DOES PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
FOSTER CLOSER CONGRUENCE BETWEEN
CITIZENS AND POLICY MAKERS?
Andrè Blais, Marc Andrè Bodet
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Tomè Clarissa
May, 22 nd 2013
INTRODUCTION
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“PR system ensures close correspondence
between citizens’ whishes and what policy
makers decide”.
Is this statement true?
Purpose of the article: assess the validity of the
claim that proportional systems foster a more
responsive government.
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The number of parties in the legislature increases with
the proportionality of the electoral system and with
the size of the district magnitude.
More possibility to find representatives whose views
are congruent to those of the voters.
But what about government overall positions?
Government’s objective: minimize the distance
between policy makers and voters.
Cox: this objective is more easily achieved choosing the
median voter’s position.
Does PR induce governments to locate themselves
closer to median voter positition?
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DISTINCTION BETWEEN NON-PR(STRONG) AND PR (WEAK/PERMISSIVE)
SYSTEMS
Strong system
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Low poportionality;
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If two parties: median voter:
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If more than two parties:
candidates try to distinguish
themselves ideologically
from each other → extermist
parties;
But if voters act
strategically, centrist
candidates will win over
extremist ones (Cox).
Weak system
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High proportionality, many
parties;
Less centrist parties;
But centripetal process in
coalition formation →
positional advantage of
centrist parties;
Incentive not to move from
median voter’s position,
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The congruence between the median voter’s position and
that of the government is achieved both in strong and
permissive systems but through different routes.
In both systems we have pressures to minimize the
distance between voters’ wishes and and public policy
…but no guarantee of congruence.
Centrist pressures are weaker when the issue is
multidimensional.
PR systems have two contraductory consequences:
1.
More parties → greater choice for voters → parties are
more extreme → weaker congruence;
2.
Centrist parties more likely to form a government →
PR good for congruence → but excludes extremist
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parties.
BLAIS AND BODET MODEL
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Use Comparative Study for Electoral Systems (CSES)
dataset: information about the positions of voters and
governing parties.
Compare respondents’ self-placements on a Left-Right scale
with placements of cabinet’ parties’ location.
Voters’ median placements: indicator of parties’ true
ideological positions on the Left-Right scale. Voters’
perceptions of party position are affected by parties’ true
positions and individual idiosyncratic factors (projection
effects).
Focus on parliamentary systems → homogenoeus sample:
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formation of cabinet is the direct product of elections.
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21 countries and 31 election studies.
48,675 respondents be asked to place themselves on a 0 to 10
Left-Right scale and place up six major parties on the same
scale.
4 types of electoral systens: plurality, majority, PR and
mixed.
Independent variable: degree of disproportionality in the
electoral system.
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Gallagher’s index of disproportionality:
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5 hypothesis.
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HYPOTHESIS 1: PR PRODUCES LESS CENTRIST
PARTIES AND THUS GREATER DIVERSITY
Mean party distance from the median voter
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Table 1: median voter at the point 5 (except for
Germany and Israel)
First dependent variable: centrifugal strenght of the
party system → measure the location of each party
Mean party distance from the median voter (Γ):
v : median voter position for country j;
ρ: median placement of party p.
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Diversity
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Indicator of diversity: dispersion of parties’ positions
relative to voters’ dispersion
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ρ: party position on the scale,
κ: pth party’s share of the vote,
τ : weighted mean of parties on the scale
σ : standard deviation of voters’ position
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Typical situation: score around 0.8
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Old democracy: dummy variable for countries that
have been democratic for at least 20 years at the
moment of election.
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More proportional systems:
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Old democracies have a more stable partisan structure
→ less diverse party system →better congruence.
greater range of ideological options,
less centrist parties.
Older democracies:
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less centripetal party system
less political choice (than non old democracies).
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HYPOTHESIS 2: PR INCREASES THE
NUMBER OF PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT
PR facilitates the entrance and survival of many
parties .
 PR leads to the formation of coalition
governments more frequently than majoritarian
systems.
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HYPOTHESIS 3: THE GREATER THE DIVERSITY IN THE PARTY
SYSTEM, THE LARGER THE DISTANCE (THE WEAKER THE
CONGRUENCE) BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND VOTERS
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In order to measure the cabinet distance from voters (congruence) we
need a measure for cabinet position.
Cabinet position (ψ): sum of governemnt parties’ positions weighted
by their share of cabinet seats in government.
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ω: the relative weight in terms of cabinet seat share by party p
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ρ: the median location of party p.
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Ex: Denmark (1998): 16 Social democrats (median placement:4); 4
Socialists (median placement:2)
Weighted position of Danish government:
|(16/20)*4 + (4/20)*2|=3.6
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Cabinet distance from voters (Φ): average absolute
distance between each respondent’s position and the
cabinet position:
θ : voter’s position,
• n: number of votes,
• ψ: the cabinet’s position
 Average distance between voters and governments
should be higher when the party system is diverse
(positive and statistically significant relation).
•
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HYPOTHESIS 4: THE MORE PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT, THE
SMALLER THE DISTANCE (THE STRONGER THE CONGRUENCE)
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND VOTERS
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Average distance between voters and
governments should be lower when there are
more parties in government.
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HYPOTHESIS 5: PR HAS NO NET EFFECT ON THE DISTANCE
(CONGRUENCE) BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND VOTERS
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Proportionality has no net effect on the distance
between voters and the government.
PR doesn’t produce more representative governments
when representativeness is defined as the
minimization of the distance between the ideological
locations of voters and the ideological location of
cabinet.
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CONLUSION
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PR contributer to a greater range of choice for voters (voters
con choose among more parties).
But PR doesn’t bring about a better representation for citizens.
Better rapresentation entails that the government converges to
the median voter position
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goal achieved in different ways
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no electoral system is clearly superior on that front.
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Push toward the center in both system.
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