Exploring internal stickiness: impediments to the transfer of best

INTEGRATION OF THE SALES FORCE:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
Anderson, E., & Schmittlein D. C.,
Rand Journal of Economics, 1984
Youngsoo Kim, BADM 545 Fall 2013
Overview

When does vertical integration take place?

Conventional approach



What is new?



Company size model
Focus on manufacturing – physical assets valuation oriented
Human assets and vertical integration
Empirical verification of TCE approach
How?


Direct salesperson vs. Representative agency
Logistic regression analysis
Problem: “Rep” vs. “Direct”

Representative agency (“Rep”)



Direct sales people



Independent of multiple manufacturers that it represents
market governance mode
Employees of one manufacturer
hierarchical governance mode
Industry practices

Rep accounts for only 10% of U.S. dollar volume (as of 1977)
Proposition 1: Asset specificity

Fungible assets



Relationship specialized assets



Economies of scale, risk-pooling
Rep is preferable
Opportunism, inflexibility
Direct is more efficient
The greater the total value of company-specific assets, the
greater the likelihood of vertical integration in the form
of a direct sales force
Fungible: able to replace or be replaced by another identical item; mutually interchangeable
Proposition 2: Uncertainty

Environmental uncertainty (Williamson, 1979)



Difficulty of performance evaluation (Williamson, 1981)


Unforeseen environment shifts result to incomplete contracts
Direct is more suitable under high uncertainty because of
easier adaptations, provided that assets are company specific
Input measures and a subjective judgment are preferable to
output measures when they are hard to assess
The likelihood of integration should increase with two
forms of uncertainty
Proposition 3: Frequency

Tradeoff – overhead and opportunism




Measurability of transaction frequency




Specialized governance needs setup and maintenance costs
Market governance incurs opportunism and inflexibility
Transaction frequency
Can a firm break even on the fixed cost of integration?
Fixed costs / breakeven point estimation is not straightforward
Heuristic: geographic transaction density
As density increases, more use of a direct sales force is
expected
Empirical model: data collection

Industry : Electronic components manufacturing


Unit of analysis


“… its variety makes it a microcosm of American business …”
Product line of a given company in a given (set of) territory
Survey respondents

Territory sales managers
Empirical model: logistic regression

Explanatory variables








Transaction specificity of assets (TSA)
Uncertainty as environmental unpredictability (UEU)
Uncertainty as difficulty of evaluating performance (UDEP)
Territory density (TD)
Company size (SIZE)
Asset specificity / unpredictability interaction (ZUEUTSA)
Asset specificity / measurement difficulty (ZUDEPTSA)
Regression model
Empirical results (1)

Empirical results (2)

Coefficient of determination

To evaluate the contribution of the set of transaction-cost
variables over SIZE alone

Both coefficient significance test and predictive effectiveness
test indicate that TC variables significantly explain the
likelihood of vertical integration
Conclusion

Some TC variables are crucial for vertical integration



Asset specificity
Performance immeasurability
Limitations



Specificity/uncertainty interactions were not found
Effect of density turns out to be insignificant
Findings are limited to one type of integration and industry