Thursday’s Child
China’s Long March Toward Military
Transformation
Information Age Metrics Working Group
Evidence Based Research, Inc.
February 18, 2005
China’s leaders have long recognized the need to
modernize—indeed, to transform—PLA warfighting
capabilities, especially the ability to command and
to control more agile, better equipped forces
operating according to “local wars under modern,
high tech conditions” doctrine.
The “long march” to transform has not been an
easy one, and has been hobbled by distractions
and debate. Finally, for the past decade, the PLA
seems to be getting it about right, and the way
ahead looks more promising than many have
expected.
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This Presentation
• Factors motivating “transformation” of
the PLA
• Use of wargames, simulations
• Institutionalizing transformation: The
role of the research community as an
agent for change
• Vignettes
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Background and Motivation for
Change
• 1970s, modern war games in the West
• 1980s
– Falklands War
– Bekka Valley Campaign
– Operation Just Cause, Panama
• 1990s
– Desert Storm: Wake up call for political leaders
– 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis
– Serbia/Kosovo
• 2000s
– OEF and OIF
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The Threat Debate
People’s War Traditionalists
People’s War Scenarios
• Major power threat
• E.g., Russia, India, United
States
• Mobilize the population
• Retreat but slow the invader
• Multi-year war from the interior
Power Projection Advocates
Local War Scenarios
• Local wars on China’s periphery
• E.g., Taiwan, Vietnam, Central
Asian terrorists
• More modern and professional
RMA Enthusiasts
• No war for 10-20 years
• Time to develop leap-ahead
capabilities and technology, develop
new doctrine, tactics
• Use of rapid reaction forces
• Defend at border or frontier
RMA Scenarios
• Preempt the superior—anti access
• Asymmetric strategy—ASAT, info war
• Destroy C2, prevent entry of logistics
• Preemptive paralysis of the enemy
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See Michael Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future Security Environment
The Goal: Shashoujian
• Simplistically interpreted as “assassin’s mace”
– Shashou (hitman), Jian (mace, club sword)
• Roots in antiquity (Tang Dynasty, 618-907
A.D.)
• Can be “weapons and equipment” and/or a
“combat method”
• Think in terms of “airland battle” or “shock and
awe”
• It is a way for the “inferior to defeat the
superior”
See Jason Bruzdzinski, Chapter 10, Civil Military Change In China
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Two Ironies
• Tsien Hsue-shen (Qian Xuesen)
– U.S. educated, helped found JPL, worked
classified projects in WWII, expelled from
U.S. prior to gaining citizenship, became
father of China’s missile program (and was
instrumental in establishing PLA OR)
• Sino-American Seminar on
Methodologies in Defense Systems
Analysis, 1987 and 1988
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PLA Operations Research
• Models and simulations “main approach” to
defense systems analysis
• Computerized simulations, ca. 1979-82
• Four approaches to war games
–
–
–
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Semi-empirical (Lanchester)
Empirical (Dupuy)
Monte Carlo (Johnson)
Scientific/theoretical (von Neumann game theory)
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Chinese War Game Development
• Naval doctrinal evaluation model, 1983
• Cost/operational effectiveness of:
– Air defense, 1983
– Ground artillery, 1985
– Anti-aircraft artillery, 1985
• Great Wall I, tactical model, independent
action forces, 1985
• Yangtse River II, division war game, 1986
• Air defense battle simulation, 1987
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War Game Example
• Developed by OR section at AMS about
1986-87
• Division/regiment level
• Networked, PC-based
• Graphics, data base, Chinese character
processing
• Met commander’s requirements for
training
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Start
Initialize Data:
Weapon Index, Unit Combat Index
Environmental Data, Attrition Index Coefficient
Scenario Play Data
Nuclear Attack Sub-Model
Chemical/Artillery Fire Sub-Model
Air-Ground/Ground-Air Sub-Model
Input Control Data
Land Combat Sub-Model
Display:
Initial Situation
Initial Index Ratio of Both Sides
Initial Force Ratio of Both Sides
Display:
Battle Play
Force Table
Two-Sided Index Attrition Rate
Manual Intervention Process
Command & Control Sub-Model
No
Combat Ended?
Movement Sub-Model
Yes
End
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Battle Laboratories
• CPX simulations for training, C2 evaluation,
event/mission synchronization
• Got idea from U.S.
– At least six battle labs have been stood up
• Other uses
– Logistics training, LOGEX
– Camouflage, concealment and deception
technology, techniques
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Influence of Wang Shouyun
• Protégé of Qian Xuesen
• Wrote Modern War Game in 1982
• Leader of Chinese delegation, SinoU.S. Seminar on Methodologies in
Defense Systems Analysis, 1987-88
• Secretary general of COSTIND, 1997
• Died in a mysterious accident in Dec.
1997
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Influence of T. N. Dupuy
• Numbers, Predictions and War published in
1977 and read in PLA OR circles
• Lecture tours to China from 1987-1990 +
• Understanding War, 1987
• Sino-American seminars
• Mentioned in dispatches
• Well known to Wang Shouyun, COSTIND
• QJMA license to CDSTIC, 1988
• Multi-front model development, 1989-90
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Comprehensive National Power
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•
•
•
Chinese derived methodology
Complex, many elements and indices
AMS and CASS versions
Helps to show
–
–
–
–
Status hierarchy in world politics
Power potential of rivals and partners
Who will best exploit RMA
Which side will win a war
• Also a rhetorical, political tool
See Michael Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future Security Environment
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Acquisition Process
• Handout: Comparison of PRC and U.S.
acquisition stages/milestones
• Comments on other procurement
activities
– Planning for visitors
– Acquiring information abroad
• CDSTIC and NTIS
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Institutionalizing Transformation
• State-level and PLA think tanks
– CDSTIC, AMS, NDU
• Academic research centers
– CAPS
• Semi-private think tanks
– Shanghai RimPac Center for Strategic and
International Studies
• Have undergone major changes since late
1990s
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Vignettes
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•
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Air defense system RDT&E
New, stovepipe research centers
CAPS direct contract with PLA
Radar displays
Decision making is collective; a shared
responsibility; trial balloons often used
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Q&A
Chuck Hawkins
410-643-8807
[email protected]
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