West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire
Review Lolo National Forest, U.S. Forest
Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
5/9/2014
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Identify actions taken by the Incident Management Team (IMT) and Forest to meet the
intent/direction of the Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol .......................................... 6
Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident
cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome ......................................... 8
Identify best business practices used on fires this past season ....................................................... 9
Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making ................................. 10
Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded ................................................ 11
Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations ......................... 12
Lessons Learned- Observations and Recommendations............................................................... 14
Fire Chronology ............................................................................................................................ 20
West Mullan Cost Appendices...................................................................................................... 33
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document
risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect
effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management
for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive
analysis of incident documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning
environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Review Objectives:
Objectively look at actions
taken by the Incident
Management Team and the
local Agency Administrator
to meet the direction
provided by the Forest
Service Chief
Asses the consideration and
effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to
incident cost through the
associated decisions and
expenditures as an outcome
Identify Best Business
Practices Used on Fires This
Past Season
Identify How Social and
Political Issues Factored Into
Our Decision Making
Purpose
On December 20, 2013, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and
Private Forestry (SPF) issued a letter requiring review of several large
Fiscal Year 2013 wildfires. The Washington Office Fire and Aviation
Management (FAM) staff, with input from the Northern Region Fire
and Aviation Management Director determined that the West Mullan
would be reviewed. Fires were selected based on complexity and
national significance. The designated fires represent a cross section of
our risk management and investment performance, which includes
financial, size, and oversight complexity. Further details will be sent to
individual Regions/Forests prior to each review. The reviews will be
conducted using the 2013 Risk Decision Framework. On January 17,
2014, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management
delegated Dan Kleinman to be the Team Leader for the 2013
Programmatic/Cost Fire Review for the West Mullan wildland fire that
occurred on the Lolo National Forest in Montana.
Identify Which Current
Procedures Can Be Enhanced
or Expanded
The purpose of the review is to learn from those who were involved
and share those learned lessons. The review objectives include:
Identify Improvements That
Can Be Made In Sharing and
Clarifying Expectations
 Conduct fire reviews to meet our responsibility to provide
oversight at the national level.
 Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management
Team and local Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided
by the Chief in his 6700; Chief’s Letter of Intent dated April 19, 2013.
 Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to incident cost through the associated
decisions and expenditures as an outcome.
 Identify best business practices used on fires this past season.
 Identify how social and political issues factored into our
decision making.
 Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or
expanded.
 Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and
clarifying expectations.
Review Team Members:
Tracey Nimlos, Incident
Business Coordinator,
Northern Region
Alex Sienkiewicz, District
Ranger, Gallatin National
Forest
Al Watson, District Ranger,
Pacific Southwest Region
Rick Connells, FFMO,
Flathead National Forest
Dan Rose, FFMO, Kootenai
National Forest
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Review Team Members
Continued:
Marty Mitzkus, AFFMO,
Helena/Lewis & Clark
National Forest
Reggie Day, DAFMO, Idaho
Panhandle National Forest
Bertram Smith, Helitack
Squad Leader, Flathead
National Forest
Review Team
The review team members consisted of: Tracey Nimlos, Incident
Business Coordinator, Northern Region; Alex Sienkiewicz, District
Ranger, Gallatin National Forests; Al Watson, District Ranger, Pacific
Southwest Region; Rick Connell, FFMO Flathead National Forest; Dan
Rose, FFMO Kootenai National Forest; Marty Mitzkus, AFFMO,
Helena/Lewis & Clark National Forest, Reggie Day, DAFMO, Idaho
Panhandle National Forest; and Bertram Smith, Helitack Squad
Leader, Flathead National Forest.
Background
The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Forest,
within the West Mullan ftp site, and on InciWeb. Documentation that
was reviewed included: Incident Action Plans (IAPs); Wildland Fire Decision Support
System (WFDSS); Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire maps; and cost summaries. Onsite interviews and phone interviews were held in Missoula and Superior Montana on
March 25-27, 2014. Those interviewed included: retired Forest Supervisor; Forest FMO
and deputy; Acting Forest Supervisor; District Ranger; District FMO; Incident Commanders;
Operations Section Chiefs; Montana State Emergency Management personnel; and County
Sheriff.
The review team found that there were many factors that influenced the outcome of the
West Mullan fire. It was a complex incident located in difficult terrain with multiple values
at risk including Wildland Urban Interface (WUI), national power grid, Montana Rail Link,
Interstate 90 and also a Hazardous Material Superfund site that caused concern for
firefighter safety.
The review team focused on the objectives of the review and was cognizant of not being
influenced by hindsight bias when reviewing documents or interviewing people. The team
had open discussions with personnel regarding the incident, their interactions, and what
they thought was important to be shared as lessons learned.
Critical Values at Risk
Values at risk in the fire area as identified by Forest Service (FS) representatives,
cooperators/partners, and stakeholders included: firefighters working in extreme terrain,
public/cooperator/partner relationships and jurisdictions, private structures and property,
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FS campgrounds, active timber sales, Iron Mountain Superfund site, the town of Superior,
MT, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) transmission lines, Montana Rail Link railroad,
and Interstate 90. Resource values such as road access for recreational use, wildlife
habitat, threatened and endangered species, watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were
identified by agency personnel. The community of St. Regis and Highway 135 are located a
distance from the fire but were not directly threatened.
West Mullan Fire – Summary of Actions
The West Mullan Fire was ignited on July 14, 2013 in Montana on the Lolo National Forest
(NF) Superior Ranger District and full suppression action was taken. The fire was deemed
human caused on July 22, 2013 and declared 100% contained on July 28, 2013. The West
Mullan Fire burned 6,282 acres.
The Lolo National Forest is a high fire frequency forest. However, energy release
component (ERC) was approaching the 90th percentile which contributed to this being a
statistically uncharacteristic early season large fire. The national preparedness level was 2
and the Lolo National Forest was at a preparedness level 3. Fire management submitted
for severity funding on July 22, 2013 and received confirmation July 28, 2013 allowing
requests for additional resource support for an already active initial attack (IA) load. At the
onset of the West Mullan fire the Lolo National Forest fire load consisted of 61 IA fires, 48
of which were human caused and 1 extended attack fire. The West Mullan fire was the first
fire of the season locally that was resistant to IA efforts.
The fire was detected by Superior Ranger District fire management personnel as it was
highly visible from the district office. Dispatch was contacted and IA action was taken at
approximately 1700 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT) on July 14, 2013. There were multiple
values at risk, extreme fire behavior, and rapid fire growth that led to the transition from
Type 3 Incident Commander (IC) to Tom Heintz Northern Rockies Type 2 Incident
Management Team (IMT). Heintz Team assumed command on July 16, 2013.
The fire behavior and proximity to the town of Superior, MT population 830, Interstate 90,
active timber sales, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) transmission lines that supply
power to the national grid; Montana Rail Link railroad, agency infrastructure and Flat
Creek Iron Mountain Mine (IMM) superfund (hazmat) site created a complex incident. The
imminent threat to the town of Superior prompted Stage 1 evacuations and operationally
aggressive fire suppression strategy.
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The close coordination between the cooperators and interagency entities allowed for
management of values at risk. The fire did impact one agency timber sale that contributed
to the salvage of part of that sale. The Interstate 90 corridor was not shut down or rerouted. The smoke impacts to BPA lines did not require de-energizing. Standard
precautions were in place for firefighter safety working near the Flat Creek Iron Mountain
Mine (IMM) superfund site.
There were seven Management Action Points (MAPs) developed, none of which were
breached. The general tactical approach included 24 hour operations, structure protection
and indirect fireline with burnout. As containment percentage increased evacuation orders
were lifted, rehab began and transfer of command back down to the local unit occurred on
July 29, 2013. The fire burned 1,534 acres of Plum Creek industry timber land, 1,233 acres
of State of Montana Department of Natural Resources (DNRC) land, 714 acres of private
land and 2,801 acres of FS land for a cost of $10,079,080. The Lolo National Forest is
responsible for wildland fire protection of all the noted lands due to the “Protection Offset
Agreement” with the State of Montana.
The
following
are key
observation
s and
correspondi
West Mullan Fire
West Mullan Fire
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Observation by Objective:
The following are key observations and corresponding
lessons learned organized by the four objectives of the
review.
Identify actions taken by the Incident Management Team (IMT) and Forest to meet
the intent/direction of the Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol
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The actions addressed the intent of the Chief’s letter. The strategy the IMT took was
fairly clear. The IMT utilized straight-forward full perimeter control. The risk
assessment was in-line with the strategy. The IMT “ramped-up and went heavy with
night-ops.” One person stated that night operations prevented the incident from
going bigger and being more costly. From one person interviewed, the Forest
wanted the fire put to bed before prime fire season kicked in. One person stated
“Truthfully there was not a lot of talk about costs…a little bit of consciousness there,
but it was more like, get what you need and keep that fire in the box.”
“There was a desire to avoid the long-duration fire scenario. It was stated that “we
wouldn’t have caught [the fire] without night-ops.” There was fear that one little
mistake during night operations would’ve taken the tool away.” From one
perspective there was a reluctance to go direct on the fire during the day due to fire
behavior and that night operations were a viable option. Also noted that Type 2
IMTs are not necessarily staffed or equipped for night-ops with the current staffing
level.
The 7 Standards and 5 Rights were managed within the WFDSS. The Forest
mirrored their partners’ language in their decision documents. Montana
Department of Emergency Services (MTDES) assisted Mineral County. The Forest
believes they met the intent of the Chief’s letter.
First WFDSS decision was difficult to meet timeframes of policy. There was not a lot
of deliberation over the course of action. The second decision had a Strategic
Operational Planner (SOPL) involved as well as IMT members. The WFDSS spatial
components are helpful, but the Forest would have made the same decision without
WFDSS. The Forest prefers the cost index they use better than the Stratified Cost
index (SCI) in WFDSS. The SCI just validated their cost index. They used FSPro and
short-term/near term fire behavior which validated what they already knew. The
WFDSS tools were used more to validate the decision that had already been made. A
Type 2 IMT was ordered because a lot of the values were at the heel of the fire with
the community.
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The Forest had developed partnerships early in the season and is something they do
annually to prepare for incidents. Partners getting together pre-season to go over
scenarios. Forest level delegations and responsibilities were discussed through
meetings and documentation.
Pre-incident meetings were critical for success. The Forest was very proactive in
pre-incident meetings and scenarios which led to joint response that was seamless.
Roles were defined early and trust was developed so decisions could be made in a
timely manner. Example being the IMT and the Sheriff’s Department were able to
work in concert regarding evacuations. The IMT took responsibility of when and
worked with the Sheriff’s Department to implement.
Building working relationships with local county and local government with
scenarios and meetings. Roles and responsibilities being outlined to facilitate a joint
group response.
The District Ranger (DR) felt the incident went well overall. The pre-season
preparedness was a big part of their success, noting that there are great
relationships between the FS home unit and county, local Rural Fire Department
(RFD), mayor, etc. The local unit and local cooperators are practiced at working
together. Also the DR meets monthly with County Commissioners. Because the fire
was right in town, there was a great deal of discussion about values at risk, including
homes, power lines, a superfund site, etc. The decision to utilize night operations
allowed them to get control of the fire more quickly. “Night operations actually
improved the overall safety of the effort by containing the fire more quickly.”
The Forest had recognized and formed priorities before the IMT arrived. The
decision to do full perimeter control and work a night shift contributed to reducing
firefighter exposure.
The representative from the MTDES stated that the forest had gone through great
lengths to building partnerships through pre-season meetings. This translated to
federal and local agencies being engaged from the beginning.
The Lolo NF had invested heavily in the pre-season work and had developed
outstanding relationships with the local community cooperators. The in-brief
included the risk analysis process. Lots of actions were in play before the team
arrived such as mutual aid for the local RFD that just needed support from the IMT
to organize.
With it being second year of policy letter the struggle wasn’t there. Superior Ranger
District personnel worked well together especially during the emergent phase. It
was obvious that they are used to working together.
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Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to
incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome
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Implementing a full night operations definitely contributed to overall costs savings
on the fire. Burnouts could have not been accomplished during the day as
effectively as at night.
Letter of delegation and meeting with IMT to give Leader’s Intent to fire personnel
was a major change from years ago where often line officers were not engaged with
employees at the ground level.
The forest articulated to the incoming team its intent for management of the fire and
also gave designation of authority to the Incident Commander (IC).
The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and the Montana
Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association developed the STAR agreement which
provides a mechanism to request additional law enforcement personnel from other
counties.
It was the local District Fire Management Officer’s (DFMO) perception that having a
night operation was beneficial in reducing the overall cost of the fire as they were
able to keep the containment area to a smaller footprint. Although the short-term
cost is larger due to 24 operational periods, the long-term impact to acres burned
and firefighter exposure was less.
There was a perception that the use of airtankers may have been excessive, but due
to the time lag when they arrived on the incident may have limited their use for the
long term.
Early in the fire, there was concern over the lack of overhead that the IMT was
supplying, particularly division supervisors and operations. Cause of concern from
the forest was that information was late coming in and on several occasions real
time fire information was not coming from the team but from locals. A cause for the
lack of management could be attributed to the forest’s insistence on running a night
operation that the team may not have had staff for day and night staffing.
The Logistics Section struggled with procurement of certain items such as reefers,
rental vehicles, etc. Kudos to the Dispatch Center Manager who addressed problems
quickly and successfully. There was confusion, in the context of procurement, as to
what “local” means, and how far away would still qualify as a “local” business or
resource.
The acknowledgement that all the values at risk ringed the “box” provided by the
Lolo NF at the in-briefing combined with the early season activity and conditions
enhanced the cost of this event. With day time fire behavior too extreme to facilitate
burnout opportunities, it was recommended by the Lolo NF and accepted by the
team, that a fully staffed operational night shift could increase the success of the
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suppression objective. Day light activities included significant use of aviation assets
to minimize fire spread also lead to increased costs, but again with considerable
values at risk around the fire, were appropriate.
Felt the costs were commensurate with the values at risk. Had to encourage the IMT
to be more aggressive in order to keep the fire from becoming a long-term event.
The request to build a long-term plan was done by the Forest to help solidify the
assumption that if the fire exceeded the box, it would be tough to deal with and
likely cost more and impact more values at risk.
The IMT used the Operational Planning Worksheet (ICS 215) and the Incident Safety
Analysis (ICS-215a) to identify work assignments, risks and chances of success.
Every day the Operations Section Chief (OSC) and the Safety Officer (SOF) went
through the process to complete the ICS 215 and the ICS 215a forms. The Agency
Administrator (AA) and Forest Fire Management Officer (FFMO) were involved on a
daily basis going through the risk analysis process.
There was no debate over costs when the fire was coming down the face toward the
town of Superior. The necessity to hold the fire in the box and away from power
lines was a bigger discussion later. They knew if they didn’t catch the fire and
contain it within the box, it would be big, long duration and expensive.
Running the night shift contributed significantly to containing the fire and precluded
it from becoming a long-term event. Even though initially it was more expensive to
run two shifts, overall costs were probably lower because of it.
Identify best business practices used on fires this past season
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Aircraft assigned to the fire were also supporting IA within the zone.
There was an overt effort from the IMT to only use the needed resources and also
release resources that were no longer needed in a timely manner. The IMT was very
efficient at this.
A Type 2 IMT was ordered instead of a more costly Type 1 IMT.
The community of Superior, MT remembered the last big fire. There was a lot of
desire to catch the fire quickly and put it to bed, for fear of other starts
compounding the situation. One person interviewed stated that “this was one of the
best experiences he’s ever had in regard to working with local communities and
partners.” The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was run very well. The public
information process went very well and made public meetings almost unnecessary.
The interviewee noted that the local fire chief was “very dialed-in” and used mutual
aid agreements well.
Fortunately this fire was early and the ability to get resources was not a limiting
factor. However, logistics were tough due to the delayed arrival of the Logistics
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Section Chief (LSC) and the limited availability of local logistical support; which the
team thought would be sufficient to cover for the delay. Additionally, there were
some issues with determining what the Forest meant when they requested the IMT
support “local” business when possible. Local was interpreted to mean Missoula by
the IMT and Buying Team, when the Forest meant Superior and St. Regis.
Pre-season agreements were slow to get implemented. Additionally, rental cars
were an issue.
Some lessons that were reaffirmed were the importance of maintaining
relationships with local entities; and the effective component that night shifts can be
when implemented safely. Cost-wise you are better to hit it hard with everything
you can and keep it from becoming a longer term event.
Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making
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The values at risk were self-evident, they knew immediately it was a full
suppression event. Public information drove some decisions and the need to
manage the media.
Stakeholders were part of the discussions, but did not have protection
responsibilities so they were part of the process, but not part of the WFDSS. BPA
probably did have influence on the decisions. The FFMO did not feel BPA
necessarily caused higher costs on the fire. BPA was engaged directly with concerns
to the power line and provided information at briefings.
There were no outside influences that effected decision making.
For the community of Superior, there is an annual softball tournament that is critical
to the community regarding tourist dollars. The IMT was sensitive to this and
worked with local community leaders to ensure that businesses were open and not
impacted by the fire as much as possible to allow the event to continue.
There were excellent relationships in place between the FS and community entities
and partners. The public was very supportive of the IMT and FS efforts. The Sheriff
was a key supporter and partner during the incident.
With local relationships well established, situations were handled without issue.
The use of the STAR Agreement to facilitate bringing in outside law enforcement
help to the county was unknown to the Sheriff. The community was very supportive
of the entire event.
Stakeholder meetings were held every day. They were briefed and given the
opportunity to provide input into the planning. The community of Superior was
holding public meetings at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) every day and
the IMT participated in those. Early on, input from the Sheriff and fire department
was critical to influencing how resources were assigned and how the IMT
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approached the situation. On the day of the burnout, the IMT felt better having the
extra local resources in place.
Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded
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At the beginning of the fire, there were issues with WFDSS in that the 24 hour policy
was difficult to meet.
A good in-brief and delegation should be sufficient instead of spending hours on
building WFDSS completely for the in-brief. Should Management Action Points
(MAPs) actually be “evaluation” instead of action, given that time and conditions
have likely changed and the “implementation” may need to change but we interpret
actions as fixed.
There were concerns noted for the law enforcement officers that were exposed to
wildfire hazard and operations and also unfamiliar with the IMT environment and
associated processes.
From the MTDES perspective, there was nothing to be enhanced but continually
strive to have a local and state government’s meeting prior to incidents to
determine roles and responsibilities for all risk incidents.
Continue to develop partnerships and utilizing night operations as a viable
suppression tool. Additionally, having the EOC engaged was valuable to keep a
consistent message and manage rumor control.
We did as well as one could with several acting’s in key positions on the Forest. The
local DR and DFMO were always available and present for the IMT. One person
noted the awkwardness of transitions and the question as to whether the IMT
should take the fire immediately upon arrival, or after an extended period of size-up
and information gathering. When it became clear that night operations were a
desirable strategy, there was question as to when was the right time to take the fire.
Night time medevac concerns were mitigated by the local ambulance being on call
and having EMT/Medics staged where the most folks were located.
How do we get an IMT up to speed in an immediate high tempo environment, when
the ability to gather experience in the environment is limited? Changes in policy
lead to challenges in aligning delegations, course of action, etc., when all the prework has been completed. Limits to staff due to budgets are limiting the ability to
generate paper work and meet time frames.
Commitment to IA versus large fire support, especially for aviation assets, needs to
be forcefully adhered to. “A Type 1 helicopter likely will have minimal effect on
large fire growth, but may have a large impact on an emerging fire.”
West Mullan was interesting and challenging, it was their first fire of the season.
There was a lot of potential on the face above the community of Superior. Part of
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the town was already evacuated when they arrived. Lots of structures threatened,
BPA power line. The IMT clearly understood from the briefing what their objectives
were, which triggered ordering additonal resources immediately. During the initial
and extended attack there was a lot of retardant delivered by airtankers. Lots of
media interest due to the high visibility from I-90. There was a high level of media
presence and with several public meetings. The IMT had a lot of interaction with the
local fire departments, county sheriff, and local EOC.
Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations
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There were communication struggles within the IMT. The Forest had to give strong
direction to beef up operations oversight. The Forest did not print out the
Organizational Needs Assessment or Relative Risk Assessment for the IMT as they
should have.
The FFMO’s involvement with the objectives included pre-loading them in WFDSS
by Fire Management Unit (FMU). They needed to be rolled into strategic objectives.
The FFMO or DFMO usually writes the delegation of authority. The Forest is
working on beefing up their delegation of authority templates so that they are
readily available for the next fire.
National filming contract was problematic on a number of issues. The Forest
Supervisor who received very little notice that there was an agreement to have the
filming crew follow the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) hotshot crew. Decisions
were being made at the fire level without discussions with Lolo NF line officers
which was putting firefighters at risk. Examples include the film crew wanting to be
at the head of the fire with Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) so they could get better
footage, the filming crew including Arnold Schwarzenegger wanted to take assigned
air resources to fly the fire for footage. Additionally, the MOU from the Boise office
was not readily available due to the weekend so no clarification could be made.
From what we gathered from a few interviews from forest personnel there could
have been improved communication from the firefighter to the IMT to the Forest.
This was attributed to the lack of operational oversight.
The Mineral County Sheriff was very satisfied with expectations and also
communication from the IMT. He specifically mentioned the IMT Public Information
Officer (PIO) for the team as being consistently engaged with the law enforcement
group and was able to keep them updated with timely information.
Expectations need to be in-sink up and down the line, this was a challenge. Changes
in mid-stride can be difficult when direction changes. When local firefighters who
are engaged in the incident report back to their supervisors their interpretation of
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what is going on but don’t have the big picture, that input when returned to the IMT
generates unnecessary friction.
If local managers are going to take a flight make sure an IMT representative goes
along so that consistent conversations and interpretations in the air can be made.
Some members of the IMT felt somewhat intimidated when they were told by the
Forest that “if they let the fire go outside a “box” that was drawn around it, a Type 1
IMT would be ordered.” With operational area that was defined by the Forest some
felt it didn’t give them much room to do anything other than direct attack.
Delegation and WFDSS decision was in place when they arrived. Objectives were
structure protection and full perimeter control. The IMT was given a tight box to
work within; an escape to the north would have put the fire in rough, inaccessible
country which would have caused the fire to be long duration with multiple IMTs.
Direction was pretty straight-forward when they arrived. The fire bumped up
against the box a couple of times, but they kept it inside the original parameters.
Balance local involvement at the tactical level. Day to day operations was mostly left
to the IMT but a couple of times the Forest got involved in some of the tactics being
used by the IMT.
There was no After Action Review (AAR) with the Forest, but there were discussions
during the IMT evaluation.
Clear direction from the Forest was present from the beginning, even though it
seemed like an ominous challenge at the time. Working with local communities and
integrating them into the operation ensures success in building relationships. The
IMT felt they could not have protected the town as well without having those folks
integrated into the operation.
West Mullan Fire
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Lessons Learned- Observations and Recommendations
National Priority
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Night Operations
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Multiple interview subjects suggested that in the West Mullan Fire utilization
of night operations strategies significantly contributed to overall mission
success. This success was borne-out in the context of limiting the duration of
the event; reducing the likelihood of higher costs associated with a longer
event; as well as limiting the exposure of dayshift firefighters facing more
extreme day-time fire conditions. Interviewees also suggested that the
utilization of night operations strategies contributed to overall incident
safety by limiting the overall duration and exposure that is associated with a
long-duration incident and the cumulative fatigue and exposure associated
with such incidents.
Although situational conditions (fuels, weather, terrain, resource availability,
values at risk, etc.) dictate whether night operations may or may not be
appropriate; there was consensus that night operations proved a valuable
tool in this incident. Although the daily costs of incident management might
have been higher than otherwise due to running double shifts with added
personnel, overall benefits to cost and risk management appear to have
contributed to successful incident management. Nonetheless, there was
concern among incident staff that the night shift tool would be taken away
with any mishap.
The discussion of night shift operations and their utility as a fire
management tool beg several policy questions:




Are night shift operations widely supported as a strategy and tool?
Is there sufficient expertise left in the agency to perform significant nightshift
operations safely?
Is there sufficient understanding of the potential safety and cost benefits in
utilizing night operations?
Has enough discussion of the costs vs. benefits of night operations played out
in the crafting of relevant policy?
14 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014

Are managers too quick to preclude night operations due to perceptions that
night operations are universally hazardous and do not offer sufficient
benefit?
Relevant Quotations








“The [fire’s] proximity to town, the freeway, the power line, steep ground
and risky terrain, and lots of values at risk meant we had to take action [on
the fire].
“There was a desire to avoid the long duration fire scenario. In my opinion,
we wouldn’t have caught the fire without night-ops.”
“The choice to work nightshifts allowed us to contain the fire much quicker.”
“The way it was burning at night; conditions lent themselves to success.”
“Using night shifts actually improved the overall safety of the effort by
containing the fire more quickly.”
“During the day, we were unable to do burnout operations due to the timing
of the fire season and other situational challenges.”
The Northern Region and their interagency partners developed the NRCG Decision
Document Template which outlines roles and responsibilities (including financial
responsibilities) for wildland fire, structure protection, structure suppression,
evacuations, road/highway management, and search and rescue. The Decision
Document Template may be utilized to document these types of decisions when
there will not be a cost share agreement, and allows us to document financial
responsibilities and significant decisions made with agencies that would not
normally be party to a cost share agreement, such as the Department of
Transportation or the Sheriff’s Department.
The Decision Document Template is also used to define selected cost share
methodologies agreed upon by AAs. The use of this template has allowed them to
streamline our cost share agreements to only include the basic information needed
by agency payment centers. Once a cost share agreement is completed, it becomes
an addendum to the Decision Document Template. One of the major advantages to
using the Decision Document Template is that filling out the template and
identifying responsible parties assists AAs with the decision-making and negotiation
process.
15 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
WFDSS
Policy Observations


The policy direction to publish a decision within 24 hours of determining a
decision is needed, or within 24 hours of requesting an IMT is sometimes being
interpreted as a published decision is needed within 24 hours of all fires that
escape IA or exceed initial response (Redbook 2014, Chapter 11, pages 11-10 &
11-11).
Unintended outcome looks like this; we are spending time and resources during
an IA/Extended Attack fire situation that can distract key people in the oversight
role from the developing situation. Often these published decisions need to be
re-visited immediately in the event the suppression tactics are not successful
and an IMT is ordered. The other end of the spectrum is we spend time
publishing a decision on a fire that is contained at 8 acres in 48 hours that
always had a high tactical probability of success, firefighters needed more time.
This direction generally comes from the Regional level asking units for published
decisions on fires that are over 24 hours old and we are still engaged in tactical
operations.
Recommendation

If the intent is to have a published decision within 24 hours of a fire exceeding
initial response and we have a fire we will be successful with but need a longer
time frame an option to pick a preplanned response for extended attack much
like the preplanned response feature already in WFDSS. This could simplify the
process for publishing a decision. We click a button that pulls pre-populated
planned contain/control objectives by FMU, require no planning area boundary
only point of origin and perimeter, conduct the relative risk and complexity
analysis (RCA) within WFDSS and publish that decision.
Operational Functionality with WFDSS Recommendations:


When printing the published report the relative RCA does not automatically
print out. They have to be manually attached to the printed report. Consider
making this part of the print out.
The format of the printed report with all sections is difficult to read. For some
IMT members this may be the only format they see the decision in. It would aid
the local units in communicating the most important issues if the format could
be cleaned up. Course of Action, Strategic Objectives and Management
16 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Requirements need to be front and center in the report. With the lists of
information towards the back, should be a simple fix.
Potential Direction for WFDSS Enhancements



If we wanted to really help the local unit that is dealing with an extended attack
fire WFDSS could be used to publish an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the
incident. The map, weather and objectives/requirements are part of the
published decision. If we could preload frequencies, medical protocols, with a
blank division assignment sheet to be completed, that would be the basis of an
initial IAP for an extended attack fire without a lot of extra effort or additional
people needed.
The spatial component of WFDSS is valuable, if we could increase the
functionality of the mapping and analysis tools, they could be used for more than
wildfire decisions. Just by including our forest fuels treatment layer it became
the tool to use to identify areas for fuels treatment areas impacted by wildfire
monitoring requirements.
It could be used to house fuels analysis tools for NEPA specialist reports or even
produce burn plans.
Regional and Local Priority
The STAR Agreement

The STAR Agreement is entered into between the Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation and the Montana Sheriffs and Peace
Officers Association. The purpose of this agreement is to facilitate rapid
deployment of law enforcement strike teams to a major wildland fire incident in
the event of a large scale evacuation of the public in situations in which a local
jurisdiction is overwhelmed by events and cannot effect the evacuation on that
scale without reinforcement. Montana law provides for mutual aid and
assistance between law enforcement agencies crossing county and jurisdictional
lines. This agreement does not replace mutual aid or the responsibility of
counties to carry out law enforcement duties or evacuations, nor the fiscal
obligations associated with those duties or mobilizations.

Prior to requesting a resource order to mobilize strike teams, the line officer or
IMT from a wildland fire protection agency must confer with and have the
concurrence of the Sheriff or county official with authority to order an
17 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
evacuation and the authority to make related expenditures to do so.
Reimbursement for personnel wages will be based on the “you order, you pay”
basis. This agreement does not automatically obligate the wildland fire agency
to pay for law enforcement duties which would ordinarily be the county’s
responsibility, but does augment deployment and support (including
reimbursement in some circumstances) in large or prolonged evacuation
deployments by Sheriff’s Officers outside of their normal jurisdiction to another
jurisdiction which has surpassed its capabilities due to a wildland fire. All costs
submitted for payment by the sending agency will be reimbursed by the
ordering agency. Federal wildland fire protection agencies in Montana may
utilize this agreement, and any negotiation to place a resource order is between
that wildland fire protection agency and the local Sheriff.
Public Information
Observations

The Public Information Officer (PIO) for the team was not engaged with the
public. Additionally, he was not responding to line officers recommendations.
This created an air of distrust between the PIO and the local DR. Even though
there was discussion with the IMT IC, no improvement was noted. Also
information from the fire line was not real time. Information that was coming in
from the IMT was already stale by the time things changed. Local resources
were getting more up to date information from residences than from the IMT.
This improved over time with communication and more overhead management.
Recommendations




Deliberate efforts need to be made to ensure correct and timely information is to
be distributed to the public. The appropriate actions need to be taken to ensure
this recommendation is addressed in the future.
Law Enforcement groups need to be included in the IAP. This was important to
the law enforcement group as it made them feel as if they were part of the IMT
and provides for accountability and safety.
Having public meetings and discussions locally and in the community helped
open up communication lines. Having the IMT go to the community in a local
setting was a success.
Having public meetings on neutral ground instead of the ranger station or
similar was a good step. This was positively received by the local community.
18 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014



The STAR Agreement was a success and put law enforcement in the field that, for
the most part, understood a wildfire environment.
Have the appropriate level of resource advisors for conditions. At times, dozer
line was built with no direction or oversight towards the end of the fire. A
resource advisor could have mitigated hours of rehab.
Biggest success was relationships with the local RFD, there’s a feeling that
relationships were better after the IMT left. The District works well with them,
so the relationship was set up ahead of time.
Day time sleeping facilities
Observations

At times schools used for night shift crew sleeping facilities can be noisy, hot etc.,
and do not allow for quality sleep.
Recommendations


Explore other means to mitigate cumulative fatigue and allow for quality of rest
when implementing night or swing shifts.
Preparation for the in-brief of the IMT should be on their needs to get up and
running for the first 24-48 hours. Being flexible and expect that there will be
change during that time as the IMT gains situational awareness.
Long-term Planning



It is important to develop a long-term plan on a full suppression fire.
It is important to have all the right people to be involved to develop the plan and
agree on the plan. This includes forest and IMT personnel.
There is an insufficient amount of SOPLs, there should be deliberate efforts to
address this void.
19 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Fire Chronology
Date
%
Command
Acres
+
7/14
0
T3 S.
Borgen
400
7/15
0
T3 S.
Borgen
700
7/16
7/17
15
20
T2 T. Heitnz 1800 +1100
T2 T. Heitnz 2100 +1000
7/18
23
T2 T. Heitnz 4150 +2050
7/19
23
T2 T. Heitnz 4550
+450
7/20
30
T2 T. Heitnz 5230
+680
7/21
35
T2 T. Heitnz 5880
+650
+300
7/22
45
T2 T. Heitnz 6090
+210
7/23
60
T2 T. Heitnz 6300
+210
7/24
74
T2 T. Heitnz 6300
+/-0
7/25
82
T2 T. Heitnz 6300
+/-0
7/26
88
T2 T. Heitnz 6282
-18
Comments
Running, Torching,
town of Superior MT,
threatened T2 Team
Ordered,
Crown Fire, Structure
protection, T2 Team
assuming command end
of shift
Active Fire, Evacuations
Spotting downhill
making runs uphill,
moving towards BPA
Transmission line
Evacuation notice for
residence in Pardee
Creek, some residences
in the town of Superior
and in Flat Creek.
Day and Night structure
protection, continue
with line construction
Backing and flanking,
isolated single and
group tree torching
Major smoke impacts to
BPA power lines
causing arcing and
power shut downs/
safety concern for
Firefighter
Active fire on NE
flanks, mandatory
evacuation still in effect
NE corner of fire still
has activity, but minimal
activity on rest of fire
Evacuation orders lifted
for residents, patrol,
mop monitor fire
behavior
Patrol, mop up and
rehab has begun
Creeping, smoldering
20 | P a g e
Person
Est. Cost
80,000
177
180,000
353
479
421,000
1.3 mil
572
2.8 mil
787
4 mil
799
4.7 mil
923
5.8 mil
914
6.5 mil
821
7.2 mil
600
8 mil
507
8.6 mil
383
9 mil
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
7/27
7/28
7/29
100
100
100
8/1
100
T2
T2
T3
(T)
T3
(T)
T. Heitnz 6282
T. Heitnz 6282
T. Pfister 6282
+/-0
+/-0
+/-0
T. Pfister 6282
+/-0
FB
Rehab
Transfer of Command
Patrol, mop up, rehab
Patrol, mop up, rehab,
fire received rain
ATTACHMENTS





WFDSS Summary for July 15 and July 22; see pages 21-27.
Progression Map July 15, 2013; see page 28.
Progression Map July 21, 2013; see page 29.
Progression Map July 24, 2013; see page 30.
Fire Progression Map; see page 31.
21 | P a g e
226
166
166
9.5 mil
9.7 mil
9.7 mil
166
9.749
mil
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Rationale)
July 15, 2013 - Day 2 of Fire Heintz T2 IMT
Weather

Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps 55-65, 85-95 degrees.
Objectives
Communication

Coordinate and communicate appropriate incident information with the
appropriate agency (Mineral County, Sanders County, Sheriff Department, Montana
Department Natural Resource Conservation, Bonneville Power Company).

Provide appropriate incident information to the public (Superior area residents) in
regards to fire status and road and trail closures. Consider establishing a fire
information point.
Safety



Make public, firefighter and aviation safety your number one priority by using the
Tactical Hazard Analysis (215A) as part of your operational planning process,
ensuring all IAPs reflect this commitment to safety through the 10 Standard
Firefighting Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations, and if you cannot mitigate a
tactical hazard don’t implement the corresponding tactical action. Ensure that
Leader’s Intent is clearly communicated and understood, and is based on current
factual information.
Provide relevant information to maintain situational awareness at all times, ensure
risks are being mitigated based on changing conditions.
Emphasize the use of contingency and trigger points to manage risk associated with
tactical actions.
Course of Action



July 15, 2013
Follow the planned initial response.
When the weather, fuels, and/or topography presents a viable window of
opportunity, establish anchors and move from one anchor point to another
22 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014


minimizing the size of the fire and limiting fire in the Wildland Urban Interface
(WUI). This will be done to minimize fire spread and reduce the potential of WUI
exposure. Only construct line that you are reasonably assured you can hold.
Planning area encompasses approximate 41,000 acres and is contained by the Clark
Fork River on the North and South. Keystone Creek is the western most boundary
with the ridge system on the east side of Johnson Creek as eastern boundary.
Prioritize the southern boundary to protect private property values and structures.
Full perimeter control is the intent at this time, re-evaluate as necessary.
Rationale
Risk Assessment
What are the critical values at risk?

Structures along southern boundary and Pardee Creek.
What is the chance the critical values will be impacted and, if so, what are the
consequences?

High, Structure protection has been initiated along the southern boundary and in
the mouth of Pardee Creek.
What are the opportunities to manage the fire to meet land management plan
objectives?

None
What are the possible low probability/high consequence events?


Fire spotting south of I-90.
Northwest winds pushing the fire through the town of Superior.
Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision?

Mineral County, State of Montana, and BPA, town of Superior, potentially impacted
private landowners.
23 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Risk Decision
What alternatives (objectives, strategies, and tactics) are being considered?

Indirect attack using roads, mechanical lines and natural barriers with burnout.
What is the exposure to responders for the alternatives being considered?

Lack of safety zones, under slung control lines (rolling debris), unburned fuels
between firefighters and main fire.
What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being
considered?

High for modified direct (going as direct as possible utilizing natural features, roads,
and burnout while avoiding under slung line) and low/moderate for true direct or
indirect.
What alternative provides for the best balance between the desired outcome and
exposure to responders?

Modified direct attack.
What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed
alternatives and how will they be monitored?

Fire reaches or makes a major run at the current planning area and is expected to
exceed.
July 22, 2013 - Day 8 of Fire Heintz T2 IMT
Weather

Dry, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps 55-65, 85-95 degrees.
Objectives
Communication
24 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014

Coordinate and communicate appropriate incident information with the
appropriate agency (Mineral County, Sanders County, Sheriff Department, Montana
Department Natural Resource Conservation, BPA.

Provide appropriate incident information to the public (Superior area residents) in
regards to fire status and road and trail closures. Consider establishing a fire
information point.
Safety




Make public, firefighter and aviation safety your number one priority by using the
Tactical Hazard Analysis (215A) as part of your operational planning process,
ensuring all IAPs reflect this commitment to safety through the 10 Standard
Firefighting Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations, and if you cannot mitigate a
tactical hazard don’t implement the corresponding tactical action. Ensure that
Leader’s Intent is clearly communicated and understood, and is based on current
factual information.
Provide relevant information to maintain situational awareness at all times, ensure
risks are being mitigated based on changing conditions.
Emphasize the use of contingency and trigger points for to manage risk associated
with tactical actions.
BPA line bisects the planning area 500Kvolt lines create an aviation hazard and
potential hazard to ground crews. Smoke and heat can cause the lines to arc.
Operation efforts should not utilize aviation and helicopter efforts within the
immediate area of the lines. The exposure time of crews working in the vicinity of
the lines should be limited.
Course of Action




July 22, 2013
When the weather, fuels, and/or topography presents a viable window of
opportunity, establish anchors and move from one anchor point to another
minimizing the size of the fire and limiting fire in the WUI. This will be done to
minimize fire spread and reduce the potential of WUI exposure. Only construct line
that you are reasonably assured you can hold.
Full perimeter control is the intent at this time, re-evaluate as necessary.
Planning area encompasses approximate 97,560 acres and is contained by the Clark
Fork River on the North and South. Fourmile Creek is the western most boundary
25 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014

with Second Creek as eastern boundary. Prioritize the southern boundary to
protect private property values and structures.
Given the current elevated early season fuel conditions (ERC levels), full perimeter
control may not be effective or feasible if fire spread rates and intensities increase to
the point that firefighter safety may be compromised under that strategy.
Suppression priorities would focus on protection of the WUI along the Clark Fork
River corridor and point protection of structures within the private in-holdings and
other values at risk within the planning area. In the event the fire becomes well
established north of the Superior Ranger District boundary, concentrate protection
efforts on values at risk along the Clark Fork River drainage between St. Regis and
Siegel Creek.
Rationale

The West Mullan Fire is currently 5,500+ acres burning adjacent to Superior, MT
with private in-holdings with the fire and planning area. The relative risk
assessment is rated as high due to the high values at risk and elevated seasonal
severity for this early in the season. A plan has been developed and entered into
WFDSS to manage this potentially long-duration fire if current incident objectives
are not successful.
Risk Assessment
What are the critical values at risk?

Structures along southern planning area boundary adjacent to the Clark Fork River
from Sloway Creek to Johnson Creek and within the in-holdings in the Pardee, Flat,
and Keystone drainages. Other values at risk include a communication site on
Keystone Peak, a timber sale in Keystone Creek, the Superior Municipal Watershed,
and the BPA transmission line.
What is the chance the critical values will be impacted and, if so, what are the
consequences?

High. Structure protection has been initiated along the southern boundary, in the
mouth of Pardee and Keystone Creeks. Potential for loss of structures adjacent to
the fire on the private in-holdings surrounded by National Forest lands. BPA
transmission line is threatened with potential of power being shut down. There is a
potential loss of a timber sale in Keystone Creek.
26 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
What are the opportunities to manage the fire to meet land management plan
objectives?

None
What are the low probability/high consequence events?

Fire spotting south of I-90.

Northwest winds pushing the fire through the town of Superior and threatening
numerous other residences and structures in the Clark Fork River corridor.

Strong SW winds causing fire spread to the N-NE up the side drainages spreading
across the Keystone Ridge and Ninemile Divides onto adjacent Ranger Districts.
Who are the stakeholders that should be consulted prior to making a decision?

Mineral County, State of Montana, and BPA, town of Superior, potentially impacted
private landowners.
Risk Decision
What alternatives (objectives, strategies, and tactics) are being considered?
Objectives for the incident include:

Provide for safety of firefighting resources, public and aviation safety.

Full perimeter control is the intent at this time; re-evaluate as necessary.

Contain the fire on the north and south by the Clark Fork River, Keystone Creek on
the west, and the ridge system on the east side of Johnson Creek. Prioritize the
southern boundary to protect private property values and structures.

Display regard and professional courtesy toward every person involved in this
incident, the local public, local officials and the land management agencies.

Implement food storage standards to eliminate potential for bear encounters.

Give BPA one to two hour notice if power-lines will be threatened.
27 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014

Coordinate closely with the Mineral County Sheriff on all evacuation related actions.
Course of Action alternatives include:

Modified direct attack taking advantage of natural features, roads, and favorable
weather conditions to construct line and patiently conduct burnout operations to
secure.
What is the exposure to responders for the alternatives being considered?

Lack of safety zones, under slung control lines (rolling debris), unburned fuels
between firefighters and main fire. Elevated seasonal severity and associated fire
behavior increases the exposure to responders.
What is the relative probability of success associated with the alternatives being
considered?

High for modified direct (going as direct as possible utilizing natural features, roads,
and burnout while avoiding under slung line) and low/moderate for true direct or
indirect given the elevated ERC level this early in the season.
What alternative provides for the best balance between the desired outcome and
exposure to responders?

Modified direct attack.
What are the critical thresholds that will trigger reconsideration of the proposed
alternatives and how will they be monitored?

Fire reaches or makes a major run at the current planning area and is expected to
exceed.

The IMT has a plan to manage this incident as a potentially long duration fire MAPs
established. If the proposed alternative is not successful, the MAPs will be
monitored and if the fire crosses any established MAPs within the planning area,
specific actions will take place to protect lives, private property, structures, and
other values at risk.
28 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
July 15th Fire Perimeter
29 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
July 21st Fire Perimeter
30 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
July 24th Fire Perimeter
31 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
West Mullan Fire Progression Map
32 | P a g e
West Mullan Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Lolo National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
West Mullan Cost Appendices
Activity Date
7/14/2013
7/15/2013
7/16/2013
7/17/2013
7/18/2013
7/19/2013
7/20/2013
7/21/2013
7/22/2013
7/23/2013
7/24/2013
7/25/2013
7/26/2013
7/27/2013
7/28/2013
7/29/2013
7/30/2013
7/31/2013
8/1/2013
8/2/2013
8/3/2013
Grand Total
CAMP
PERSONNEL
CAMP
SUPPORT
$1,146
$24,463
$39,306
$48,096
$56,668
$63,137
$62,730
$65,952
$66,637
$67,025
$62,856
$57,713
$48,796
$45,049
$38,486
$23,097
$9,502
$7,981
$7,609
$6,649
$6,159
$3,788
$44,447
$77,433
$103,925
$115,665
$222,617
$173,120
$195,578
$165,580
$161,725
$129,180
$107,682
$90,374
$92,230
$67,521
$26,374
$25,052
$21,077
$20,870
$19,633
$17,261
AIRCRAFT
CREWS
$43,158
$314,204
$365,435
$429,746
$436,776
$137,978
$159,676
$128,158
$97,559
$40,561
$38,287
$31,955
$5,758
$5,464
$3,796
$3,796
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
EQUIPMENT
$13,794
$125,551
$130,363
$193,685
$243,119
$291,629
$310,343
$316,736
$315,257
$287,924
$231,477
$153,582
$103,978
$77,589
$32,402
$32,983
$32,547
$32,983
$24,859
$16,041
$5,681
$13,917
$51,569
$80,666
$111,254
$138,218
$142,367
$144,542
$143,714
$146,202
$145,510
$141,699
$104,459
$84,832
$79,735
$33,305
$32,680
$18,180
$16,083
$12,934
$7,402
$4,124
$809,057 $1,881,132 $2,242,307 $2,972,523 $1,653,392
LINE
PERSONNEL
$2,066
$20,120
$36,997
$32,814
$41,885
$46,677
$49,356
$47,901
$49,196
$48,299
$37,409
$27,468
$19,471
$19,017
$12,778
$8,631
$4,930
$4,490
$4,517
$3,856
$2,791
Grand Total
$77,869
$580,354
$730,200
$919,520
$1,032,331
$904,405
$899,767
$898,039
$840,431
$751,044
$640,908
$482,859
$353,209
$319,084
$188,288
$127,561
$90,211
$82,614
$70,789
$53,581
$36,016
$520,669 $10,079,080
Total Cost Percentage by Resource Category
EQUIPMENT
16%
CAMP PERSONNEL
8%
CAMP SUPPORT
19%
LINE PERSONNEL
5%
AIRCRAFT
22%
CREWS
30%
33 | P a g e