Reading List for Part 1: Product Markets and Competition Law
*Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (June 1987), ”Contracts as Barrier to Entry”, The
American Economic Review, Vol. 77 (3): 388-401.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Michael D. Whinston (1990), ”Multimarket Contact and
Collusive Behavior”. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 21 (1): 1-26.
Bolton, Patrick, Joseph F. Brodley and Michael H. Riordan (1999), ”Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy”. Geo. LJ 88: 2239.
Carlton, Dennis W., and Michael Waldman (2002), ”The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries”. RAND Journal of Economics,
Vol. 33 (2): 194-220.
*Deneckere, Raymond, and Carl Davidson (1985), ”Incentives to Form Coalitions with
Bertrand Competition”. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (4): 473-486.
Dixit, Avinash (1980), ”The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence”. Economic Journal,
Vol. 90 (357): 95-106.
*Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole (1984), ”The Fat-Cat Effect, The Puppy-Dog Ploy, and
the Lean and Hungry Look”. American Economic Review, Vol. 74 (2): 361-366.
Ganslandt, Mattias, Lars Persson and Helder Vasconcelos (2012), ”Endogenous Mergers
and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures”. Economica, Vol. 79 (316): 766-791.
*Gilbert, R., and D.M.G. Newbery (1982), ”Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly”. American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (3): 514–526.
*Green, Edward, and Robert H. Porter (1984), ”Noncooperative Collusion under
Imperfect Price Information”. Econometrica, Vol. 52 (1): 87-100.
Harrington, Joseph E. (2008), ”Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs”. Journal of
Industrial Economics, Vol. 56 (2): 215-246.
Kreps, David, and Jose Scheinkman (1983), ”Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand
Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes”. Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (2): 326-337.
*Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Michael Whinston (1986), ”Free Entry and Social Inefficiency”.
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1): 48-58.
*Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts (1982), ”Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete
Information: An Equilibrium Analysis”. Econometrica, Vol. 50 (2): 443-459.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, and Lars Persson (2012), ”Entrepreneurial Innovations,
Competition and Competition Policy”. European Economic Review, Vol. 56 (3): 488-506.
Persson, Lars (2005), ”The Failing Firm Defense”. The Journal of Industrial Economics
53 (2): 175-201.
Recommended text book for students that want to research in the field: Motta, M., 2004,
”Competition Policy: Theory and Practise”, Cambridge University Press, UK.
Reading List for Part 2: Product Markets and Corporate Law
Bolton, P. 2011. “Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control.”
Mimeo.
*Bolton, P, and D S Scharfstein. 1990. “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems
in Financial Contracting.” American Economic Review: 93–106.
Bolton, Patrick, and Martin Oehmke. 2013. “Strategic Conduct in Credit Derivative
Markets.” Mimeo (January 4): 1–23.
*Brander, J.A., and T R Lewis. 1986. “Oligopoly and Financial Structure: the Limited
Liability Effect.” American Economic Review: 956–970.
Brander, James A, and Tracy R Lewis. 1988. “Bankruptcy Costs and the Theory of
Oligopoly.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 21 (2) (May 1): 221–243.
Buccirossi, P, and G Spagnolo. 2008. “Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour.”
In, ed. Dale W Collins. Issues in Competition Law and Policy.
Bulow, J I, J D Geanakoplos, and P D Klemperer. 1985. “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic
Substitutes and Complements.” Journal of Political Economy: 488–511.
Cestone, G. 1999. “Corporate Financing and Product Market Competition: an Overview.”
Giornale Degli Economisti E Annali Di Economia 58 (2): 269–300.
Cestone, G, and L White. 2003. “Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: the Design of
Financial Claims.” The Journal of Finance 58 (5): 2109–2142.
*Chevalier, J A, and D S Scharfstein. 1996. “Capital Market Imperfections and
Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence.” The American Economic Review 86:
703–725.
Fershtman, C, and K L Judd. 1987. “Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly.” American
Economic Review: 927–940.
Foros, Øystein, Hans Jarle Kind, and Greg Shaffer. 2011. “Mergers and Partial
Ownership.” European Economic Review 55 (7) (October): 916–926.
*Gilo, D, Y Moshe, and Y Spiegel. 2006. “Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion.”
The RAND Journal of Economics 27: 81–99.
Legros, P, and A Newman. 2011. “Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: a
Survey.” Mimeo.
*Maksimovic, Vojislav. 1988. “Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies.” RAND Journal
of Economics 19 (May 19): 389–406.
Malueg, D A. 1992. “Collusive Behavior and Partial Ownership of Rivals.” International
Journal of Industrial Organization 10 (1): 27–34.
Martin, S. 1993. “Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model.”
Journal of Economic Theory 59 (2): 445–450.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, Lars Persson and Joacim Tåg 2014 "Acquisitions, Ownership
Efficiency, and the Tax Shield of Debt, Mimeo. Available at http://www.ifn.se/joacimt
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, Lars Persson and Joacim Tåg 2014 "Buying to Sell: Private Equity
Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring, Mimeo. Available at http://www.ifn.se/joacimt
Poitevin, M. 1989. “Financial Signalling and the‘ Deep-Pocket’ Argument.” RAND Journal
of Economics: 26–40.
Raith, M. 2003. “Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives.” American Economic
Review 93: 1425–1436.
Reitman, D. 1994. “Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion.”
The Journal of Industrial Economics: 313–322.
Reynolds, R J, and B R Snapp. 1986. “The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests
and Joint Ventures.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 4 (2): 141–153.
*Schmidt, K M. 1997. “Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition.” The
Review of Economic Studies 64 (2): 191–213.
Shelegia, Sandro, and Yossi Spiegel. 2012. “Bertrand Competition When Firms Hold
Passive Ownership Stakes in One Another.” Economics Letters 114 (1) (January): 136–
138.
Showalter, D M. 1995. “Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment.” American
Economic Review: 647–653.
Sklivas, S D. 1987. “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives.” RAND Journal of
Economics: 452–458.
*Spagnolo, Giancarlo. 2000. “Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market
Competition.” The RAND Journal of Economics 31: 22–42.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. 2005. “Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior.” European
Economic Review 49 (6) (August): 1501–1523.
Vickers, J. 1985. “Delegation and the Theory of the Firm.” The Economic Journal 95: 138–
147.
Reading List for Part 3: Empirical analysis of firms
*Angrist, J., and Pischke, J-S. 2008. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s
Companion. Princeton University Press 2008. Chaper 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
Autor, D.H., Kerr, W.R., and Kugler, A.D. 2007. ”Do employment protections reduce
productivity? Evidence from U.S. states”, The Economic Journal, 117, 189–217.
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 1999. ”Is There a Discretaion in Wage Setting? A Test
Using Takeover Legislation”. RAND Journal of Economics, 30(3), 535-554.
*Bertrand, M., E. Duflo and S. Mullainathan. 2004. ”How Much Should We Trust the
Differences-in-Differences Estimates?”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2004) 119
(1): 249-275.
*Card, D., and A. B. Kreuger, 1994. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of
the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania”, American Economic Review,
84(4), 772-793.
Davis, S., J. Haltiwanger, K. Handley, R. Jarmin, L. Lerner and J. Miranda 2014. “Private
Equity, Jobs and Productivity”, American Economic Review, 104(12), 3956-3990.
Donald, S.G., Lang, K., 2007. ”Inference with difference-in-differences and other panel
data”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 221–233.
Meyer, B, (1995) “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments in Economics”, Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, v. 13151-162.
Olsson, M. (2009) “Employment Protection and Sickness Absence”, Labour Economics,
16(2), s. 208–214.
Olsson, M. och J. Tåg 2014. “What Explains Layoffs After Private Equity Buyouts?”, mimeo.
Pagano, M. och P. Volpin 2008. “Labor and Finance”, mimeo,
von Below D and Skogman Thoursie P (2010) "Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of
seniority rules in Sweden", Labour Economics, 17, 987-997.