Journal of Applied Psychology
2012, Vol. 97, No. 2, 435– 447
© 2011 American Psychological Association
0021-9010/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0025303
Peer-Based Control in Self-Managing Teams: Linking Rational and
Normative Influence With Individual and Group Performance
Greg L. Stewart and Stephen H. Courtright
Murray R. Barrick
University of Iowa
Texas A&M University
The authors use a multilevel framework to introduce peer-based control as a motivational state that
emerges in self-managing teams. The authors specifically describe how peer-based rational control,
which is defined as team members perceiving the distribution of economic rewards as dependent on input
from teammates, extends and interacts with the more commonly studied normative control force of group
cohesion to explain both individual and collective performance in teams. On the basis of data from 587
factory workers in 45 self-managing teams at 3 organizations, peer-based rational control corresponded
with higher performance for both individuals and collective teams. Results further demonstrated that the
rational and normative mechanism of peer-based control interacted to explain performance at both the
individual and team levels. Increased peer-based rational control corresponded with higher individual and
collective performance in teams with low cohesion, but the positive effects on performance were
attenuated in cohesive teams.
Keywords: self-managing teams, control, team compensation, group cohesion
Considerable research has focused on identifying factors that
explain differences in the effectiveness of self-managing teams
(Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008). One important issue
that has not been adequately studied is the transfer of leadership
and influence from external supervisors to teams themselves
(Manz & Sims, 1987; Stewart, Courtright, & Manz, 2011). To be
effective, members of self-managing teams must assume responsibility for motivating both individual teammates and collective
action. Understanding the motivational states that emerge in teams
to replace hierarchical control is thus of critical concern. In order
to understand team motivational states, prior research has predominantly applied individual-level motivational states, such as efficacy and empowerment, to the team level of analysis (Chen &
Kanfer, 2006; Seibert, Silver, & Randolph, 2004). Although this
perspective has yielded critical insight, we adopt a different approach. Rather than applying individual-level motivation theories
up to the team level, we apply an organization-level motivational
concept down to the team level. We specifically draw on theories
of organizational control to introduce peer-based control as an
emergent motivational state in self-managing teams that replaces
hierarchical control to coordinate the direction and persistence of
individual and collective efforts of team members.
Peer-Based Control as an Emergent Motivational State
of Self-Managing Teams
Team motivation in its entirety represents “the collective system
by which team members coordinate the direction, intensity, and
persistence of their efforts” (Chen & Kanfer, 2006, p. 233). Forces
that coordinate goal-directed behavior include emergent motivational states (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001) that represent
shared beliefs among members regarding their task environment,
including what is valued in the environment and their capabilities
and opportunities to handle tasks (Chen & Gocus, 2008; Chen &
Kanfer, 2006). These team motivational states emerge as a result
of individual motivational states, mutual interactions among team
members, and contextual factors, and they exert direct (i.e., proximal) influences on the direction, intensity, and persistence of team
members’ collective and individual effort (Chen & Kanfer, 2006;
Marks et al., 2001). In order to describe peer-based control as a
team-level motivational state, we first describe two primary mechanisms through which it operates—rational and normative influence—and then clarify its nature as an emergent motivational state.
Rational and Normative Mechanisms of Peer-Based
Control
Although control is often seen as pejorative, within macro
organizational theory it is simply the motivational force whereby
individual acts are coordinated to assure that effort is directed
toward not only individual goals but also collective pursuits
(March & Simon, 1958). Consistent with this notion, O’Reilly and
Chatman (1996) define control as a force that “comes from the
knowledge that someone who matters to us is paying close attention to what we are doing and will tell us if our behavior is
appropriate or inappropriate” (p. 161). In self-managing teams,
peers become the “someone” responsible for monitoring and influencing one another to coordinate work (Barker, 1993; Manz &
Sims, 1987; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985).
This article was published Online First September 5, 2011.
Greg L. Stewart and Stephen H. Courtright, Department of Management,
University of Iowa; Murray R. Barrick, Department of Management, Texas
A&M University.
We thank Sara Rynes and Amy Colbert for their thoughtful comments
on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Greg L.
Stewart, Tippie College of Business, Department of Management, Univesity of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1000. E-mail: [email protected]
435
436
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
Barnard (1938) described two ways to exert control at work. His
first mechanism of “general” inducement reflects feelings of social
support and perceptions of being a critical part of the organization’s success. His second mechanism of “specific” inducement
reflects monetary incentives and rewards. Over subsequent years,
these two fundamental forms of inducement have served as a basis
for identifying two broad types of control mechanisms: normative
and rational (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Pfeffer, 1997). Normative
and rational control have subsequently been incorporated into
various organizational theories such as social exchange (Blau,
1964), which recognizes the influence of economic and social
exchange, and psychological contracting (Rousseau, 1989), which
includes both transactional and psychological agreements. These
normative and rational mechanisms can also be applied at the team
level.
Normative control is captured by principles from social psychology and explains how a sense of belonging and attachment
invokes social pressure for individuals to comply with group or
organizational standards. Desire to be part of a community motivates individuals to pursue goals endorsed by the group and omit
behaviors that do not further collectively accepted goals (Sorrels &
Kelley, 1984). This motivational force goes beyond mere compliance, as processes of social identification (Ashforth & Mael, 1989)
and social categorization (Tajfel, 1982) operate so that normative
control results in internalization of group standards (MacNeil &
Sherif, 1976; Pollis, Montgomery, & Smith, 1975). In the context
of self-managed teams, peer-based normative control is thus a
motivational state whereby individuals feel influenced by their
teammates through the pull of social inclusion and internalization.
Rational control is captured by economic principles and focuses
on how knowledge of who and what determines the provision of
monetary rewards influences individuals to comply with standards.
The basis for rational control is the notion that employees are
“calculative actors with instrumental orientations to work” (Barley
& Kunda, 1992, p. 384). Desire to obtain rewards motivates
individuals to pursue goals endorsed by whoever determines the
rewards and to omit behaviors that detract from obtaining these
rewards. In the context of self-managed teams, peer-based rational
control is thus a motivational state that occurs when team members
perceive their rewards as being dependent on the input and decisions of their teammates.
Peer Control as an Emergent Motivational State
Normative and rational forms of peer-based control reflect
emergent states that influence motivated behavior in work teams
because they (a) emerge as shared beliefs regarding what is valued
in the environment and (b) represent proximal influences of individual and collective efforts and thus directly influence goal generation and pursuit.
First, in accordance with the definition of an emergent team
motivational state offered by Chen and colleagues (Chen & Gocus,
2008; Chen & Kanfer, 2006), peer-based control represents a
shared belief regarding what is valued in the environment. With
rational control, a desire to obtain rewards motivates individuals to
pursue goals and comply with standards endorsed by peers. With
normative control, a desire for belonging and inclusion in the
group motivates team members to likewise pursue and comply
with group standards. Thus, because normative and rational con-
trol capture shared beliefs regarding the value and necessity of
conforming to group standards, they are both best identified as
emergent team motivational states.
These perceptions of what is valued emerge from inputs and
processes—sometimes labeled ambient stimuli (Hackman, 1992).
For example, perceptions of peer-based rational control are enhanced by compensation policies that base a percentage of pay on
peer evaluation (Heneman & Von Hippel, 1995). Using peer input
to determine pay has been specifically advocated by Lawler and
colleagues (Lawler, 2003; Lawler & Cohen, 1992) as a method for
motivating both cooperative actions and personal contribution, and
studies involving student work groups have found that linking peer
evaluations to a portion of students’ grades improves team motivation, team processes, and collective performance (Druskat &
Wolff, 1999; Erez, Lepine, & Elms, 2002). Moreover, preliminary
anecdotal evidence from progressive organizations such as W.L.
Gore (Shipper, Manz, & Stewart, 2012) and Johnsonville Sausage
(Heneman & Von Hippel, 1995) suggests that compensation based
on peer evaluations can indeed be a beneficial ambient stimulus in
self-managing teams. Another ambient stimulus, norms for cooperation, unfolds over time and influences how peers allocate not
only rewards (Bamberger, 2007) but also social pressures to conform (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). Differences in ambient stimuli
across groups thus suggest that perceptions of peer control emerge
within teams and likely exhibit substantial variation even within a
single organization.
Second, peer-based control is an emergent motivational state
because perceptions of peer control fit Kanfer’s (1990) proximal
rather than distal category of motivational influences. Distal influences have indirect effects on behavior, whereas proximal processes “highlight motivational constructs and mechanisms that
control the initiation and execution of actions during engagement
with the task” (Kanfer, 1990, p. 82). Because both rational and
normative forms of peer-based control operate during task engagement, they represent proximal influences that can best be classified
as motivational states. As proximal influences of individual and
collective effort, both rational and normative control emerge to
directly affect the direction, intensity, and persistence of goaldirected behavior. Goal generation and pursuit come specifically
through the alignment of individual and team goals. Alignment
comes about through a process of mutual monitoring, which is
defined as “the reciprocal assessment of performance among individuals working on common tasks” (Welbourne, Balkin, &
Gomez-Mejia, 1995, p. 883). This mutual influence process leads
team members to establish and pursue goals that maximize not
only their own individual performance but also collective performance. Peer-based control thus results in the generation and pursuit of goals that simultaneously increase both individual and
collective performance.
Hypotheses Development
Chen and Kanfer’s (2006) framework of team motivation suggests that team motivational states affect (a) goal generation that
influences how efforts are directed in teams and (b) goal pursuit
that determines whether efforts are sustained. Members of selfmanaging teams often generate goals that focus their efforts on
either individual or team performance. They then receive feedback
that provides them with information about how well they are
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
pursuing and achieving these goals (DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt,
Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004). Although some motivational forces
emphasize either individual or group goals at the expense of the
other (DeShon et al., 2004; Terborg & Miller, 1978), the motivational state of peer-based control is expected to positively influence goal processes related to both individual and team performance. To capture this multilevel effect, we explore relationships
between the two team-level motivational states of focus in this
study (peer-based normative control and peer-based rational control) and performance outcomes at both the individual and team
levels. The specific relationships we assess are illustrated in Figure
1. Relationships among the motivational states and collective
performance exist at the team level of analysis, whereas relationships with individual performance are cross-level with team-level
independent variables (rational and normative peer control) and an
individual-level dependent variable.
Within the framework shown in Figure 1, peer-based normative
control has received the most research attention. Indeed, social
psychologists have argued that peer-based normative control is
best captured by cohesion (Blau, 1964; Festinger, 1950; Heckathorn, 1990; Kwok, Au, & Ho, 2005; Marks et al., 2001; Seashore, 1954), which represents the extent to which individuals
internalize group standards and thereby adopt group goals as their
own (Lott & Lott, 1961; Zander, Natsoulas, & Thomas, 1960).
Cohesive groups enforce higher performance norms because commitment to completing tasks increases as individuals feel greater
attraction to the group (Lott & Lott, 1965; Wech, Mossholder,
Steel, & Bennett, 1998). Team members are more willing to take
on difficult tasks (Klein & Mulvey, 1995), and they expend more
effort to complete those tasks (Karau & Hart, 1998). Indeed,
meta-analytic results suggest that cohesion is positively linked to
task performance of both individual team members (Gully,
Devine, & Whitney, 1995) and collective teams (Beal, Cohen,
Burke, & McLendon, 2003; Evans & Dion, 1991; Gully et al.,
1995; Mullen & Cooper, 1994).
Yet, as illustrated by applying the organizational-level perspective of control, normative influence need not be the only form of
peer-based control in self-managing teams. Peer-based rational
control can also be a means for monitoring and coordinating
actions. Moreover, normative and rational forms of control are
likely to have joint effects on performance (Barley & Kunda,
1992). Thus, in the sections that follow, we extend our understand-
Peer-Based
Rational Control
Team Level
of Analysis
ing of control beyond cohesion by illustrating how peer-based
rational control operates as an additional motivational state in
self-managing teams. We then explore how normative control and
rational control interact to influence individual and team performance. This analysis is critical as this is the first study to examine
the effects of peer-based rational control on individual or team
performance, as well as the first to explore this rational form of
peer-based control in conjunction with the well-established peerbased normative mechanism of cohesion.
Cross-Level Relationships With Individual
Performance
Main effect for rational control. Team members who perceive peer-based rational control generate a personal goal of maximizing individual contribution and then expend greater effort
toward achieving that goal. The process by which this occurs can
be illustrated by exploring the two primary features of peer-based
rational control. The first feature is having control reside with
peers rather than supervisors. In self-managing teams, peers are
able to observe and evaluate individual contributions more accurately than are external supervisors. The second feature is control
based on rational, or economic, rewards. The emphasis on remuneration increases effort by linking contribution tightly with an
economic incentive.
Studies related to withholding of effort in team settings illustrate
the benefits of perceiving peers to be responsible for monitoring
and evaluation. Specifically, individuals working in groups often
fail to maximize their individual performance because of freeriding and social loafing (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993). Yet, people
are less apt to withhold effort when they perceive that tasks are
visible (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979), identifiable (Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981), and most importantly, able to be
evaluated by peers (Harkins & Jackson, 1985; LePine & Van
Dyne, 2001; Price, Gavin, & Harrison, 2006). Teammates, as
active coparticipants in task processes, offer a unique perspective
on a given employee’s performance that a supervisor may not be
able to observe (Murphy & Cleveland, 1991; Saavedra & Kwun,
1993). This is particularly true in self-managed teams, as peers
assume many traditional leadership roles such as performance
monitoring (Loughry & Tosi, 2008). Improved opportunity for
observation improves the reliability and validity of assessments
Hypothesis 3
Team-Level Direct Effect
Hypothesis 2
Team-Level
Interaction Affecting
Individual-Level
Outcome
Collective Performance
Hypothesis 4
Team-Level
Level Interaction
Peer-Based
Normative Control
(Team Cohesion)
Individual Level
of Analysis
Hypothesis 1
Cross-Level Direct Effect
Figure 1.
437
Individual Performance
Multilevel framework for effects of peer-based control in teams.
438
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
(Reilly & Chao, 1982). Given that people are motivated when their
goals are recognized as important by others (Hackman & Morris,
1975), improved performance appraisal should in turn increase
personal motivation and thereby performance.
Peer monitoring and evaluation will also be most effective when
it is perceived to result in tangible economic consequences rather
than when it is used only for feedback. In this sense, it is important
to distinguish between peer-based rational control and traditional
peer feedback. A meta-analysis by Smither, London, and Reilly
(2005) found peer appraisal to have only a modest impact on
performance. Peer ratings have been found to be relatively comparable across feedback and administrative purposes (Greguras,
Robie, Schleicher, & Goff, 2003), but peer evaluations are infrequently tied to compensation and almost always used simply for
feedback (Rynes, Gerhardt, & Parks, 2005). Peer-based rational
control thus goes beyond traditional peer appraisal and captures
the extent to which team members perceive rewards such as
bonuses, raises, and promotions to be contingent on peer input.
The present study of peer-based rational control thus captures a
tighter linkage between peer evaluations and economic rewards
than does traditional peer appraisal research.
The perception that peer assessments are linked to incentives is
expected to strengthen the relationship between providing maximum effort and receiving valued rewards, which is a basic tenet of
the expectancy theory of motivation (Sheppard, 1993). This benefit of an explicit link to rewards has been confirmed in several
meta-analyses (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997),
and Rynes et al. (2005) explicitly state that peer evaluation should
have its strongest effect when it is believed to be attached to real
consequences. Increased individual performance is thus expected
to correspond with peer-based rational control in self-managing
teams not only because of the enhanced observation and identification of personal effort but also because of the tighter linkage
between individual contribution and economic rewards. Hence,
Hypothesis 1: Peer-based rational control is positively related
to individual performance.
Interaction between rational and normative control. Control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) and team motivation theory
(Chen & Kanfer, 2006) posit that behavior is motivated and
coordinated by a process of goal generation and pursuit. From this
perspective, peers influence the choice and intensity of teammate
effort by encouraging choice of certain goals and then supporting
efforts to pursue those goals. Normative and rational forms of
peer-based control thus operate through the same process—
namely, encouraging goal generation and pursuit. This common
mechanism suggests that these forms of control are largely redundant. When cohesion is operating to encourage actions that increase individual and collective performance, there will be little
additional benefit from the rational mechanism that encourages
effort toward the same goals. In short, once team members accept
and are vigorously pursuing goals to maximize individual effort in
a way that does not compete with the efforts of peers, additional
peer pressure supporting those same goals is expected to be of
limited value.
Although not previously tested empirically, this notion that
rational and normative forms of peer-based control are redundant
and operate as substitutes is consistent with various theoretical
perspectives on supervisor control, as well as with concepts that
researchers have proposed concerning how normative group processes interact with rational forms of control (Heckathorn, 1990;
Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Welbourne et al., 1995). For example, in
substitutes for leadership theory, Kerr and Jermier (1978) posit that
cohesive work groups have the ability to render rational-based
performance feedback and control inconsequential because cohesive groups already have stable performance norms. This effect is
empirically shown in relation to control that emanates from supervisors. Wang, Oh, Courtright, and Colbert (2011) illustrate that the
effects of transformational (normative control) and transactional
(rational control) leadership on individual performance are similar
in magnitude and operate even in the absence of the other, and
Judge and Piccolo (2004) show that the combined effects of
transformational leadership (normative control) and contingent
reward (rational control) are comparable to the effects of either
alone. Leaders enacting both rational and normative control thus
have essentially the same effect as leaders enacting either mechanism alone.
The specific redundancy in normative and rational mechanisms
of peer control can be illustrated by further examining the effects
of cohesion and comparing those effects with the already discussed
effects for peer-based rational control. Specifically, early group
researchers like Asch (1951) and Seashore (1954) found highly
cohesive groups to exercise more influence over individual members than low-cohesive groups. In contrast, underperforming members of groups low in cohesion allow teammates little influence
over their actions (Berkowitz, 1954; Schacter, Ellertson, McBride,
& Gregory, 1951). The social force of peers is weak because
groups low on cohesion lack synergy, cooperation, and norms
encouraging high individual effort (Karau & Williams, 1993).
Cohesion is thus expected to be similar to rational control in that
both replace hierarchical control with concertive— or peerbased— control (Barker, 1993).
Also similar to rational control, cohesion is expected to channel
behavior toward individual task accomplishment. Specifically,
highly cohesive groups—which are characterized by a strong bond
around high task commitment— use social pressure to induce
members to expend effort toward assuring high individual performance (Barker, 1993; Beal et al., 2003; Goodman, Ravlin, &
Schminke, 1987). In this sense, cohesive groups have been shown
to enforce high-performance norms because commitment to completing tasks increases as individuals feel greater attraction to the
group (Lott & Lott, 1965; Wech et al., 1998; Zander, 1968).
Individual effort is more consistent, and social loafing decreases in
cohesive groups (Karau & Hart, 1998; Seashore, 1954). Finally,
team members with high individual performance receive positive
support from teammates in cohesive teams (Wech et al., 1998).
Desire to gain acceptance from peers translates into high individual effort in cohesive groups (Barker, 1993; Blau, 1964; Seashore,
1954).
In summary, given that rational and normative mechanisms of
control operate through the same goal processes, we expect rational and normative control to operate as substitutes, in that having
both forms will be comparable to having high levels on just one
form of control. Specifically, individuals in either cohesive teams
or teams that are high on peer-based rational control experience
peer influence that encourages individuals to establish and pursue
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
goals consistent with high individual performance. When perceptions of cohesion are strong, team members establish and pursue
goals because of a desire to gain acceptance from peers, creating
a normative motivational state. Because individual effort is already
being channeled toward goal formation and striving, rational control is expected to have limited impact. However, individuals in
less cohesive teams do not feel attraction and social pressure,
meaning that their goal-driven activity is more dependent on
alternative motivational forces such as rational control (Berkowitz,
1954; Schacter et al., 1951). Peer-based rational control should
thus have a weaker effect in cohesive groups because the normative motivational state is already ensuring goal generation and
pursuit. Individuals who are strongly motivated by normative
pressure are already putting forth high effort to achieve goals and
are unlikely to become more motivated by economic influences,
whereas individuals who do not perceive normative pressure are
less controlled by the social influence and thus likely to be susceptible to rational control from teammates. Hence,
Hypothesis 2: Peer-based rational control interacts with normative cohesion such that its positive relationship with individual performance attenuates when cohesion is high.
Group-Level Relationships With Team Performance
Main effect for rational control. Similar to individual performance, collective team performance is expected to increase
when peers are perceived as influencing rewards. Shifting to peer
control encourages team members to establish and pursue goals
that benefit the collective because peer evaluators are guided by
their own self-interest and inevitably assess the extent to which
a teammate’s performance has influenced, for better or for worse,
their own performance, and by virtue, the performance of the team
as a whole (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). Individual excellence is
acknowledged and evaluated positively only when it is not detrimental to the cooperative effort and performance of coworkers. As
a result, team members who pursue individual goals at the expense
of teammate and collective goals will be penalized by peers who
are negatively affected by competitive actions. Peer-based rational
control thus aligns teammate interests and assures that attention
and focus are balanced between individual and team goals.
Enhancing rational control is also helpful because it can facilitate other aspects of group self-management. Specifically, peers
who perceive increased discretion over reward allocation become
more observant and knowledgeable of each other’s performance
(Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Mumford, 1983). Peers sense that it is
their task, rather than that of a supervisor, to monitor and influence
behavior. Indeed, as noted by Welbourne et al. (1995), “When
workers know it is the supervisor’s job, not theirs, to monitor
performance, they are more prone to ignore the deviant behaviors
or excellent work performance of their peers” (p. 884). Increased
observation and monitoring thus gives team members the opportunity to both reinforce behavior seen as beneficial to the team and
discourage behavior that is perceived to be detrimental (Sewell,
1998). Indeed, observation and reinforcement among teammates
are critical to the effectiveness of self-managing teams (Loughry &
Tosi, 2008; Manz & Sims, 1987).
Yet, Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that mutual monitoring
is best when team members have the means to affect their peers’
439
behavior. Perceiving that peers allocate rewards strengthens the
effect of aligning the interests of individual group members with
those of the group, which is consistent with Willer’s (2009) research finding that team members perceived as having greater
group-oriented motivation are granted more rewards from their
peers. Hence,
Hypothesis 3: Peer-based rational control is positively related
to team performance.
Interaction between rational and normative control. As
with rational control, the normative force of cohesion encourages
team members to generate and pursue goals related to collective
achievement. Normative and rational forms of peer-based control
are thus expected to influence collective performance through
common goal processes, suggesting an interaction similar to the
relationship predicted with individual performance—again, a substitution effect.
Peer-based normative control corresponds with collective performance because members of cohesive groups strongly associate
themselves with the team and become concerned that collective
performance reflects on them personally (Jehn & Shah, 1997).
Cohesive groups are specifically known to enforce high productivity norms and regulate effort toward achieving common objectives (Goodman et al., 1987). Such an emphasis on team facilitation likely explains the positive meta-analytic link (Beal et al.,
2003; Evans & Dion, 1991; Gully et al., 1995; Mullen & Cooper,
1994) between cohesion and collective team performance.
Specific evidence supporting pursuit of team-facilitating goals
comes from George and Bettenhausen (1990), who found individuals in cohesive groups to engage in more helping behavior.
Cohesive teams also share more information and communicate
better (Keller, 1986; Lott & Lott, 1961; Mellinger, 1956), suggesting that cohesive teams better coordinate goal activity. Higher
team cohesion specifically leads to more difficult goals and to
stronger goal commitment, which in turn corresponds with improved team performance (Klein & Mulvey, 1995; Mulvey &
Klein, 1998).
Teams with either cohesion or rational peer-based control thus
assure coordination of collective goal-driven effort. For highly
cohesive teams, there is high task commitment and synergy, which
occurs because of internal social pressures (Beal et al., 2003). In
these teams, economic rewards decided by peers are expected to
have little influence because the social pressures characteristic of
highly cohesive groups already operate sufficiently to encourage
generation and pursuit of team-facilitating goal processes. In contrast, peer-based rational influence is expected to be critical in less
cohesive teams, as team members lack a social mechanism to
influence coworkers’ actions and thereby assure cooperative task
pursuit.
Thus, as with individual performance, we expect rational and
normative control to be substitute mechanisms in that having both
will be comparable to having a high level of either alone. Although
this study represents the first time this interaction has been explored in relation to peer-based control, the proposed pattern of the
interaction is once again consistent with substitutes for leadership
theory, which suggests that the stable performance norms inherent
in cohesive groups may render rational feedback and control
redundant and inconsequential (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). Further-
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
440
more, evidence on supervisor control, particularly studies on transformational/transactional leadership and structure/consideration
perspectives of leadership, shows that normative and rational
forms of supervisor control have nearly equal effects on group
performance, operate successfully even in the absence of each
other, and provide little incremental advantage in combination
(Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004). This leads
to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Peer-based rational control interacts with normative cohesion such that its positive relationship with team
performance attenuates when cohesion is high.
Method
Sample
Data were obtained from a sample of 587 factory production
workers organized into 45 self-managing teams at three manufacturing plants of different companies in the midwestern United
States. The manufacturing plants varied in terms of the goods they
produced, including electronic equipment, small appliances, and
rubber. Average team size was 14. Average age of participants was
42 years. Fifty-six percent of participants were women, and 98%
were Caucasian. Participants averaged 14 years of tenure with their
organization and 3.5 years with their team. Participants across
teams and organizations completed essentially the same types of
tasks, which included receiving materials and information from
suppliers, transforming and adding value to those inputs in cooperation with management and staff, and delivering output to customers. Furthermore, participants’ work was largely designed so
that members depended on teammates in completing their work.
Thus, group tasks can be classified primarily as behavioral in
McGrath’s (1964) typology and as additive in Steiner’s (1972)
taxonomy. All three organizations were working with a common
organization development consultant (not a study author) to facilitate self-managing teams, which explains why the three different
plants relied on similar influences of team cohesion and peer-based
allocation of rewards. Although the emphasis on rewarding for
group versus individual contributions varied somewhat across
groups, in all cases compensation plans included a mix of incentives for both individual and collective contributions. As expected,
the effectiveness of these teams as self-managing, cohesive units
allocating peer-based rewards differed across work teams, even
within the same organization.
Measures
Peer-based rational control. As noted earlier, peer-based
rational control reflects individuals’ perceptions regarding the degree to which they believe their economic rewards depend on
recommendations from teammates. We thus deemed perceptions
of peer-based control, rather than objective compensation practices
(which are ambient stimuli), to be a superior method of capturing
this construct.
Given the lack of a specific measure of peer-based rational
control, the literature for an existing measure that could be adapted
was first scanned. Substitutes for leadership theory, which identifies a set of individual, task, and organizational variables that
substitute for, or neutralize, the effects of leadership (Kerr &
Jermier, 1978), was found to come the closest to capturing peerbased rational control. One variable included in substitutes for
leadership theory is whether rewards are outside the leader’s
control. This scale was adapted by clarifying that the rewards were
perceived as being under the control of teammates, not just outside
the leader.
Participants were asked to individually rate their perceptions of
peer-based rational control in their respective teams using five
items adapted from Childers, Dubinsky, and Gencturk (1986).
Items were based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree,
5 ⫽ strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater peerbased rational control. Specific items were “My chances for a pay
raise depend on the recommendation given by my team”; “My
chances for a bonus are not influenced by my team’s recommendation (reversed)”; “My chances for promotion depend on the
recommendation given by my team”; “I am not dependent on my
team for important organizational rewards (reversed)”; and “The
rewards I receive are determined by the recommendation of my
team members.” Coefficient alpha for the scale was .78.
Because participants were nested within teams and peer-based
control is conceptualized as a collective construct, it was necessary
to aggregate perceptions of peer-based rational control to the group
level. In order to justify the aggregation of perceived peer-based
rational control to the group level, agreement and consistency were
assessed among teammate perceptions regarding the degree to
which their individual rewards depended on peer recommendations. Following Bliese (2000), rwg values were calculated to
assess team member agreement, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted to assess variance across teams, and
interclass correlation (ICC) values were calculated. ICC(1) indicates the amount of variance in ratings due to team membership,
whereas ICC(2) indicates whether work units can be differentiated
on the variable of interest. A rectangular distribution of rwg was
assumed, and given that some measures were only available as
means and not at the item level, rwg(1) was calculated, with scale
means being used as a representation of a single item scale. Mean
rwg(1) across teams for peer-based rational control was .78. The
one-way ANOVA supported significant variation across teams,
F(45, 587) ⫽ 7.86, p ⬍ .05. ICC(1) was .40, and ICC(2) was .91.
Aggregation of peer-based rational control as a group-level construct was thus supported (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).
Team cohesion. Individual team members rated their perceptions of team cohesiveness using a four-item measure developed
by Seashore (1954) and adopted by O’Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett (1989). Items were based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽
strongly disagree, 5 ⫽ strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater cohesion. Items included the extent to which members were “ready to defend each other from criticism by outsiders,”
“helped each other on the job,” “got along with each other,” and
“stuck together. ” Coefficient alpha was .87. Rwg(1) was .74; the
one-way ANOVA was significant; F(45, 587) ⫽ 3.06, p ⬍ .05),
ICC(1) was .24; and ICC(2) was .75, justifying aggregation of
cohesion to a group-level variable.
Individual performance.
Supervisors provided ratings of
individual performance. An eight-item, 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽
strongly disagree, 5 ⫽ strongly agree) previously used by Barrick,
Mount, and Strauss (1993) was adopted. Dimensions included
quantity of work, quality of work, initiative, interpersonal perfor-
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
mance, job knowledge, planning and implementing goals, effort,
and overall performance. Exemplars include “Completes work
thoroughly, accurately, and according to specifications” and
“Maintains good interpersonal relations.” Factor analysis revealed
a single factor underlying the items. Therefore, the mean score of
the eight items was adopted as a measure of individual performance. Coefficient alpha was .93.
Team performance.
Team performance was assessed
through ratings from team supervisors on a scale developed with
eight items using a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ somewhat below requirements, 5⫽ consistently exceeds requirements; Barrick, Stewart,
Neubert, & Mount, 1998). Performance dimensions in the scale are
quality of work, quantity of work, knowledge of tasks, initiative,
planning and allocation, interpersonal skills, commitment to team,
and overall team performance. Each dimension was defined for
raters by a one-sentence description and included several interpretive examples. Factor analysis supported a single factor. Hence, the
mean of the eight items was adopted as the measure of team
performance. Coefficient alpha was .83.
Covariates. At the individual level of analysis, team tenure
(years since the individual had joined the team) was controlled for
because longer tenure in a team may result in higher individual
performance (McDaniel, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1988). At the team
level, four variables were controlled for: organization, team size,
degree of task interdependence, and peer-based feedback. Because
data from three organizations were collected, two dummy variables were created to capture potential differences across organizations. Interdependence and team size served as team-level covariates because of their potential effects on team performance and
processes (Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993; Stewart & Barrick,
2000). Interdependence was measured using a seven-item 5-point
Likert scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree, 5 ⫽ strongly agree; coefficient alpha was .74) adapted from Kiggundu (1983). Rwg(1) was
.87; the one-way ANOVA was significant, F(45, 587) ⫽ 3.06, p ⬍
.05; ICC(1) was .21; and ICC(2) was .73. Example items include
“other members of my team depend on my performance to do their
work” and “how other team members do their work has an impact
on my performance.” Finally, because peer assessments are often
used to provide feedback independent of rewards (Meyer, Kay, &
French, 1965), we also wanted to assure that perceived peer-based
rational control represents something that extends beyond peerbased feedback. Four items were thus adapted from Childers et al.
441
(1986) to assess and control for peer-based feedback. Items were
based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree, 5 ⫽
strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater peer-based
feedback. Specific items included “Feedback about how well I am
doing my work comes primarily from information from members
of my work team” and “I rely on members of my work team for
feedback about how well I am performing.” Rwg(1) was .82; the
one-way ANOVA was significant, F(45, 587) ⫽ 2.30, p ⬍ .05,
ICC(1) was .10; and ICC(2) was .60.
Analysis
Individual performance and team tenure are variables at the
individual level of analysis. Peer-based rational control, team
cohesion, organization, interdependence, peer-based feedback,
team size, and team performance are team-level constructs. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is a preferred method for testing
hypotheses when the dependent variable is measured at the lowest
level (individual level in the present case; Hofmann, Griffin, &
Gavin, 2000). Regression analysis is appropriate when the dependent variable is captured at the higher level of analysis (team
level). Hence, HLM techniques were adopted to assess relationships with individual performance and regression techniques to
explore relationships with collective performance.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for
study variables. To test Hypothesis 1, which predicted greater
peer-based rational control to be positively related to individual
performance, we first determined that 18% of the variance in
individual performance resides between groups. Additional results
are displayed in Table 2. We first entered team tenure as a Level
1 predictor of individual job performance and team membership as
a random effect. We next included our Level 2 variables to test
how team-level characteristics influence individual performance,
after controlling for team tenure. As a set, cohesion, peer-based
rational control, and their interaction explained 63% of the variance in the Level 2 intercepts, which reflects 11% of the total
variance in individual performance. As indicated in Table 2, Hypothesis 1 was supported in that perceived peer-based rational
control had an overall positive effect on individual performance
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients
Variable
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Team tenure
Individual performance
Peer rational control
Team cohesion
Peer feedback
Task interdependence
Team size
Team performance
N
M
SD
1
587
587
45
45
45
45
45
45
3.45
3.41
2.73
3.51
3.60
3.67
13.91
3.50
3.22
0.83
0.49
0.41
0.39
0.28
7.65
0.42
—
⫺.10ⴱ
—
.31ⴱ
.42ⴱ
.36ⴱ
.49ⴱ
.40ⴱ
2
3
4
5
6
—
.60ⴱ
.22
.04
—
.29
.01
—
⫺.10
—
—
—
.35ⴱ
.25
⫺.01
.34ⴱ
Note. Individual-level descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are shown in the upper part of the table. Team-level descriptive statistics and
intercorrelations are shown in the lower part of the table.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05.
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
442
Table 2
Hierarchical Linear Modeling Testing Effects of Peer-Based Rational Control and Team
Cohesion on Individual Performance
Individual performance
Variable
Level 1 effects
Team tenure (␥10)
Level 2 effects
Organization Dummy 1 (␥01)
Organization Dummy 2 (␥02)
Peer feedback (␥03)
Team size (␥04)
Interdependence (␥05)
Team cohesion (␥06)
Peer rational control (␥07)
Peer Rational Control ⫻ Team Cohesion (␥08)
(␥07 ⫽ .281, 95% CI [.15, .41]). Consistent with expectations,
cohesion also had an overall positive effect on individual performance (␥06 ⫽ .31, 95% CI [.22, .39]).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that peer-based rational control would
have greater effects on individual performance when group cohesion was low. As shown in our HLM results in Table 2, peer-based
rational control and team cohesion did interact to explain individual performance (␥08 ⫽ ⫺.09, 95% CI [⫺.17, ⫺.01]). Following
the guidelines of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the
nature of the interaction is shown graphically in Figure 2, with
cohesion as a moderator of the relationship between peer-based
rational control and individual performance. Post hoc probing
revealed that whereas the simple slope of the regression equation
was greater than zero when cohesion was either low (.36, 95% CI
[.27, .45]) or high (.20, 95% CI [.11, .29]), consistent with our
prediction, the magnitude of the relationship is greater when cohesion is low. This finding supports Hypothesis 2, with the relationship between peer-based rational control and individual performance being strongest when cohesion is low.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that perceptions of peer-based rational
control would correspond with higher levels of team performance.
Hierarchical regression results used to test this prediction are
shown in Table 3. We assessed a model (Model 1) with team
Model 2
⫺.03ⴱ (⫺.05, ⫺.01)
⫺.03ⴱ (⫺.05, ⫺.01)
.07 (⫺.04, .19)
.02 (⫺.05, .09)
⫺.08 (⫺.24, .09)
⫺.29ⴱ (⫺.40, ⫺.19)
⫺.01 (⫺.15, .13)
.31ⴱ (.22, .39)
.28ⴱ (.15, .41)
.06 (⫺.05, .18)
.02 (⫺.06, .09)
⫺.11 (⫺.28, .05)
⫺.29ⴱ (⫺.39, ⫺.19)
.00 (⫺.14, .14)
.33ⴱ (.24, .42)
.31ⴱ (.17, .45)
⫺.09ⴱ (⫺.17, ⫺.01)
performance regressed on the covariates (organization, team size,
peer-based feedback, interdependence) plus the main effects of
group cohesion and peer-based rational control. Our results provided support for Hypothesis 3 in that teams with stronger perceptions of peer-based rational control had higher team performance (␤ ⫽ .68; 95% CI [.25, 1.00]).
To examine Hypothesis 4, we added a cross-product term
(Model 2) to our hierarchical regression analysis shown in Table 3.
Results revealed a change in R2 of .15 for the model with the
interaction term (␤ ⫽ ⫺.48; 95% CI [⫺.77, ⫺.19]). Following the
guidelines of Cohen et al. (2003), the pattern of the interaction is
plotted in Figure 2, with cohesion as the moderator. As expected,
teams low in cohesion performed substantially better when peerbased rational control was high, whereas the performance of highly
cohesive teams was less affected by peer-based rational control
(see Figure 3). Post hoc probing revealed that the simple slope for
peer-based rational control is significantly greater than zero when
cohesion is low (.57, 95% CI [.14, 1.00]) but not when cohesion is
high (.17, 95% CI [⫺.34, .68]). These results support Hypothesis
4 as the effects of peer-based rational control attenuated as cohesion increased. Highly cohesive teams benefited very little from
increased rational control. Either form of peer-based control by
itself was essentially equivalent to the combination of both.
Discussion
4.25
Ind iividual Pe rrformanc e
Model 1
4
High Team Cohesion
3.75
Low Team Cohesion
3.5
3.25
3
2.75
Low
High
Peer-Based Rational Control
Figure 2. Cross-level interaction of peer-based rational control and cohesion in predicting individual performance.
This study highlights the importance of peer-based control as a
team motivational state in self-managing teams. Specifically, this
study represents the first attempt to study the multilevel performance effects of the rational mechanism of peer-based control and
its interaction with the more commonly studied normative mechanism. Our results suggest that perceptions of peers controlling
team member rewards correspond with increased performance at
both the individual and team levels. This finding adds to previous
research concerning the normative mechanism of cohesion by
illustrating how peer-based control—whether normative or rational— encourages high performance of both individuals and teams.
Furthermore, our results also clarify the nature of the relationship
between rational and normative mechanisms of peer-based control
in self-managing teams. In the case of collective team performance, the two control mechanisms essentially substituted for one
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
443
Table 3
Hierarchical Regression Analyses Testing Effects of Peer-Based Rational Control and Team
Cohesion on Team Performance
Collective team performance
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Organization dummy 1
Organization dummy 2
Team size
Peer feedback
Interdependence
Team cohesion
Peer rational control
Peer Rational Control ⫻ Team Cohesion
R2
⌬R2
.23 (⫺.33, .80)
.23 (⫺.27, .73)
⫺.36ⴱ (⫺.68, ⫺.03)
⫺.19 (⫺.55, .17)
⫺.03 (⫺.38, .33)
.24 (⫺.06, .54)
.68ⴱ (.25, 1.00)
.19 (⫺.31, .69)
.24 (⫺.21, .69)
⫺.29 (⫺.58, .00)
⫺.33 (⫺.66, .00)
.02 (⫺.29, .33)
.29ⴱ (.02, .56)
.89ⴱ (.49, 1.00)
⫺.48ⴱ (⫺.77, ⫺.19)
.50ⴱ
.15ⴱ
another. Collective performance of teams can thus be enhanced
either through perceptions of belonging and commitment (peerbased normative control) or through perceptions of aligned economic interests (peer-based rational control), but having shared
perceptions of both peer-based control mechanisms does not result
in even higher performance. Interestingly, the interaction effect
was slightly different for individual performance. Consistent with
expectations, the effect of peer-based rational control on individual
performance attenuates as cohesion increases. Yet, for most teams
the effect is not sufficiently strong so that a high level of team
cohesion completely substitutes for the effect of increased perceptions of peer-based rational control. Up to a point where cohesion
is several standard deviations above the mean, increased peerbased rational control corresponds with additional improvement in
individual performance. Thus, combining normative and rational
control can be somewhat beneficial for individual performance.
Implications for Theory and Research
Our findings identify peer-based rational control as a motivational state that, in addition to cohesion, can improve performance
across both individual and team levels. Numerous studies have
demonstrated the value of cohesion as a normative peer force, but
little work has explored other peer forces such as rational control.
Team members who perceive their teammates as having input into
Team Perfformance
T
4.5
Low Team Cohesion
4
High Team Cohesion
3.5
3
2.5
2
Low
.35
their individual rewards increase their own individual performance in
a way that also adds to rather than detracts from collective performance. To date, team researchers have largely ignored the effectiveness of this economic mechanism of peer-based rational control, and
future research should seek greater understanding of rational forms of
peer-based control. Future efforts should particularly focus on identifying objective factors, such as pay practices, that create the ambient
stimuli needed to create peer-based rational control.
Our results also clearly illustrate that rational and normative
peer-based control interact. This finding highlights the need to
explore how different control mechanisms—and perhaps other
team motivational states— combine to influence team outcomes.
Barley and Kunda (1992) argued that rational and normative
control mechanisms are opposed, and, hence, an emphasis on one
mechanism usually reduces emphasis on the other. In contrast, our
results show that in the case of peer-based control, the two mechanisms do not work in opposition such that the presence of one
harms the other, but, rather, that they act as substitutes. Of course,
additional research is needed to fully understand their joint influence, but our results suggest that future effort should be directed
toward gaining a better understanding of how peer-based normative and rational control mechanisms combine in the context of
self-managing teams.
Our multilevel findings also confirm that control mechanisms can
have differential effects on individual and group performance. Even
though either form of control by itself may be sufficient for assuring
high collective performance, a combination of both normative and
rational control may be necessary to assure the highest level of
individual contribution. One explanation is that cohesion has a stronger influence on coordinated action than on individual excellence.
Indeed, the theoretical explanation of higher collective action through
greater identification seems stronger than the explanation of higher
individual performance through greater task commitment. Nevertheless, given that most people working in team settings are expected to
contribute both as an individual and as a member of a group, capturing
performance at both levels of analysis seem critical.
High
Peer-Based Rational Control
Figure 3. Team-level interaction of peer-based rational control and cohesion in predicting team performance.
Implications for Practice
Our results also have important practical implications. A common conclusion in the literature has been that peer-based forms of
444
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
influence such as peer input into performance appraisals may be
detrimental to team functioning (Saavedra & Kwun, 1993). Although we did not objectively assess compensation features of the
teams in our sample (i.e., ambient stimuli), our results do suggest
that higher individual and collective performance results from
perceptions that peers influence organizational rewards, especially
for groups that are dysfunctional in terms of cohesiveness. Managers should thus realize that to maximize a team’s potential, they
must motivate both the individual and the collective, and peerbased rational control does this.
Yet, creating a sense of peer-based rational control may not be
equally beneficial in all settings. Peer-based rational control is
particularly well suited for teams that are low in cohesiveness. It
also seems that peer-based rational control may potentially be ideal
for organizations using empowerment strategies. Empowerment is
aimed at increasing intrinsic motivation at work through the decentralization of power and authority to the lowest levels of the
organization (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Seibert, Wang, &
Courtright, 2011; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990). Because of its shift
of control to teammates, peer-based rational control is likely an
important motivational ingredient for empowered teams. Peerbased control may be particularly beneficial given that individuals
and teams feel psychologically empowered when they believe they
can influence strategic, administrative, or operational activities
(Kirkman & Rosen, 1999; Spreitzer, 1995).
We might also note that organizational leaders should potentially account for individual differences, as some team members
may be more susceptible to rational control mechanisms and others
more sensitive to normative mechanisms. For example, extraverts
are susceptible to external rewards (Stewart, 1996); hence, it
is possible that extraverts are influenced more by rational control,
whereas others, perhaps agreeable team members who dislike
conflict, are influenced more by normative control. Additional
research is needed in this area.
ceived peer-based feedback as covariates. Task interdependence is
particularly critical because it has been shown to have important
interactions with other team characteristics. In fact, it is possible
that interdependence might interact with the two control mechanisms. Although the analyses reported above include interdependence only as a main effect, we did test for interactions between
interdependence and cohesion and peer-based rational control. No
interaction could be detected to explain either individual or collective performance, suggesting our analyses adequately controlled
for this important contextual factor.
Third, we did not explicitly examine mediating variables. We
drew on team motivation theories to suggest that goal-setting
processes (i.e., goal generation and goal pursuit) account for the
relationships between peer-based control and individual and team
performance. Future work should specifically examine goal generation and pursuit at both the individual and team levels of
analysis. Other mediators besides goal-setting processes could also
be examined. For example, team processes that effectively manage
conflict and emotions may serve as mediators.
Fourth, our performance variables were measured using supervisor ratings rather than objective ratings, which were not available. Nevertheless, we eliminated common-method bias by capturing predictors from team members and performance from
supervisors.
Finally, our findings are based on cross-sectional data. Future
studies should longitudinally examine the effects of control mechanisms to rule out, for example, the possibility of reverse causality.
Moreover, a particular emphasis should be placed on the temporal
effects (Marks et al., 2001; Stewart, 2010) of peer-based rational
control, as researchers have suggested that over time, peer-based
rational control could lead team members to maximize their own
rewards by suggesting less reward for teammates (Saavedra &
Kwun, 1993).
Conclusion
Limitations and Future Research
We should note several limitations of our study. First, we did
not measure the ambient stimuli that generate a sense of peerbased rational control. In particular, measures of actual compensation practices would serve to capture the unique effects of
peer-based rational control. Specifically, giving peers a say in each
other’s pay differs from other methods of reward systems in teams
such as team-based rewards, where members’ pay is based on
collective performance. Future research should compare teambased reward systems and compensation systems based on peer
evaluations in terms of their relative effects on perceptions of
peer-based rational control and, in turn, team performance. Moreover, given that we were unable to assess other compensation
practices that were not peer based, we were not able to control for
these effects. It is, of course, possible that these other compensation practices influence team motivational states in ways that we
did not capture. We thus hope that future research can include
these and other potentially relevant variables to examine the multiple psychological mechanisms through which a mix of team and
individual rewards affect perceptions of peer-based rational control and performance.
A second limitation concerns contextual factors. We included
team tenure, organization, team size, interdependence, and per-
Normative and rational peer-based control both correspond positively with individual and collective performance in selfmanaging teams. The two forces are, nevertheless, somewhat
substitutable. Either form of control is strongest when the other is
weak. This highlights the importance of simultaneously examining
both motivational forces. Our findings also demonstrate the importance of using a multilevel framework when investigating motivational states as the effects can be different at the collective and
individual levels. We hope this initial study stimulates further
research on peer-based control in self-managing teams.
References
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and
distortion of judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership, and
men (pp. 177–190). Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of Management Review, 14, 20 –39.
Bamberger, P. (2007). Group norms and excessive absenteeism: The role
of peer referent others. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 103, 179 –196. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.03.003
Barker, J. R. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in
self-managing teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408 – 437.
doi:10.2307/2393374
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
Barley, S. R., & Kunda, G. (1992). Design and devotion: Surges of rational
and normative ideologies of control in managerial discourse. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 363–399. doi:10.2307/2393449
Barnard, C. (1938). The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Strauss, J. P. (1993). Conscientiousness
and performance of sales representatives: Test of the mediating effects
of goal setting. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 715–722. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.78.5.715
Barrick, M. R., Stewart, G. L., Neubert, M. J., & Mount, M. K. (1998).
Relating member ability and personality to work-team processes and
team effectiveness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 377–391. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.83.3.377
Beal, D. J., Cohen, R. R., Burke, M. J., & McLendon, C. L. (2003).
Cohesion and performance in groups: A meta-analytic clarification of
construct relations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 989 –1004. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.88.6.989
Berkowitz, L. (1954). Group standards, cohesiveness, and productivity.
Human Relations, 7, 509 –519. doi:10.1177/001872675400700405
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York, NY:
Wiley.
Bliese, P. D. (2000). Within-group agreement, non-independence, and
reliability: Implications for data aggregation and analyses. In K. J. Klein
& S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel theory, research, and methods
in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions (pp. 349 –
381). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Campion, M. A., Medsker, G. J., & Higgs, A. C. (1993). Relations between
work group characteristics and effectiveness: Implications for designing
effective work groups. Personnel Psychology, 46, 823– 847. doi:
10.1111/j.1744-6570.1993.tb01571.x
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982). Control theory: A useful conceptual
framework for personality-social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin,92, 111–135. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.92.1.111
Chen, G., & Gocus, C. I. (2008). Motivation in and of teams: A multilevel
perspective. In R. Kanfer, G. Chen, & R. D. Pritchard (Eds.), Work
motivation: Past, present, and future (pp. 285–317). New York, NY:
Routledge Academic.
Chen, G., & Kanfer, R. (2006). Toward a systems theory of motivated
behavior in work teams. Research in Organizational Behavior, 27,
223–267. doi:10.1016/S0191-3085(06)27006-0
Childers, T., Dubinsky, A. J., & Gencturk, E. (1986). On the psychometric
properties of a scale to measure leadership substitutes. Psychological
Reports, 59, 1215–1226.
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple
regression/correlation analyses for the behavioral sciences. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Conger, J. A., & Kanungo, R. N. (1988). The empowerment process:
Integrating theory and practice. Academy of Management Review, 13,
471– 482.
DeShon, R. P., Kozlowski, S. W. J., Schmidt, A. M., Milner, K. R., &
Wiechmann, D. (2004). A multiple-goal, multilevel model of feedback
effects on the regulation of individual and team performance. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 89, 1035–1056. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.6.1035
Druskat, V. U., & Wolff, S. B. (1999). Effects and timing of peer appraisals
in self-managing work groups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84,
58 –74. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.84.1.58
Erez, A., Lepine, J. A., & Elms, H. (2002). Effects of rotated leadership
and peer evaluation on the functioning and effectiveness of selfmanaged teams: A quasi-experiment. Personnel Psychology, 55, 929 –
948. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2002.tb00135.x
Evans, C. R., & Dion, K. L. (1991). Group cohesion and performance: A
meta-analysis. Small Group Research, 22, 175–186. doi:10.1177/
1046496491222002
445
Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 57, 271–282. doi:10.1037/h0056932
George, J. M., & Bettenhausen, K. (1990). Understanding prosocial behavior, sales performance, and turnover: A group-level analysis in a
service context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 698 –709. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.75.6.698
Goodman, P. S., Ravlin, E., & Schminke, M. (1987). Understanding groups
in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, 121–173.
Greguras, G. J., Robie, C., Schleicher, D. J., & Goff, M. (2003). A field
study of the effects of rating purpose on the quality of multisource
ratings. Personnel Psychology, 56, 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.17446570.2003.tb00141.x
Gully, S. M., Devine, D. J., & Whitney, D. J. (1995). A meta-analysis of
cohesion and performance: Effects of level of analysis and task interdependence. Small Group Research, 26, 497–520. doi:10.1177/
1046496495264003
Hackman, J. R. (1992). Group influences on individuals in organizations.
In M. D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and
organizational psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 199 –267). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Hackman, J. R., & Morris, C. G. (1975). Group tasks, group interaction
processes, and group performance effectiveness: A review and proposed
integration. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 45–99). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Harkins, S. G., & Jackson, J. M. (1985). The role of evaluation in eliminating social loafing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11,
457– 465.
Heckathorn, D. D. (1990). Collective sanctions and compliance norms: A
formal theory of group-mediated social control. American Sociological
Review, 55, 366 –384. doi:10.2307/2095762
Heneman, R. L., & Von Hippel, C. (1995). Balancing group and individual
rewards: Rewarding individual contributions to the team. Compensation
Benefits Review, 27, 63– 68. doi:10.1177/088636879502700410
Hofmann, D. A., Griffin, M. A., & Gavin, M. B. (2000). The application
of hierarchical linear modeling to organizational research. In K. J. Klein
& S. W. J. Koslowski (Eds.), Multilevel theory, research, and methods
in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions (pp. 467–
511). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Jacobs, R. C., & Campbell, D. T. (1961). The perpetuation of an arbitrary
tradition through several generations of a laboratory microculture. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 62, 649 – 658. doi:10.1037/
h0044182
Jehn, K. A., & Shah, P. P. (1997). Interpersonal relationships and task
performance: An examination of mediating processes in friendship and
acquaintance groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,
775–790. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.775
Jenkins, D. G., Mitra, A., Gupta, N., & Shaw, J. D. (1998). Are financial
incentives related to performance? A meta-analytic review of empirical
research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 777–787. doi:10.1037/
0021-9010.83.5.777
Judge, T. A., & Piccolo, R. F. (2004). Transformational and transactional
leadership: A meta-analytic test of their relative validity. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 89, 755–768. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.5.755
Judge, T. A., Piccolo, R. F., & Ilies, R. (2004). The forgotten ones? The
validity of consideration and initiating structure in leadership research.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 36 –51. doi:10.1037/00219010.89.1.36
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal
of Political Economy, 100, 801– 817. doi:10.1086/261840
Kanfer, R. (1990). Motivation theory and industrial-organizational psychology. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 75–170). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting
Psychologist Press.
Karau, S. J., & Hart, J. W. (1998). Group cohesiveness and social loafing:
446
STEWART, COURTRIGHT, AND BARRICK
Effects of a social interaction manipulation on individual motivation
within groups. Group Dynamics, 2, 185–191. doi:10.1037/10892699.2.3.185
Karau, S. J., & Williams, K. D. (1993). Social loafing: A meta-analytic
review and theoretical integration. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 65, 681–706. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.681
Keller, R. T. (1986). Predictors of performance of project groups in R and
D organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 29, 715–726. doi:
10.2307/255941
Kerr, S., & Jermier, J. M. (1978). Substitutes for leadership: Their meaning
and measurement. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
22, 375– 403. doi:10.1016/0030-5073(78)90023-5
Kidwell, R. E., & Bennett, N. (1993). Employee propensity to withhold
effort: A conceptual model to intersect three avenues of research. Academy of Management Review, 18, 429 – 456.
Kiggundu, M. N. (1983). Task interdependence and job design: Test of a
theory. Organizational Behavior & Human Performance, 31, 145–172.
doi:10.1016/0030-5073(83)90118-6
Kirkman, B. L., & Rosen, B. (1999). Beyond self-management: Antecedents and consequences of team empowerment. Academy of Management
Journal, 42, 58 –74. doi:10.2307/256874
Klein, H. J., & Mulvey, P. W. (1995). Two investigations of the relationships among group goals, goal commitment, cohesion, and performance.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 61, 44 –53.
doi:10.1006/obhd.1995.1004
Kwok, C., Au, W. T., & Ho, J. M. C. (2005). Normative controls and
self-reported counterproductive behaviors in the workplace in China.
Applied Psychology: An International Review, 54, 456 – 475. doi:
10.1111/j.1464-0597.2005.00220.x
Latané, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. (1979). Many hands make light the
work: The causes and consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 822– 832. doi:10.1037/00223514.37.6.822
Lawler, E. E. (2003). Reward systems in knowledge-based organizations.
In S. E. Jackson, M. Hitt, & A. S. Denisi (Eds.), Managing knowledge
for sustained competitive advantage: Designing strategies for effective
human resource management (pp. 274 –301). San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
Lawler, E. E., & Cohen, S. G. (1992). Designing pay systems for teams.
ACA Journal, 1, 6 –19.
LeBreton, J. M., & Senter, J. L. (2008). Answers to 20 questions about
interrater reliability and interrater agreement. Organizational Research
Methods, 11, 815– 852. doi:10.1177/1094428106296642
LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (2001). Peer responses to low performers:
An attributional model of helping in the context of groups. Academy of
Management Review, 26, 67– 84.
Locke, E. A., Feren, D. B., McCaleb, V. M., Shaw, K. N., & Denny, A. T.
(1980). The relative effectiveness of four methods of motivating employee performance. In K. D. Duncan, M. M. Gruenberg, & D. Wallis
(Eds.), Changes in working life (pp. 363–388). New York, NY: Wiley.
Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1961). Group cohesiveness, communication
level, and conformity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62,
408 – 412. doi:10.1037/h0041109
Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1965). Group cohesiveness as interpersonal
attraction: A review of relationship with antecedent and consequent
variables. Psychological Bulletin, 64, 259 –309. doi:10.1037/h0022386
Loughry, M. L., & Tosi, H. L. (2008). Performance implications of peer
monitoring. Organization Science, 19, 876 – 890. doi:10.1287/
orsc.1080.0356
MacNeil, M. K., & Sherif, M. (1976). Norm change over subject generations as a function of arbitrariness of prescribed norm. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 762–773. doi:10.1037/00223514.34.5.762
Manz, C. C., & Sims, H. P., Jr. (1987). Leading workers to lead them-
selves: The external leadership of self-managed work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32, 106 –129. doi:10.2307/2392745
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York, NY:
Wiley.
Marks, M. A., Mathieu, J. E., & Zaccaro, S. J. (2001). A temporally based
framework and taxonomy of team processes. Academy of Management
Review, 26, 356 –376.
Mathieu, J. E., Maynard, M. T., Rapp, T., & Gilson, L. (2008). Team
effectiveness 1997–2007: A review of recent advancements and a
glimpse into the future. Journal of Management, 34, 410 – 476. doi:
10.1177/0149206308316061
McDaniel, M. A., Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1988). Job experience
correlates of job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73, 327–
330. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.73.2.327
McGrath, J. E. (1964). Social psychology: A brief introduction. New York,
NY: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
Mellinger, G. D. (1956). Interpersonal trust as a factor in communication.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 304 –309. doi:10.1037/
h0048100
Meyer, H. H., Kay, E., & French, J. R. P., Jr. (1965). Split roles in
performance appraisal. Harvard Business Review, 43, 123–129.
Mullen, B., & Cooper, C. (1994). The relation between group cohesion and
performance: An integration. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 210 –227.
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.210
Mulvey, P. W., & Klein, H. J. (19998). The impact of perceived loafing
and collective efficacy on group goal processes and group performance.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 62– 87.
doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2753
Mumford, M. D. (1983). Social comparison theory and the evaluation of
peer evaluations: A review and some applied implications. Personnel
Psychology, 36, 867– 881. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1983.tb00516.x
Murphy, K. R., & Cleveland, J. N. (1991). Performance appraisal. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
O’Reilly, C. A., III, Caldwell, D. F., & Barnett, W. P. (1989). Work group
demography, social integration, and turnover. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 34, 21–37. doi:10.2307/2392984
O’Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1996). Culture as social control:
Corporations, cults, and commitment. Research in Organizational Behavior, 18, 157–200.
Pfeffer, J. (1997). New directions for organization theory: Problems and
prospects. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Pollis, N. P., Montgomery, R. L., & Smith, T. G. (1975). Autokinetic
paradigms: A reply to Alexander, Zucker and Brody. Sociometry, 38,
358 –373. doi:10.2307/2786170
Price, K. H., Gavin, J. H., & Harrison, D. A. (2006). Withholding inputs in
team contexts: Member composition, interaction processes, evaluation
structure, and social loafing. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 1375–
1384. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.6.1375
Reilly, R. R., & Chao, G. T. (1982). Validity and fairness of some
alternative employee selection procedures. Personnel Psychology, 35,
1– 62. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1982.tb02184.x
Rousseau, D. M. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2, 121–139. doi:
10.1007/BF01384942
Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Parks, L. (2005). Personnel psychology:
Performance evaluation and pay for performance. Annual Review of
Psychology, 56, 571– 600. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103
.070254
Saavedra, R., & Kwun, S. K. (1993). Peer evaluation in self-managing
work groups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 450 – 462. doi:10.1037/
0021-9010.78.3.450
Schacter, S., Ellertson, N., McBride, D., & Gregory, D. (1951). An experimental study of cohesiveness and productivity. Human Relations, 4,
229 –238. doi:10.1177/001872675100400303
PEER-BASED CONTROL IN SELF-MANAGING TEAMS
Seashore, S. E. (1954). Group cohesiveness in the industrial work group.
Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research.
Seibert, S. E., Silver, S. R., & Randolph, W. A. (2004). Taking empowerment to the next level: A multiple-level model of empowerment,
performance, and satisfaction. Academy of Management Journal, 47,
332–349. doi:10.2307/20159585
Seibert, S. E., Wang, G., & Courtright, S. H. (2011). Antecedents and
consequences of psychological and team empowerment in organizations:
A meta-analytic review. Journal of Applied Psychology. Advance online
publication. doi:10.1037/a0022676
Sewell, G. (1998). The discipline of teams: The control of team-based
industrial work through electronic and peer surveillance. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 43, 397– 428. doi:10.2307/2393857
Shepperd, J. A. (1993). Productivity loss in performance groups: A motivation analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 67– 81. doi:10.1037/00332909.113.1.67
Shipper, F., Manz, C. C., & Stewart, G. L. (2012). Developing global teams
to meet 21st century challenges at W. L. Gore & Associates. In A. A.
Thompson Jr., A. J. Strickland III, & J. E. Gamble (Eds.), Crafting and
executing strategy: The quest for competitive advantage: Concepts and
cases (18th ed., pp. C391–C405). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Smither, J. W., London, M., & Reilly, R. R. (2005). Does performance
improve following multisource feedback? A theoretical model, metaanalysis, and review of empirical findings. Personnel Psychology, 58,
33– 66. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2005.514_1.x
Sorrels, J. P., & Kelley, J. (1984). Conformity by omission. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10, 302–305. doi:10.1177/
0146167284102017
Spreitzer, G. M. (1995). Individual empowerment in the workplace: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1442–1465. doi:10.2307/256865
Stajkovic, A. D., & Luthans, F. (1997). A meta-analysis of the effects of
organizational behavior modification on task performance, 1975–1995.
Academy of Management Journal, 40, 1122–1149. doi:10.2307/256929
Steiner, I. D. (1972). Group process and productivity. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Stewart, G. L. (1996). Reward structure as a moderator of the relationship
between extraversion and sales performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 619 – 627. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.81.6.619
Stewart, G. L. (2010). The past twenty years: Teams research is alive and
well at the Journal of Management. Journal of Management, 36, 801–
805. doi:10.1177/0149206310371512
Stewart, G. L., & Barrick, M. R. (2000). Team structure and performance:
Assessing the mediating role of intrateam process and the moderating
role of task type. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 135–148.
doi:10.2307/1556372
447
Stewart, G. L., Courtright, S. H., & Manz, C. C. (2011). Self-leadership: A
multilevel review. Journal of Management, 37, 185–222. doi:10.1177/
0149206310383911
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Terborg, J. R., & Miller, H. E. (1978). Motivation, behavior, and performance: A close examination of goal setting and monetary incentives.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 63, 29 –39. doi:10.1037/00219010.63.1.29
Thomas, K. W., & Velthouse, B. A. (1990). Cognitive elements of empowerment: An “interpretive” model of intrinsic task motivation. Academy of Management Review, 15, 666 – 681.
Tompkins, P. K., & Cheney, G. (1985). Communication and unobtrusive
control in contemporary organizations. In R. D. McPhee & P. K.
Tompkins (Eds.), Organizational communication: Traditional themes
and new directions (pp. 179 –210) Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Wang, G., Oh, I.-S., Courtright, S. H., & Colbert, A. E. (2011). Transformational leadership and performance across criteria and levels: A metaanalytic review of 25 years of research. Group & Organization Management, 36, 223–270. doi:10.1177/1059601111401017
Wech, B. A., Mossholder, K. W., Steel, R. P., & Bennett, N. (1998). Does
work group cohesiveness affect individuals’ performance and organizational commitment? A cross-level examination. Small Group Research,
29, 472– 494. doi:10.1177/1046496498294004
Welbourne, T. M., Balkin, D. B., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1995). Gainsharing and mutual monitoring: A combined agency-organizational justice interpretation. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 881– 899.
doi:10.2307/256750
Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution
to the collective action problem. American Sociological Review, 74,
23– 43. doi:10.1177/000312240907400102
Williams, K., Harkins, S., & Latané, B. (1981). Identifiability as a deterrent
to social loafing: Two cheering experiments. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 40, 303–311. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.40.2.303
Zander, A. (1968). Group aspirations. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.),
Group dynamics: Research and theory (pp. 418 – 429). New York, NY:
Harper & Row.
Zander, A., Natsoulas, T., & Thomas, E. J. (1960). Personal goals and
group goals for the members. Human Relations, 13, 333–344. doi:
10.1177/001872676001300403
Received July 9, 2010
Revision received June 27, 2011
Accepted July 5, 2011 䡲