Why doesn`t the government respond to the

WHY DOESN’T THE GOVERNMENT RESPOND TO THE
PARTICIPATING PUBLIC?
Mike Williams - December 2002
How to Reference this article:
Williams, M. (2002) Why doesn’t the government respond to the participating public? Vanguard
Online, December 2002, http://www.vgpolitics.f9.co.uk/030101.doc
Introduction
In the last twenty years, British governments have promoted user, citizen and public
centred planning processes. To this end they have encouraged local service providers
to respond to the views of the participating public (DETR, 1999d, p.40). What the
government means by responsiveness is not always clear. Sometimes it takes
responsiveness to mean state agencies acknowledging the viewpoint of the public
(DoH, 1999: 25-26), i.e. ‘we have heard what you have said'. Other times
responsiveness is used to mean acknowledging what the public have said and
agreeing to act in accordance with it. The government suggests that responsive
government can be secured by establishing deliberative forums between local people
and local authorities (DETR, 1999d: 26-27; DoH, 1998b; 2001b; Cm 4818-I, 2000).
This claim relies on the first sense of responsiveness for its coherency. If the second
sense is being used, then the claim relies on the questionable assumption that service
providers automatically act on the views of the public. This article tests that
assumption by reviewing 53 empirical studies on participation in the UK between
1989 and 2001. The review suggests that more often than not the participating public
does not influence local state agencies. It is argued that this is because the democratic
nation state tends to be influenced only by groups that possess resources that the state
wants and cannot get at less cost or at all, that threaten the state and its projects,
and/or that are made up by a large number of voters. Because the participating public
rarely constitutes one of these three groups, it rarely influences local state agencies or
the government. It is concluded that the government's ambition of responsive local
state agencies requires more than 'encouragement'. The participating public must be
enabled or empowered to make decisions at the local level. Two corresponding
1
models of participation are offered. This article starts by describing participation in
health and social services under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997 and under
New Labour between 1997 and 2002.
The Conservatives 1979-1997
Under Conservative governments public participation was one of a number of
initiatives belonging to a programme of reform geared towards putting the brakes on
social expenditure; promoting non-state provision; and focussing the application of
welfare on those in greatest need (Alcock, 1996; Gilleard & Higgs, 1998). A key
moment in health and social care provision was the 1990 NHS and Community Care
Act. The Act served to increase central government control over health and social care
expenditure, prescribe quality standards, increase the use of independent sector
services and promote consumer choice (DoH, 1989; Chapman & Cowdell, 1998;
Crinson, 1998). It also required local authorities to involve users and carers in the
formulation of individual care plans and to ensure public input in service inspection
units (DoH, 1990). Authorities were obliged to consult representatives of users of
community care over the preparation of community care plans (para.46). This, in
theory, gave users who were represented by groups, the opportunity to attempt to
influence those plans. According to Barnes & Bennett-Emslie (1997), at the same
time, health authorities were being encouraged to consult local people over the future
shape of local health services (see NHSME, 1992). The Government was keen to
emphasise the benefits of the reforms for users, arguing that they were designed to
give people a say in services and a greater individual say in how they lived their life
(DoH, 1989: para.1.8). One government paper said, 'the rationale for this
reorganisation is the empowerment of users and carers' (SSI & SWSG, 1991: 7). In
fact the reforms were designed to encourage the participation of users in discussions
about how agencies were to meet the central government’s agenda.
2
New Labour 1997-2002
Participation under New Labour should be understood as part of the government's
project to 'modernise government' (DETR, 1999d: 6). Indeed participation has been
intended to make modernisation more effective (DoH, 1998b: para.1). Modernisation
is best understood by making reference to New Labour’s political-economic approach
to government. New Labour recognises the liberalisation of trade; the deregulation of
capital and labour markets and the rapid evolution of technology as irreversible and
beneficial (Hay & Watson, 1999; Coates & Hay, 2001). To maintain the
competitiveness of the UK economy, it has kept public spending and taxation at levels
similar to those of preceding Conservative governments (Hay & Watson, 1999).
New Labour aims to use economic growth to finance measures designed to ensure
social justice and tackle social exclusion (Abbott, 1999: 13). New Labour claims to
reconcile social justice and social inclusion with economic development. Social
justice means providing people with the opportunities to meet the challenges of
modern society, i.e. the demands of capital. The welfare state is seen as a tool to get
people back into work (Cm3805, 1998: para.13; Abbott, 1999). Social inclusion
policies take the form of 'back into employment initiatives', retraining and skill
development (Abbott, 1999). Security and dignity are to be ensured for those unable
to work (Cm3805, 1998: para.13).
New Labour argues that economic growth and increased public spending can only be
sustained if government modernises, particularly in the way it delivers welfare.
Modernisation constitutes three aims (DETR, 1999: 6):

Ensuring that policy making is more joined up and strategic.

Ensuring public service users, not providers, are the focus, by matching
services more closely to people’s lives.

Delivering high quality and efficient public services.
Two key initiatives in social and health care delivery have encapsulated these aims.
The first is the establishment of national and local service standards (DETR, 1999:
3
para.18). The government considers that many health and social care services are not
provided, 'sufficiently conveniently, promptly or to a good enough standard'
(Cm4169, 1998, foreword). A mixture of national and local performance indicators on
efficiency, cost and quality in have been established (DETR, 1999c). A number of
programmes and initiatives have been developed:

The Best Value regime is considered a duty to deliver clear standards by the
most effective, economic and efficient means available (DETR, 1999c: para.7.1).

Public Service Agreements were developed in 20 pilot local authorities
between 2001-2002. Local authorities were expected to deliver on key national
and local priorities in return for certain flexibilities and financial rewards.

National Service Frameworks (NSFs) have set standards and defined service
models for specific services or care groups (Cm4169, 1998: para.3.14).
The second key initiative is partnership. Partnership is considered important at every
level of government decision-making and service provision (DoH, 1997a: 3; DoH,
1998b: para.8). Local authorities are required to take a strategic approach to
participation ensuring that it becomes a mainstream feature of their activities (DETR,
1998a).
Partnership has been encouraged in service planning. The government often charges
local authorities with the responsibility for drawing up local strategies in partnership
with the public, voluntary and private sector organisations (DETR, 1998b; 1999b;
1999d; Abbott, 1999). Health authorities have similar duties when drawing up local
health strategies. In 2001, the Health and Social Care Act required the NHS to involve
the public in the planning and development of services and in major decisions (DoH,
2001a: para.4.2). A range of initiatives was aimed at giving patients more power in
the NHS (Cm 4818-I, 2000; DoH, 2001a). Local taxpayers and service users should
be consulted whenever local authorities review services (DETR, 1999d: para.7.18).
Partnerships are also encouraged in service delivery. Procuring authorities are
expected to work in partnership with service providers across the charitable,
independent, community, private and public sectors to eradicate gaps in service and
4
ensure the provision of seamless services (DETR, 1999). Welfare is to be delivered
via associations, networks and communities (Abbott, 1999: 14). Special emphasis has
been placed on the need to work in partnership with the private sector (Cm3805,
1998: para.13).
The Public's Role
Government legislation and guidance requires Councils and health authorities to
involve the public in planning, shaping and reviewing services and policies (DETR,
1998a: para.2.48; 1998b: paras2.1 & 4.2; DoH, 2001a: para.4.2). Public participation
has been seen as a means of:

Facilitating the effective realisation of the government's modernisation
programme (DoH, 1998b: para.1).

Promoting better public understanding of why and how local services need to
change and develop (DoH, 1998b: para.4).

Facilitating citizen centred services that deliver higher standards (DoH, 1998a:
para.1.19; 1998b: para.4).

Allowing Councils to meet their population's needs and concerns (DETR,
1998a: para.2.55; 2000: para.51). One piece of guidance states, 'The ultimate aim
[of participation] is to enable people to run their own lives and communities'
(DETR, 1998a: para.4.1).

Improving the quality of democracy (DETR, 1999d). The government
questions the democratic legitimacy of those who do not effectively engage the
public (DETR, 1998b: para.2.1).

Leading to a, 'new brand of involved and responsible citizenship' (DETR,
1998b: para.4.4); social cohesion within communities (DoH, 1998b: para.6); a
feeling of greater local ownership of health services (DoH, 1998b: para.4) and
strengthened public confidence in the NHS (DoH, 1998b: para.22).
Within partnerships, the legislation and guidance consistently mark out a role for the
participating public as consultants to local lead authorities:
5

Local advisory forums are to act as 'sounding boards' to health authorities on
health strategies (Cm 4818-I, 2000).

Citizens Council are to 'advise' the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
on clinical assessment (Cm 4818-I, 2000: para.10.34).

Patients Forums have the right to visit and inspect any aspect of its related
health trust’s care (Cm 4818-I, 2000).

Independent advisory panels 'advise' Government Ministers when awarding
Beacon Status to local authorities (DETR, 1999d: para.2.19).
The government frequently require the consultation of the public alongside a number
of other groups including businesses, service providers and policy makers (Cm4169,
1998: para.2.55; Cm 4818-I, 2000; DETR, 2000: para.16; Cabinet Office, 2001:
para.5.10). For example, the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act requires local
authorities to consult representatives of the public and other authorities operating in
the locality (DoH, 1990: para.46 (2)). Under the Best Value regime, local authorities
have a duty to consult with local taxpayers, services users and the wider business
community in the setting of new performance targets (DETR, 1999b; 1999d:
para.8.13; HMSO, 1999).
Crucially, within the participatory initiative the government assigns the right of
speaking on behalf of the public to the lead authority, and not the participating public.
The government expects the lead authority to mediate competing views and take, 'the
lead in developing a clear sense of direction for their communities' (DETR, 1999d:
para.8.7). Strategic health authorities are assigned the role of 'balancing the needs and
concerns of local people' in creating a coherent strategic framework for service
development (DoH, 2001b: para.28). Local authorities are ‘uniquely’ placed to
mediate among different interests and interpret the needs of people in its area (DETR,
2000: para.76). The views of local communities should be balanced with a proper
analysis of needs' which seems to mean professional research based analysis
(para.77). 'Opposition from sections of the community should not preclude action if
the council and the local strategic partnership believe that it is in the best interests of
the area' (para.77).
6
Nevertheless central government expects local and health authorities to be influenced
by the participating public (DETR, 1998a; para.1.3; 1999b: para.19.). Partnerships
should listen to the public and involve them in their decisions if they are to service
people better (DETR, 1999). Local authorities will need to show how Best Value
Review programmes have been drawn up from consultation with local people,
business and employees (DETR, 1999b: para.19). Health Action Zones are expected
to 'be able to provide evidence of involving local users of services (and their carers) in
reshaping services to ensure they are more responsive, integrated and person-centred'
(DoH, 1998b: 13). 'Every local NHS organisation, as well as care homes, will be
required to publish… an annual account of the views received from patients – and the
action taken as a result' (Cm 4818-I, 2000: para.10.23). Central government has also
recognised that by responding to the participating public, local authorities can reengage a number of traditionally marginalised groups (DoH, 1998b: para.10; DETR,
1998a: para.6.22; 1999b: para.8; 2000; 2001). A renewal of democracy cannot come
about if, 'local people are not interested or feel that the council, or their views about it,
are irrelevant' (DETR, 1998b: para.2.1).
The government does not specify how local authorities should ensure the participating
public influences their decisions or on what issues local authorities should be
influenced. Councils seem to be expected to voluntarily identify and delegate areas of
decision-making to local people that they would have ordinarily kept to themselves
(DETR, 1998a; 2000). New Labour seeks to make local agencies more responsive to
the public voice through the power of persuasion, rather than the implementation of a
thought through model of practice.
In summary, Conservative and New Labour governments have taken public
participation to mean participation in dialogue with government. This form of
participation allows local people to have a greater say in decisions only to the extent
that decision-makers act in accordance with their views. Both governments have
encouraged but have not forced local agencies to act in accordance with the views of
the participating public.
7
Public Influence on Government Decision-Making: A Review Of The Literature
Fifty-three empirical studies in the UK, published between 1987 and 2001 were
reviewed, to establish the extent to which the public has influenced decision-making
and the extent to which local lead agencies have established mechanisms ensuring
public influence. Relevant studies were identified on the Baths Information and Data
Services International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; in the most recent journals
at the University of Sheffield and in the bibliographies of relevant articles. A number
of studies were case studies based on one or several examples of public participation.
Others were reports on practice across national or regional areas.
Of all these papers Lowndes et al.'s (2001) 'census of participation' gave the best
perspective on national trends in public participation. The census data was derived
from a survey of 332 local authorities (85% of all local authorities) and 11 detailed
case studies of local authority practice. They asked local authorities to describe 'the
effect of participation initiatives on final decisions' (2001: 214). Twenty percent of
authorities indicated that they felt the public had had a strong influence on decisions.
A number of other studies included in this review reported that the public had
influenced:

The development of local strategic plans such as community care plans
(Means & Lart, 1994: 29; Boaz & Hayden, 2000: 5); local primary care plans;
health commissioning plans (McCabe & Ross, 2000: 181); and local health
strategies (Barnes & Bennett-Emslie, 1997).

The development of needs assessment forms (Barnes & McIvor, 1999: 15).

The specifications of contracts used by local purchasers of welfare provision
(Harrison, 1993; Raynes, 2000: 73).

Increases in service provision (Lupton, 1995a, pp39-40).

Alterations to existing services (Boaz & Hayden, 2000: 23; DoH, 2001a: 7) or
the details of plans for future services (Fitzpatrick et al., 2000: 499).

Establishing new services (Barnes & Wistow, 1994: 535; Lupton, 1995a: 9;
Barnes & McIvor, 1999, pp14-15) and programmes (Lupton, 1995b: 9).
8

The lay-out and design of surveys and publicity leaflets (Barnes & Bennett-
Emslie, 1997).
Four caveats should be introduced at this point. Most studies on participation, and
thus reports of the public influencing decision-makers, were premised on interviews
with or surveys of representatives of local authorities or other agencies. Given that
representatives may distort events, knowingly or otherwise to present themselves or
their organisation in a favourable light, findings premised on their views should be
treated with caution (Foddy; 1994; Fielding & Thomas, 2001). The tendency for
discrepancy between what is reported and what happened is all the more likely given
that the representative is unlikely to have drawn on independent systematic research
on participation within their organisation. Research on influence is scarce and usually
only of academic concern. Secondly, no study identified what it understood by the
notion of ‘influence’. This means that claims of public influence may be contestable.
A few studies implied that a similarity between the public’s views and decisions-taken
by the organisation constituted influence. Where this was the case only one study
questioned (Weeks, 2000) and none established whether the similarity was a
coincidence or due to the public voice being taken into account. Thirdly, where
studies had established that local people had influenced plans, few investigated
whether those plans, and more importantly the parts influenced by local people, had
been implemented. Fourthly few studies investigated why decision-makers were
influenced on the occasions that they were. Was it because:

They felt the public had come up with the best way of resolving the issue?

They were acting in accordance with the principle of citizen control, i.e. even
if they disliked the publics’ idea they would still seek to realise it anyway?

They were seeking to co-opt the participating public on a given policy? I.e.
giving them a little influence in return for their acceptance of the overall policy.
Although the evidence suggests the participating public has influenced decisionmaking it also suggests that on any given occasion it is more likely not to influence
decision-making. Eighty percent of authorities responding to the census did not
indicate that the participating public influenced decision-making (Lowndes et al.,
9
2001). A survey of 'best practice' local authorities found three-quarters failing to link
consultation results with decision-making processes (Audit Commission, 1999b: 41).
A national survey of how local authorities involved the public in setting local
standards and targets, found that although a number had communicated to and asked
for the public's commendation of their ideas, few had asked for the public's ideas of
what the targets should be (Audit Commission, 1999a: 48). In 1993 the Office for
Public Management found that although there were a number of user and carer
involvement initiatives operational in the forty local authorities they reviewed, major
changes in service provision resulting from that involvement could only be identified
in a few authorities (p.7). Better Government for Older People [BGOP] was a
government led pilot programme designed to listen to the views of older people
(BGOP Steering Group, 2000: 10). Its principal goal was to develop strategies for an
ageing population through 28 local authority pilots (BGOP Steering Group, 2000: 10).
An 'acknowledged limitation' of the programme was the inability of pilots to translate
'listening into action' (Hayden & Boaz, 2000: 27). Other studies have reported that
although the public have influenced relatively minor issues, they have not influenced
significant ones (Bewley & Glendinning, 1994: 16; Means & Lart, 1994; Foley &
Martin, 2000: 481; Fitzpatrick et al., 2000; Martin & Boaz, 2000: 51; Abbott et al.,
2000; Riseborough & Sribjilanin, 2000: 13). Participants are commonly reported to
have felt unable to influence major decisions (Barnes & Wistow, 1993; Burns et al.,
1994; Hayden & Boaz, 2000).
The literature suggests that few authorities have created mechanisms that ensure the
participating public influences decision-making. Only one initiative referred to in the
literature was explicitly intended to ensure 'public influence'. That was a health
authority consumer strategy which aimed to 'open decision-making to influence by the
public' (Lupton & Taylor, 1997, appendix).
Literature on participation also suggests central government impositions often leave
local authorities with little room to delegate decisions to the participating public.
Authorities must meet central government requirements for organisational change;
service improvements and efficiency measures within strict and short deadlines. In so
doing they struggle to respond to local concerns (Martin & Gaster, 1993: 48; Means
& Lart, 1994; Goss & Miller, 1995; Wilson, 1999; Braye, 2000: 22). Some BGOP
10
pilots described themselves as, 'a 'battleground' in the struggle to be both citizen
centred and to meet government expectations' (Hayden & Bennington, 2000: 32).
Even where local authorities have discretion often they do not use it to respond to the
voices of the participating public or to delegate decision-making to local people.
Evaluators of the Best Value and BGOP pilot programmes argued ‘'citizen centred
government' requires a greater capacity to take account of citizens' needs and
priorities than many local authorities have so far demonstrated' (Martin & Boaz, 2000:
53). The BGOP evaluators claimed that inter-agency partnerships were, 'not looking
creatively enough at opportunities for joint decision-making with older people on
matters where the local authority is well within its power to delegate authority'
(Hayden & Boaz, 2000: 33). Meadowcroft (2001) researched Liberal Democrat
controlled authorities seeking to build local consensus from competing local interests
through processes of deliberation. He found that authorities continued to retain a
corporate view of the best policy outcomes, often based upon professional advice which took precedence over local preferences. In summary, the available evidence
gives examples of local people influencing decision-makers. It also suggests that more
often than not the participating public does not influence local agencies. The next
section attempts to explain the latter phenomenon.
Why Doesn’t the Government Respond To the Participating Public?
To answer this question it is necessary to understand the reasons for why the
government and state are willing to engage groups in dialogue, and to respond to the
issues of certain groups and not others. This in turn requires an understanding of the
primary motivations of the democratic nation state. The emergence and proliferation
of the nation state has been a defining feature of the last one and a half hundred years
of world history (Hall et al., 1992). The state is the most powerful group within a
given area, a group that is able to have itself recognised as the dominant and/or
sovereign political authority. Once established it is perpetually engaged in an attempt
to consolidate its position and in some cases to absorb or control other territories
(Bobbio, 1995; Held, 1996). This motivates it to use violence, and technologies and
resources secured by that violence, to impose social forms which reproduce the power
11
of the state and realise its projects (Foucault, 1986: 141-9; Giddens, 1991: 15; p.3;
McNay, 1998: 220).
Although the state is capable of developing 'political strategies' not necessarily
reducible to any particular set of interests (Held, 1996: 26) it inevitably depends on
some groups and individuals to implement its impositions. The state’s desire to co-opt
motivates it to engage certain groups in dialogue and make decisions in their favour.
In a representative democracy, the elected government guides the objectives and
actions of the state. In so doing it takes into account the wishes of the electorate. It is
often argued that the popular vote ensures the state acts in the best interests of all the
people. The impositions of the state are said to be the outcome of a settlement
between the people. However the representative state ensures two political
inequalities. Firstly, the citizen if not an elected representative is excluded from the
policy formulating and sanctioning mechanisms assumed by representatives. The
second inequality is the product of the first. A person or group is able to influence the
government or a local state agency only if they have access to some resource that the
government or agency wants and cannot get at less cost or at all, or they pose a
serious threat to the state or its projects. Those who hold no resources or pose no
threat are unlikely to influence the state. It is arguable that the popular vote lessens the
extent of this inequality. The government's perception of the electorate inevitably
influences its actions. However it rarely looks to please the whole electorate but
tactically chooses to please some groups at the expense of others. Minority and nonevoter interests are likely to be overlooked in the interest of significant voting groups.
Where the political system allows representatives to be elected by only a majority of
those who vote, rather than a majority of those eligible to vote, this diminishes the
proportion of people whose interests politicians need to take into account. The lower
the turnout the more this is so. The Labour party had to court only 25% of the British
electorate to win the last General Election (only 59% of the electorate voted). To
summarise, the vote gives political capital to a number of individuals who might
otherwise have none. But to the extent that equality is afforded to people through the
vote, then it is in deciding the constituents of a system that ensures two significant
political inequalities.
12
With this analysis behind us we can now begin to answer the question. Under New
Labour the public is invited to participate in discussions about how politicians could,
should or will take decisions. This form of participation does not challenge but
maintains elected representative's exclusive right to formulate and sanction public
policy. The only groups who influence the state continue to be those who have access
to some resource that the state wants, or who pose some kind of threat to the state.
Given that participatory forums are often established to engage the poor, disabled and
marginalised, they are unlikely to fall into the two categories just mentioned, and are
therefore unlikely to influence the state. Secondly, participatory forums tend to in
practice constitute a minute percentage of the electorate. The government is unlikely
to respond to their wishes, because in so doing it may act against the wishes of the
much larger none-participating public. This is all the more likely when one considers
that the voting public, mass media and political opposition commonly hold the
government and not the ‘public it listened to’ responsible for any bad decision
(Meadowcroft, 2001). Many criticise the notion of handing power to unrepresentative
forums as being undemocratic. Furthermore, a responsive government, i.e. one that is
prepared to admit that it has no fixed agenda and/or which is prepared to deviate from
its original agenda is often interpreted as being weak, unorganised and lacking in
conviction. Hence in his study of over 600 councillors Copus (1999: 85) found the
majority believing that they and not the public should make decisions on local needs
and priorities.
In summary, although successive governments have encouraged public-government
dialogue and emphasised responsiveness, the bases from which participants have been
able to negotiate, and therefore the outcomes of the negotiations have not changed.
The relatively powerless continue to have little chance of influencing the government
or local state agencies through participation in dialogue, despite the increased
opportunities for such dialogue. On the issue of citizen-centred and responsive
planning processes, the government and local state agencies have proven that on
many occasions and in many places they have yet to practice what they preach. The
absence of a thought through model of practice, which ensures that providers act in
line with the wishes of the participating public, suggests that the government is
tentatively exploring the meaning and consequences of citizen centred government.
Its tentativeness is manifest in doublethink around the issue of responsiveness, and
13
not only in the ways outlined earlier in this article. The government has encouraged
local agencies to be responsive to the public but at the same time it has reserved the
right to speak on behalf of the public for the local authority and/or itself. This begs the
question does government responsiveness mean government responding to the
participating public, government responding to its own priorities or local agencies
responding to central government? This section has provided a number of reasons for
why central government encouragement will not in itself bring about a more
responsive government and state. A political motivation to ‘enforce’ responsiveness is
necessary.
Policy Options
This section presents two policy options for the government. The first I call the
delegated decision-making model [DDM] of participation. It is based on an
acceptance of the notion that the elected government and local authorities have the
unique right to set agendas and decide policy matters on behalf of the public.
However they should also seek to give the participating public a role in decisionmaking. They should do this by delegating certain decisions within otherwise predefined agendas to citizen target groups (a particular community of citizens) [CTG].
Each decision delegated would be accompanied by a number of decision options – all
of which would be feasible and politically acceptable. A mechanism that affords
equality to citizens in determining the outcome of the decision made by the CTG
would be identified prior to participation. The authority would ensure that 'all' those
who wished to participate were enabled to do so, rather than leaving it to the already
active. The decision-making procedure would be managed by an organisation that was
independent of the delegating authority and that did not have a vested interest in the
outcome.
Implementation of the DDM model could be the next step for central government and
local organisations in the path towards citizen-centred planning processes. Authorities
have already been urged to develop practices similar to the DDM model. Guidance on
drawing up long-term care charters states 'For users to have faith in the charter it will
be important to make clear how they can influence the content of the charter and how
14
this relates to operational policy' (DETR, 1999a: para.10.3). 'Enabling the electorate
to determine or influence policy on a specific issue' where the authority is, 'handing
over a decision or influence to those affected' is identified as a legitimate option for
local authorities (DETR, 1998b: para.4.11). Use of the DDM model could be the key
to local authorities meeting the challenge laid down by central government to 'develop
a capacity to lead without insisting on control' (DETR, 1998a: para.7.2). The DDM
model could be used to involve a range of stakeholders and would allow organisations
to overcome two commonly reported drawbacks of participation: the retardation of
the policy process and the raising of unrealistic expectations (Lowndes et al., 2001).
Furthermore it would give local people the feeling that they had influenced
government decision-making; and it would allow local agencies to show central
government that they had responded to local people.
The DDM model could be used as part of a strategy to allow citizens to take more
decisions. This pertains to Hirst’s (1993: 117) vision of associationalism, that is to
'decentralise and devolve as much of the affairs of society as possible to publicly
funded but voluntary and self-governing associations.' The state would move away
from providing services to regulating service providers. It would ensure that standards
of provision were met, and that the internal governance of service providers were
consistent with democratic norms (Hirst, 1993).
The second and more radical option would be to institute a form of participation as
government rather than participation as dialogue with government. This option I call
local participatory government [LPG]. Although set within the context of a
representative democratic centralised state, it is based on the idea that increased
participation in dialogue with local state agencies will not lead to influence, when the
bases from which participants are able to negotiate remain unequal. It is the bases that
must be changed. Therefore this model proposes to eradicate, at the local level, the
political inequality between political none-representatives and representatives. It does
this by ensuring that:

All citizens can articulate and define possible policies.
15

All citizens have a formal vote in determining which policies should be
sanctioned.
Furthermore, local policies would have to receive the support of a significant majority
(perhaps somewhere around 70%) of eligible voters rather than of actual voters. This
feature would counteract the tendency under local representative government for
politicians to take into account only significant voter groups, or other powerful
interests. Those keen to develop and see particular policies sanctioned, would need to
engage with a greater number of the electorate than under the current system. Where
they found that some members of the community had different agendas they would be
forced into making concessions either through altering the policy they were proposing
or accommodating alternative policies. In short, individuals and groups, driven by a
selfish desire to further their own interests would be motivated to engage and
deliberate with, understand and to some extent act in the wider interests of the
community. This is in contrast to the current liberal representative system of
democracy where individuals seeking to further their interests battle each other to
impose their views on the state or local authority (Parekh, 1993).
LPG would require an institution or institutions which would provide access to
processes of policy formulation, deliberation and sanctioning. These institutions
would offer access to information, venues for discussion and office, administrative
and legal resources. Mosse (1995: 144) argues that participatory institutions are,
'constituted, negotiated and challenged in the context of existing structures of power'.
There are likely to be individuals who by way of their relative poverty in spheres of
life such as education, income and status find themselves effectively barred from
participating. It would be important that the institution develop a continuing internal
critique of their policies on ensuring basic standards of access, with the assumption
being that improvements could always be made. The institutions would also need to
organise the procedure through which local communities voted for a proposal.
16
Questions
Under LPG, central government would allow local people to act independently of the
government’s interests. However if the central state would not also be transformed by
the participatory ideal, then how would it relate to LGP? To what extent for example
could LPGs deal with matters concerning monetary policy, taxation, redistributive and
welfare measures, the workplace, industry, schools and hospitals? One possibility
would be for central government to fund LPGs. Each LPG would focus on what it
could add to what central government provides. Where an LPG could not be reach a
consensus, the money would go back to central government.
Under LPG, once local people had decided on a policy, the policy would need to be
implemented. This might be done by a locally elected executive or by bureaucrats
under the employment of the government. Alternatively, the policy itself might
specify who should implement it.
Critiques
It is often argued that people do not have the inclination or ability to participate in
participatory government (Holden, 1993). However under the model outlined, where
there is a lack of interest: then either no policy would be implemented and the status
quo would prevail; or the state would take the decision. A lack of interest would not
be a problem. Secondly, there are many contemporary examples of people engaging
in participatory activity which puts a lie to this notion (see Switzerland, Italy and
some US states in Budge, 1996). The huge amount of work expended by people
involved in local political, voluntary and civil society also suggests otherwise.
Furthermore the current lack of interest in initiatives that go under the name of
participatory democracy can be explained by the lack of power afforded by them. The
participatory system proposed here would offer people formal rights to determine
public policies. A second critique is that participatory government would lead to the
rule of activists (Holden, 1993). This applies to any system of rule. Some might retort
that under representative democracy the activists are representative and under a
17
participatory system they are not. This critique rests on the idea that participatory
government means giving exclusive policy making rights to a band of self-selecting
citizens. However the system offered here extends the right to make and sanction
policy to all citizens.
Conflict
Local participatory government would draw resources away from the state, reducing
its effectiveness in promoting national economic growth. Abrahamson (1977: 208) a
staunch advocate of participatory democracy defines the dilemma, 'It is hard to deny
that centralization, concentration of resources, increasing expert functions… very
often lead to gains in efficiency'. But the ethos behind participatory democracy is to
ask 'whose efficiency' or if we are to consider that efficiency always presupposes an
outcome 'whose outcome'? Centralised decision-making is effective precisely because
it subordinates the will of others and incorporates them into its projects. 'Strong
government' is what happens when a government has enough power to insert
everyone and everything into its agenda, regardless of what others feel (Marr, 1995:
16).
Many people value living in a relatively wealthy and powerful country, both of which
are the consequences of a centralisation of power and a number of government
impositions. Ascending the ranks and exercising the impositions of hierarchical
organisations are also valued. For this reason the values of participatory democracy
and political equality are often held in abeyance in day to day living. Nevertheless
support for them continues to bubble under the dominant discourses of our age. The
following comment was made by the Secretary of State for Scotland (Reid, 2000):
Anyone who thinks that the state in itself can solve all problems or that
the state enshrines all compassion, all goodness falls into error. What we
have to try and do is to use the state to enable individuals and groups in
what we could call civil society to accomplish an element of their own
liberation and their own advancement because the state does not know
the best ways of doing everything. And people in localities and
18
communities and groups very often understand their own problems
better, they can think up their own solutions more appropriately and
tailor made to themselves so the state should be, wherever possible, an
enabler.
With enough support and will power the values of participatory democracy, inherent
in this politician's statement, could be used to inform real change.
Conclusion
Public participation under New Labour and Conservative governments has meant
involving the public in discussions about how the government and state agencies
should, could and will take decisions. To the extent that this method leads to the
participating public gaining greater control of decisions that affect their life, then it is
through decision-makers agreeing to act in accordance with what they say. However,
the literature suggests that often decision-makers do not in accordance with what the
participating public says. This article has argued that this is because the democratic
nation state tends to be influenced only by groups that possess resources that the state
wants and cannot get at less cost or at all, that threaten the state and its projects,
and/or that are made up by a large number of voters. The participating public rarely
constitutes one of these three groups; therefore it rarely influences local state agencies
or the government. If the participating public is to influence, then the government has
to enforce a thought through model of participation that guarantees local state
agencies act in accordance with the public’s expressed wishes.
Please send letters and enquiries on this article to [email protected]
19
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