.648 0.935 0.426 0.484 0.977 0.413 0.647 -457.4155 -204.4735 -145.2046 -349.21 -304.2089 -527.411 -188.5228 285.6022 222.1492 342.1115 166.2921 313.2665 218.0076 302.5984 177 APPENDIX 18: LSDV Linear Regression Result (REB) . areg reb l.reb wr cab intr open reer yr*, robust absorb( countryid) (dropping yr1 because it does not vary within category) Linear regression, absorbing indicators reb Coef. reb L1. wr cab intr open reer yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 _cons .3663364 -.2239559 .6587274 7.782394 147.7737 -.6012485 (dropped) (dropped) -106.6473 -76.12383 -10.63278 -157.1491 -81.68543 -332.4017 -171.8505 countryid absorbed Robust Std. Err. Number of obs F( 12, 113) Prob > F R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE t P>|t| = = = = = = 146 60.27 0.0000 0.9820 0.9769 389.07 [95% Conf. Interval] .0926983 .1016109 .0639868 8.989553 265.9012 .4330388 3.95 -2.20 10.29 0.87 0.56 -1.39 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.388 0.579 0.168 .1826844 -.4252654 .531958 -10.02753 -379.0246 -1.459176 .5499885 -.0226464 .7854968 25.59232 674.5719 .2566794 153.3732 101.6442 107.5454 116.07 138.6195 226.7708 169.0538 -0.70 -0.75 -0.10 -1.35 -0.59 -1.47 -1.02 0.488 0.455 0.921 0.178 0.557 0.145 0.312 -410.5072 -277.4992 -223.6996 -387.1047 -356.3156 -781.6757 -506.7767 197.2127 125.2516 202.4341 72.80655 192.9447 116.8722 163.0756 (21 categories) . 178
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