Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Springer Series in Game Theory
Official Series of the Game Theory Society
Pierre von Mouche
Federico Quartieri Editors
Equilibrium
Theory for Cournot
Oligopolies and
Related Games
Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi
Springer Series in Game Theory
Official Series of the Game Theory Society
Series editor
Bernhard von Stengel
London School of Economics, UK
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8107
Pierre von Mouche • Federico Quartieri
Editors
Equilibrium Theory
for Cournot Oligopolies
and Related Games
Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi
123
Editors
Pierre von Mouche
Wageningen University
Wageningen, The Netherlands
ISSN 1868-517X
Springer Series in Game Theory
ISBN 978-3-319-29253-3
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0
Federico Quartieri
University Federico II of Naples
Naples, Italy
ISSN 1868-5188 (electronic)
ISBN 978-3-319-29254-0 (eBook)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016937751
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made.
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
On vous a sans doute souvent demandé à quoi servent
les mathématiques et si ces délicates constructions que
nous tirons tout entières de notre esprit ne sont pas
artificielles et enfantées par notre caprice. Parmi les
personnes qui font cette question, je dois faire une
distinction: les gens pratiques réclament seulement de
nous le moyen de gagner de l’argent. Ceux-là ne
méritent pas qu’on leur réponde.
Henri Poincaré,
La Valeur de la Science, Chapitre V.
Preface
This book is about homogeneous good Cournot oligopolies and games with a similar
structure. The theory was proposed some time ago: in the first half of the nineteenth
century. One might expect that the passing of time would have brought about an
exhaustion of the aspects of this peculiar class needing to be fully understood. This,
however, appears not to be true. Various scholars throughout the world—including
Prof. Okuguchi, to whom this book is dedicated—are still trying to find answers to
the unsolved and new problems connected to this class. The diversity of the articles
in the present book provides a balanced selection of these problems.
We are grateful to all authors, in particular to Dr. Takeshi Yamazaki, for the
helpful and fruitful cooperation. Lastly, we would like to thank the founding editor
of the series Dr. Bernhard von Stengel and also Dr. Johannes Glaeser from Springer
for their positive role and valuable assistance in the process of publishing this book.
Wageningen, The Netherlands
Naples, Italy
October 2015
Pierre von Mouche
Federico Quartieri
vii
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierre von Mouche and Federico Quartieri
1
On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Takeshi Yamazaki
7
Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rein Haagsma
15
Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone
Best Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nikolai S. Kukushkin
31
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative
Games: An Expository Treatment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richard Cornes and Takashi Sato
47
On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set:
The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierre von Mouche
63
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games
and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Takuya Iimura and Takahiro Watanabe
89
On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Ferenc Szidarovszky and Akio Matsumoto
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The
Exponential Model .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Luis C. Corchón and Lourdes Moreno
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy . . . . 133
Kojun Hamada
ix