JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT, 1981, WI,7-18
The Ethos of Games
Fred DYAgostino
The Australian National University
This paper is concerned with games of the ordinary kind such as cricket, baseball,
soccer, hockey, and basketball, and not with practices (speaking, behaving morally,
etc.), which may or may not be games, or which may be games only in some
metaphorical sense.' What I say may, however, have some bearing on our understanding of such practices.
My aim is to show that it is important to recognize that any particular game has an
ethos as well as a set of formal rules. By the ethos of a game I mean those conventions determining how the formal rules of that game are applied in concrete circumstances.
I will consider a widely canvassed account of games that does not recognize the importance of the ethos of a game, show that this account is irreparably defective in
various ways, and show that an account of games which recognizes that every game
has an ethbs is not defective in these ways and has other advantages as well.
Formalism
I use the term "formalism" to refer to an account of games according to which
various game-derivative notions are defined solely in terms of the formal rules of a
game. According to formalism, then, for a particular game G:
1. 'is playing G' MEANS 'is foIlowing the formal rules of G'. "To engage in a
practice
means to follow the appropriate rules." (8: p. 26)
2. 'is action in G' MEANS 'is action in accordance with the formal rules of G'.
"Action breaking a rule will be ineffectual or impossible within the rule-context,
or it will be judged not in that context at all." (5: p. 270)
3. 'is an instance of G' MEANS 'is activity in accordance with the formal rules
of G'. "If an instance of behavior does not fulfill the rules of a game ...
[we] discount the behavior as an instance of playing the game." (3: p. 73)
4. 'wins G' MEANS 'succeeds by means of activity in accordance with the formal
rules of G'. "One cannot (really) win the game unless he plays it, and one cannot
(really) play the game unless he obeys the rules of the game." (10: p. 150)
...
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VIII
As stated, formalism is a very strong thesis. We shall see just how strong in the
next section. I do not define formalism in this way in order to set up a straw man,
however; I have in fact at least three reasons for defining formalism in this way: (a)
formalism informs many philosophically standard accounts of games; (b) those
philosophers who have recognized that formalism is, as I will argue, overly strong
have by and large done so in the context of otherwise formalistic discussions of
game^;^ (c) formalism has a valid kernel or core; it does help illuminate certain
aspects of games. I will consider this third point in the next section.
Proformalistic Considerations
One can have various personal ends in view when playing a particular game. But
whatever these ends, one thing is clear: One's means for achieving these ends are importantly limited in ways they would not be in a more purely "technical" exercise. If
one chooses to realize some end by playing a particular game, then there are some
means t o that end which one cannot appropriately employ. It is quite natural to suppose that the rules of the game determine the limits on the means which can be
employed in playing that game to achieve some particular end. Black (1: p. 124) put
this point as follows: "Games of skill are played for the sake of winning according to
the rules (if all you wanted was a touchdown, why not shoot the opposing team?)."
Here, then, is part of the appeal of formalism when it is formulated as a strong
thesis. If 'is playing G' MEANS 'is following the formal rules of G', then we can explain why participants in a game employ only limited means (and means limited only
in particular ways) to achieve whatever ends they may have in view. The explanation
is as follows. It is a consequence of formalism that 'to achieve an end by playing G'
MEANS 'to achieve an end by following the rules of G'. But the behavior of one
who follows such rules is limited by them in particular ways.
Formalism also has a ready and plausible explanation for another important and
undoubted fact about games. When someone refuses to submit to authoritative official decisions about the conduct of some game G, he or she will, in the ordinary
course of events, be banished from the field of play or be held to have forfeited the
game (or both). Here is another part of the appeal of formalism. When it is formulated as a strong thesis, we can explain why participants in a game who refuse to
submit to authoritative official decisions are banished from the field of play. The explanation is this. According to formalism, 'is playing G' MEANS 'is following the
formal rules of G'. But authoritative official decisions about the conduct of G invoke the formal rules of G. Following these rules thus entails being willing to submit
to such decisions. From this, it in turn follows that a necessary condition for the
truth of 'x is playing G' is that x be willing to submit to authoritative decisions invoking the rules of G.'It is a consequence of formalism, then, that 'is unwilling to submit to authoritative decisions about G' MEANS 'is unwilling to play G'. But it is
natural to banish from the field of play persons who are unwilling to behave as
players.
Formalism as I have formulated it is not a straw man, then, at least partly because
it does have explanatory power with respect to some important features of games.
This is the appealing side of formalism. I consider its unappealing side in the next
section.
THE ETHOS OF GAMES
Antifowalist Considerations
At least two telling points against a formalist account of games exist.
1. If 'is playing G' MEANS (as it does according to formalism) 'is following the
formal rules of G' then a formalist account of games effaces the distinction in ordinary language between playing and playing fairly (i.e., according to the rules).
Against formalism, we might maintain, with Quinn (7: p. 80), that "it seems more
reasonable to say that the cheater is not playing fairly than that he is not playing at
all." Furthermore, one need not regard ordinary language as authoritative to find
this distinction an important and useful one. It is useful, for instance, in explanatory
contexts. Why was x penalized? It seems right to say that x was penalized because he
or she was not playing fairly. It does not seem right to say that x was penalized
because he or she was not playing at all. If this individual was not playing at all, then
what is the point of penalizing him?
2. According to formalism, 'x is an instance of G' MEANS 'x is activity in accordance with the formal rules of G'. But in this case, formalists are driven to a kind of
Platonism about games. For them, games are ideal types; they are only very imperfectly realized in their alleged instances. Certainly, any instance of Gin which any
rule of G is violated is not, on this account, really an instance of G.
Two points need to be made about the Platonistic implications of a formalist account of games. First, we have no reason to believe that formalists intended their account of games to be an account only of "ideal" games that are very imperfectly
realized by the games people actually play, If they did have some such intention, then
what is the point of their occasional ad hoc remarks about the excessive strength of
formalism? Presumably, formalism could be excessively strong only if it were intended as an account of "real" games. Second, it is, in any event, not clear that
Platonism about games is as innocuous as is Platonism in the natural or social
sciences. When a scientist constructs an ideal type model of an actual physical or
social system, the construction is justified to the extent that the behavior of the real
system approximates that of the ideal system more and more closely as certain
limiting conditions are approximated. And, if formalism is correct, this suggests that
a "real" game should approximate its ideal type (in which no rule-violating behavior
occurs) as its players become more and more skillful. But this, of course, is not the
case. Although it may be true that more skillful players unintentionally engage in
rule-violating behavior less frequently than less skillful players, it certainly need not
be true that "real" games between more skillful players approximate more closely to
their ideal types than do "real" games between less skillful players. More skillful
players may intentionally engage in rule-violating behavior more frequently than less
skillful players. (As we shall see, this depends on the ethos of the "real" game which
they are engaged in playing.)
Of these anti-formalist considerations, this latter is, I think, the more telling. In
the next two sections, I will construct a defense for formalism against this point, and
subsequently, I will show why this defense fails.
The Problem of Platonism
Formalism entails that no activity is an instance of some particular game G if any
rule of G is violated during that activity. This, in turn, entails that formalism pro-
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vides what I have called a Platonistic account of games: if a rule of G is violated during an alleged instance of G, then this alleged instance is not in fact a genuine instance of G . This consequence of formalism can, however, apparently be avoided by
interpreting the rules of a game in a particular way.
We might propose, then, that the rules of a game G are all conditional in
form-that is, that they have one of a number of normal forms such as
R,: if x performs action a, then x makes move m in G,or
Rp: if x performs action b, then x is subject to penalty p.
I call this proposal the regimentation thesis, since it embodies the claim that the
forms of the rules of a game can be regimented in a particular way.
Now, if all of the rules of G have some such forms as R, and R p and, in particular, if none of the rules of G has the form
R,: action b is prohibited in G,
it then follows that no rule of G can be violated. For instance, x does not violate a
rule of the form Rp if he or she performs the action b. A rule of this form, unlike a
rule of the form Rv, does not prohibit the performance of action b, and so is not
violated if some player does perform this a ~ t i o n . ~
The regimentation thesis, then, provides a solution for the problem of Platonism.
If the regimentation thesis is accepted, formalism does not entail a Platonistic account of games. This is so because formalism does entail Platonism only if it is possible to violate the rules of a game. But it is precisely this possibility which the regimentation thesis rules out. Any activity which positively instantiates the rules of G will,
on this account, count as a genuine instance of G.
Before saying why this solution does not really rescue formalism from all of its difficulties, it may be appropriate to consider the status of the regimentation thesis.
This thesis is not an empirical one. It is not a claim about the forms of rules of games
as these are actually recorded in official rulebooks. It is, rather, a proposal of a kind
rather similar to Quine's (6: $33) proposal about the regimentation of ordinary
language. According to the regimentation thesis, we can better understand the
nature of games by treating their rules as if t h e did in fact conform to the standard
normal forms R, and Rp. This proposal is incorrect, however, as I will show in the
next section.
Against the Regimentation Thesis
There is at least one good reason for rejecting the regimentation thesis and, with it,
the possibility of defending formalism in the way previously outlined. We would
normally be inclined to say, and it is explanatorily useful to be able to say, that a
penalty in G is invoked because some rule of G has been violated. The point of
penalties in G is to punish violations of the rules of G. But the regimentation thesis
rules out the possibility of describing the point of penalties in this way. If the
regimentation thesis is correct, then the rules of some game cannot be violated and, a
fortiori, we cannot say that penalties in G have been imposed because the rules of G
have been violated. To preserve a quite sensible account of penalties, then, we must
THE ETHOS OF GAMES
reject the regimentation thesis and, with it, the possibility of avoiding the Platonistic
implications of formalism.
Of course, the recommended account of penalties is that suggested by our ordinary intuitions about games. Rejecting these intuitions, the formalist might offer
something like the following alternative account of the point of penalties. A
regimented rule of the form Rp of G specifies a kind of behavior b and a kind of
penalty p which is to be invoked when b is performed in G. The penalty p is invoked
against b, then, because invoking p is, according to the rule of the form Rp, the appropriate official response to b.
Ordinary intuitions aside, why is this account of penalties less satisfactory than
that supported by these intuitions? This alternative account of penalties suggests that
the only rational motive a participant in G might have for refraining from b is that
engaging in such behavior is likely to be technically inefficient since it is likely to be
penalized. But, surely, participants in G often refrain from b, not for reasons of
technical efficiency, but because they believe that engaging in b is, by and large, inappropriate in the context of G. It is the inappropriateness, rather than the technical
inefficiency of penalty-liable behavior which this alternative account of penalties
fails to capture. The standard account, on the other hand, has a ready explanation
for this fact. On this account, penalty-liable behavior is inappropriate because it is
prohibited. Thus, ordinary intuitions aside, the formalist account of penalties is less
satisfactory than the standard account.
Invoking the regimentation thesis rids formalism of its Platonistic implications
only at the cost of exacerbating the problem of penalties. In the next section, I will
construct a defense of formalism which takes the problem of penalties as a central
concern. Subsequently, I will show why this defense of formalism also fails.
The Problem of Penalties
With or without the regimentation thesis, formalism cannot satisfactorily explain
the nature of penalties. We can apparently solve this problem, however, by
distinguishing two different kinds of rules of games.
We might propose that each rule of G is either a constitutive rule or a regulative
rule, but not both constitutive and regulative. We might further propose: (a) that
only the constitutive rules of G define various G-derivative notions ('is playing G',
'is an instance of G', etc.), and (b) that all the penalty-invoking rules of G are
regulative rules and have the normal form R,. (On this account, every penaltyinvoking rule of G is regulative, but not constitutive. For instance, the rule in football prohibiting "clipping" is, on this account, a regulative but not a constitutive
rule of football.)' I call this proposal the dichotomization thesis, because it embodies
the claim that the set of rules of G can be dichotomized unequivocally into two
subsets; namely, the subset consisting of the constitutive rules of G and the subset
consisting of the regulative rules of G.
The dichotomization thesis provides a plausible solution for the problem of
penalties. If x performs some action b prohibited by some regulative rule of G, then
x ipso facto violates that rule, and this is the reason why x is penalized for performing that action. In short, if we interpret formalism in terms of the dichotomization
thesis, then no problem of penalties is posed for formalism.
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VIII
But since, on this account, only the constitutive rules of G define various
G-derivative notions, the dichotomization thesis also apparently provides a solution
for the problem of Platonism. If we say that 'is an instance of G' MEANS 'is activity
in accordance with the constitutive rules of G', then only those alleged instances of G
in which the constitutive rules of G are violated would fail to be genuine instances of
G. Since, on this account, the regulative rules of G do not define G, the many
candidate-instances of G in which only regulative rules of G are violated are, as
commonsense dictates, genuine instances of G . In short, if we interpret formalism in
terms of the dichotomization thesis, then formalism apparently has no Platonistic
implications.
Before saying why this solution does not really rescue formalism from its various
difficulties, it may be appropriate to consider the status of the dichotomization
thesis. Like the regimentation thesis, the dichotomization thesis is a proposal, rather
than an empirical claim. According to the dichotomization thesis, it is possible to
treat the rules of a game as if each rule were unequivocally either constitutive or
regulative, but not both, and to do so without conceptual or explanatory loss. In the
next section, I will show that this proposal is, in fact, incorrect.
Against the Dichotomization Thesis
There are two related reasons for supposing that formalism, as interpreted by the
dichotomization thesis, does not provide a satisfactory account of games.
1. According to the dichotomization thesis, all of the penalty-invoking rules of a
game G are regulative, not constitutive rules of G. As such, the penalty-invoking
rules of G do not define G or the various G-derivative notions.
Consider, then, a regulative rule r of G, and the game G ', which differs from G
only in that r is not a (constitutive or regulative) rule of G '. Because r does not define
G, the games G and G ' are, according to formalism, the same game. For some
choices of r, our intuitions about G and G ' will probably confirm this alleged identity. But for other choices, our intuitions are likely t o be radically at variance with
this alleged identity. For instance, let G be soccer, and let r be the rule prohibiting
"handball." Is G ' here the "same" game as G? It seems clear that this identity fails
to obtain in this case. (There is probably a continuum of cases in this regard.) Of
course, we could avoid this conclusion by defining a game G i n terms both of its constitutive and some of its regulative rules. But this account would again have
Platonistic implications.
The dichotomization thesis and formalism together entail that G and G ' are the
same game just when they have the same constitutive rules, whatever their respective
regulative rules might be. This claim is, in certain cases, refuted by compelling
commonsense intuitions about the "identity of games." Thus, the dichotomization
thesis cannot provide a satisfactory interpretation for the formalist account of
games.
2. The argument just presented in effect establishes, contrary to the dichotomization thesis, that the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is (for games
at least) somewhat arbitrary. A rule which is regulative from the formal point of view
(a penalty-invoking rule of the form Rv)may be constitutive from the intuitive point
of view.6 But, in fact, even if this dichotomy were not arbitrary in this way, it could
be drawn only in a way which reduces, but does not entirely eliminate, the Platonistic
implications of a formalist account of games.
THE ETHOS OF GAMES
13
Among the constitutive rules of G will be rules that define various moves in G and
their effects, e.g., rules of the form
R,: i f x performs action a in G , then x scores in G.
Among the regulative rules of G will be rules which prohibit actions in G and specify
the sanctions to be applied if such actions are performed in G, e.g., rules of the form
Rv-
Let us now consider a player
- x of G who performs the action a referred to in a rule
of the form R,. Does this fact suffice to determine that x has scored in G? It does
not, since, in performing a, x might also have performed the action b which is referred to in and prohibited by a rule of the form R,. Because x violated this regulative
rule by performing the action b, the fact that he or she also performed the action a
does not suffice to qualify this individual as scoring in G. Consequently, we might
say, in this case, that rules of the form Rs implicitly refer to rules of the form R,, and
thus ought to be construed as having the normal form
R,*: i f x performs action a in G , without at the same time performing any action prohibited by any regulative rule o f G, then x scores in G .
... - ..- - - ---
We can now see that interpreting formalism in terms of the dichotomization thesis
reduces, but does not eliminate, the Platonistic implications of formalism. I take
these points in turn.
a. Even if the constitutive rules of G have some such normal form as R,*, activities
in which the regulative rules of G are violated may still count as genuine instances of
G. For rules of this form are conditional and thus cannot be violated by players even
when these players violate the regulative rules to which these constitutive rules implicitly refer. The player x does not violate a rule of the form Rs* when he or she performs the action b prohibited by some regulative rule of the form R,. Of course, in
the normal course of events, neither will x be adjudged to have scored in G, even
though he or she may also have performed the action a referred to in a rule of the
form Rs*. If we interpret formalism in terms of the dichotomization thesis, then at
least some of its Platonistic implications can be avoided.
b. However, interpreting formalism in terms of the dichotomization thesis does
not suffice to eliminate all of its Platonistic implication. We can see this as follows.
According to the dichotomization thesis, only the constitutive rules of G define
various G-derivative notions. We have seen that the dichotomization thesis must be
modified slightly to take account of the fact that the constitutive rules of G implicitly
refer to the regulative rules of G. Consider now an alleged instance of G in which the
player x performs the action a referred to in a rule of the form Rs*; at the same time
performs the action b referred to in a regulative rule of the form R,; and, finaIly, is
judged by game officials to have scored in G. Is this alleged instance of G a genuine
instance of G?
From an intuitive point of view, the answer to this question depends on the reason
why game officials (incorrectly) credited x as scoring. Some reasons-the officials
were bribed by x-would clearly disqualify this alleged instance of G as a genuine instance of G. But other reasons-honestly mistaken judgment-would just as clearly
not disqualify this alleged instance of G as a genuine instance of G . Game officials
do (often) make honest mistakes, but this fact does not, from an intuitive point of
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view, disqualify as game action activity in which such mistakes are made.
From the formalist point of view, however, the reason for mistaken official judgment is irrelevant. If the constitutive rules of G define the G-derivative notion 'is an
instance of G', and if these rules have some such normal form as R,* above, then an
official who mistakenly applies such rules engages in behavior not in accordance with
them, and any activity in which such mistakes occur is thus ipso facto not a genuine
instance of G. In short, interpreting formalism in terms of the dichotomization thesis
does not suffice to eliminate its Platonistic implications.
We cannot, then, rescue formalism from its various difficulties by interpreting it in
terms of the dichotomization thesis. An account of games other than that offered by
formalism is required. In the next section, I will offer such an account.
The Ethos of Games
To see why formalism fails as an adequate account of games, consider, for instance, the game of basketball. (A very similar story could be told about football,
hockey, and many other games.)
According to the formal rules of basketball, basketball is a "noncontact" sport: in
general, physical contact between players is prohibited by the rules of basketball. But
any game of American professional basketball is filled with (one might almost say
consists of) incidents in which players (accidentally or deliberately) make contact
with one another.' Of course, only some of these incidents are observed by game officials. But only some even of these observed incidents actually result in the invocation of penalties. Why is this so? This is so because the players and game officials
have, in effect, conspired to ignore certain of the rules of basketball, at least in certain situations, in order to promote certain interests, which they share, for instance,
with team owners and spectators-e.g., to make the game more exciting than it
would be if the rules were more strictly enforced.
Of course, when I say that the players and officials (in effect) conspire to ignore
certain rules in certain situations, I do not mean to suggest that these particular rules
cease to have any possible bearing on the conduct of the game. The formal rules of
basketball specify sanctions which can be invoked, even though they are often ignored. Furthermore, a game in which certain kinds of foul moves are regularly ignored need not degenerate into anarchy, since there is, implicit in the ways in which
basketball games are played and officiated, an unofficial system of conventions
which determines how the official rules of the game will be applied in various concrete circumstances. Foul moves which deviate, not from the formal rules per se, but
from the formal rules as these are interpreted in terms of a particular set of implicit
conventions will, in fact, be penalized if detected. This, then, is the answer to Black's
rhetorical question: "Why not shoot the opposing team?" Furthermore, this implicit
set of conventions for interpreting the formal rules of basketball can be inferred by
players from their own experience, and they can thus learn what sorts of formally
prohibited behavior are, in some sense, "acceptable." To determine the conventions
which guide game officials in their application of the formal rules of a game, it does
not suffice simply to consult the formal rules of that game: One must make this
determination empirically, by investigating the actual practices which these conventions sanction.
-
THE ETHOS OF GAMES
15
In short, the unofficial, implicit, empirically determinable conventions which
govern official interpretations of the formal rules of basketball constitute the ethos
of American professiofial basketball.
The ethos of a game in effect provides the basis for making two distinctions where
the formal rules of that game provide the basis for making only one such distinction.
Thus, the formal rules of a game distinguish between behavior which is permissible
(in that game) and behavior which is impermissible. On a formalist account of
games, this distinction is interpreted as a distinction between behavior that is part of
the game and behavior that is not part of the game at all. But the ethos of a game
distinguishes between behavior that is permissible, behavior that is impermissible but
acceptable, and behavior that is unacceptable. Permissible behavior is, on this nonformalist account of games, either in accordance with the formal rules of a game or
violates those rules only in a way which, according to the ethos of that game, does
not require the invocation of penalties. Impermissible but acceptable behavior, on
this account, violates the rules of the game in a way which, according to the ethos of
that game, does require the invocation of penalties. And unacceptable behavior
violates the rules of the game in a way which, according to the ethos of that game,
disqualifies its perpetrator as a player of that game. According to this nonformalist
account of games, only such unacceptable behavior is not game-behavior; only a
player engaging in such behavior ips0 facto ceases to be a player. (The ethos of a
game also distinguishes between those mistaken official judgments which are acceptable, and those which are unacceptable. This answers the point raised in the
penultimate paragraph of the last section.)
I have suggested that our speculations about basketball would help us to see why
formalism fails as an adequate account of games. Formalism fails, then, because its
advocates ignore the role which the ethos of a game plays in defining various gamederivative notions. The ethos of a game G is that set of conventions which determines how the rules of G are to be applied in concrete circumstances. The ethos of G
should thus figure in the definition of various game-derivative notions in the following way. Where, according to formalism, 'is an instance of G' MEANS 'is activity in
accordance with the formal rules of G', our nonformalist account suggests that 'is an
instance of G' should be understood as meaning 'is activity in accordance with the
formal rules of G as these are interpreted by the ethos of G'. (This same transformation can be carried out for the other game-derivative notions.)
w h y is such a nonformalist, ethos-incorporating account of games superior to the
formalist account? First, the nonformalist account does not entail a Platonistic interpretation of games. Any alleged instance of some game G is, according to our nonformalist account, a genuine instance of G so long as it is activity within the
limits jointly defined by the formal rules of G and the ethos of G-i.e., so long as it
is "acceptable" activity in the sense already specified. According to formalism,
however, activity within these limits which is not strictly in accordance with the formal rules of G will not count as a genuine instance of G. Formalism is Platonistic, in
short, precisely because its advocates have failed to recognize the importance of the
ethos of games.
Second, the problem of penalties has a trivial solution once we recognize the importance of the ethos of games. On the ethos-ignoring, formalist account of games,
penalty-invoking rules have the normal form of prohibitions-i.e., have the normal
form R,. When a prohibited action is performed, a penalty is invoked because the
rule prohibiting such an action has been violated. As we have seen, the formalist can
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offer such an account of penalties only at the cost of accepting a Platonistic interpretation of games, But an account of games that recognizes the importance of the
ethos of games pays no such price. Penalties are invoked, on this nonformalist account, when rules prohibiting certain actions are violated in a way which, according
to the ethos of the game, requires the invocation of a penalty. But action of this kind
is, generally, action within the limits jointly defined (as "acceptable" if impermissible) by the rules and the ethos of the game in question. Those who engage in ruleviolating behavior therefore only rarely ipso facto cease to be players on this nonformalist account.
Third, an account of games which recognizes the importance of the ethos of games
explains a number of facts and intuitions about games which must remain puzzling
on a formalist account.
a. Most habitual spectators would find a game of basketball in which no ruleprohibited actions were performed an extremely strange game of basketball. But
such a game is, from the formalist point of view, an ideal game of basketball. We can
explain the perceived "strangeness" of such a game only when we take into account
the prevailing ethos of basketball, according to which all sorts of rule-violating
behavior is, in fact, "acceptable.'"
b. Game officials sometimes deliberately ignore a foul move in the explicit interest
of promoting some good (the continuity of play, an advantage gained by the opponents of the rule-violators, etc.). Such official action is, from the formalist pbint
of view, (generally) inexplicable. We can account for such action only when we take
into consideration the role played by the ethos of a game in determining how the
rules of the game are applied. (Some games such as soccer, of course, incorporate a
formal rule that permits game officials to ignore rule-violating behavior in order to
"play the advantage." In such cases, the formalist account of games is, in this particular, on a par with the nonformalist account. For such games, we might say that
part of the ethos of the game has been assimilated to its formal rules. But this situation by no means pertains to all games. And where it does not pertain-as in basketball-only an account of games which recognizes the importance of the ethos of a
game will suffice.)
To all this, the formalist could, of course, reply that what I have called the ethos
of a game is, in fact, (an unwritten) part of what he or she calls the formal rules of
that game. This reply, however, is entirely ad hoc, since as far as I can tell, formalists
have never even noticed that a game has an ethos, let alone suggested that this ethos
forms a part of the rules of that game. In any event, my point is not that formalism
cannot be salvaged as an account of games. It is, rather, that if formalism is to be
salvaged, it must be supplemented, one way or another, by an account of the ethos
of games.
Conclusion
I have here considered the standard formalist account of games, according to
which various game-derivative notions are to be defined solely in terms of the formal
rules of games. I have argued that this account of games is defective because it has
Platonistic implications and because it fails to provide a satisfactory account of the
function of penalties in games. I have suggested that formalism is defective because
its advocates ignore the role of the ethos of a game in defining that game. The ethos
THE ETHOS OF GAMES
17
of a game is that set of unofficial, implicit conventions which determine how the
rules of that game are to be applied in concrete circumstances. On the nonformalist
account of games recommended here, game-derivative notions are defined jointly in
terms of the formal rules and the ethos of a game. I have shown that this nonformalist, ethos-incorporating account of games does not have Platonistic implications and does explicate the point of penalties. I have also shown that such an account explains certain facts and intuitions about games which must remain puzzling
on any formalist account.
Notes
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1. My particular thanks to Howard Burdick for his very helpful comments on a previous
version of this paper. Thanks also to Jack Smart and Chris Mortensen.
2. In the context of an otherwise formalistic discussion of games, Black (1: p. 123)
makes the literally parenthetical remark: "But of course occasional failure to observe
the rules is not ground for disqualification as a player." I agree with this remark,
but it is surely ad hoc in the context of Black's claim that "a man who failed to
'heed' the rules of chess would not count as playing the game." Of course, in,
Black's view, "heeding" does not entail "observing." There is no logical inconsistency
here. What there is is a puzzle: How much "observing" is entailed by the "heeding"
requirement? Black, too, finds this puzzling. He says that the "heeding" requirement
"seems to imply arso at least conformity with the rules on the whole." But puzzlement is not illumination, and without illumination, Black's remarks remain ad hoc
and unmotivated by anything more systematic than his quite correct intuitions about
games.
3. I claim that this condition for the truth of ' x is playing G' is, contra formalism,
the maximal necessary condition. I can here only sketch an argument to this effect. For the
purposes of this sketch, I will take it as given that Quinn (7: p. 80) has established that ' x
follows the rules of G' is too strong a necessary condition. Quinn himself suggests (p. 79)
that "being able to follow the rules of a practice is surely a necessary condition for engaging in that practice." But this condition is also too strong. Being able to follow the rules of
a game entails knowing those rules. But many games have quite recondite rules which are
known to few of the persons we would normally (and rightly) regard as players of those
games. Because such players do not know these (recondite) rules, they are not able to
follow them. Being able to follow the rules of a game cannot, then, be a necessary condition for being a player of that game. Being willing to submit to authoritative decisions
about even such recondite rules is, however, an unexceptionable necessary condition for
being a player. It is, I think, the maximal such necessary condition which can be formulated in a precise way.
4. I developed the regimentation thesis on the basis of a (literally) parenthetical remark
by Ganz (3: p. 94): "One doesn't necessarily violate a rule by committing a foul; instead
one's behavior might fall under a rule by so doing."
5. My formulation of the dichotomization thesis depends on a distinction drawn by Hart
(4: p. 9) between "those rules of a game which veto certain types of conduct under penalty ... and those which specify what must be done to score or to win." See also Searle
(9: $2.5).
6 . My claim that the constitutive/regulative dichotomy is arbitrary may be anticipated by
Black (1: pp. 123-124) and by Cherry (2: pp. 311-313).
7. According to the Boston Globe, the final quarter of the sixth playoff game between Boston and Philadelphia in 1981 "ticked down to a final quarter just bulging with
karate chops, goal-line stands and cross-body blocks, pro basketball played according to
NFL rules
Typical was a Bird follow-up basket that featured at least six different fouls
on the play-but no calls-and five bodies sprawled across the court."
....
18
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT-VOLUME VIII
Bibliography
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1962.
2. Cherry, Christopher. "Regulative and Constitutive Rules." Philosophical
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3. Ganz, Joan. Rules; The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
4. Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
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267-287.
6. Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1960.
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8. Rawls, John. "Two Concepts of Rules." Philosophical Review, 64 (1955),
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9. Searle, John. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
10. Suits, Bernard. "What is a Game?" Philosophy of Science, 34 (1967). 148-156.