The cost of being apprehended
fishing illegally
Ussif Rashid Sumaila ([email protected])
Jackie Alder
Heather Keith
Fisheries Economics Research Unit
Sea Around Us Project
Fisheries Centre
University of British Columbia
OECD IUU Fishing Workshop, April 19-20, 2004
Global picture of IUU incidence
Key elements of cost
•
Detection likelihood;
– depends on enforcement & regulation;
•
•
Amount of fine;
Cost of avoidance;
– depends on regulations & budget
allocated to activity;
•
Impact on fishers’ moral and social
standing in society.
Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers
Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in
IUU activity
Vessel /
Gear Country
Arresting
Country
Fishery
Expected
Revenue
(USD)
Expected
Penalty
(USD)
Total
Cost
(USD)
Total
Cost /
Expected
revenue
Deterrence
fine when
Ø=0.2
Spain (longline)
Australia
Patagonian
toothfish
504 000
87 000
526 091
1.04
0.75
Russia (pots)
Japan
Crab
38 256
1 483
31 131
0.81
5.8
Mexico
(bottom trawler)
Mexico
Shrimp
22 060
1 091
16 428
0.74
6.2
China
(bottom trawler)
Russia
Alaska
pollack
8 818
234
4 539
0.51
19.4
Norway
(longline)
Mauritius
Patagonian
toothfish
352 000
480 000
786 667
2.23
0.38
Case 1: Namibian fisheries
• … from
‘IUU Fishing Paradise’
• … to
‘IUU Fishing Hell’
– IUU fishing before independence
– IUU fishing after independence
Case 2: Patagonian toothfish
• … high price of fish - the main attractor
to IUU fishing;
• … also, the low detection likelihood large area to patrol and few resources
for the number of vessels fishing is a
driver.
Case 3: Northwestern Australia
• … poverty among IUU fishers - the
main driver of IUU fishing;
– despite a high probability of getting caught
and severe penalty the need to generate
an income is stronger;
– the alternatives to IUU fishing require even
more (hard) work for much less economic
benefits.
Summary results
• IUU fishing is widespread spatially;
… but fewer IUU activities in the
northern hemisphere.
• Current fine levels are not high enough
to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing.
– Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being
apprehended, current fines need to be
increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to
serve as a deterrence
Summary results
• … the probability of detection must be
well above 0.2 for current fine levels to
serve as a deterrent;
• Outside of EEZs there is no social
driver constraining IUU fishing.
Summary results
• From case studies
– Namibia
• it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by
increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly;
– Patagonian toothfish
• when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is
high, a much higher detection probability and fine level
are required to stop the activity;
– Northern Australian
• when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence
models are not capable of explaining and providing
solutions to the IUU problem.
Way forward
• Enrich Sea Around Us project database to:
– Further develop world incidence maps;
– Expand the empirical work presented in table 1;
• More effort at determining the prevailing
detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots;
• Extend the deterrence model so it can
capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers
are very poor .
Thanks for your
attention