The Hubris Hypothesis: The
Downside of Comparative
Optimism Displays
Marie Helweg-Larsen, Dickinson College
With Vera Hoorens (University of Leuven), Carolien Van
Damme (University of Leuven), and Constantine Sedikides
(University of Southampton)
The benefits of optimism
• Compared to pessimists, optimists
• are happier and better adjusted (Taylor & Brown, 1988)
• approach challenges more energetically and constructively and
cope better with adversity (Peeters, Czapinski, & Hoorens, 2001)
• recover faster from surgery and experience less pain from chronic
illness (Rasmussen et al, 2009)
• make more money, have better psychological and physical health
(Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010)
• But optimists might become disappointed when their rosy
expectations are not met (Krizan & Sweeny, 2013). Or might
be viewed by others as naïve or arrogant (Sedikides et al,
2007)
Views of optimistic vs pessimistic
people
• We generally like optimists over pessimists.
• People (“observers”) view other people (“claimants”)
more favorably when they express optimistic than
pessimistic beliefs about their own futures (HelwegLarsen et al., 2002).
• In the current research we did (in Exp 1) compare how
pessimistic and optimistic people (claimants) were
viewed. We found that compared with pessimistic
people, optimistic people were viewed more positively
(warm and competent) and observers were more
interested in spending time with them.
Hubris hypothesis
• But even if we like optimists over pessimists might
there be downsides to some expressions of optimism?
• Hubris hypothesis: people (observers) will respond less
favorably to directly comparative self-superiority claims
(“I’m better than others”) than to other types of selfsuperiority claims: “I am a good,” “I am as good as
others,” or “I am better than I used to be” (Hoorens et
al, 2012).
• The mechanism of dislike is that the self-superiority
claimant is seen as viewing others negatively especially
the observer (Hoorens et al, 2012).
Present research
• Hubris hypothesis has been supported with one
type of self-superiority belief namely the betterthan-average effect contrasting comparative (“I’m a
better friend than others”) vs. absolute (“I am good
friend”) descriptions (Van Damme et al, 2016).
• Here we tested it with likelihood ratings of 4 events
(for undesirable events) contrasting comparative (“I
have a much lower chance than others”) with
absolute (“I have a very low chance”) claims. The
claimant was always showing optimism.
Predictions
1. We predicted that observers (participants) would
view claimants (ostensibly another student) more
negatively when the claims were comparative vs.
absolute.
2. The negative views would entail seeing the
claimant as less warm (but not necessarily less
competent) and show lower desire for affiliation.
3. We predicted that the reason lies in the observer
thinking the claimants’ views reflected negatively
on the observer’s future.
Participants
• Participants: 161 undergraduate students (117
women, 44 men), aged between 17 and 51 years
(M = 19.16, SD = 3.04), who fulfilled a course
option.
• We presented participants with likelihood ratings
that an unnamed student had allegedly made for
four undesirable events on a questionnaire about
future expectations.
• Participants were randomly assigned to a
comparative or an absolute likelihood condition.
Comparative likelihood condition
Instructions: Some time ago a group of students
completed a questionnaire about future
expectations. They estimated the probability that
they would experience a series of events compared
to the average student of their age and gender. For
each event they circled a rating on a scale from -5
(my chances are much smaller) to +5 (my chances
are much greater). Here are some answers given by
one of the students. Look at them carefully, because
you’ll answer questions about them later.
Comparative likelihood condition
My chance of dying young is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
much lower
chance
My chance of an unhappy love life is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
much lower
chance
My chance of a boring life …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
much lower
chance
My chance of being poor is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
much lower
chance
4 5
much higher
chance
4 5
much higher
chance
4 5
much higher
chance
4 5
much higher
chance
Absolute likelihood condition
My chance of dying young is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
very low
chance
My chance of an unhappy love life is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
very low
chance
My chance of a boring life …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
very low
chance
My chance of being poor is …
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
very low
chance
4 5
very high
chance
4 5
very high
chance
4 5
very high
chance
4 5
very high
chance
Dependent Variables
• The claimant was rated on 14 traits (1 = not at all, 7
= completely); Peeters, 1997
• Warmth (communion): helpful, trustworthy, honest,
loving, just, respectful, tolerant (alpha = .79)
• Competence (agency): ambitious, confident, decisive,
energetic, resourceful, sharp, willful (alpha = .87)
• Affiliation preferences: Fun to hang out with, go to
a campus party, have person on sports team, have
as a friend, work together on a class project, like to
meet (1 = definitely would not, 7 = definitely
would); alpha = .87; Helweg-Larsen et al., 2002
Mediational variables
• Participants estimated how likely these 4 events
were. They rated what what they thought the
claimant would think (1 = not likely, 8 = extremely
likely):
1. Of claimant’s own life
2. Of participant’s own life
• The 4 events were worded in the opposite direction
(e.g., instead of “dying young” it asked participants
to estimate the likelihood of “living a long life”).
Figure 1: Evaluations of an absolute versus
comparative optimism claimant for warmth
and competence.
Absolute
Comparative
MEAN EVALUATION (1-7)
5.5
5.16
5
5.22
4.5
4
4.27
4.03
3.5
3
Warmth
Comptetence
Figure 2: Evaluations of an absolute versus
comparative optimism claimant for affiliation
preference.
Absolute
Comparative
MEAN EVALUATION (1-7)
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
4.14
3.74
3
Affiliation Preference
Figure 3: Likelihood estimates for positive
events as observer perceives claimant’s view
Absolute
Comparative
MEAN LIKELIHOOD RATING (1-8)
6.5
6
5.91
5.99
5.36
5.5
5
4.5
4.22
4
3.5
3
Of claimant him/herself
Of participant
Mediation Analysis
• Hayes’ PROCESS macro: Bootstrapping with 5000 re-samples, 95%
confidence intervals.
• In the relationship between Condition (absolute vs. comparative) and
Warmth we examined the mediator (Claimant-views-of-Participant:
what the participant thought the claimant thought about the
participant). The mediation was significant. Indirect effect: B = 0.28,
CI [0.46, 0.14].
• Similarly in the relationship between Condition and Affiliation we
examined the Claimant-views-of-Participant as a mediator. Again the
mediation was significant. Indirect effect: B = 0.43, CI [0.69, 0.24],
Conclusion
• Claimant was seen less positively when optimism
was expressed comparatively instead of absolutely.
• Why: because participants assumed the claimant
would view the participant’s chances of the
negative events as higher.
Discussion
• We found that optimism loses some of its appeal when
it is expressed in a comparative than an absolute
manner because comparative expressions of optimism
lead observers to assume that the claimant views the
observers’ future gloomily.
• The effect is noteworthy because people are
overwhelmingly comparatively optimistic (see their
own risks as less than others) but this research shows
they are less enthusiastic about comparative optimism
in other people (compared to absolute optimism).
• Also, social comparison is implied in absolute
estimations as well as directly comparative estimation
(Alicke, 2007).
Future directions
• People know that they should be optimistic instead of
pessimistic to be viewed favorably. But we are bound by
reality: Tyler and Rosier (2009) found that comparative
optimism changes as a function of how accountable people
are to the truth (less accountable = more comparative
optimism).
• Future research: What happens when the claims are about
health risks? And are made in an interpersonal context
where impression management is more salient.
• Do people know that others view them less favorably when
they make comparative optimistically claims as opposed to
just optimistic claims?
Thanks
Questions?
Figure 1a: Evaluations of an absolute versus
comparative pessimism, neutral, or optimism
claimant on warmth in Experiment 1.
Figure 1b: Evaluations of an absolute versus
comparative pessimism, neutral, or optimism
claimant on competence in Experiment 1.
Figure 2: Affiliation preferences with an
absolutely versus comparatively pessimism,
neutral, or optimism claimant in Experiment 1.
Figure 1: Evaluations of an absolute versus
comparative optimism claimant on warmth
and competence.
Figure 4: Likelihood estimates for
positive events in Experiment 2.