History of Economics as Economics?
Yuichi Shionoya
“Das Studium der Geschichte der Philosophie [ist] Studium der Philosophie selbst,
wie es denn nicht anders sein kann.’’ (G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte
der Philosophie [1817], Werke 18, Suhrkamp, 1999, S. 49.)
I. Introduction
The background to this paper is the question: how the future of the history of economics
will be.１ Although this question has emerged directly from a worry on the part of historians
of economics about a declining general interest in the discipline, it arises basically from a split
between economics and the history of economics. The question must be addressed by an
examination of some structural problems that have led to such consequences. The reasons
responsible to the division are found in the prevailing practice of both economics and the
history of economics. If the history of economics has suffered from a slight and disregard by
economists, philosophy has undergone no less than complete neglect by economists as well as
historians of economics. It is under the reign of positivism and formalism in the last century
that the links between economics, the history of economics, and philosophy have almost
disappeared. Focusing on the research stance of historians of economics, this paper, as the
self-reflection of the discipline, intends to discuss the crucial relevance of economics and
philosophy to the history of economics rather than to preach to economists on the utility of the
subject. It seems also meaningless to forecast the future of the history of economics without a
presumption of some normative view on the discipline, which should serve as a basis for
action.
This paper first tries to extend the above quoted Hegel’s thesis on the relationship
between philosophy and the history of philosophy to the context of economics and
heuristically holds that the study of the history of economics is the study of economics as such,
and vice versa. Of course, as is the case with Hegel, this statement is not descriptive but
prescriptive, meaning that the history of economics must be economics, and vice versa, if they
are to be noble sciences.
Why start with Hegel? According to him, there was no history of philosophy before him,
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but merely a chronological exhibition of different doctrines of different philosophers. He
claims that he submits for the first time the conception of the history of philosophy so that it
can be established as a discipline. It is worthwhile to examine what his thesis means before
we proceed to the history of economics, particularly because partnership with economics is
often urged by historians of economics to get rid of their difficulties. Apart from Hegel’s
metaphysical slant on history, we can accept his thesis on the identity of philosophy and the
history of philosophy, and construct a scheme for the history of economics, which we would
call a panorama-cum-scenario model (section II).
Since there are naturally differences between economics and philosophy, the relationship
between them will become another topic of the present discussion. First, whereas the history
of economics is metatheory addressed to economics, the history of philosophy is metatheory
addressed to metatheory; and second, whereas economics is theory addressed to the real world,
philosophy is metatheory addressed to the ideational world. Based on these comparisons, it is
argued that the history of economics is better characterized as a metatheory of economics
rather than the vague notions of a subdiscipline or a coordinate of economics and is ranked
alongside philosophy on the metatheoretical level (section III).
Against the Hegelian panorama-cum-scenario model, we compare several approaches to
the history of economics. They are also examined with reference to Nietzsche’s anti-Hegelian
models of history. Nietzsche’s viewpoint provides us important modifications to Hegel’s
thesis and suggests specific roles to be played by our model. In view of its broad perspective
and strict requirements, the panorama-cum-scenario model is to be viewed not as a specific
approach but a basic framework for research in the history of economics (section IV).
Since it is a difficult task for single scholars in the history of economics to construct a
grand panorama-cum-scenario model, the number of accomplished models is actually limited.
The absence of comprehensive models of this kind, coupled with specialization in separate
subject matters, in the practice of historical research is one of the causes of a downward
interest in the discipline. Among others, Schumpeter’s approach in this field is particularly
worthy of attention for its grand philosophy and consistent system (section V). The paper
concludes with a summary and implications of the discussion for the future (section VI).
II. Hegel’s Thesis on the History of Philosophy
Although Hegel’s philosophy is completely out of favor with economists, his view on
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history gives a central idea of historicism and deserves our attention. To put it shortly,
historicism is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition, and on the
segregation of human from natural phenomenon. It is intended as a critique of the a-historical
epistemology of the Enlightenment and belongs to Continental philosophy vis-à-vis analytical
philosophy.２ According to the historical studies of the Western thought by Ernst Troeltsch
and Friedrich Meinecke, two moments in the way of thinking, i.e., individuality and
development, characterize the paradigm of historicism.３ The historicist conception of history
recognizes the individuality of historical phenomena in the process of development. Of course,
historicism did not begin with Hegel. What is distinctive about his historicism is that it
becomes the self-conscious method of philosophy in place of a-historical reason. Thus he
historicized philosophy, placing it in its social context, and argued that there is no distinction
between philosophy and the history of philosophy, leading to the famous statement that the
study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself, and vice versa.
For Hegel, philosophy is the self-recognition of human mind and the history of
philosophy is the process of development of such recognition in time and space; philosophy
and its history are parallel each other. In Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Hegel described
the process of human intellectual development as the logically necessary working out of
mind’s coming to know itself from the primitive stage of consciousness, through
self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion to the ultimate stage of the absolute knowledge.
As philosophy is a theory of knowledge or a metatheory, which means a theory behind theory,
particular sciences including economics are to emerge at the final stage in which the
philosophical enquiry into the process of evolution of consciousness terminates. Hegel’s
thesis on the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy leads to the
boldest statement that the logical succession of moments of ideas developed in
Phänomenologie would be in parallel with the temporal succession of ideas described in
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, because, for him, history is the
self-development of reason. The point is that the historical succession of philosophical
systems is primarily determined by the underlying logic of the main ideas.４ The history of
philosophy does not deserve the name of discipline unless it is grasped as a system of the
development of underlying logic behind phenomena; a collection of historical material
without regulative principles is not a science.
Hegel criticizes existing approaches to the history of philosophy for being devoid of
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philosophy to deal with philosophies. According to Hegel, many historians only display a
variety of individual philosophical doctrines to show off their erudition of the storage of
historical materials that appears to be a dump for defective products or an antique collection.
He labels their history of philosophy “the gallery of follies” (die Galerie der Narrheiten) or
the record of failed efforts.５ He does not even admit the value of erudition because it consists
of a number of useless things which hardly contain a matter of interest. Someone might say
that knowledge of diverse views in the past would be of some use in discovering important
ideas for the future, but Hegel rejects this defense because the history of philosophy would
then be reduced to a superfluous and boring discipline. This criticism can be applied to some
of contemporary approaches to the history of economics.
As a result of the historicization of philosophy, Hegel derives an important conclusion
with regard to the conception of the history of philosophy, which has a crucial bearing on the
history of economics. Since the plurality or diversity of thought is regarded as the essence of
the development of thought according to historicism, different thoughts and conceptions
produced in the history of philosophy and thus regarded as historical constitute the totality of
philosophy. Therefore, any views once proposed in the history of philosophy are not
eliminated but put together and preserved as necessary moments in the totality of philosophy.
Instead of treating the diversity of knowledge in the history of thought as an awkward source
of historical relativity and theoretical conflict, Hegelian approach regards it as building blocks
for the whole system of knowledge and anticipates in a sense the ideas of Ernst Troeltsch’s
“current cultural synthesis” (gegenwältige Kultursynthese) and Hans-George Gadamer’s
“fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) to rescue philosophy and science from the
crisis of historicism.
Since Hegel’s history of philosophy is part of his philosophy of history, it is based on the
presumption of the total progression of all history towards a final goal: that the end of history
is the self-awareness of freedom. We can dispense with this metaphysical and teleological
presumption and replace it with an open-ended vision on the scope and structure of the
discipline in question, maintaining his claim for the need of a pre-theoretical vision
concerning the development of knowledge.
In sum, the history of knowledge (i.e., philosophy, economics, etc.) must set a panoramic
scene of all past achievements as the object of the study and depend on a subjectively drawn
scenario to decipher the structure and development of knowledge before the specialization of
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historical research begins. In terms of economics, any system of economics is not complete in
itself, and should be seen as an attempt to contribute to a total system of economics by
focusing on a particular aspect of the economic mechanism and structure with particular
methods, concepts and models. The total system involving conflicts of thought is constructed
only by the history of economics with a broad perspective and a constructive scenario. We call
this Hegelian conception of the history of knowledge a panorama-cum-scenario model.
Basically, the study of the history of economics is a creative venture to interpret and resolve
the diversity of approaches to the economy. Just as Hegel viewed the history of philosophy as
philosophy and resolved the conflicts of ideas through the dialectics, so the history of
economics is seen as a set of diverse approaches to the self-discovery of economic
knowledge.
III. Economics, Philosophy, and History
Can we apply this Hegelian model to economics as a heuristic device for identifying the
relationship between economics and the history of economics? It is required to clarify the
differences between economics and philosophy and rectify the Hegelian model, if necessary.
The question is raised on whether the relationship between philosophy and the history of
philosophy, on the one hand, and the relationship between economics and the history of
economics, on the other, are plausibly considered as parallel. This question is examined, first,
in terms of the distinction between theory (economics) and metatheory (philosophy), because
this distinction defines the different statuses and functions of knowledge, and second, in terms
of the distinction between real science (economics) and ideational science (philosophy),
because this distinction relates to the different nature of the object of knowledge.
Let us consider the history of these sciences. The history of knowledge is another
metatheory besides the philosophy of knowledge and the sociology of knowledge. From the
Hegelian conception of philosophy as the self-recognition of human mind, it follows that the
history of philosophy is the self-reflection and self-discovery of philosophy conducted on the
level of metatheory, although there is regress within the metatheory. Hegel’s thesis on the
identification of philosophy and the history of philosophy implies that both disciplines are
identified as coordinate on the level of metatheory and that the development of ideas forms
not linear progression but spiral movements on plural tracks. It is argued that a spiral
movement of ideas on the level of metatheory has to rely on the so-called “hermeneutical
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circle” between pre-understanding and understanding as the dynamics of the intellectual
movements, as Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer later argued. The interactions between
philosophy and its history constitute a large part of the hermeneutical circle.
In contrast, economics is not a metatheory, but deals with the changing external world on
the basis of its own internal theoretical tradition. As a result, the history of economics has to
face the intertwinement between the history of the outer world and the history of the internal
world. Hence, when we discuss the thesis that economics is the history of economics, it is
interpreted to mean that economics develops as the internal as well as external history in that
the development of economics depends on advances in logical formulation and responses to
the challenge of economic reality. Moreover, since the history of economics is metatheory,
there is a difference in the status of knowledge between economics and the history of
economics. It is a unique function of metatheory of economics to critically evaluate economic
doctrines and thereby indirectly influences and regulates the direction of economic research.
How?
The history of economics has the rules and procedures of historiography for recording
historical data, but it must rely on further tools that would make it avoid the castigation of
“the gallery of follies.” The tools needed by historians of knowledge in general are two: the
philosophy of knowledge and the sociology of knowledge, in addition to the knowledge of a
field in question. The philosophy of knowledge is required to address the internal history of
knowledge, and the sociology of knowledge is utilized to deal with the external history of
knowledge. Historians of ideas are more likely to be engaged in the sociological
investigations of doctrines, including biographical aspects of authors, in terms of
socio-economic situations, schools of thought, research institutions, ideology, personal
propensity, etc. and describe the intellectual products as part of social history at a certain time
and place. On the other hand, average historians of thought are weak in the philosophical
investigations of doctrines, which consist of epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Only in the
philosophical, rather than the sociological, investigations of the history of knowledge,
historians are able to not only describe and interpret but also normatively criticize and
prescribe intellectual activities of the past.
The influence of the external world on philosophy appears much more remote and
indirect in rationalist philosophy, but is more powerful and fundamental than the case of
social sciences including economics, because in the Hegelian historicist conception of
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philosophy the Weltanschauung or Zeitgeist constitutes the substantive contents of philosophy,
reflecting the organic whole of activities and institutions in history. Here applies Hegel’s
another historicist thesis: “philosophy is its own age comprehended in thought.”６ The
philosophical concepts relating to the world and the time are not an external history but the
internal scenarios explored by the self-consciousness of spirit. Examples of the scientific
Weltanschauung are positivism, historicism, romanticism, and phenomenology, and a deep
philosophical inquiry into the history of economics cannot dispense with them.
In sum, the adapted Hegelian conception of the history of economics as economics
teaches us the need to study economics when studying the history of economics and the need
to study the history of economics when studying economics. From the didactic point of view,
this will be the first requirement for the profitable future of the history of economics, but not
all. The second requirement will be to recognize the status and function of the history of
economics distinct from economics. The history of economics is not only economics but also
a metatheory of economics. The history of economics is not a showroom or gallery of past
publications; it should present a scenario for interpreting and evaluating the panoramic
scenery of thought by the use of the sociology and philosophy of science. Thus, we argue that,
first, a panorama-cum-scenario model of the history of economics not only formulates the
self-development of human mind into theoretical constructs but also takes account of
interactions with the external world; and second, it not only describes but also prescribes
historical development of economics achieved internally and externally. The latter
considerations will lead to the notion of the utility of the history of knowledge in comparison
with the truth of knowledge.
IV. Several Approaches to the History of Economics
Here we take account of five approaches to the history of economics, including a
panorama-cum-scenario model based on the adapted Hegelian thesis. First two approaches
are typical practices currently prevailing in economic theory and the history of economics.
For the sake of modeling, they are a bit caricatured.
First, most theoretical and empirical economists don’t regard the history of economics as
a subdisciplinary field within economics necessary to their own discipline, because, they
believe, they work at the frontiers of the discipline with the most advanced techniques, while
all past theories are obsolete or wrong and superseded by current ones. They don’t admit the
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history of economics even as a subdiscipline, much less as a discipline coordinate with
economics. In consequence, if there exists in fact a discipline or course called history of
economics, doing the history of economics is seen as not doing economics, or doing second
rate economics.
This view can be easily rebutted. If it is true that past theories are replaced with a present
one, a present theory will be replaced with future ones and judged at once as worthless. The
development of science is not such a linear and cumulative process. All theories in the past
have not necessarily converged on current mainstream theories in all branches of the
discipline. The formation of mainstream in knowledge is largely a matter of sociological
phenomena, not a matter of truth or falsity. In fact, the past and the present coexist
simultaneously as parts of the whole ideas of the discipline of economics. Therefore, the
current world is not addressed by current theories alone, but by a set of the present and past
theories. Although past theories were originally concerned with the past state of affairs, they
are still legacies to the present as the source of eternal views, whether they are recognized or
not. According to Hegel’s thesis, it does not matter whether the combined set of present and
past theories is called theory or the history of theory. All theories from the past to the present
provide materials for a panoramic view of the history of theory.
The view of the cumulative development is doubtful even in natural science. Before the
radical positivistic philosophy of science prevailed, Ernst Mach, the physicist, had warned
theoretical scientists that the prevailing theories were not inevitable and might not have taken
over important ideas:
“We shall recognize also that not only a knowledge of the ideas that have been
accepted and cultivated by subsequent teachers is necessary for the historical
understanding of a science, but also that the rejected and transient thoughts of the
inquirers, nay even apparently erroneous notions, may be very important and very
instructive. The historical investigation of the development of a science is most
needful, lest the principles treasured up in it become a system of half-understood
prescripts, or worse, a system of prejudices. Historical investigation not only
promotes the understanding of that which now is, but also brings new possibility
before us, by showing that which exists to be in great measure conventional and
accidental.”７
Second, most historians of economics publishing articles and monographs, far from
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negating and disbelieving the history of economics, are absorbed in specific figures or schools
in the past often without proposing a panoramic overview of the subject as well as a scenario
of the development of thought. When their works are not necessarily informative of why they
are interested in their chosen topics, they are unlikely to escape the criticism of “the gallery of
follies” and a hobby of antiques and niches. Even if this approach focuses on specific, limited
aspects of the history of economics, the importance of a scenario that explains the rationale of
particularized research should be emphasized in clipping fragments from the history. It is also
the crucial weakness of this approach that it often lacks any reference to the current economic
theory, whether it might be a positive or negative appraisal. Possibly this approach merely
keeps up the fashion of remarkable research attained for some major figures or schools. Under
the great names of Smith, Marx, Keynes, and the like, historians of economics seem to feel
like exempt of revealing their intention of research.
The third and fourth approaches are exemplified by Christina Marcuzzo and Annalisa
Rosselli as the traditional American and British “Whig” approach and the Italian approach in
the 1970s respectively.８ According to them, the “Whig” approach is tried to legitimatize
current mainstream by tracing the predecessors of modern theory. It is a “quest for
ascendancy” of mainstream thought. In the fourth approach, in contrast, the past is searched,
by concentrating on some neglected authors or some neglected aspects of major authors, for
what has been lost and can no longer be found in current mainstream. It is a “quest for an
alternative” to mainstream and implicitly intends to stimulate the development of economics
in a new direction. Whereas both the third and fourth approaches do not necessarily exhibit
panoramic views of the whole history of thought, they seem to select their objects of study
based on certain scenarios of intellectual development.
There is another type of approach which is related to the fourth one. Whereas the fourth
approach usually focuses on a positive appraisal of neglected past thought, its variant provides
an opposite type of history through a critique of a line of mainstream from the past to the
present as the preliminaries in pursuit of an alternative theory. Examples are: Böhm-Bawerk’s
Geschichte und Kritik der Kapitalzinstheorien (1884) and Marx’s Theorien über den
Mehrwert (1905-10).
It is not possible to discuss the relative superiority of the third and fourth approaches
offhand; they are equally creative work in the history of economics and also excellent practice
of the thesis that the history of economics is economics. But I personally agree with Marcuzzo
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and Rosselli that the quest for alternative theories rather than confirmation of present theories
is potentially more fruitful.
The fifth approach is a full use of the panorama-cum-scenario model. The third and
fourth approaches are insufficient application of this model in that at least they presume some
scenarios serving as a selection principle for the subject matter. The fifth approach is
apparently demanded when an author writes a treatise on the history of economics as a whole
from the antiquity to the present, if he is to avoid the criticism of “the gallery of follies.” It is
appropriate to illustrate the fifth approach with Schumpeter’s work. Before doing so, it seems
important to examine the above mentioned approaches from the standpoint of Nietzsche’s
anti-historicism.
Friedrich Nietzsche criticized Hegelian historicism for the excessive emphasis on history.
If we were fascinated too much by the past history, we would become stunted and degenerate
in living our life. The past should not be treasured for its own sake, but be valued for its utility
to life and action. He inquired about the “advantage and disadvantage of history for life” in an
essay with the same title (“Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben”) and argued
that history should serve life, not that life should serve history.９ Thus he submitted a
viewpoint to counterbalance history with life. History is demanded and reinterpreted only to
satisfy the present concern for life. He mentioned three kinds of approaches to history which
could serve life: (1) monumental, (2) antiquarian, and (3) critical history.
According to Nietzsche, while a monumental history praises great achievements of the
past, an antiquarian history deals with the past in a reminiscent mood; both lack a reference to
our action in the present and future. In contrast, a critical history brings the past before the
tribunal of the present and asks whether it could provide a new vision for life. An excessive
weight of past knowledge would deprive us of energies and innovations for the future and
bring about formidable harms to life, because it is impossible to live without forgetting the
past. He claimed that only ones with high power and strong personality are allowed to
interpret the past; the weak is effaced by the weight of history. Historical knowledge is useful
for the future only when it is ruled and guided by a high power and does not itself rule and
guide.
The above mentioned first approach to the history of economics in our classification,
which maintains the complete dismissal of the history of the discipline, appears to comply
with Nietzsche’s anti-historicism. However, he would blame it for the guilt of not pondering
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using history to serve life. The second particularized approach by historians, which covers
Nietzsche’s monumental and antiquarian history, is less valued than the third and fourth
approaches, which belong to his critical history. Nietzsche’s critical history means a positive
or negative appraisal of the past thought and is compatible with a quest for ascendancy of
mainstream and a quest for an alternative to mainstream. His thesis that history should serve
life should not be understood exclusively as a defense of a Whig history; the thesis rather
advocates the use of history for creating the future through a critique of the present. From his
viewpoint, positive value of the history of economics is to be found in the productivity of a
panorama-cum-scenario model for life. It is a function of a scenario that rules and guides
history.
It is interesting to see that Nietzsche associates different types of history with different
mental states of historians to emphasize the priority of a subjective standpoint over the alleged
existence of objective history. According to him, a monumental history belongs to a man who
is active and striving to accomplish something great; an antiquarian history to a man who
likes to preserve and admire the tradition; and a critical history to a man who suffers from
some present misery and is in need of liberation.
Whereas Hegel identifies philosophy outright with the history of philosophy, Nietzsche
separates them and weighs one against another. For Nietzsche, the nuts and bolts of historical
research is not to discover the eternal truth but to interpret the past so that we can live a
creative life and action. He provides us with a principle for selecting the type and subject
matter of history, which would make life most productive and creative. This superb economic
principle can be applied to detect a proper relationship between economics and the history of
economics through a specification of the panorama- cum-scenario model. The advantage and
disadvantage of the history of economics for the current activity of economists rest on the
specific contents of the panorama-cum-scenario model that would articulate the creative
directions of life.
V. Schumpeter’s Approach to the History of Economics
Since Schumpeter advocated the theoretical formulation of history or the histoire
raisonnée (reasoned history) as the approach to the socio-economic evolution, it was
incumbent on him to develop a theoretical framework of history---be it the history of the
economy or the history of economics.１０ In the present context, the histoire raisonnée means
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working out a scenario for formulating the history of economic thought.
By proposing a definition of science in History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter
declares that science is the object of the philosophy of science because it has certain rules of
procedure, on the one hand, and that science is the object of the sociology of science because
it is carried out by groups of experts and is thus socially conditioned, on the other.１１ History
is subjective; there exists no objective scheme or scenario for historical description acceptable
to everyone. However, the sometimes implicit framework of historians yielding subjective
scenarios should be made explicit. What is the basic idea that characterizes Schumpeter’s
approach to the history of economics?
１２
In History of Economic Analysis, a set of metatheory (the philosophy of science, the
history of science, and the sociology of science), a set of substantive theory (economic statics,
economic dynamics, and economic sociology), and a set of analytic tools (theory, history,
statistics, and institution) are presented as the components of a theoretical framework to
describe the history of economics. Here I have to set aside several interesting issues but
concentrate on how Schumpeter sees the philosophy of science and the sociology of science
cooperate in doing the history of science. This problem relates to Schumpeter’s conflicting
statements that appear paradoxical:
(1) “Within serious economic theory there are no such things as ‘schools’ or differences
of principles, and the only fundamental cleavage in modern economics is between good
work and bad. The basic lines are the same in all lands and in all hands.”１３
(2) “The history of science is a fascinating study which unveils us the ways of the human
mind. And it has a neighboring field of research, which is developing slowly and is
perhaps more fascinating still. It may be called the Sociology of Science, and consists of
the study of science as social phenomenon…. In this study, the phenomenon of grouping,
which we call scientific schools, is of primary importance.”１４
Here is no paradox; Schumpeter argues that as the ultimate ideal of the philosophy of science,
there can be no schools, whereas schools are important as a subject matter in the sociology of
science. He is confronted with a problem how the two theses are integrated. In the scientific
world, conflict, dispute, and disharmony are apparently dominant instead of compromise,
cooperation, and harmony. He believes, however, that at a deeper level of turbulent scientific
activity in pursuit of novelty consistent development is likely to be achieved because of the
common recognition of the basic nature of science. Although the process of scientific activity
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is in a mess like a tropical forest, the history of science is written as if it were a logically
consistent architecture. Thus he claims the following philosophical thesis concerning the
organized chaos in science and tries to explain it as the central question of the history of
science:
“This is one of the cases, so often found in all fields of human history, where the
‘arbitrariness,’ ‘accidentalness,’ ‘uncertainty,’ etc. of actual individual phenomena are
paired with the irresistible impression of ‘regularity,’ ‘uniformity,’ ‘necessity,’ etc. of
the totality grasped by observers.”１５
He argues that the activity of different schools, on the one hand, is too shortsighted to shape a
well-ordered history of science, and the logic prescribed by the philosophy of science, on the
other, is too unrealistic to depict an actual history of science. Nevertheless, Schumpeter
considers the possibility that the logical direction of science is approximately realized.
How is such a belief possible? He emphasizes the existence of given facts we cannot
change, which consist of historically given objects and apparatus of science, namely the
problems and methods of science. Intellectual innovation must struggle with the tradition and
routine of science. Sooner or later, the new is absorbed into the old to accomplish a new
equilibrium. Schumpeter called the inevitable forces by which individual conflicts and
diversities in science are coordinated into a totality so as to form a uniform development in a
certain direction “the logic of things” (Logik der Dinge).１６ The same view is shown, though
more concisely, in the concluding part of his earlier work on the history of economics.１７
This argument is an application to scientific development of Schumpeter’s notion of the
static-dynamic interactions based on the distinction between adaptive and innovative forces in
economic development. “The logic of things” provides a scenario for the history of economics
with the modus operandi of the history in question. He defines the “classical situation” in the
history of economics as “the achievement of substantial agreement after a long period of
struggle and controversy---the consolidation of the fresh and original work which went
before.”１８ This is comparable with the establishment of Kuhn’s normal science in terms of
paradigm through the play of sociological factors. The establishment of the “classical
situation” is an analogy with the adaptation of the economy through business cycles to the
introduction of technological innovation. This is neither an accident nor an analogy; it is the
outcome of the methodology of Schumpeter’s universal social science.
For Schumpeter, the scope of a scenario in the history of economics covers his tripartite
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classification of substantive theory (economic statics, economic dynamics, and economic
sociology). In fact, History of Economic Analysis traces the developments of the trinity. Here
we can see how he practiced the Hegelian thesis on the history of economics as economics.
Hic Rhodus, hic salta.
According to Schumpeter, static economics was first accomplished by Walras after the
efforts of the classical and neoclassical schools through the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. The first half of the twentieth century was devoted to the pursuit of economic
dynamics, where a keen rivalry developed between Keynes and Schumpeter in a competition
for alternatives to neoclassical economics, although Schumpeter’s name was effaced from his
text. He must have been confident that his theory of economic development was a real
contribution to dynamic theory. To his regret, largely owing to the sociological reasons,
Keynes gained a victory. However, Schumpeter referred to the development of Keynesian
economics as aberrations leading to what he called “Ricardian vice.” A scenario cannot be
written without selective affirmation and critique of past thought, as Nietzsche’s critical
history indicates.
With regard to economic sociology, Schumpeter tried to evaluate grand theories with the
names of economic sociology, unitary social science, universal social science, and the like,
going beyond the boundaries of economic statics and dynamics. Vico, Comte, Marx,
Schmoller, Pareto, and Weber among others were discussed against the background of his idea
of universal social science. The three branches of economics have developed with different
speeds on different tracks, and sometimes experienced “relative maturity” and “relative
immaturity” due to sociological reasons.１９ In the trend of the specialization of sciences in
the first half of the twentieth century, the comprehensive orientation of economic sociology
lost its appeal. As the time went on, the work of economic sociology was on the decline. For
Schumpeter, however, in the perspective of the eternities (sub specie aeternitatis) a success or
failure of science in the short-run is a triviality.２０ For him, “a century is a ‘short run.’”２１
Rising interest in Schumpeter’s dynamic theory and economic sociology since the 1980s
might be a tribute to the return to the “logic of things” inherent in his scenario of the history
of economics. Thus, he practiced the history of economics as economics in the sense that the
panoramic view of the entire history of economics was constructed by the building blocks of
the trinity of economics according to the scenario based on the “logic of things.”
The History of Economic Analysis is a distinguished achievement among the studies of
14
the history of economics. For fifty years after its publication, nothing has taken its place;
nothing has equaled it. However, historians of economics seem to pay not so much attention
to the underlying scenario of the entire volume as to short descriptions of specific figures,
utilizing the volume as an encyclopedia or a dictionary. In his introduction to the Routledge
edition of History of Economic Analysis, Mark Perlman challenges to decipher the vision of
Schumpeter’s volume which I call here the scenario. He suggests that “the vision that
Schumpeter really sought was one involving something akin to a theological
paradigm---integrating fundamental, non-changing, ethical and social values and the dynamic
workings of an evolutionary economy.”２２ He concludes that Schumpeter failed to find it. In
my interpretation, Schumpeter was based on the philosophy of science as the standards of
knowledge, on the one hand, and described historical movements of science in zigzags, on the
other. Perlman thinks that this causes incoherence. But he does not need to conclude so,
because science is unfinished eternal efforts to search for completion.
VI. Conclusions
The title of this paper is followed by a question mark, meaning the question whether the
history of economics is economics in accord with Hegel’s thesis for philosophy. My answer
was drawn out through two steps. First, yes, the history of economics is economics, as judged
from the didactic point of view. Economists should take into account all the approaches
recorded in the history of economics as their proper subject matter; at the same time,
historians of economics should be acquainted with the current state of economics. Second, no,
the history of economics is more than economics because it is metatheory addressed to
economics. To substantiate the dual conception of the history of economics, I formulated a
panorama- cum-scenario model, which emphasizes the totality of diverse economic thoughts
in history and the subjectivity of writing stories for history.
From the viewpoint of this general model, together with Nietzsche’s anti-historicist
principle, I examined four approaches to the history of economics: (1) complete neglect, (2)
the antiquarian and monumental approach, (3) the “Whig” approach, and (4) the
anti-mainstream approach. Is it possible for historians of economics primarily working by the
approach (2) to avoid both Hegel’s charge against “the gallery of follies” and Nietzsche’s
charge against “an excess of history”? For all the diminished role the history of economics has
been given in the training of economists, the field in question might appear strangely vibrant
15
and growing, because in Nietzsche’s view, “the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary,”
given the time and resource available to the human beings.２３
After finishing textbook economics, historians of economics perhaps get interested in the
subject rather than advancing the frontiers of economics because they are inspired by works
of individual authors in the past. They are no doubt fascinated with unique ideas of past
individual authors in different processes of the development of ideas. Their mental state is
described as historicist and amenable to the paradigm of Continental philosophy. The history
of economics is originally the German doctrine and is a stronghold of historicism in social
science. Given the concerns for particulars and evolution of thought cherished by historians of
economics, there are two preconditions for the desirable practice of the discipline: first, the
historians should explicitly refer to a panorama-cum-scenario model in which to locate their
work; and second, they should justifiably believe in the positive value of historical knowledge
with reference to the present state of economics. If the requirements were fulfilled, we do not
have to worry about a bleak prospect of the discipline. We could then entrust Nietzsche with
answering the question whither the future of the history of economics:
“There exists in the world a single path along which no one can go except you:
whither does it lead? Do not ask, go along it. Who was it who said: ‘a man never
rises higher than when he does not know whither his path can still lead him.’?”２４
１
E. Roy Weintraub (ed.), The Future of the History of Economics, Durham: Duke University
Press, 2002.
２
For the contrast between Continental philosophy and analytical philosophy, see Simon
Critchley and William R. Schroeder (eds.), A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998.
３
Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 1922. Friedrich Meinecke, Die
Entstehung des Historismus, 2 vols, 1936.
４
Frederck C. Beiser, “Hegel’s Historicism,” in F.C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion
to Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 277.
５
G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by T.M.
Knox and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 15.
６
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1967, p. 11.
16
７
Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung: historisch-kritisch dargestellt, 1883. (The
Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development by Mach,
translated by T.J. McCormack, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1960, p. 316.)
８
Maria Christina Marcuzzo and Annalisa Rosselli, “Economics as History of Economics:
The Italian Case in Retrospect,” in E.Roy Weintraub (ed.), op. cit.
９
Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, 1873-76. (“On the Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Meditations, translated by R.J. Hollingdale,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 59.)
１０
For the details of Schumpeter’s approach to economic sociology, see Yuichi Shionoya,
Schumpeter and the Idea of Social Science: A Metatheoretical Study, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997, Chapter 8 (A Methodology of Economic Sociology).
１１
J.A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press,
1954, p. 7.
１２
For the details of Schumpeter’s history of economics, see Shionoya, op. cit., Chapter 10
(The Historical World of Economics).
１３
J.A. Schumpeter, “The Instability of Capitalism,” Economic Journal, September 1928, p.
363.
１４
J.A. Schumpeter, “The Present State of Economics or on Systems, Schools and Methods,”
Kokumin Keizi Zasshi, May 1931, pp. 7-8.
１５
J.A. Schumpeter,Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Sozialwissenschaften, Leipzig: Duncker
& Humblot, p. 94.
１６
op. cit., p. 102.
１７
J.A. Schumpeter, Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1914, p. 124.
１８
J.A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 51.
１９
op. cit., p. 463.
２０
J.A. Schumpeter,Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Sozialwissenschaften, p. 96.
２１
J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Brothers,
3rd. ed., 1950, p. 163.
２２
Mark Perlman, “Introduction,” in J.A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis,
London: Routledge, 1994, p. xxxiv.
２３
Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely
17
Meditations, p. 59.
２４
Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in Untimely Meditations, p. 129.
According to the English translator, the maxim in the quote is that of Oliver Cromwell, as
quoted in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay “Circles.”
18