Long-term focus and prosocial-antisocial tendencies interact to predict

Personality and Individual Differences 75 (2015) 121–124
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Long-term focus and prosocial–antisocial tendencies interact to predict
belief in just world q
Carolyn L. Hafer ⇑, Alicia N. Rubel
Department of Psychology, Brock University, Canada
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 2 September 2014
Received in revised form 31 October 2014
Accepted 2 November 2014
Keywords:
Belief in a just world
Justice motive
Long-term goals
Prosocial behavior
a b s t r a c t
According to justice motive theory, individuals need to believe that the world is a just place where people
generally get what they deserve (Lerner, 1977). Individuals are thought to need belief in a just world
(BJW) in part because it gives them the confidence required to invest in long-term goals. However,
BJW can only provide confidence that individuals will reap the rewards of their investments if they invest
in their goals through prosocial means (e.g., Hafer, 2000). The current study provides evidence for this
argument. Specifically, we examined individual differences in BJW, long-term goal focus, and prosocial–antisocial tendencies to test the hypothesis that higher long-term focus would be associated with
higher BJW, but only amongst those who are also high in prosocial (low in antisocial) tendencies. This
hypothesis was tested four times using four measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies. Simple slopes
analyses revealed the predicted pattern of results for three of the four measures. Our findings (a) provide
novel support for the idea that BJW aids in the prosocial pursuit of long-term goals, and (b) have implications for individual variation in BJW.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
According to justice motive theory, people need to believe that
the world is a just place in which individuals get what they deserve
(Lerner, 1977). Theorists claim that people need to believe in a just
world, in part, because belief in a just world (BJW) gives people the
confidence in the world that they require to invest in long-term
goals. More specifically, Hafer (2000) proposed that BJW helps people to invest in long-term goals through prosocial means. Hafer and
colleagues (2000, 2002; Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & Dempsey, 2005)
found initial support for this claim in studies of reactions to victims
who presumably threaten BJW. In the present research, we add to
these studies by using individual differences in the strength of people’s BJW, rather than reactions to victims, as the dependent
variable.
According to Lerner (e.g., Lerner, 1977), children develop a need
to believe in a just world as they learn to forgo immediate gratification and hold out for larger, longer-term rewards. In order to
invest in long-term rewards, people need to trust that the world
is a just place in which individuals get what they deserve. If the
q
This research was conducted at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S
3A1, Canada.
⇑ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, Brock University, St.
Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1, Canada. Tel.: +1 905 688 5550; fax: +1 905 688 6922.
E-mail address: [email protected] (C.L. Hafer).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.006
0191-8869/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
world is a place where individuals get what they deserve, then
people’s investments in future goals will pay off. Because people
need to believe in a just world, they defend BJW in the face of
threats to the belief—threats such as victims who are not responsible for their suffering or ‘‘innocent victims.’’
Support for the notion that BJW aids in long-term goal investment comes from several sources. Correlational studies show that,
the more confident people are that their goals will be met, and the
more they invest in and focus on long-term goals, the stronger
their chronic BJW (Dette, Stöber, & Dalbert, 2004; Hafer, 2000,
Study 3; Otto & Dalbert, 2005; Sutton & Winnard, 2007; Xie, Liu,
& Gan, 2011). In experimental work, Callan, Shead, and Olson
(2009) found that a threat to BJW led to a greater preference for
smaller, immediate rewards than larger, longer-term rewards
(see also Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2011).
There is also evidence that people defend BJW when it is threatened, in part, because BJW is important for long-term investment.
For example, research suggests that people with a strong focus on
long-term goals—due to either situational pressures or individual
differences—evaluate a victim who threatens BJW more negatively
than do people with less long-term focus (Bal & van den Bos, 2012;
Hafer, 2000). The rationale for these effects is that focussing on
long-term goals should engage or strengthen the need to believe
in a just world, thus prompting one to defend the belief when it
is threatened by a given victim. Negatively evaluating the victim
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C.L. Hafer, A.N. Rubel / Personality and Individual Differences 75 (2015) 121–124
defends BJW by rendering the victim’s suffering less undeserved
and unjust. Additional work by Callan, Harvey, and Sutton (2014)
suggests that negative evaluations of a victim who threatens BJW
leads to a greater preference for larger, longer-term rewards compared to smaller, immediate rewards.
The research we have described so far suggests that people need
to believe in a just world because the belief provides the confidence required to invest in long-term goals. However, BJW should
only aid investment in long-term goals if people desire to achieve
their goals through prosocial means. After all, in a just world, only
positively-valued behavior (e.g., prosocial striving) is rewarded
with positively valued outcomes (e.g., one’s long-term goals).
Therefore, people should need to believe in a just world, not
because BJW helps them to invest in long-term goals per se, but
because BJW helps them to invest in long-term goals through prosocial means. In support of this claim, Hafer and colleagues (Hafer,
2002, Study 6; Hafer et al., 2005) found evidence that people who
temporarily or chronically focus on both long-term goals and prosocial means show a greater tendency to defend BJW when the
belief is threatened. For example, in Hafer et al. (2005), participants
were presented with an innocent victim of illness (strong threat to
BJW) or a victim who was responsible for the illness (weak threat
to BJW). Individual differences in long-term goal focus and in prosocial–antisocial tendencies interacted to predict BJW-defense.
Specifically, when the victim was innocent, a stronger, chronic
long-term focus was associated with greater victim blame, but only
amongst participants who were low in antisocial (high in prosocial) tendencies. No interaction was present in the weak threat
condition. Presumably, BJW is more useful for people high in
long-term focus and prosocial tendencies; therefore, these individuals have a stronger need to believe in a just world and a stronger
motivation to defend the belief, for example, by blaming an innocent victim for her fate.
In the present study, we build on Hafer et al. (2005) to examine
additional evidence that people need to believe in a just world
because BJW aids in the prosocial pursuit of long-term goals. We
examine this function of BJW using individual differences in the
strength of BJW as the dependent variable, rather than reactions
to victims (BJW-defense) as in Hafer et al. (2005). Our argument
is as follows. Individuals who intend to invest in long-term goals
through prosocial means should be more motivated to maintain
BJW so that they can feel secure in making these investments.
Efforts to maintain BJW, such as seeking out evidence that the
world is just or vigilantly defending against threats to BJW, likely
strengthen the belief over time (for discussion of the link between
individual differences in BJW and BJW-defense, see Hafer & Bègue,
2005; Lerner & Clayton, 2011). Therefore, one would expect to find
an interaction between individual differences in long-term goal
focus and prosocial–antisocial tendencies in predicting BJW, similar to the interaction that Hafer et al. (2005) found using reactions
to an innocent victim as the dependent variable.
In the current study, we assessed individual differences in longterm goal focus, prosocial–antisocial tendencies, and BJW. We
expected an interaction between long-term focus and prosocial–
antisocial tendencies in predicting BJW, such that greater longterm focus would predict stronger BJW, especially for people with
high prosocial (low antisocial) tendencies.
2. Method
2.2. Procedure
The data were collected in four mass-testing sessions, each of
which took about 1 h. For each session, students completed questionnaires for several unrelated studies. With regards to the present study, all students completed the same measure of BJW and
long-term focus, and from two to four measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies. Each prosocial–antisocial scale had its pros and
cons; thus, we tested our hypothesis four times, once for each of
the four measures. Sample sizes for our tests therefore vary,
because not everyone completed all four measures of prosocial–
antisocial tendencies.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Belief in a just world
We used Lipkus’s (1991) 7-item Global Belief in a Just World
Scale to assess individual differences in BJW (e.g., ‘‘I feel that people get what they deserve’’). Each item was rated on a scale ranging
from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree. Higher mean scores
indicate stronger BJW (a = .81).
2.3.2. Long-term focus
Participants completed the 16-item University Investment Orientation Scale (Hafer, 2000), which assesses the degree to which
students think about and invest in long-term goals, and their confidence in reaching long-term goals (e.g., ‘‘My university experience is a means to fulfilling my goals for the future’’). The items
are rated on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree, with six items reverse-keyed. Higher mean
scores indicate greater long-term focus (a = .81).
2.3.3. Prosocial–antisocial tendencies
Four scales assessed prosocial–antisocial tendencies. For
Rushton and Chrisjohn’s (1981) Self-Report Delinquency Scale,
respondents rate the frequency with which they have engaged in
each of 20 antisocial behaviors, such as stealing from a store or taking illegal drugs (1 = never, 5 = very often). Higher mean scores indicate greater antisocial tendencies (a = .77).
For the honesty–dishonesty morality subscale of the revised
Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (Katz, Santman, & Lonero,
1994), respondents rate the extent to which each of 13 antisocial
behaviors, such as accepting a bribe or cheating on one’s taxes, is
justifiable (1 = never justified, 10 = always justified). Higher mean
scores indicate greater antisocial tendencies (a = .89).
Participants also completed the 20-item Mach IV measure of
Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970; e.g., ‘‘It is wise to flatter
important people’’). Each item was rated on a scale ranging from
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, with 10 items reversekeyed. Higher mean scores indicate greater antisocial tendencies
and lower scores indicate greater prosocial tendencies (a = .76).
The Attitudes Toward Cheating Scale (Gardner & Melvin, 1988)
consists of 34 items assessing students’ attitudes toward academic
cheating (e.g., ‘‘Cheating on college tests is morally wrong’’). Items
are rated on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly
disagree, with 20 items reverse-keyed. Higher mean scores indicate
greater antisocial tendencies and lower scores indicate greater prosocial tendencies (a = .85).
2.1. Participants
3. Results
Participants were 442 undergraduate psychology students (333
women; Mage = 20.73, SDage = 4.27) from a midsize Canadian university. Students received course credit for their participation.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables. Note that,
although the range of scores on the delinquency, attitudes toward
cheating, and honesty–dishonesty scales are somewhat truncated
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C.L. Hafer, A.N. Rubel / Personality and Individual Differences 75 (2015) 121–124
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
6
M
SD
Min
Max
442
442
442
240
316
239
3.25
3.90
1.57
2.66
3.62
2.60
0.80
0.52
0.37
1.29
0.66
0.34
1.29
2.29
1.00
1.00
1.90
1.62
6.00
5.00
3.40
7.54
6.20
3.50
Note: Higher scores on the measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies indicate
greater antisocial tendencies. Min = minimum value in the data; Max = maximum
value in the data. For University Investment Orientation, Delinquency, and Attitudes Toward Cheating, possible scores range from 1 to 5. For Belief in a Just World,
possible scores range from 1 to 6. For Machiavellianism, possible scores range from
1 to 7. For Honesty–Dishonesty Morality, possible scores range from 1 to 10.
High Machiavellianism
5
Belief in a Just World
Belief in a Just World
University Investment Orientation
Delinquency
Honesty–Dishonesty Morality
Machiavellianism
Attitudes Toward Cheating
N
Low Machiavellianism
4
3
2
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
.05
(442)
.17***
(442)
.31***
(442)
.17**
(240)
.20***
(316)
.04
(239)
.15**
(442)
.05
(442)
.09
(240)
.09
(316)
.16*
(239)
UIO
Delinq
HDM
1
Mach
Low Long-Term Focus
High Long-Term Focus
Fig. 1. Belief in a Just World as a function of long-term goal focus and
Machiavellianism (controlling for participant sex).
.09
(442)
.09
(240)
.10
(316)
.20**
(239)
.42***
(240)
.31***
(316)
.27***
(239)
6
.24**
(114)
.45***
(239)
Low Cheang
High Cheang
.28**
(113)
Note: Higher scores on the measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies indicate
greater antisocial tendencies. For sex, 0 = women, 1 = men. N is in parentheses.
*
p < .05.
**
p < .01.
***
p < .001.
at the high end, there is adequate variability for all of these
measures.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all variables. All measures of prosocial–antisocial behavior were positively correlated
with one another. Also, participant sex was correlated with several
of the predictors, and was thus controlled for in our hypothesis tests.
We tested our hypothesis with four hierarchical regressions.
BJW was regressed onto sex, the measure of long-term focus (centered), and one of the measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies
(centered) on the first step, and onto the interaction between longterm focus and prosocial–antisocial tendencies on the second
step.1 There was a significant interaction between long-term focus
and Machiavellianism, b = .32, t(311) = 2.58, p = .01, sr2 = .02,
and between long-term focus and attitudes toward cheating,
b = .72, t(234) = 2.23, p = .03, sr2 = .02. The interaction between
long-term focus and self-reported delinquency was marginal,
b = .35, t(437) = 1.72, p = .09, sr2 = .01. The interaction involving
BJW and honesty–dishonesty was nonsignificant, b = .04,
t(235) = .49, p = .62, sr2 = .001.
Significant and marginal interactions were followed up with
tests of simple slopes (Aiken & West, 1991). The slope of the regression line predicting BJW from long-term focus was tested at high
and low levels (±1 SD) of prosocial–antisocial tendencies. As seen
in Fig. 1, when the prosocial–antisocial measure was Machiavellianism, the greater participants’ chronic long-term focus, the stronger
their BJW, but this relation only occurred for individuals with lower
1
There were significant main effects for both sex and long-term focus in two of the
four analyses (greater BJW for men, and greater BJW with greater long-term focus). Of
the measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies, only attitudes toward cheating
demonstrated a significant main effect (lower BJW with more favorable attitudes
toward cheating). There were no other significant main effects.
5
Belief in a Just World
Honesty-Dishonesty
Morality (HDM)
Machiavellianism
(Mach)
Attitudes Toward
Cheating
BJW
4
3
2
1
Low Long-Term Focus
High Long-Term Focus
Fig. 2. Belief in a Just World as a function of long-term goal focus and attitudes
toward cheating (controlling for participant sex).
6
Low Delinquency
High Delinquency
5
Belief in a Just World
Belief in a Just World
(BJW)
Univ. Investment
Orientation (UIO)
Delinquency (Delinq)
Sex
4
3
2
1
Low Long-Term Focus
High Long-Term Focus
Fig. 3. Belief in a Just World as a function of long-term goal focus and delinquency
(controlling for participant sex).
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C.L. Hafer, A.N. Rubel / Personality and Individual Differences 75 (2015) 121–124
antisocial (higher prosocial) tendencies, b = .49, t(311) = 4.20,
p < .001, and not for those with higher antisocial (lower prosocial)
tendencies, b = .07, t(311) = .71, p = .47. As seen in Fig. 2, when the
prosocial–antisocial measure was attitudes toward cheating, the
greater participants’ long-term focus, the stronger their BJW, but
again this relation only occurred for individuals with lower antisocial (higher prosocial) tendencies, b = .39, t(234) = 2.66, p = .008,
and not for those with higher antisocial (lower prosocial) tendencies, b = .09, t(234) = .61, p = .54. Fig. 3 shows the analogous
interaction between long-term focus and delinquency. The greater
participants’ long-term focus, the stronger their BJW, but only for
individuals lower in antisocial tendencies, b = .39, t(437) = 3.62,
p < .001, not for those higher in antisocial tendencies, b = .13,
t(437) = 1.28, p = .20.
One limitation of our findings is that the study was correlational, thus we cannot make causal conclusions. The desire to
invest in long-term goals through prosocial means might lead to
a stronger BJW, as previously discussed. Conversely, having strong
BJW might also make individuals more willing to engage in the
prosocial pursuit of long-term goals. In future, researchers should
examine prosocial goal pursuit and individual differences in BJW
using longitudinal designs in order to investigate potential causal
associations between variables.
4. Discussion
References
Researchers have argued that BJW aids individuals in pursuing
long-term goals through prosocial means (e.g., Hafer, 2000; Hafer
et al., 2005). We attempted to find support for this argument by
testing the hypothesis that long-term focus predicts BJW, but only
amongst participants higher in prosocial (lower in antisocial) tendencies. For three of the four tests of this hypothesis, the predicted
interaction was significant or marginally significant and showed
the expected pattern of results. Specifically, stronger long-term
focus predicted stronger BJW, but only for participants higher in
prosocial (lower in antisocial) tendencies.
Our findings provide evidence that one of the functions of BJW
is to help individuals invest in long-term goals through prosocial
means. If BJW serves this function, then individuals who plan to
invest in long-term goals through prosocial means should be more
motivated to maintain BJW, and these efforts likely strengthen BJW
over time. Our findings are consistent with this logic. Given that
individuals are likely to defend beliefs that serve a valued function,
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because BJW helps people engage in prosocial pursuit of long-term
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Our findings help explain why individuals vary in BJW.
Researchers have proposed a number of ways that individuals benefit from believing that the world is just (see Dalbert, 2001; Hafer &
Sutton, in press). However, it is likely that different individuals
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BJW. Presumably, BJW is of greater benefit to these individuals in
their life pursuits. In the future, researchers should examine other
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Although our findings were relatively consistent across measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies, the predicted interaction
was not observed when our hypothesis was tested using the honesty–dishonesty morality scale. The scale correlated highly with
the other measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies and so it is
unlikely to measure a construct entirely separate from that measured by the other scales. In the future, researchers should use
additional measures of prosocial–antisocial tendencies to better
understand what aspects of these tendencies moderate the association between long-term focus and BJW. Researchers should also
attempt to replicate our interactions with additional measures of
long-term focus.
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We thank Wendy Gotts, Cathy Hopkins, Osamu Minami, and
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