zz - Behavioural Operational Research (BOR)

How to make ambiguity an enabling
factor in group decision:
hints from drought risk management
Raffaele Giordano
Water Research Institute – National Research
Council, Italy
Irene Pluchinotta
LAMSADE-CNRS, Paris Dauphine University
(France)
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 1
Background
Decisions
Decisions
Decisions
Information
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 2
Background
The behavioural repertoires the agents use to interact with
one another affect the creation of the sharing understanding
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 3
Goal and methodology
This work aims to demonstrate that sufficient overlap in interaction
frames is a sine-qua-non condition allowing decision-actors with
divergent problem frames to interactively co-construct overlap in their
decisions; that is, to develop collective action.


Decision-agents’ understanding of the interaction space
Decision-agents’ understanding of the system dynamic (Mental Model of Dynamic
System)

Ambiguity analysis

Learning process
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 4
Drought risk management in the Apulia Region


Decision-Agent
Role
Type
Regional Authority
Controller
(high level)
Organization
Technician/Seller
(middle level)
Organization
Users
(Low level)
Individual
Water Manager
Irrigation Consortium
Farmers
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta

The Regional Water Authority proposed the
enforcement of restrictive measures in the use of
groundwater in case of drought
The new legislation caused strong conflicts between
farmers, the Regional Authority and the Irrigation
Consortium due to the expected economic damages
to the agricultural sector
Due to this conflicting situation, the Water
Protection Plan has not been implemented yet, and
the Regional Authority is carrying on a time and
money consuming revision process
EURO 2016
SLIDE 5
The interaction space
Objects
𝑜1
Environmental
protection
Actors
𝑎3 Regional Authority
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑜2
𝑜3
Water availability
𝑜5
Decrease of
groundwater
overexploitation
𝑜6
Water distribution and
control of the
irrigation network
𝑎2 Farmers
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑎3 Regional Authority
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑎2 Farmers
𝑎3 Regional Authority
𝑎3 Regional Authority
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑎2 Farmers
𝑜7
𝑜8
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
Effectiveness of the
irrigation water
management
𝑜4
𝐼𝑆 = < 𝐴, 𝑂, 𝑅, 𝑆 >
Formal structure to describe the
system of interactions within a
finite set of agents
Agricultural
productivity
Reduction of water
consumption during
drought
Env., econ. and social
sustainability of the
agricultural activities
𝑎1 Irrigation consortium
𝑎3 Regional Authority
Resources
𝑟2
Legislative constraints and regulations
𝑟1
𝑟3
𝑟5
𝑟6
𝑟8
𝑟1
𝑟3
𝑟2
𝑟3
𝑟3
𝑟6
𝑟8
𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟1
𝑟7
𝑟1
𝑟2
𝑟3
𝑟4
𝑟7
𝑟7
𝑟6
𝑟4
Economic resources (water price)
Information flow
Water accessibility
Illegal actions
Yield
Economic resources (water price)
Information flow
Legislative constraints and regulations
Information flow
Information flow
Illegal actions
Yield
Legislative constraints and regulations
Legislative constraints and regulations
Economic resources (water price)
Technical resources
Economic resources (water price)
Legislative constraints and regulations
Information flow
Decisional power
Technical resources
Technical resources
Illegal actions
Decisional power
𝑟7
Technical resources
𝑟2
Legislative constraints
𝑟9
Control of the territory
EURO 2016
SLIDE 6
The decision-agents’ understanding of the
interaction space
(𝐴) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,1
(𝑂) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,1
(𝑅) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,1
(𝐴) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,2
(𝑂) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,2
(𝑅) 𝑅𝑒𝑔,2
Perception of other actors
Perception of other actors’
objectives
Perception of other actors’
resources
Perception of other actors
Perception of other actors’
objectives
Perception of other actors’
resources
< 𝐴, 𝑂, 𝑅, 𝑆 > 𝑅𝑒𝑔
𝑎2
Farmers
𝑜2
Agricultural productivity
𝑟5
𝑟8
𝑎1
Water accessibility
Yield
Irrigation consortium
Water distribution and control of the
irrigation network
𝑜6
𝑟7
< 𝐴, 𝑂, 𝑅, 𝑆 > 𝐼
Perception of other actors
(𝑂) 𝐼,1
Perception of other actors’ objectives
(𝑅) 𝐼,1
Perception of other actors’ resources
(𝐴) 𝐼,2
(𝑂) 𝐼,2
Perception of other actors
Perception of other actors’ objectives
𝑎2
𝑜2
𝑜4
𝑟3
𝑟8
𝑎3
𝑜1
(𝑅) 𝐼,2
Perception of other actors’ resources
𝑟2
(𝐴) 𝐼,1
Technical resources
Regional Authority
Farmers
Agricultural productivity
Water availability
Information flow
Yield
Regional Authority
Environmental protection
Legislative constraints and
regulations
Irrigation consortium
(𝐴) 𝐹,1
Perception of other actors
(𝑂) 𝐹,1
Perception of other actors’ objectives
(𝑅) 𝐹,1
Perception of other actors’ resources
(𝐴) 𝐹,2
(𝑅) 𝐹,2
(𝑅) 𝐹,2
Perception of other actors
Perception of other actors’ objectives
Perception of other actors’ resources
< 𝐴, 𝑂, 𝑅, 𝑆 > 𝐹
𝑎1
Irrigation consortium
𝑜6
Water distribution and control of the irrigation network
𝑜7
Reduction of water consumption during drought
𝑟1
Economic resources (water price)
𝑟2
Legislative constraints and regulations
𝑟4
Decisional power
𝑟7
Technical resources
𝑎3
Regional Authority
𝑜5
Decrease of groundwater overexploitation
𝑟2
Legislative constraints and regulations
Farmers
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 7
The decision-agents’ mental
models of dynamic system (MMDS)
Regional Authority
Irrigation consortium
Farmers
Representing the perceived cause-effect chains influencing the dynamic evolution of a system
EDUCEN - Murcia Progress Meeting (October 2015)
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 8
The Ambiguity analysis
DIFFERENCES IN IS PERCEPTION: THE JACCARD INDEX
Given two sets, 𝐴 and 𝐵, each having 𝑛 binary attributes, the J index measures the degree of overlap
between two sets by computing the ratio of the number of shared attributes between 𝐴 and 𝐵
𝐴∩𝐵
𝐽 𝐴, 𝐵 =
𝐴∪𝐵
DIFFERENCES IN MMDS: THE MODEL DISTANCE RATIO (MDR) INDEX
The method is based on three measures:
i) Elements Distance Ratio (EDR), the differences between two MMDS considering the variables and the
causal links in each pair of MMDS;
ii) Loop Distance Ratio (LDR), the similarity between each pair of loops for the two compared MMDS;
𝐿𝐷𝑅(𝑚, 𝑛) = 𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚, 𝑛 + 𝐸𝐷𝑅(𝑚, 𝑛)
iii) the Model Distance Ratio (MDR) is the average of all loop distance ratios (Schaffernicht and Groesser,
2011).
The MDR index allowed to define the distance between two actors’ MMDS by aggregating the LDR for
each pair of similar loops.
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 9
The Ambiguity analysis
DIFFERENCES IN IS PERCEPTION:
THE JACCARD INDEX
Analyst
Analyst
Analyst
DIFFERENCES IN MMDS:
THE MODEL DISTANCE RATIO (MDR) INDEX
Actor
J index
Distance
Irrigation Consortium
Farmer
Regional Authority
0,42
0,48
0,35
0,58
0,52
0,65
Regional
Authority
Irrigation
Consortium
Farmers
Regional
Authority
Irrigation
Consortium
Farmers
-
0,21
0,90
0,21
-
0,82
0,90
0,82
-
The main differences:
1) the IC neglects the capability of the F to activate
illegal pumping
2) the IC considers the information flow as a crucial
resource in the interaction with F
3) the RA ignores the role played by the market
The main differences:
1) The RA perceives the limits to GW as an action
to restore the system equilibrium
2) The RA and the IC perceive the water
availability as the only driver influencing the
system dynamic
4) the RA perceives the control of the territory as a
crucial resource to achieve its main goal
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 10
The learning process



The Irrigation Consortium became aware of the importance of providing information to
farmers in time to actually influence their decision process
The Irrigation Consortium became aware of the illegal pumping activities, which requires a
better understanding of the impact of the water price policy.
The Regional Authority introduced the irrigation consortium’s role in influencing the
farmers’ behaviour.
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
Actor
J coefficients
Analyst
Irrigation consortium
0,64
Analyst
Farmer
0,53
Analyst
Regional Authority
0,62
EURO 2016
SLIDE 11
The learning process
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 12
Conclusions




Decision-agents have a limited understanding of the complexity of the
INTERACTION SPACE
Decision-agents tend to neglect the existence of different and equally valid
problem framing  they ignore the AMBIGUITY
In order to take actions, decision-agents make assumptions about how the others
are going to act and/or react to their actions  CONFLICTING SITUATION
COLLABORATIVE DROUGHT RISK MANAGEMENT CLAIMS FOR A DECISIONMAKING ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE PARTIES ARE FULLY AWARE OF THEIR
ROLE AND THE ROLES OF THE OTHERS IN THE INTERACTION ENVIRONMENT
(INTERDEPENDENCY PRINCIPLE)
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 13
Thank you.
[email protected]
[email protected]
R. Giordano, I. Pluchinotta
EURO 2016
SLIDE 14