An Economic Analysis of Parental Choice of Primary School in

Centre for Market and
Public Organisation
An Economic Analysis of
Parental Choice of Primary
School in England
Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, Wilson
June 2009
Introduction: School Choice in
England
• Education Reform Act of 1988
– school choice mechanism by which parents can
choose the school their child attends.
• Funding follows the pupil.
– Competitive pressure for schools to exert greater
effort to improve their academic achievement levels.
• Limited market
– No indefinite expansion of good schools
– Failing schools supported with additional resources
– Not necessarily the case that academic standards are
key determinant of school choice by parents
Introduction: School Choice in
England
• Parents’ preferences for schools matter for
outcomes of “school choice”
• In theory, schools compete according to parents’
preferences
• This may lead to social stratification under some
conditions
• What constraints do parents face in school
choice?
• Small catchment areas for the best schools?
• Transport?
• Information?
Introduction: School Choice in
England
• We look at parents’ stated and revealed
preferences for schools
• Are stated and revealed preferences consistent?
• What constraints matter in parents’ decisions?
Literature
• Markets in education and the role of school
choice
• Rothstein, 2005, Hoxby, 2005
• Impact of competition minimal in England
• Lavy, 2006, Gibbons et al., 2006, Burgess and Slater, 2006;
Allen and Vignoles, 2009
• For contrary early evidence see Bradley, Johnes and
Millington, 2001
• Competition potentially leads to greater sorting
but no evidence it increased in UK post 1988
• Söderström and Uusitalo, 2004, Burgess et al, 2006; Allen
and Vignoles, 2007
Literature
• Stated parental preferences vary by socioeconomic background and ethnicity
• Ball 2003; Gerwitz et al 1995; Hastings et al.,
2005; Weekes-Bernard 2007; Reay, 2004; Butler
and Robson 2003; West and Pennell 1999 and
Coldon and Boulton 1991
• BUT Stated preferences may differ from
their true preferences
Data
• Combine survey and administrative data
• Millennium Cohort Study (MCS)
• Pupil Level Annual Schools Census (PLASC)
• EduBase
• This is an excellent combination. We have:
• Detailed family level survey responses and
background controls
• Detailed administrative information on all primary
schools in England
• We essentially have the local market/choice set
Data
• MCS provides information on:
– Up to 3 nominated schools on preference form (LA)
– Other “truly preferred” schools not on form
– Non-nominated schools that are feasible (more on
this later)
– Stated reasons for preferences (all; most important)
– Rich set of controls for families
– Rich set of data on all schools
– Actual school attended
Data
• MCS: Sample longitudinal survey
• Random sample of electoral wards
• Born 1st September 2000 – 31st August 2001
• Over-sampled from deprived areas and areas
with over 30% black or Asian families
• Wave 3 – children are aged 5, primary
school age
• We look at England only
• Final sample is 9,468 children
Stated preferences
Table 1: Most important reasons (grouped) for application for 1 st choice school
Reason
Proximity/ease of travel
Sibling Rule
Other family/friends
Academic standards
General good impression
School characteristics and facilities
Strategic
Religion
School composition
Pre-school & childcare
Total
Note: Table gives unweighted observations
N
2,567
2,350
467
1,521
1,439
485
62
315
44
97
9,347
%
27.5
25.1
5.0
16.3
15.4
5.2
0.7
3.4
0.5
1.0
100
Variation by family type
Table 2: Percentage giving each (grouped) most important reason, by the main respondent’s highest level of education
Education
None
‘Other’ or voc. qual.
GCSE, grades D-G
GCSE, grades A*-C
AS/A Level
Degree +
Proximity
Sibling
Academic
40.02
31.81
29.51
23.82
20.03
20.3
28.62
26.01
24.46
25.99
24.26
20.94
7.68
13.22
12.14
16.67
20.76
20.15
Note: Table gives weighted %, using non response weight 2.
Good
impression
8.81
13.86
13.77
16.38
17.44
22.65
School
characteristics
3.66
4.92
6.67
5.58
5.28
4.61
Religion
1.55
3.79
2.75
2.79
4.22
4.3
Stated Preferences: Problems
• Actual behaviour (or revealed preference) is not
observed
• Revealed and stated preferences may diverge:
– Only “socially desirable” responses may be given
(Jacob and Lefgren, 2007)
– Stated preferences do not require parents to make
realistic trade-offs
– Parents may conflate preferences:
• Proximity (did they move to a desirable catchment area first?)
• Older siblings (what was the initial choice based on?)
Revealed Preferences
• Use information from MCS wave 3
• What school was put as the ‘first preference’ on
the LA application form?
• Look at characteristics of this school, in relation
to other schools in the ‘feasible choice set’
• What ‘type’ of school is chosen?
→ need to define feasible choice set
Feasible choice set
• All schools for which:
• The pupil lives within 3km of the school
• The pupil lives in the same LA as the school
• Ignores geography within this boundary
Feasible choice set
• All schools for which
– The pupil lives within the schools’ catchment
area, defined by the straight line distance in
which 80% of pupils live
• The pupil lives within 20km of the school
• The pupil lives in the same LA as the school
• Useful to compare results from each
‘Type’ of school
• 8 ‘types’ of school
• Defined relative to the median in the feasible
choice set
• Above/below median %FSM
• Above/below median average KS2 score
• Faith/non-faith
• So we have:
• ‘Low FSM, high scoring, non-faith’ schools
• ‘High FSM, low scoring non-faith’ schools….
• Not all pupils have each type of school in their
feasible choice set but most have common types
Table 4: The % of pupils that have each school 'type' in their feasible choice set
% of pupils with group in choice set
Group
1. Rich, low scoring non-faith school
59.59
2. Rich, high scoring non-faith school
89.53
3. Poor, low scoring non-faith school
93.04
4. Poor, high scoring non-faith school
75.85
5. Rich, low scoring faith school
31.23
6. Rich, high scoring faith school
85.76
7. Poor, low scoring faith school
51.99
8. Poor, high scoring faith school
41.47
Stated vs. Revealed
• But different proportion of schools chosen…
Table 6: The prop. choosing each type of school, by the parent’s most important reason for school choice
Grouped 'type of school' indicator
Proximity
Academic
Religion
Strategic
%
%
%
%
Rich, low scoring non-faith school
8.14
4.97
0.52
4.44
23.15
40.94
1.57
31.11
Rich, high scoring non-faith school
37.88
13.16
3.14
20
Poor, low scoring non-faith school
15.01
11.32
0
20
Poor, high scoring non-faith school
1.78
1.75
7.85
2.22
Rich, low scoring faith school
5.79
21.16
69.11
11.11
Rich, high scoring faith school
5.62
2.76
8.38
8.89
Poor, low scoring faith school
2.64
3.96
9.42
2.22
Poor, high scoring faith school
Total
100
100
100
100
Total sample size
1,783
1,092
192
46
Stated vs. Revealed
• Interesting similarities/differences
• Parents that state academic standards are more likely
to choose the ‘rich, high scoring non-faith’ school
• Parents that state proximity are more likely to choose
the ‘poor, low scoring non-faith’ school
• Parents who claim to want high academic standards
are much more likely to choose rich high scoring
schools than poor high scoring schools.
• Parents that state religious grounds are much more
likely to choose the ‘rich, high scoring faith’ school but
much less likely to choose the ‘poor, high scoring
faith’ school than the ‘rich, high scoring faith’ school
• So more than religious considerations
Revealed preferences: Model
• What school ‘type’ is chosen?
– Discrete choice modelling
– Random utility framework
• How do school characteristics affect this choice?
• How do parental characteristics affect this
choice?
X is
Revealed preferences: Model
• We use a conditional/multinomial logit:
Pis 
e
xis   wi  s
xil   wi  l
e
l 1
n
s  1,..., n
• Where schools indexed s=1,…,n , x varying
characteristics of the schools, w represent the
alternative invariant characteristics of the parent.
Revealed preferences:
specification
• What family characteristics affect the ‘type’ of
school chosen?
•
•
•
•
•
Parents’ SES
Parents’ education
Parents’ religion
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) of area
Child characteristics
Revealed preferences:
specification
• What school characteristics affect the ‘type’ of
school chosen?
•
•
•
•
•
% of pupils with FSM
% of pupils with SEN
% of pupils with EAL
% of pupils that are White British
Proportion of school that achieves all level 5 (highest
level) at KS2
• Rank of distance from the home (closest, 2nd
closest…, furthest)
Revealed preferences: Role of
School Characteristics
Table 8a: Results of 'mixed' logit regression
Odds-ratio
t stat
School char
***
% FSM
0.027
8.86
% Level 5
% EAL
% White
% some SEN
Distance rank
1.659
0.922
1.482
0.676
0.690***
1.68
0.18
0.98
1.12
41.16
School characteristics are reported only. The schools
are ranked closest, 2nd closest… in the feasible
choice set
Revealed preferences: Role of
Parental Characteristics
Table 8b: Results of 'mixed' logit regression, SES
Odds-ratio
Parental characteristics Group 1 Group 2 Group 4 Group 6
*
*
**
*
SES: 2nd quinitle
1.571
1.400
1.584
1.505
SES: 3rd quinitle
1.546** 1.661** 2.215***
1.406
***
*
SES: 4th quinitle
1.472
1.843
SES: 5th quinitle
1.304
1.904*** 1.592*
Note: Group 3 is the base category
1.604
***
2.745
2.521***
1. Rich, low scoring non-faith school
2. Rich, high scoring non-faith school
3. Poor, low scoring non-faith school
4. Poor, high scoring non-faith school
5. Rich, low scoring faith school
6. Rich, high scoring faith school
Revealed preferences: Role of
Parental Characteristics
Table 8e: Results of 'mixed' logit regression, IMD
Odds-ratio
Parental characteristics Group 1 Group 2 Group 4
IMD: 2nd decile
1.061
1.019
0.903
IMD: 5th decile
1.957*
1.715** 0.984
IMD: 10th decile
2.220** 1.204
0.632
Group 6
0.99
1.627*
1.52
Note: Group 3 is the base category. IMD is the Index of Multiple Deprivation
A higher IMD indicates a more affluent area
1. Rich, low scoring non-faith school
2. Rich, high scoring non-faith school
3. Poor, low scoring non-faith school
4. Poor, high scoring non-faith school
5. Rich, low scoring faith school
6. Rich, high scoring faith school
Importance of distance/feasible
choice
Table 9b: The effect of distance rank on IMD coefficients
Odds-ratio: Group 2 only
Excluding Distance Including Distance
Parental characteristics
IMD: 2nd decile
1.486*
0.99
IMD: 5th decile
3.388***
1.627*
IMD: 10th decile
2.988***
1.52
Note: Group 3 is the base category
1. Rich, low scoring non-faith school
2. Rich, high scoring non-faith school
3. Poor, low scoring non-faith school
4. Poor, high scoring non-faith school
5. Rich, low scoring faith school
6. Rich, high scoring faith school
Ongoing work
• A more accurate definition of catchment
areas
• Catchment area in which 80% of pupils
live
• Define the feasible choice set as all
schools for which the pupil lives inside the
catchment area
Any ‘good’ schools left?
Table 11a: The % of each type of school exlcuded in '80%'
Lowest IMD decile (most deprived)
% of schools available
School type
Rich, low scoring non-faith school
15.19
15.25
Rich, high scoring non-faith school
21.88
Poor, low scoring non-faith school
20.77
Poor, high scoring non-faith school
44.47
Rich, low scoring faith school
37.38
Rich, high scoring faith school
32.09
Poor, low scoring faith school
33.51
Poor, high scoring faith school
Any ‘good’ schools left?
Table 11b: The % of each type of school exlcuded in '80%'
Highest IMD decile (least deprived)
% of schools available
School type
Rich, low scoring non-faith school
56.86
56.09
Rich, high scoring non-faith school
33.36
Poor, low scoring non-faith school
45.03
Poor, high scoring non-faith school
57.14
Rich, low scoring faith school
76.30
Rich, high scoring faith school
60.92
Poor, low scoring faith school
67.00
Poor, high scoring faith school
Conclusions
• Stated and revealed preferences vary
• Parents’ socio-economic status and education
do play a role in their preferences
– rich and poor do not have same preferences for
school factors
• High scoring advantaged schools are more likely
to be ‘chosen’ by high SES individuals
– Limit market forces in some areas
– Increase social sorting
Conclusions
• Geography is crucial
– are we really capturing genuine choice or
constrained choice
• We know that school de facto catchment
areas have a big effect on the feasible
choice set
• Disproportionately for low SES families
 more work needed