International Cooperation
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Anarchy – No central authority outside of states
to require or enforce cooperation
Cooperation can be military, economic, other
National interests: Some common interests,
some interests may be in competition or conflict
Cooperation requires
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Positive sum mentality (vs zero-sum)
Potential for greater rewards/gains if cooperate
Communication mechanism
Not TOO many countervaling interests
Stag Hunt: What’s the Rational Choice
• Cooperate with other cavemen & hunt the stag?
– If all cooperate, all get lots of meat
– If even one defects to go after a rabbit on his own,
the rest get nothing (stag gets away)
• Defect and go for the rabbit?
– Definite source of a little meat
• What will the other hunters do? Can you trust
them and will they trust you? What is the risk?
• Pursue immediate short-term self interest or is
there a basis for long-term common interest?
Consider the Caveman’s Options
• In addition to food, needs security against bears
• Similar benefits and risks as with Stag Hunt
• Cooperate with other cavemen & fight bear?
– If all cooperate (a few guard, all rally to fight bear):
• All are generally safer, can sleep better
• But each risk death in fighting bear
– If even one guard defects to go sleep or hide, the rest
may get eaten
• Or do you defect and go hide or sleep?
– Definite short term safety (assuming bear goes into
someone else’s cave)
Consider the Caveman’s Options II
• What will the other cavemen do? Can you trust
them and will they trust you? What is the risk?
• Pursue immediate short-term self interest or is
there a basis for long-term common interest?
• Options:
– Wait until bear shows up, then try to rally (Coalition)
– Agree ahead of time that if bear appears, all will rally
to fight it (Collective Security)
– Subset of cavemen form a tribe (maybe on basis of
who feels most threatened), organize a guard, practice
to fight bear (Alliance or Collective Defense)
Security Cooperation: Coalitions
• Ad Hoc group formed to cooperate in fighting a
specific conflict
• Both 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf wars against
Iraq were fought by coalitions, formed just for
those conflicts
• Everything may have to be done on the fly,
procedures and agreements made up as the
operation progresses
– Minimal chance for partners to practice together
– Language, equipment and cultural differences may be
a problem
Cooperation: Collective Security
• Any aggression must be met by all as a matter of
law enforcement
• League of Nations, United Nations (somewhat)
• Limitations:
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Requires some agreement on what to do
Enforces status quo rather than address injustice
Members may promise action but not deliver
Takes time to put together operation for each event
Not as flexible or fast as a unilateral response
Small conflict can escalate as more join operation
• Free Rider problem
Cooperation: Collective Defense
• Formal Alliances for long term threat
• Attack against one by outsider is attack against all
– All may have to agree on HOW to respond
• NATO, World War I alliances
• Big investment
– Develop combined procedures, communications,
weapons standards
– Practice together
– Requires sizable military expenditures
• May have free rider problem
• If threat changes, alliance may falter
Economic Cooperation
• Trade agreements such as NAFTA or WTO
• Producer Cartels such as OPEC
• Financial institutions such as
– World Bank
– International Monetary Fund
• Health: WHO
• Communications: How to divide the electronic
spectrum
World Government?
• Discussed many times
• Has some benefits
• Seems unlikely that world actors such as states
would all give up their sovereignty to such a body
– Cultures differ: Democracy vs Authoritarianism
– Significant trust needed. High stakes stag hunt?
• United Nations?
• A federation?
UN Charter and Legal Use of Force
• Charter authorizes force under three conditions:
– Unilaterally in self-defense: US Afghanistan in 2001
– Multilaterally if authorized by UN Security Council
“to maintain or restore international peace & security”
– Multilaterally by regional collective defense action to
aid alliance member in self-defense: NATO &
Afghanistan
• Preserves each state’s sovereignty
• Does not legalize intervention in civil wars or
humanitarian/human rights problems unless
– State authorizes OR
– UN Security Council feels conflict will spread
United Nations
• General Assembly: All members have a vote
– 2/3 majority for budget, big issues
– Elects members to bodies and commissions
• Security Council (15 members)
– Maintain international peace & security
– Permanent Members (5) can veto resolutions, need 9
– Military activity rare
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No military of its own; Requires member contributions
Korea was UN action: UNCMAC still there today
1991 Gulf War was UN authorized, but not UN action
Frequently paralyzed during Cold War or over Israel
– Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping – A Misnomer?
• Consensual between warring parties with a truce
• Not to take sides. Provides “honest broker” to:
– Lessen surprise, slow an attack
– Act as tripwire for other nations’ involvement
• Defends self only
– Does not impose or enforce peace
• Examples
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Egypt & Israel 1956-1967, 1975 to today
US in Lebanon 1983
Somalia 1993
Bosnia 1990s