Third Time Lucky?
Lessons from New Labour’s
2005 Election Campaign
edited by Matt Browne
Matt Carter
Fiona Gordon
Philip Gould
Alan Milburn
Sally Morgan
Published in 2006 by Policy Network
Policy Network, 3rd Floor, 11 Tufton Street,
London SW1P 3QB, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7340 2200
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7340 2211
[email protected]
www.policy-network.net
Copyright © 2006 Policy Network
All rights reserved
Contents
About Policy Network
2
About the Contributors
5
Executive Summary
6
Introduction
Matt Browne
8
How Labour won the 2005 General Election
Alan Milburn
22
How to Campaign when the World won’t Stop
Philip Gould
27
Election Pamphlet
Matt Carter
40
The role of MPs in the 2005 General Election
and Beyond
Fiona Gordon
49
Blair’s ‘Masochism Strategy’: Confrontation
and Connection
Sally Morgan
61
Conclusion: Four Wider Lessons for European
Progressive
Matt Browne
68
1
About Policy Network
Policy Network is an international think-tank launched in December
2000 with the support of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Giuliano Amato
and Göran Persson following the Progressive Governance Summits in
New York, Florence and Berlin. In July 2003, Policy Network organised
the London Progressive Governance Conference, which brought together
12 world leaders, and over 600 progressive politicians, thinkers and
strategists. In October 2004, Policy Network built on this success by
organising the Budapest Progressive Governance Conference, hosted
by the Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. In July 2005, Policy
Network co-organised with the Africa Institute of South Africa and
the Presidency of South Africa, the first Regional African Progressive
Governance Conference in Johannesburg. Most recently, Policy Network
hosted a Progressive Governance summit on 11th and 12th February
2006, in Hammanskraal, South Africa.
} A Progressive Network
Policy Network’s objective is the promotion and cross fertilisation
of progressive policy ideas among centre-left modernisers. Acting
as the secretariat to the Progressive Governance Network, Policy
Network facilitates dialogue between politicians, policy makers and
experts across Europe and from democratic countries around the
world. By providing a forum that promotes debate and shares ideas,
Policy Network strengthens the hand of modernisers and the case for
permanent renewal.
} Our Common Challenge
Progressive governments and parties in Europe are facing similar
problems and looking for modern social democratic responses. There
are increasingly rising fears for security – economic, political and
social – combined with the contradictions of reforming the traditional
welfare state with employment policies, rapid change in science and
technology and pressing global issues, all of which should be tackled
2
in common, as part of the need for fundamental democratic renewal.
In the past, progressives used to work independently to resolve these
problems. Today, there is a growing consensus that we must engage with
progressives from other countries and to situate European and national
responses within a broader international framework of progressive
thinking, rooted in our social democratic values.
} Activities
Policy Network is animated through a series of regular events,
particularly the annual Spring Retreat and the 18-monthly Progressive
Governance Conferences and Summits. In addition to these, we
organise symposia, working groups and one-day conferences that
focus on particular policy problems. The outcome and results of the
discussions are published in the three annual issues of Policy Network’s
journal Progressive Politics and a series of individual pamphlets that
are distributed throughout the network, placed on our website and
used as the basis for discussions at Policy Network events.
Our interests in the past few years have centred on: Economic
Reform, Public Services, Democratic Renewal, Community and
Inequality as well as Global Governance. During 2005 and 2006, we
have concentrated our energies on the renewal of the European Social
Model. Our programme on the European Social Model was launched
during the UK Presidency of the European Union and has investigated
the principal means through which the various models for welfare states
in Europe can be adapted to meet the challenges of the twenty-first
century. Fifteen working papers were commissioned for the project,
and six of presented for discussion at a private seminar for the UK Prime
Minister at 10 Downing Street one week prior to the European Summit at
Hampton Court. Since then and following a symposium organised at the
end of November 2005, the debate has widened in a series of discussions
across Europe in collaboration with other European centre-left think
tanks in Italy, the Netherlands, France, Hungary, Germany, Spain and
Finland in 2005 and 2006. Similar discussions also took place around
the UK. The first results have been published in a policy pamphlet,
Hampton Court Agenda: a Social Model for Europe, published by Policy
Network in March 2006. A further book, Global Europe – Social Europe,
was published by Policy Press in October 2006.
In the second half of 2006, we will continue our work on the
European Social Model, and begin preparations for the next Progressive
Governance Conference to be held in 2007.
3
} Global partnership
Since its inception in 2000, Policy Network has strived to contribute to
the new policy agenda for the centre-left, not only in Europe, but also
across the world. These meetings have been held not only in London,
but around Europe in partnership with a variety of national think tanks
such as the Fondazione Italianieuropei, the Wiardi Beckman Stichting,
the Global Progressive Forum, the Fundación Alternativas, A Gauche en
Europe, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the EPC, the Progressive Policy
Institute, and the Centre for American Progress.
We have always prided ourselves on being the first in the field in
policy innovation, an achievement that has been greatly aided by the
strength of the network of international partners we have built up.
} Policy Network are
Honorary Chair
Director
Executive Assistant
Office Manager
Events Manager
Webmanager/Online Editor
Head of Research
Policy Researchers
Peter Mandelson
Patrick Diamond
Suzanne Verberne-Brennan
Anna Bullegas
Joanne Burton
Matthew Carter
Olaf Cramme
Constance Motte
Chelsey Wickmark
Gabriela Dimitrova
Annie Bruzzone
Lucy Greig
Policy Officer
Media and Website Officer
Publications Officer
Policy Network
Third Floor
11 Tufton Street
London SW1P 3QB
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7340 2200
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7340 2211
www.policy-network.net
4
About the contributors
Matt Browne is the former director of Policy Network and editor of
Progressive Politics. Before joining Policy Network he worked as a
chargé de mission for Jaques Delors at Notre Europe.
Matt Carter is a former General Secretary of the British Labour
Party. As Assistant General Secretary, he set up the policy think tank
Forethought. He has a DPhil in Political History from York University.
Matt Carter is the managing director of the London office of Penn,
Schoen and Berland Associates.
Fiona Gordon was the Special Adviser to the Chief Whip, Hilary
Armstrong. She was formerly the West Midlands Regional Director for
the Labour Party.
Philip Gould is strategy and polling adviser to the Prime Minister and
author of The Unfinished Revolution. He founded his own polling and
strategy company, Philip Gould Associates.
Alan Milburn is Member of Parliament for Darlington. Previously, he
was Secretary of State for Health (1999-2003), Chief Secretary to
the Treasury (1998-1999), and Minister of State, Health Department
(1997-1998). Alan Milburn was Labour’s General Election Coordinator
for the 2005 election.
Sally Morgan became political secretary to Tony Blair after the
1997 election. She joined the House of Lords in June 2001. She was
Director of Government Relations until June 2005. In the Lords she
serves on the European Select Committee on Social and Consumer
Affairs.
5
Executive Summary
The political environment in which the UK General Election of 2005
was conducted differed markedly from those that preceded it in 1997
and 2001. Voter turnout was low and political apathy high. New Labour
experienced a significant weakening in its ‘middle England’ coalition
– a development which has the potential to pose considerable problems
next time around. New Labour’s success was met with some surprise in
other European countries, as many had predicted a more pessimistic
outcome. There was, consequently, a great deal of international
progressive interest in the campaign techniques and strategies which
had propelled Tony Blair’s party to victory. Greater co-operation,
collaboration and networking between progressives are urged here,
particularly in light of a resurgent and united international Right. In
this respect, the pamphlet is aimed at an international audience and
gives insider accounts of the strategies and techniques used by New
Labour in order to secure victory.
There are four wider lessons which can be drawn from these
articles. Firstly, it is important for progressives to highlight, politicise
and promote their governmental achievements. Ministers, MPs and
candidates should personally engage with people and demonstrate
how the successful implementation of policies has benefited them
and other constituents. Secondly, it is important to mount a ‘rolling
campaign’ as the development of a strong and personal MP-constituent
relationship during a parliamentary term can consolidate support for
candidates at election time. Moreover, this should be reflected by
tailored campaigning, thereby making progressives more attractive
and accessible. Thirdly, progressives should emphasise their values and
ideas, as well as their policies. Continued reform is often necessary
and popular, if successfully explained, and vital to the electability
of progressives. It should never be shied away from. A broadening of
progressive networks – incorporating sympathetic NGOs, for instance
– is also vital for the bolstering of party resources, both in terms
of ideology and activism. Finally, progressives must continue to set
agendas. By maintaining their dominance of the political centre-
6
ground, progressives ensure the positive definition of their parties and
policies – the Right should never be allowed to define what we stand
for. Moreover, it is important that progressives target electoral battles
with targeted campaign messages because not all voters respond to
the same election material.
7
Introduction
Matt Browne
For the first time in its history, Labour won a third successive election
victory in May 2005. For many in Continental Europe, this came as
something of a surprise. In the months running up to the general
election, several prominent newspapers in France, Germany, Italy,
Spain and elsewhere had been full of articles criticising Tony Blair’s
leadership and proclaiming the death of New Labour. Even in the days
following the victory, both at home and abroad, news reports of the
election result tended to focus on the vastly reduced majority with
which Labour had been returned, not the victory itself. Everything
and anything that could be used to dampen the sense of success was
thrown to the fore.
With time, however, the historic nature of what had been
achieved in the run up to the campaign as well as the campaign itself
can be more appreciated. Historically speaking, Labour’s current
majority of over 60 seats would be considered substantial, even if
it is far less than that of the two previous landslides. International
comparisons are even more favourable, when one considers the oneperson majority that Schröder held in his second term of office, or the
narrow majority with which Romano Prodi recently regained office.
Since the victory of Bill Clinton in the 1992 American Presidential
Election, there has been a growing interest among the progressive
left to exchange and learn from one another’s electoral strategies.
In recent times, given the apparent decline of the US Democrats,
it is perhaps only natural that much of that interest has focused on
learning from the techniques and strategies developed and used to
return Labour to office. In the 13 years since 1992 when Labour last
lost a general election, the Party has transformed itself from being one
of the least successful progressive parties into a clear market leader
in electioneering and strategy. It was this interest that inspired Policy
8
MATT BROWNE
Network to host a seminar on lessons from the UK election in London in
October 2005. Several months earlier in July, at a sherpa meeting for
the Progressive Governance Network in Johannesburg, strategists and
officials from Canada, Sweden and Hungary all indicated an interest in
learning from the strengths and weaknesses of the last Labour campaign.
The contributions to this volume by Matt Carter, Philip Gould and Alan
Milburn are based on their presentations at this October seminar.
This form of co-operation and networking among progressive
strategists and politicians has never been more important for there
is growing evidence that the Right’s strategists are collaborating and
supporting one another to an ever-increasing degree. The role of Lynton
Crosby, the Australian strategist who masterminded John Howard’s
third successive election victory in Australia, in the British Conservative
Party’s election campaign in 2005, is simply the visible tip of this iceberg.
Patrick Muttart, the little-known strategist behind Stephen Harper’s
recent victory in Canada is a diligent student of electoral campaigns in
the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Evidence from New Zealand and
Canada additionally illustrates the indirect roles played by Evangelical
movements in these campaigns. This collaboration and learning has
coincided with a political resurgence of the Right across much of the
industrialised world. In recent years, the Right has come to power in
a number of countries – Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the
United States to name but a few – often with the help of a subversive
campaign that does little to offer people hope but rather plays on
their fears and insecurities, switching – in the case of George W. Bush,
for example – the electorate’s focus from the economy to national
security and terror. Strategists of the Right have been parachuted in
to advise on this politics of fear in election campaigns most recently in
New Zealand, where the centre-left was able to beat the Right back,
and Canada, where unfortunately it was not. Progressive parties must
respond to this challenge, both ideologically and organisationally.
As the Right’s electoral techniques develop, we too must
continue to collaborate and learn from one another about how best to
fight campaigns and to combine this with a renewed sense of purpose
and vision. It is my hope that by drawing on the lessons of New Labour’s
experience, this pamphlet will form an important contribution to the
9
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
goal of strengthening a mutually supporting network of the centre-left
across the globe.
This pamphlet is aimed primarily at an international audience,
although I have little doubt that it will also be of interest domestically.
The contributions to this pamphlet focus both on the ideological and
organisational aspects of New Labour’s election campaign in 2005, and
on the medium and short term dynamics of the strategy.
Alan Milburn’s chapter, the first in this volume, identifies how an
incumbent centre-left party can retain power after two previous election
victories focusing on the long-term positioning of the party. He argues
that six factors lay behind Labour’s success in 2005. First, that Labour
was capable of reaching out beyond its heartlands to hold together the
broad coalition of working and middle class voters that had brought it
to power in 1997. This was possible because in the last ten years Labour
had effectively become the party of aspiration as well as redistribution.
Second, he argues, Labour emphasised its role in equipping citizens to
deal successfully with the challenges of globalisation and the future.
Third, Labour positioned itself in the centre, making sure that it set
its stamp firmly on policy areas that had traditionally been regarded
as Conservative territory: crime, welfare and public service reform. By
putting forward credible progressive policies and narratives in these
areas – over a sustained period of time – Labour effectively minimised
the space for the Conservatives to put forward an agenda based on
the politics of fear (although as we will see with regard to crime and
immigration this space was not completely foreclosed). Fourth, Labour
re-emphasised its modern methods in delivering its traditional aim of
social justice by presenting a comprehensive renewal of welfare policy
as a central pillar of the election manifesto. Fifth, by underlining the
crucial importance of reforming and modernising in the manifesto,
Labour successfully positioned itself as the party of the future and
took ownership of the modernisation agenda. Sixth, Labour’s campaign
made full use of the abilities of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown to reach
out and connect with voters in a way that lifted them above the fray of
party politics – an asset that none of the rival contenders in 2005 could
come close to equalling.
Philip Gould’s chapter concentrates more specifically on the
10
MATT BROWNE
dynamics of the short campaign and in particular on the changing
landscape of the campaign itself. He observes that more than ever,
modern political campaigning is fluid. He argues that far too often
campaigners seek to fight the elections of the past, losing focus on
the changing political environment of the day. The successful Labour
campaign of 2005, however, took every current factor into account:
values, vision, mood, competition, character, and economy – in short
the full range of factors competing in the political arena. The key
challenge for any strategy, he argues, is to draw on the lessons of the
past, focus on the present and to look to the future by weaving these
three strands together in a clear and simple message that resonates
with the voters and embodies the values of the Party.
Matt Carter’s chapter describes how Labour overcame three
organisational challenges resulting from changes within the wider
Labour movement since 2001 and 1997, both in the 18 months running up
to the campaign and during the campaign itself. These were: first, how
to win back lapsed Labour voters, in particular lapsed women voters;
second, how to actually get out the vote on election day – persuading
wavering voters to get along to the polls; and third, how to deliver on
these two challenges with a smaller team of active members.
Getting the vote out on election day was achieved through a
significant increase in the ‘personalisation’ of the relationship between
Labour and its supporters. Monthly direct mail contacts were established
with voters in 107 key constituencies, tailor-made DVDs were produced
dealing with the core concerns of swing voters (public services, crime
and business), and candidates were brought to the fore in the campaign
in an unprecedented way – as Fiona Gordon’s contribution shows.
Labour’s challenge in 2005 was a race in which identifying
voters’ intentions was no longer enough. Thus the campaign could not
simply be political, but it also had to be personal, reaching out to
key voter groups more directly than ever before. Every voter at risk
of not turning out was contacted personally at least seven times in
the four months leading up to the election. In addition, the role of
the centre in co-ordinating the campaign shifted away from running a
national campaign towards facilitating local, direct and personalised
campaigning. As Matt Carter argues, this strategy would not have been
11
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
feasible without the establishment of a National Communications
Centre well in advance of the campaign.
Winning over women voters was also an issue for Labour for
the first time in over a decade. The campaign brought a response at
every level – from devoting a party political campaign to the exclusive
concerns of women, to producing election materials designed for
women or indeed launching a Women’s Tour as a supplement to the
usual Leader’s Tour. This was complemented by emphasising a series of
policy issues that were of particular concern to women: breast cancer
and child care amongst others.
Sally Morgan’s chapter focuses on the Prime Minister’s role in
the campaign: the so-called ‘Masochism Strategy’. Quite simply, the
masochism strategy brought Tony Blair and citizens face-to-face,
allowing them to voice their grievances on a whole host of issues. The
purpose of the strategy was to regain voters who felt the Prime Minister
was out of touch. Its objective, then, was to return the Prime Minister
to the people, to illustrate that he was still on their side, concerned by
their problems and listening to them. These connections were created
by engaging members of the public in direct debate – with a studio as
well as television audience there to share in the encounter. A secondary
strength of this strategy was that it also allowed Labour to by-pass
the obstacles that journalists can erect between or imbue within the
politician-citizen relationship. While this relationship is sociologically
complex, the degree to which the media are now actors in the political
arena has reached unprecedented levels, posing new challenges for
progressives.
Although this situation and strategy were not particularly new
to Labour or Tony Blair, the circumstances of the 2005 election were.
It gave the Prime Minister the chance to engage with voters on very
tough, highly controversial issues, such as the war in Iraq or top-up
fees. It was a chance for Tony Blair to rebuild the confidence of voters
in his judgement and restore some of the trust that had ebbed away
since 1997.
Fiona Gordon’s contribution is also focused on the importance
of establishing personal relationships with the electors, although she
focuses on how the role of the incumbent MPs as candidates has changed
12
MATT BROWNE
radically during the past few elections. Fiona argues that successful
MPs are those who have moved to continual campaigning, making sure
that their relationship with constituents is constantly strengthened
between general elections. Voters are won over to Labour in the long
term, and here the key seems to be making sure that constituents know
that their MP is working for them and their interests at Westminster.
If these successful relationships can be built, then Labour MPs are
capable of holding what might otherwise be considered ‘unsafe’ seats
– as the examples of Jim Knight in Dorset South or Parmjit Dhanda in
Gloucester testify. Where MPs devote time and effort to speaking to
individual voters throughout the campaign – and providing space for
feedback from constituents – they can buck trends and hold seats, she
concludes.
Each of the authors in this pamphlet thus addresses crucial
aspects that contributed to Labour’s success in 2005. As stated above,
the environment in which this campaign was conducted differed
radically from those in which Labour won two historic landslides in
1997 and 2001. In the remainder of this introduction, I will provide
some recent historical background to the campaign with an overview
of trends in British General Elections since 1992, when Labour was
last defeated, looking at the results, the Labour voters, the issue of
declining turnout and the main challenge that Labour is facing as we
look towards 2009: the weakening coalition in southern England.
1. UK General Elections Results since 1992
The two tables below illustrate the raw statistics for UK General
Elections since 1992, presenting both the share of the popular vote
won by each of the three main political parties and the number of
seats gained in the House of Commons.
Although Labour won a convincing victory in May 2005, it did so
with a greatly reduced majority in the House of Commons – down to 66
from 167 – and its lead over the Conservatives was slashed from nine
per cent to three per cent, with Labour winning 35.3 per cent of the
popular vote across the UK, compared with 32.3 per cent for the Tories.
These statistics reveal a weakening of the Labour vote across the UK
13
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
as a whole. In 1997 Labour won 43.2 per cent of the popular vote, and
this declined only marginally in 2001 to 40.7 per cent. In fact, the 35.2
per cent polled by Labour in 2005 was only marginally better than the
34.4 per cent share in 1992 – an election that the Labour Party lost to
the Conservatives.
50
40
Labour
30
Conservative
20
Liberal Dem ocrat
10
0
1992
1997
2001
2005
Table 1. Share of the popular vote won by the three main parties since
1992, percent
Political Science Resources, available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk
Britain’s first-past-the-post voting system currently acts to the
disadvantage of the Conservative Party, which helps explain in part why
Labour managed to achieve a healthy third term majority. As things
stand, Labour currently would win 111 more seats than the Conservatives
with an equal share of the vote. Amendments of constituency borders
by the Boundary Commission are likely to be worth 20 to 30 seats to the
Conservatives at the next election, which would dramatically reduce
Labour’s majority – unless it manages to win back some of the voters
who have stayed at home or defected to other political parties since
2001.
Labour has also benefited from divisions within the Conservative
Party since 1997 – notably the split over Europe – which have meant that
the Right has spent more time tearing itself apart than attacking the
government. However, since the election of the right-winger-turnedcentrist David Cameron to the Tory leadership in 2005, the indications
are that the Conservative Party may have regained its appetite for
14
MATT BROWNE
power. In 2009, Labour may find itself facing a popular Tory leader for
the first time in two decades.
500
400
Conservative
300
Labour
200
Liberal Dem ocrat
100
0
1992
1997
2001
2005
Table 2. Seats in the House of Commons won by each of the three main
parties since 1992
Political Science Resources, available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk
2. Campaign Issues
Three issues can be said to have been salient to voters in the UK General
Election of 2005: asylum and immigration, the economy, and the war
in Iraq.
Asylum and immigration was chosen by the Conservative Party
as the issue on which to fight the election. In the run-up to the election,
85 per cent of the public believed the government had not been doing
enough to ‘ensure Britain was not seen as a soft touch for bogus asylum
seekers or economic migrants’. While such a question was clearly a
leading one, the Conservatives’ strategy to peel off voters amongst
social classes DE (the groups least likely to vote for them) had some
success. This was essentially a subversive strategy that sought to play on
people’s fears and sense of injustice, which failed to present a balanced
or serious view of the contributions of migrants to British to society. The
strategy was also laced with racist undertones. The “Are you thinking
what we’re thinking?” poster campaign, for example, explicitly asked
voters whether limits on immigration should be considered racist. In
this regard, the strategy may well have backfired. The Tories once
15
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
again managed to brand themselves as ‘the nasty party’ – alienating
many of those core AB1 voters who have switched their votes to the
Liberal Democrats and Labour since 1992.
Management of the economy has traditionally been the central
issue in UK general elections, and it comes as scant surprise that once
again it came high on the list of areas of particular concern to British
voters in 2005. The Conservatives lost their reputation for economic
competence back in 1992 when sterling crashed out of the Exchange
Rate Mechanism. Today, there is a much broader consensus about how
the domestic economy should be managed. What was interesting about
this was that the economic issue of importance was not taxation – 80 per
cent of voters believed that Labour would raise taxes (only 67 per cent
thought the Conservatives would) – rather, how the money was spent.
On this issue, 41 per cent of voters trusted Labour to deliver value for
money, a third more than the number who expected the Tories to do
so. In the south of England, however, there is growing evidence that tax
and public service delivery concerns were damaging to Labour. Labour
was also able to exploit the Conservatives’ promise to find savings of
£35 billion in public spending, presenting the figures as inaccurate and
thus raising questions about their economic competency; nevertheless,
in the future tough choices remain. The fact that delivery and taxation
are now interlinked implies that Labour must continue to push forward
on its public service renewal agenda, ensuring that its policies respond
to the concerns of those in the south whom it risks alienating. That
this represents a shift in the centre-ground of British politics should be
seen as one of Labour’s successes over the last nine years: that there
is still much to do to complete the agenda, a growing challenge given
David Cameron’s intention of presenting himself as the true heir to
Tony Blair in this regard.
The third key issue was the Iraq war. Here the two main effects
were defections to the Liberals and declining turn-out of Labour
supporters in some constituencies.
3. Who Voted Labour in 2005?
A breakdown of the Labour vote into the categories of age, gender,
16
MATT BROWNE
ethnic origin and – the perennial favourite of UK election pundits since
the dawn of mass elections in the early 20th century – social class, is
instructive.
Labour has a clear lead amongst all voters aged under 55, it is
particularly strong amongst those aged 25-34, where Labour won 38
per cent of the vote to the Tories’ 25 per cent. Labour has a ten-point
lead over the Conservatives amongst 19-24 year olds, and a nine point
lead amongst those aged 35-54. Nonetheless, older voters have moved
away from Labour. Whilst Labour enjoyed a four per cent lead amongst
voters over 55 in comparison with the Conservatives in 1997, and a
one per cent lead in 2001, by 2005 it was trailing the Tories by six per
cent.
There exists a considerable gender gap in voting behaviour.
Labour continues to enjoy a six point lead over the Conservatives
amongst women – 38 to 32 per cent – a four per cent decline since
2001. It is particularly strong amongst women aged under 55, where
Labour leads with 40 to 43 per cent of votes against 21 to 27 per cent.
Women are also slightly more likely to turnout to vote on polling day
than men. Similarly, Labour’s lead in votes amongst ethnic minorities is
staggering: Labour won some 74 per cent of the black vote in 2005, and
57 per cent of the Asian vote. The Tories polled 12 and 14 per cent of
the votes in these categories respectively. In some constituencies with
large Muslim populations, the Iraq war was a factor, turning Muslim
votes away from the Party, most notably in Bethnal Green, where Oona
King was defeated by George Galloway, who fought an aggressive, highprofile anti-war campaign.
Social class is no longer the deciding factor for voting intentions
in UK elections that it once was, but it still remains extremely important
in predicting how ballots are likely to be cast. Social mobility since the
1960s and changes in the class structure of British society complicate
means of measuring the impact of social class on voting behaviour,
since many middle class voters identify themselves as working class
and vice versa. Labour continues to hold a considerable lead over the
Conservatives in social classes C2 and DE. However, the Conservatives
have taken a clear lead over Labour in social class C1, with 37 per cent
to 31 per cent. Nonetheless, this social class is ageing and shrinking –
17
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
indeed the over-55s may be the true Thatcher generation. Amongst the
wealthiest AB social class, Labour has never led over the Conservatives,
but the results of the 2005 general election indicate that Labour is
slipping further behind here as well, coming in behind the Liberal
Democrats’ 29 per cent, with 28 per cent of the vote, as opposed to 37
per cent for the Conservatives.
If this introduction concentrates on a simple contest between
Labour and the Conservatives, this reflects the fact that – despite the
Liberal Democrats’ election of their new leader, Menzies Campbell, and
the by-election defeats they have inflicted on Labour – overwhelmingly,
the Liberal Democrats take votes from formerly Conservative AB voters,
with some C1 support. That the Liberal Democrats pull some of these
votes away from the Tories helped Labour win the largest share of the
popular vote and the significant majority in the Commons that goes
with it.
4. Turnout in UK Elections since 1992
Another source of concern is the sharp fall in turnout in elections
since 1997. As the chart below illustrates, the percentage of voters
casting a ballot on polling day has declined from the post-war average
of between 73 per cent and 78 per cent to 71.29 per cent in 1997 and
59.38 per cent in 2001, rising only slightly to 61.36 per cent in 2005.
This is far from being unique to the UK. In Canada, turnout has fallen
to between 60 and 65 per cent from a post-war average of 70 to 75
per cent. A similar story can be told in New Zealand, where turnout
has fallen from 89 per cent in 1984 to 72.5 per cent in 2002, rising
somewhat to 80 per cent in 2005.
18
MATT BROWNE
100
80
60
Turnout
40
20
0
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
Table 3. Voter Turnout in UK General Elections 1979– 2005
Political Science Resources, available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk
These statistics are even more worrying when one considers two
further factors. First, the bulk of this decline in voting is to be seen in
the under-25s. Since the 1964 General Election, the number of young
people voting has halved from 87 per cent to just 44 per cent in 2005.
The idea that ‘once a voter always a voter’ does not seem to apply
to younger voters today either. Amongst the 18-21 age group in 2001,
turnout was 52 per cent. The frequency of voting amongst this same
cohort, aged 22-25 in 2005 actually fell again to 43 per cent (as against
71 to 75 per cent of voters over 55). Second, the idea of average turnout
itself is somewhat misleading since frequency of voting varies hugely
from area to area. In some predominantly middle class constituencies,
such as Bexhill and Battle in East Sussex, turnout was well above the
national average, in this case 67.2 per cent. Nationally, 71 per cent of
social classes AB voted in 2005. In the predominantly working class east
London constituency of Hackney South and Shoreditch with its high
concentration of non-white voters, only 49.7 per cent cast a ballot.
Turnout amongst non-white voters nationally averages 47 per cent – this
is particularly worrying for Labour since as the statistics mentioned
above prove, Labour is the natural party of ethnic minorities with a
huge lead over the Conservatives. Nationally, amongst social classes
C2 DE, turnout was only 54 to 58 per cent. In short, turnout is, and has
always been, lowest amongst those sections of society who are most
19
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
likely to vote Labour. Turnout is therefore an issue that should remain
of great concern to progressives.
5. A Weakening Coalition in England
A third area of concern for Labour is the weakening of its coalition
in middle England. Despite the number of seats won, in terms of the
popular vote (Labour’s share fell to 35.4 per cent of votes cast, as
against 35.7 per cent for the Conservatives) Labour actually lost the
2005 general election in England.
As a result of the eccentricities of the UK’s first-past-the-post
system of voting, Labour still managed to gain 92 more seats in England
than the Conservatives, with a total of 286 English seats against 194
seats for the Conservatives. Yet this does not obscure the fact that
winning in England is crucial for Labour. Throughout the eighteen years
of Tory rule from 1979 to 1997, Labour always enjoyed a comfortable
plurality of seats in Scotland and Wales, and although it lost a little
ground to the Scottish National Party, and to a lesser extent, Plaid
Cymru (the Welsh National Party) in the 1990s, it still remains the
natural party of government in both countries. In 2005, Labour won
42.7 per cent of the vote in Wales and 29 seats – nearly three times
as many as all the other parties put together. A similar story is the
case for Scotland, where Labour won 39.5 per cent of the vote and 41
seats, more than twice as many as the rest of the political parties put
together.
Where Labour has lost ground since 1997 and 2001 is in England
– and the scale of the losses when factored into the broader UK picture
is not to be underestimated. Taking into account all those voters who
stayed at home in 2005, Labour has lost a staggering four million
votes since 1997. Labour’s total of 9.5 million votes in 2005 was two
million fewer than in 1992 – an election that Labour actually lost to the
Conservative Party.
For Labour, the crucial battleground in 2009 will be middleEngland: those constituencies that had never elected a Labour MP prior
to 1997 – Hastings and Rye, Finchley and Golder’s Green (part of which
was once Margaret Thatcher’s seat), or Dorset South to name but a
20
MATT BROWNE
few. Holding these seats and winning more like them is essential for
Labour to win a fourth term in 2009. In order to do this, we will have
to forge a new coalition with an agenda that appeals to the aspiration
of voters in the south of England that have deserted Labour since 2001.
We will return to this issue in the conclusion.
21
How Labour Won the 2005 UK General
Election
Alan Milburn
The Labour Party’s victory in the 2005 UK general election shows
how an incumbent progressive centre-left party can win power and
go on to retain it. Labour had never won three general elections in
succession. Indeed, we had never previously served two full terms. So
it is a towering achievement on Tony Blair’s part to have led Labour to
success in 1997, 2001 and 2005. He has transformed the Labour Party
from being one of the least successful centre-left parties in Europe to
being amongst the most successful.
After we lost in 1992, many people thought they would never
see a Labour Government again. What changed is that we did. The
advent of New Labour made us electable again. Six critical factors lay
behind the New Labour success story.
First, reaching out beyond Labour’s traditional heartlands to
forge a new coalition of support – in the South as well as the North,
in middle class areas as well as working class ones. By becoming as
comfortable with notions of individual aspiration as with traditional
redistribution, New Labour was able to lay claim to being a party of the
many not the few. Second, understanding in a world of rapid change
and in an era of globalisation the centrality of economic stability and
policies that equip people to adapt to changed circumstances. Third,
positioning Labour in the centre of politics. By taking what had long
been regarded as Conservative territory – crime, welfare and public
service reform – we have been able to force our main political opponents
to the extremes. Fourth, making a clear distinction between ends and
means, values and policies. New Labour remains clearly identified as a
party pursuing social justice but one now deploying modern means to
do so. Fifth, becoming a party that faces the future rather than being
stuck in the past. By positioning ourselves as a modernising reforming
22
ALAN MILBURN
party Labour has been able to avoid some of the pitfalls of becoming a
pro-establishment governing party. Sixth, the character of Tony Blair.
He is, of course, a seasoned global player with consummate political
and communication skills. But his real strength lies in his ability to
reach out, in a non-ideological way, that almost puts him above tribal
politics to a large swathe of voters.
These factors had been the key to victory in the two previous
UK general elections. The 2005 general election was to put them under
great pressure. There were particular challenges that faced Labour the
third time round. To begin with it was a far tighter race. The Conservative
Party was better organized and its ruthless populism – on issues like
immigration and hospital cleanliness – struck a chord both in sections
of the media and the public. Meanwhile eight years of incumbency
had begun to take its toll on Labour. The time for a change tune was
beginning to sound, reflecting concerns around issues like asylum,
crime and immigration, problems with delivery of improvements in
public services and doubts about where Labour was taking the country.
There was a particular problem of disconnection between key groups of
voters – women especially – and where Labour stood. This was apparent
in a large gap between those identifying themselves as Labour voters
but not actually intending to vote Labour.
The Iraq war compounded and amplified all these problems.
It seemed to emphasise the gap between where many voters stood
and where Labour, and particularly, Tony Blair, stood. Iraq became a
rallying cry for protest. The third party – the Liberal Democrats – sought
to hoover up the anti-Iraq vote, thus facing us with a Two (Conservative
and Liberal) against One (Labour) election contest. And with the Tories
still perceived as weak and largely unelectable (something they played
to during the campaign), the danger was that the 2005 election turned
into a referendum on the Labour Party rather than a choice between
parties.
We spent much time and energy devising an election strategy
that could see off these problems. Our aim was to fight the election on
our terms rather than anyone else’s. Above all, we were determined
to make it a choice election, not a referendum. That meant taking
the battle to our opponents to make them the issue even though they
23
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
were a party of opposition not government. The way to do so was by
exposing their weakness on the economy.
The Tories were still tarred with the brush of economic failure
following the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s. And in Opposition they
had failed to find a credible position on taxation and public spending.
By contrast Britain had enjoyed unparalleled economic stability and
high levels of public investment under Labour. So we sought to turn
incumbency to advantage by putting the economy centre stage. In the
build-up to the campaign our slogan was “Britain is working – don’t let
the Tories wreck it again”. During the campaign itself the economy was
our core daily theme with the Prime Minister and Gordon Brown, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, campaigning regularly together.
The economy focus gave us a strong dividing line of stability
versus risk. To avoid the trap of incumbency, however, we also had
to restake our claim on the future. We did so through a series of
governmental five-year plans tackling issues like crime, asylum and
the environment. They were published in the months leading up to
the campaign and helped to give the Government renewed policy
momentum. Labour’s manifesto was also determinedly forward looking,
substantive and radical (in stark contrast to a wafer-thin Conservative
slogan-based manifesto). To emphasise our claim to be the party of the
future (and to paint the Tories as unchanged and caught in the past) we
adopted “Forward not back” as our campaign slogan.
A steady stream of high profile forward policy announcements
on issues such as identity cards and childcare in the months leading to
the short campaign allowed us to reconnect with key groups of voters
– particularly women. In turn this allowed us to position ourselves on
the side of hard working families. Taken with our attack on the Tories’
plans to cut public spending – and therefore their role as a party of
privilege – this gave us a strong values message.
It was particularly important for us to refocus on the domestic
policy agenda because Iraq had seemed to show Labour’s priorities lay
abroad rather than at home. In order to demonstrate our determination
to reconnect with the public we embarked on what we called a ‘direct
to the people’ approach to campaigning. Described by some as a
‘masochism strategy’ because it involved the Prime Minister debating
24
ALAN MILBURN
with the public in television and radio studios, this approach also
engaged the Labour Party, for the first time, in mass direct marketing
to voters through mail, telephone and internet - targeted at the key
parliamentary seats we had to win to stay in government.
In the circumstances we got the best result we could. Of course
we lost seats and ended up with a smaller parliamentary majority. But
the Tories failed to break through and the Liberals did less well than
expected. For the first time Labour won a third victory. What lessons
can be drawn from this victory, particularly for incumbent centre-left
parties?
First, stay connected. This is the hardest task of all for an
incumbent party of government. But the rise of right-wing populism
in Western Europe and elsewhere is a reminder that a new politics – of
identity – symbolized in issues like immigration and crime cannot be
ignored by the centre-left. Investment in new means of campaigning
– outside of election periods – is critical to getting messages directly
through to key groups of voters on these and other issues. Second, turn
incumbency to advantage. It is both a blessing and a curse. Make it an
advantage by emphasizing, in a world of rapid change and mounting
insecurity, the risks of radical change versus continuity in policy (on the
economy, skills, technology, education and childcare) that help create
security. Third, position in the centre ground of politics. In a world
where deference has declined and traditional party loyalties hold less
sway, electoral success goes to those who can genuinely demonstrate
cross-class centre ground appeal. Fourth, emphasise values. Loyalties
to institutions might be fading but belief in values remains strong.
Finding dividing line policies that express a difference in values with
opponents. Above all, ensure that policies are driven by politics and
not the other way round. Fifth, face the future. Avoid the trap of
incumbency by refusing to rest on your laurels. Always be on the side
of reform. Conservatives conserve things. Centre-left parties change
things. The longer the tenure of office the greater the need to keep
changing.
The key policy questions that faced Britain a decade ago – how
to get out of the old stop-go economic cycle and how to modernise
public services – found their answer in New Labour. And the key political
25
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
questions facing Labour – could we govern competently as a reformed
party committed to progressive modernisation – have largely been
answered as well.
Today there are new policy questions to answer. There are
new challenges to face. A less deferential, more democratic world has
created a crisis of legitimacy for the active politics that is the hallmark
of the centre-left. Individuals have become more empowered as
consumers but they have not, as yet, become empowered as citizens.
Political institutions and public services need to catch up with
this new world. The old paternalistic relationship between State and
citizen has to be reformed. A grown up relationship is what is required
in which as much power as possible is moved outwards and downwards
from centralised states to individual citizens and local communities.
In a modern society, voting at elections is not sufficient. Democracy
has to be broadened, and the state’s role reformed. Doing things for
people will no longer do. Doing things with them is the key – whether
to improving health, fighting crime, regenerating neighbourhoods or
protecting the environment. The top-down paternalistic statism of
the last century needs to give way to a new bottom-up agenda of
empowerment that is in tune with the needs of this.
So today the priority must be to fashion an active citizenship
where the State enables more people to make choices for themselves
so they can realise their own aspirations for progress in their families
and their communities.The Right are mistaken to reject the role of the
State. The job of politics today is to reform it. Success – electorally and
economically – in the future will depend on far-reaching and radical
reforms to the relationship between State and citizen. New Labour is
best placed to do this.
While some believe New Labour’s time has past, the new
policy challenges that face progressive politics point logically to a
continuation – indeed an intensification – of the New Labour formula.
It is this formula that held the key to unlocking electoral success the
third time round. It is also the key to success the fourth time round
too.
26
How to Campaign When the World Won’t
Stop
Philip Gould
1. Strategy as Synthesis
Is political campaigning an art or a science? Does it have ineluctable
rules, principles and properties that endure over time and can be
applied in one region of the world as effectively as another? Or is
it an instinctive and intuitive activity that changes its character as
circumstances change, and is limited in its effectiveness by time and
geography? Put simply are there campaigning laws that can be written
down and tested, which are as effective in one culture as they are in
another, and which will still work despite the passage of time?
Of course, this is too simple a question and too simple a choice.
Political campaigning belongs in that nether land between social science
and history where there are rules of a sort but which change over time,
with every campaign building upon the ones that precede it, where
every campaign is different from all those that have gone before. That
is the fascination of campaigning but also of politics. There are always
lessons to be learnt from the past, but every challenge is new, every
political landscape is constantly changing. This is intrinsic to the nature
of political activity. Every action has a consequence, often unintended.
The very act of achieving political change means that the nature of the
remaining political challenge is irreversibly altered. There is no such
thing as a static landscape in politics – every move forward changes the
perspective. In the UK, the corporatist trade union dominated politics
of the 1970s led to the market liberalism of the 1980s which led in turn
to a blending of social justice and economic efficiency in the 1990s.
One of the great paradoxes of politics is that if you forget the
past you fail, but if you are imprisoned by the past you will also fail.
You always have to be moving forward, thinking afresh, guided by
27
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
experience certainly but never thinking that the future will be like
the past, because it won’t be. As Tony Blair has said: “there is only
one rule in politics, and that is that there are no rules”. Politics is an
activity in which you journey forward through an unpredictable and
often hostile sea in which you are attempting to stay afloat but also
to reach a destination. Sometimes you need to be strong, sometimes
flexible, sometimes assertive, and at other times accommodating.
Great politicians both make the weather and survive the storm, and all
of them do it in different ways.
As it is in politics so it is in political campaigning. At any one
time we allow ourselves to believe that successful campaigning depends
upon implementing a set of principles that appear timeless, but are in
fact nearly always the product of a moment. In the 1950s political
campaigning was all about marketing and public relations, now it is
about authenticity and the idea of public relations in politics almost
a slur. In the 1960s and beyond, political campaigning was about mass
communication, now it is about personalised individual communication.
In the early 1990s in the US spin was a positive and novel innovation,
now it is virtually a political crime. Every campaigning phase contains
the seeds of its own transformation, that which appears permanent is
just a stepping stone to something else.
This science of campaigning may hold some lasting truths but
not many. For the most part today’s conventional campaigning wisdom
is tomorrows campaigning fallacy. This may not appear to be much help
to real political campaigners who want answers, to absorb the state
of the art thinking, to grab what is new in the campaigning zeitgeist
and turn it into real votes in real elections. But in fact a grounding
premise that there are no fixed and ineluctable campaigning rules, and
that every campaign is unique and should be considered as such is the
best possible starting point for planning any serious national campaign.
Great campaigns, campaigns that really change events are not based
on what worked last time, but on what is the truly distinctive and
unique insight that will be decisive in the election that is to come.
What drives that insight is a strategic truth that is refined to
the point of effortless simplicity and yet complete enough to have
absorbed and integrated the full complexity of the context in which
28
PHILIP GOULD
the campaign is fought. This is the real and exasperating task of a
campaigning strategist – to absorb complexity and transform it into
decisive simplicity. Of course campaigning strategists must learn from
the past and from what is fashionable and modish, but not as a template
for what to do, but as the starting point for a new strategic journey
that only that campaign in that time and place can properly resolve.
Once a strategy has been implemented it inevitably starts to die.
It follows that successful campaign strategists must have 360
degree vision, absorbing the full complexity of the moment, always
reaching for the one big decisive insight that makes sense of it all.
Everything has to be taken into account: values, vision, policy, mood,
competition, character, economy, every last dot and comma of the
political battlefield. Everything has to be absorbed, everything has to
be evaluated. But then everything has to be transformed from a miasma
of inputs into a killing simplicity of insight. This is the process that I
call strategic synthesis. This means synthesis in the prosaic sense of
taking the chaos of the political landscape past, present and projected
future and transforming it into clear and simple insight. It also means
synthesis in the more grandiose Hegelian sense of a reconciliation of
competing historical forces into a new concept that both captures the
past and moves forward from it.
Strategy is a dynamic flowing process always moving forward,
always new, but always grounded in what has gone before: absorbing
and learning from the past, but continually transforming current
knowledge into new insight. This process of learning, evaluating and
synthesising means that strategy is never still, that it can never be
captured or codified, that once implemented it begins inevitably to
become redundant. Strategy is a flow not an end point. It is interactive
not linear. You act and your opponent reacts and the landscape
changes. The great strategic paradox is that the moment a strategy is
successfully implemented is the moment a strategy starts to become
redundant. A strategy is formed to change the political landscape;
once the landscape is changed the strategy must in turn change.
Strategists are not spectators at the play, but actors in the play. The
more successful they are as actors, the more the plot changes and the
more the actors must in turn rewrite the script.
29
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
This is the very opposite of what our instincts tell us: once a
strategy has succeeded we want to repeat it, to freeze our success in
time. But that is the opposite of what we should do: when a strategy
has succeeded we need to see its affect on the landscape and our
opponents and think the strategy afresh. There is never time to stop.
It follows that strategy is always on the very cusp of things, always on
the edge. There is no margin of safety, no comfort zone to retreat to.
Good strategy always links future to past, flexibility to structure, past
knowledge with future insight. It is a continual process of integration and
interpretation. You can never arrive at a perfect strategic destination
because the flow has always moved on. You may stop but the process
won’t.
Strategy then is a creative process, an art that uses the discipline
of science. It is in this meshing of the certainty of science and the
creativity of art that strategic synthesis is born.
2. Big Cycles
It follows from this that we are always part of a developing cycle of
campaigning – each campaign distinctive but each building on the
lessons of the path. At the broadest level there have been five big
campaigning periods in post war period.
The first phase ‘politics as marketing’ in the 1950s and 1960s
was the consequence of the growth of mass media and the developing
of public relations as a corporate discipline. This was politics that sold
to people, Madison Avenue coming to Main Street. It was the era of
politics as a product. In the second phase, ‘the politics of fear’ plunged
deep into the submerged reservoir of phobias that lay deep in the
psyche of the electorate and explored and exploited dark and often
hidden fears about race and crime. The poster boy of this campaigning
genre was Willie Horton, its creative force Roger Ailes who said:
“the only question was whether we depict Willie Horton with a knife
or without”. This campaigning approach allowed Conservatism to
dominate the 1980s in the UK and the USA as progressive politics wilted
under the ferocity of the assault. The third phase ‘total campaigning’
was the progressive fight back after a decade of retreat. The war
30
PHILIP GOULD
room, speed kills, rapid rebuttal, message discipline heralded in a
new era of tough, integrated focused campaigning which dominated
the next decade with ease. The fourth phase, yet to fully mature
is ‘personalised campaigning’ which resulted from the shift from
broadcast to narrowcast media, in which direct personalised contact
and word of mouth communication started to replace television as the
dominant medium of political communication. A cycle that started 50
years ago with the advent of mass communication has led stage by
stage to its antithesis, communication to one person alone.
These phases of campaign development illustrate perfectly
how strategy develops as a continuous flow, each era distinctive from
the one that preceded it, but each era builds on earlier foundations:
strategic progress by synthesis.
3. Small Wars
Within the big campaigning cycles real campaigning wars were being
fought. For me it started in 1987 when we fought a widely acclaimed
and highly professional and polished campaign but were completely
outgunned by an opponent who was ruthless in exploiting fears about
defence and security, and a tabloid media that was utterly brutal in its
destruction of the electability of Neil Kinnock the Labour leader. Fear
beat marketing hands down.
One year later in the US, the contest was even more brutal
and bloody, when Lee Atwater punched Michael Dukakis to the floor
without mercy, decency or a shred of fairness, and it has to be said
any discernable sense of fight. In Britain, at Labour Party headquarters
we watched the Dukakis campaign, first with admiration at its slick
professionalism and then with bemused incredulousness as a 20 point
lead was slashed to nothing by a campaigning brutality that left Dukarkis
without credibility, dignity and even worse without voice. The right
struck and we on the left limped, wounded from the field. In 1992 it
was for us even worse. It was an election we should have won but the
Conservative campaign forgot everything but the politics of fear as it
made Labour and Neil Kinnock too much of a risk, the price of Labour
in higher taxes and interest rates too much. In the end we became
31
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
voiceless too, saying one thing to the party, another to the public.
The big lesson that we learned from these defeats was that
Labour had to undergo complete and uncompromising change in order
to win elections and to deserve to win them. But a second lesson was
clear: Labour in particular and progressive parties in general had to get
off their knees and fight.
If 1992 was year of devastating defeat in Britain, in the US the
fight back had already long started. The years of retreat were ending.
In 1991 Harris Wofford had shown how it could be done, how Democrats
could win and defeat the Republican fear machine. But it was Bill
Clinton and the extraordinary campaign army that he assembled that
changed the terms of political trade for a decade. Of course, it was
not just campaigning, it was the politics. Bill Clinton was emphatic
about the change needed to win. He was a different kind of democrat,
a self proclaimed New Democrat, who understood middle class needs
and fears, who understood the importance of crime and security,
who knew welfare needed reform, who valued responsibility but who
put economic opportunity at the heart of his project, setting out a
modernised progressive politics that still lives today. If Clinton was
the navigator, it was James Carville who rode the train. Carville was,
and is, a campaigning genius, with the protean ability to change the
cause of a campaign. It was him who replied when asked how Governor
Clinton would respond to an attack: “It is not for us to respond to
Republican attacks, it is for them to answer Democratic attacks”. A
small thing now, a big thing then. Through sheer force of will and an
intensity that sometimes touched on madness he drew a line in the
sand.
I still vividly recall arriving in Little Rock in 1992 still stunned
by Labour’s awful defeat in that same year, feeling the late summer
heat as I left the airport, and arriving at the campaign headquarters
and seeing a whole new world of possibility emerge. I remember the
kindness I received; embarrassed by our failure in Britain but being
told that defeat was a step on the road to victory, a badge of honour
not of blame. Above all I remember the incredible energy and pulsating
life of the campaign, its extraordinary confidence, and the way it had
simply revolutionised the way campaigns had been run.
32
PHILIP GOULD
Together with many others who worked for Clinton the length
and breath of America, I took the lessons back home and helped build
a campaign in 1997 that bought together confidence, discipline hope
and steel. It was a New Labour victory, but it was also a victory for
a new approach to campaigning. The politics of fear was dead, total
campaigning was ascending. And total campaigning travelled the
world, few campaigns anywhere lacked their war – room, their rapid
rebuttal unit, their message discipline. In 1996 Clinton won again,
consolidating a progressive ascendancy. It seemed that the tide had
finally turned.
4. Deeper than just Defeat
David Gergen in a book on the Presidency said that a third Democratic
victory would seal the Clinton Progressive ascendancy – he was right,
but it was not to be. The start of the second millennium saw the shared
campaigning trajectories of the UK and the US sharply divided. It saw
total campaigning splinter. In 2000 in the US Bush – controversially
– beat Gore not through the great force of a public craving change, but
through a Republican campaign strong enough to fight the Democrats
to a virtual dead heat, if not a clear win. The Gore campaign had to
overcome the huge hurdle of impeachment but failed to consolidate
the campaigning gains of the Clinton years. The team fragmented,
the rift between Clinton and Gore destabilising, and once again a
Democratic candidate for President was defined in Republican terms
as a ‘flip-flopper’. Gore, a man of utmost integrity, had his character
undermined.
Conversely the Republicans advanced. Their team was long
established, their strategy robust, their message clear. In the cycle
of campaigning they had learnt, and they had advanced. They had a
project. The Bush victory was small, arguably non-existent but the tilt
in the campaigning axis massive. Democratic campaigning hegemony
was ended, the years of ‘war room’ ascendancy over.
In Britain Labour consolidated and won an unprecedented
second term with another massive majority. But the victory, although
impressive, came at a price. Voter turnout fell to below 60 per cent.
33
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
I and others, noticeably Douglas Alexander, spoke and wrote of the
need for a new involving and interactive politics, which I called
participatory campaigning. The need to engage fused with the need
to win. I rashly said that the 2001 election would be the last fought on
the old terms, new politics would produce a new campaigning. I was
wrong. Just another example how the future in politics can never be
second guessed.
Then came 9/11 and the war in Iraq which changed almost
everything. Security became the Bush touchstone and Democratic
confidence started to crumble. In Britain political pressure on the
government intensified. But the campaigning impact was not consistent
or predicable. In Spain an anti-war position helped win victories, but
not in Australia where robust defence of the war prevailed. No past
campaigning model was valid, old assumptions and certainties simply
evaporated.
In the US, Bush grabbed the campaigning moment and blended
absolute robustness of message with maximum personalisation and
individuation. Every element of the message was one or other variant
of security, every aspect of the message was delivered to the greatest
degree possible by direct, personalised contact. Karl Rove later said
he did not care about national advertising but local contact. This
campaign met the needs of the time, it was a new synthesis. The
unremitting focus on one message – national security – gave certainty
and confidence in a world of huge uncertainty and insecurity. The
personalisation of the message met the need for direct, narrowly
focused involving, participatory communication. This model was not
perfect, nor inspiring, but it was at least a coherent response to a new
campaigning world.
On the other side, Senator Kerry struggled. Representing a party
that was massively split over the war, and that lacked an identifiable and
shared political project, he struggled to build a coherent, sustainable
and robust campaigning synthesis. Without such a synthesis he appeared
inconsistent and reactive, moving positions and message as events
changed. Against the certainty of Bush this appeared indecisive, even
weak. With the greatest possible of ironies a genuine war hero was
constantly on the defensive because of continual attacks about the
34
PHILIP GOULD
validity of his war record, from a campaign led by a President who had
never personally fought in any war. Senator Kerry was trapped in the
ultimate campaigning absurdity – attacked for a genuine strength by
a candidate with an exactly commensurate weakness. He could have
come out and blasted President Bush into the hemisphere, but he did
not, choosing grace under pressure, repeating unwittingly the same
error as Governor Dukakis all those years ago.
Unable to escape for prolonged periods from war in Iraq, the
security agenda, and the validity or otherwise of his outstanding
military record Kerry was unable to reach his preferred campaigning
ground of the economy and President Bush reached home base once
more. In truth, Senator Kerry was trapped by ambivalence, not certain
about the war, he found it hard to appear certain about anything else.
He had very talented advisers but he did not have a political project.
The flexibility of the war room, essential 12 years ago was inadequate
as a compass in the rough and treacherous waters of a nation at war.
We needed battleships not light cruisers.
5. The Paradox of Hard Soft Campaigning
In Britain once more we watched and we learned. This time the view
of the campaign at almost every level and certainly my absolute
conviction was that in a time of uncertainty, turbulence, and electoral
sullenness the first imperative was absolute strategic clarity, robustness,
and constancy. At any sign of weakness, indecision, vacillation or
compromise, the public will lose confidence. In the treacherous and
swirling waves of any election held in 2005, we had to be Bush not Kerry,
not in any way in our values, but in our remorseless determination to
choose a course and to stick to it, however rough the passage.
That is why we were so determined to campaign with strength.
To show courage and consistency under fire. To hold our nerve and
certainty despite all the usual noises off. Above all to be strategic not
tactical. That is why we were so determined to make the economy
not just the campaign message but the campaign anchor, repeated
endlessly until it broke through. Why Tony Blair and Gordon Brown
campaigned together to hammer home the economic message. Why
35
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
our message was simple and potent – Forward not Back – and why it
was repeated endlessly from the start of the campaign until the finish.
This was not elegant elevated campaigning, but it was a foundation, a
framework of rock solid iron and concrete from which it was possible
to build a victory.
This was campaigning as strength. Campaigning that provided
security and confidence when many of the electorate felt neither. But
strength was never going to be enough, we also needed connection.
The vicissitudes of terror, war and insecurity made robust confident
clarity essential but the need to engage had not disappeared nor had
the need to listen and respond as the public vented anger and concern.
In our campaign strength and connection had to learn to co-exist.
This was the paradox of the 2005 campaign. We had to be
confident and strong in our message and leadership, but sensitive and
responsive in our relations with the electorate. These two apparently
conflicting imperatives had to be implemented simultaneously, both
strong and responsive at the same time. We did this by echoing the
qualities of a modern building able to resist extreme heat and cold.
Strong enough to withstand the assault of the elements, but flexible
enough not to crack under pressure. After the event I described this as
hard soft politics, not an elegant description, but an accurate one. The
bridge that always keeps its shape and structure but bends in the wind
so it does not break.
We added connection to strength in a number of ways:
First, we attempted, although we started late, to make our
campaigning as local and as personal as possible. We had some success
here but not enough, we made at least a small step forward. Second,
we undertook a considerable amount of interactive communication,
both locally but also nationally where the Prime Minister and other
ministers, were subject to direct questioning by others on key issues in
unfiltered and effectively uncontrolled debates.
The public loved this, the politicians less so as the questions
were unremitting and at times savage. So savage in fact that this
became known as the ‘masochism strategy’. Politicians may not have
liked it, but it worked, slowly the bile was drawn from the electorate,
anger abated, the mood towards us gradually warming.
36
PHILIP GOULD
The third element of connection was a new approach to polling
which I called ‘wrap around polling’. ‘Wrap around polling’ is diagnostic;
intuitive; responsive; multi-faceted and pluralist, but also systematic
and rigorous. We wanted polling not just to tell us what had happened,
but to alert us to what might happen. To be a kind of early warning
system, to anticipate where an uneasy and dissatisfied public might
flare up in protest or anger: research as radar.
To do this we used multitude of polling instruments: strategic
message polling; standard daily tracking; internet panels of various
sizes; marginal polling; daily focus groups. This polling was not kept
tight to a small group of insiders, but distributed widely and openly
throughout the campaign. Basically if anyone wanted to see the polling
they could. The old days when a pollster is effectively a physician
dispensing tough medicine to uninformed politicians is gone. We are all
polling experts now, or at least equal partners in the polling process.
This approach was effective. For example, the Prime Minister
had always said that the issue of immigration should be left until
the public turned against Michael Howard, the Conservative leader,
when he went too far on the issue which he inevitably did. Night after
night we tracked the public response on the issue seeing it move from
whole hearted support of Howard, to a gradual bemusement that it
was all they appeared to talk about, to a kind of contempt that this
was the only issue they had, and they seemed to exploiting race for
reasons of political advantage. At this point we pounced and the Prime
Minister made a powerful speech arguing for a balanced approach to
immigration and shredding Tory polices and assumptions. That was the
end of immigration as an issue in that campaign.
We won, and with a comfortable strategy, not because of the
cleverness of our advertising or the ingenuity of our tactics but because
of the robustness of our strategy. Soft/hard campaigning is not elegant
as a strategic solution, it is not Clinton in 1992 or Blair in 1997 but it
was effective because it led to a strategy and campaigning model that
was serious, completely thought through, and at that moment, and at
that time was the strategic synthesis that made best sense of the world
that we had to campaign in. I am not saying that this model will last,
although I expect some elements of it will be carried on. I am saying
37
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
that this campaigning model provided the right strategic synthesis for
that election at that time. That is why we won in 2005 while others lost,
unable to turn the fragmented reality of their political landscape into
strategy, confusing strategy and tactics, still clinging to old certainties,
which time had cast aside.
6. The New Synthesis
Every campaign, every strategist everywhere has to find its own strategic
synthesis. This is progressively less easy as every day sees new change,
new insecurity, new senses of empowerment. The world is changing as
the effects of globalisation do slow but accelerate and multiply. We
now live in a world of terror, war, migration, religious fundamentalism,
drugs, local and internally crime, and an environmental threat that
some say is now irretrievable. No wonder people feel insecure. The
media is changing, intensive and absolutely continuous, moving from
observer to player. This is perfectly exemplified by the current world
‘problem’ cartoon wars in which newspapers both caused the story
through printing the campaign and then exploded the story by covering
it. Television news programmes do not seek to report the news but make
the news. We are each of us on the stage now, actors all. The citizen
has also changed to become more demanding, more empowered, less
deferential, less trusting, more sceptical, more individuated. You can’t
just talk to the public any more, you have to talk to ‘me’.
This constant swirl of change will never ever stop. The political
landscape never static is a flow of events rather than a tableau where
the pieces are mixed or at least move very slowly. And the political flow
of events must be matched by the political flow of strategy. Somehow
with great skill and creativity the successful campaign strategist has
to interpret this flow, integrate its elements, anticipate its future
direction, and turn all this in to a strategic synthesis that will win a
particular election at a certain moment in time. Campaigning strategy
as a process that is always changing, always fluid, in which the past
is a guide but not a template, is a difficult and disturbing concept.
There can be no textbook on strategy, no enduring principles that work
equally well in Baltimore or Bangalore, no well-worn maps to guide us
38
PHILIP GOULD
as we move tentatively ahead. Each time an election is called we must
make our own maps, and each time the contours will have changed.
Those campaigns that best understand this win elections, those that
don’t lose.
The campaigning cycle has not stopped, it still goes on. It is
folly to be prescriptive about the future but it is likely that the huge
clash of elements: disengagement meshing with empowerment; terror
meshing with an ‘always on’ media; economic growth meshing economic
insecurity, will lead for the next period at least for a politics that is
confident, but a politics that also connects. Soft/hard campaigning
is crude as a concept, but somewhere, somehow others will make it
work in their own terms, in their own time. That is the nature of the
strategists’ art: part of a process that never ends and never ceases.
In the end perhaps the only advice that matters to any strategist is
this: stay true to your values, listen to your own voice – however small
– never let yourselves be bullied out of doing what is right for the
campaign, don’t let your ego get in the way and never, ever give up.
With luck your time will come again.
39
Election Pamphlet
Matt Carter
Introduction
2005 will be regarded as a remarkable election campaign for lots of
reasons – the tightness of the race, perhaps, or the Tories use of asylum
and immigration; the dominance of Iraq in the media and the leaking
of the Attorney General’s advice; even the death of the Pope during
the first few days of the short campaign. What is less understood is just
how this election was remarkable for the way the parties transformed
their ‘ground campaigns’.
Labour faced a real dilemma in planning its field organisation
for the 2005 campaign. Put simply, the choice was: to what extent
should the party simply look to repeat the tried-and-tested format
for the ground campaign used in the previous two elections, both of
which delivered huge Labour majorities, or to what extent should the
campaign deviate from that approach. Clearly, politics in Britain had
changed substantially since the mid-1990s when the original Operation
Victory strategy was developed, not least in the fact that Labour’s lead
in the opinion polls had been drastically cut. But it would be a brave,
if not foolhardy, person that abandoned the campaigning methodology
that had been so successful for the Party over the previous decade.
In the end, the 2005 field campaign was a mixture of continuity
and change, keeping the essential components from previous campaigns
but innovating in significant ways to respond to the new and fresh
challenges the Party faced, a combination that was pivotal in ensuring
the successful re-election of the Labour government for an historic
third term.
1. The Changing Political Landscape
The political world that faced Labour in the run up to the 2005 general
40
MATT CARTER
election was radically different to the circumstances in which Labour
was first elected in 1997. Firstly, and most obviously, Labour had lost its
huge opinion poll lead. In the period between 1994 and 1997, Labour
averaged well over 50 per cent in the polls, and often exceeded 60 per
cent, with the Tories languishing well below 30 per cent of the vote.
From 2003 onwards, Labour rarely reached beyond 40 per cent and
often polled neck and neck with the Tories, with the Liberal Democrats
consistently polling over 20 per cent. The race to 2005 was going to be
the closest political fight Labour had faced since 1992.
Secondly, and connected to the above, declining support in the
polls also translated into a reduction in the capacity of the party’s
volunteer organisation. In the run up to 1997, Labour had benefited
from a significant increase in its membership, rising as high as 400,000,
and a large number of other supporters who wanted to help see the
Tories swept from power. Almost as soon as this objective was achieved,
Labour’s membership began to fall dramatically. By 2005, membership
had fallen back beyond the levels before it began to rise and this led
to the potential of a smaller voluntary field organisation team in the
2005 campaign.
New dynamics had also begun to transform politics more
generally. Political apathy and disengagement, hardly concerns
particularly apparent in the period before 1997, had become issues
for major consideration. The 2001 general election saw the lowest
electoral turnout in Britain – 59 per cent – since the First World War,
and many people predicted it would fall further in 2005. Significant
sections of the electorate expressed disinterest in politics and those
that were interested were less likely to be active. It was clear parties
of all colours were going to have to work much harder to capture and
win the voters’ attention.
These and other trends led Labour to reassess its approach for
the organisation of its ground campaign. We saw there to be three
distinct challenges:
1. How to win back the Lapsed Labour voters, those people that
had supported us in 1997 and 2001 but had now moved away
from us;
2. How to ensure that enough people not only supported Labour
but that they actually went out and voted in the election;
3. And how to deliver on the above challenges with a smaller team
of active members.
41
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
These challenges were not the sole preserve of the field
campaign – clearly everything we did in our policy development or setpiece speeches, for example, would have an impact on our standing
with lapsed Labour voters. But the field campaign also needed to find
its own specific responses to these issues and it was these solutions
that drove the innovation and transformation of the campaign.
2. Winning the Lapsed Labour Votes
Much has been written about why people had moved away from Labour
after the 2001 election. This is an area where over-simplification is
dangerous. The explanations we had from our polling were complex
and even then our understanding was predictably incomplete. But
as a short-hand, there were two broad groups we needed to engage
with: those who were angry about the decision to go to war with Iraq;
and those who were concerned about domestic issues such as crime,
immigration and asylum. The challenge for the field campaign was how
it could contribute to the battle to win back these groups of voters to
Labour before polling day.
The response began with the realisation that the approach to
running the 1997 and 2001 campaigns would only get us so far. Operation
Victory, the name for the 1997 field campaign strategy, was rooted in
a simple set of objectives: to speak with as many voters as possible in
marginal constituencies, so as to identify enough Labour promises to
be reasonably able to expect to win the seat, and then turn them out
on polling day. This was a strategy primarily rooted in the identification
of voters’ intentions. It was rooted in an implicit assumption that if we
spoke with enough people, we would find enough Labour promises to
win.
However, in the run up to 2005, our problem was not simply
identifying which way enough people were going to vote. When they
were spoken with, many people whom our historic records showed
were previous Labour voters were now undecided. Identification alone
was not going to result in Labour having enough promises to turnout
on polling day to win. We needed an extra step – a process of political
engagement with those key groups of voters that were now vulnerable
to switching. Or put another way, the 1997 and 2001 field campaigns
were primarily organisational – 2005 was organisational and political.
So rather than just asking for information about voting intention, the
42
MATT CARTER
scripts for the 2005 campaign sought to find out the local and national
issues that were of concern to each voter. These provided critical
information for the Party to follow up in its range of communications.
In segmenting the electorate to identify the specific groups that
needed particular attention, young mums came out as one of the most
significant. Women aged 25-40 with school-aged children had been a
valuable source of support in the previous two campaigns. Yet polling
showed many were now moving away from voting Labour. What was
needed was a major, intensive and co-ordinated campaign to win them
back.
For the first time in a number of years, appealing to women
voters became an issue mainstreamed within Labour’s election
campaign, involving a response at every level. The party made policy
launches on issues likely to be of interest to women, whether on
extending childcare, improving the services to detect and treat breast
cancer, or providing more support for families. The targeting of ‘schoolgate mums’ became a central component in Labour’s narrative of the
campaign, with Ministers joining Labour candidates outside schools to
discuss our policies with parents collecting their children. Labour also
developed a number of its election materials specifically to appeal to
women – from the sending of direct mail to mums, segmented by the
age of their children, to the production of special magazines called
Family Matters, designed to provide informal and easy-to-read stories
about policy themes important to women.
For the first time, Labour also supplemented its traditional
‘Leader’s Tour’ with a ‘Women’s Tour’, taking a collection of women
Ministers into marginal seats on mass to ‘blitz’ communities and raise
the profile of Labour’s pledges for women. Many of the candidates
the Tour visited were themselves women, a product of the decision
by Labour to increase significantly the use of all-women shortlists to
ensure the Parliamentary Group became more representative of the
electorate at large. Finally, we also developed one of Labour’s five Party
Election Broadcasts to reflect the concerns of women voters. Featuring
a range of mainly women voters, and led by a female comedian, the
party election broadcast highlighted the difference being made by
Labour on making work pay and the threat posed by our opponents.
Young mums were only one group of many that needed to be
targeted, each with their own approach. But for all that, the essential
components were the same. In 2005, the field campaign needed to be
more political than it had needed to be before. It was not enough just
43
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
to identify voter intention and then get out the vote on polling day.
This time, critically, we also needed a dynamic and concerted field
campaign to persuade voters why they needed to stick with Labour.
3. Turning out the Labour Vote
Winning back voters to Labour was a major challenge in itself. But it was
only the first step in a two-stage process. We then needed to get them
actually to go and vote in the election. This may seem elementary, but
after the low turnout in 2001, achieving a differential turnout of Labour
supporters became a central objective for every marginal seat.
What motivates people to vote is the source of many major
academic studies. For Labour, experience from by-elections and local
campaigns had shown local, personal contact to be a key driver of
increased turnout. Where voters had heard from Labour between
elections or in the run-up to the poll, they were more likely to turnout.
If they had heard from the Party twice, they were even more likely to
vote. And if the contact was not just in the form of a leaflet, but a call
at the door or a phone-call, turnout levels increased still further. This
led Labour to develop a hierarchy of contact – ranking the different
forms of voter contact and which were most effective at motivating
people to vote. At the top was a doorstep or telephone call from your
local MP or candidate – feedback had shown that they were usually
the best resource for increasing turnout a campaign had. Next was a
doorstep contact from a party activist, then a telephone call, and so
on. Least effective form of contact was a generic leaflet – though of
course it remained valuable nevertheless.
We then wanted to ensure that there was sufficient frequency
of contact to inspire someone to bother to vote. Again, experience
from local campaigns led us to set a target of seven personal contacts
with each key voter. Every vulnerable voter in a marginal seat should
hear from Labour at least seven times in the four months before the
beginning of the short campaign. Although no guarantee, this would
provide us with the best possible assurance that the voter would actually
cast their ballot. The Party therefore planned a communications grid
for 2005 which involved monthly direct mail contact with 15,000 voters
in each of the 107 most marginal constituencies in the country, a scale
of operation never before attempted by the party. These contacts were
not from a senior government politician but from their own Member of
Parliament. These were to be supplemented by regular local contacts
44
MATT CARTER
from the constituency party, identifying themes or issues raised by the
voters themselves.
In addition, it was clear the campaign needed to be bolder and
more dynamic than 1997 and 2001 if it was to break through and connect
with voters. As a result, Labour decided to use modern technology in
the form of DVDs. For each of the 60 most vulnerable seats, Labour
created a tailor-made DVD, with a collection of films about the specific
constituency covering local schools, hospitals, businesses and the fight
against crime. 5,000 copies of each film – one for every household with
a key voter – were produced, and the feedback showed them to be
both popular and influential.
Finally, at the heart of the campaign to motivate Labour
voters to vote was their candidate, in most cases their current Labour
Member of Parliament. As noted already, we recognised the extra value
a candidate could add to mobilising support. But this was not simply an
issue for the four weeks of the short campaign. Most MPs gained their
recognition through the work they had done as an elected representative
over the full life of the Parliament. Therefore in 2004 we established
a team within Parliament called the MP Support Unit, whose sole focus
was to work with MPs to improve the way they engage with and work
for their constituents. We believed that MPs whose personal profile and
reputation were strong as a result of their Parliamentary work would
be better placed to persuade voters to go out and re-elect them. It
sounds obvious, but the traditional orthodoxy had been that voters cast
their ballot on party lines and a candidate was only ‘worth’ 500 votes
either way. However, with increased cynicism about politics, it was
clear that people trusted their local MP more than they trusted parties
or government in general. There was an emerging political dividend
from having a strong and active local MP and in a tight race this could
make all the difference.
4. Building the Labour Campaign
There was a paradox at the heart of the 2005 campaign – the demands of
winning back lapsed Labour voters and motivating people to cast their
ballot both led to an election strategy more localised and with more
personal contact, and yet in this election, we expected to have fewer
volunteers and a smaller volunteer army than in recent campaigns.
In devising the approach to the ground campaign, we also needed to
take into account just how deliverable it was for local parties in our
45
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
marginal seats. The response was two-fold – to provide a step-change in
the central support to local campaigns, and to take more seriously the
responsibility of the campaign to mobilise volunteers and activists.
Firstly, it was clear early on that if the demanding targets we
had set were to be possible, the centre would need to do much more
than it had in the past in assisting marginal seat campaigns. That is
why at the beginning of 2004, over a year before the election was even
called, we took the decision to build a new communications centre, a
team of staff based in an office in Newcastle whose sole focus was to
engage in voter contact to supplement the work of local parties. The
National Communications Centre was opened in March 2004. Over the
course of the campaign, it helped to make millions of phone calls,
sent out thousands of direct mail letters, and dealt with hundreds of
specific inquiries or requests for information. All the information about
voters collected by the NCC was added to the Labour.Contact database
used by local parties to co-ordinate their targeting strategy, so that
they could follow up with their own local visits to key voters.
The creation of the NCC marked a significant shift in the
focus of resources of the whole campaign – from nationally delivered
‘broadcast’ messages to localised, personalised contact direct with
voters. In the 2005 campaign, Labour spent less on bought media and
advertising than it had in 2001, even before inflation. All available
resources were diverted into providing additional support from the
National Communications Centre, and into increasing the number of
our local field organisers. By the end of the 2004, Labour had over 100
local organisers each leading the campaign in a marginal seat, more
than in either 1997 or 2001. And the smaller advertising budget was
spent differently – with less spent on national billboards, and instead
for the first time the party blitzing regional newspapers and even taking
cinema and internet adverts.
The centre took an increased responsibility for core elements
of the campaign – primarily voter identification and large quantities
of direct mail. However, local parties, organisers and candidates were
not given any opportunity for sitting back. The 2005 campaign clearly
reflected the party’s belief in ‘rights and responsibilities’. Local parties
were given targets for additional personalised voter contacts, using
the limited resources they had to best effect in engaging direct with
the electorate. All local activity was monitored weekly and then every
day in the short campaign, and action was taken where targets were
not being met.
46
MATT CARTER
As well as providing a major step-change in the quantity of
support given to marginal seats from the centre, the national party
also took a more proactive role in attempting to mobilise support and
activity for the local campaigns. In 2005, the party’s website was used
much more effectively than before as a means of recruiting volunteers,
raising money and providing key activists with a clear message for the
campaign. Over the period of the election, the web helped Labour to
recruit thousands of volunteers for local parties. In addition, many
people joined the Party during the election via the internet – almost
11,000 in the first five months of 2005. The Party also used a dedicated
phone bank to speak to members in or near to marginal constituencies,
to recruit volunteers or raise funds. In the end, despite the reduced
level of membership, many local parties reported that significant
numbers of non-member supporters helped in the campaign, enough
to deliver on the campaign’s key targets.
Conclusion
In the end, despite a ferocious onslaught from the Conservative
Party on the issue of immigration, and a determined attack from the
Liberal Democrats against the war in Iraq, on 5 May 2005 Labour won
a majority of 67 seats and with it an historic third consecutive term in
government.
Central to this victory was the work of the government over
the previous eight years – the establishment of a strong and stable
economy, with record numbers in work; the record levels of investment
in public services like health and education; the extra police on the
beat and the fall in crime by a quarter since 1997. But the engagement
with and motivation of Labour voters was a key contribution to that
victory.
For the first time in more than a decade, Labour faced a race
where simply identifying enough voters’ intentions would not deliver
victory. Many former Labour voters were now undecided. This was a
political fight and it required a ground campaign that could target
specific messages to the key voter groups that needed particular
engagement. In addition, the campaign needed to mobilise Labour
supporters actually to go and vote. This required a high level of
personal and direct contact – more personalised voter contact on a onetwo-one basis in fact than in any other campaign. And to deliver this,
the campaign needed to change its focus – to be less about nationally
47
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
delivered broadcast messages, instead putting more resources into
local organisation, communications and contact.
The 2005 campaign drew heavily from the strengths of the
previous Labour victories. But it also understood how the world had
changed and how it needed to be different. The innovations inspired by
the election not only helped to deliver a re-elected Labour government.
They also hopefully provide a model for centre-left parties across the
world trying to grapple with the challenges of winning trust and support
in the twenty-first century.
48
The Role of MPs in the 2005 General
Election and Beyond
Fiona Gordon
Members of Parliament lose all their privileges as soon as Parliament
is dissolved for a general election. Their offices are locked. They lose
their right to free postage to constituents. They lose the right to
call themselves an MP. Denuded of pay, of privilege, of staff, even of
computers they are sent out to face the electors no longer as tribunes
of the people, but as just another candidate seeking election.
This diminution of their status was matched by the attitude of
the campaigners whose job it was to secure the MPs re-election. Not
so long ago, a Labour Party organiser could easily get the MPs’ election
agents on side and provoke gales of laughter by explaining that once
the election was called politicians stopped being MPs and assumed a
new role as ‘LNs’ – legal necessities.
Beneath the exaggeration of the joke lay element of truth. After
all, an election cannot be won without a candidate, but many organisers
would rather candidates stuck to the traditional role of office seeker
– going where they were told to speak at meetings, knocking on the
doors selected for them by their agents and addressing poorly attended
public meetings. Election organisers would often joke that their top
priority for the candidate’s diary was to make sure they kept out of the
our way as the organisers got the campaign underway.
While the candidate was thus busily occupied, the election
agent and a few others decided the real issues of the campaign: where
to send the candidate, what leaflets to write, what press releases to
issue and who would be trusted with the delicate task of pasting up
canvass cards.
How times have changed.
Today, every election organiser recognises the essential role
that Members of Parliament play in campaigning and indeed winning
49
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
elections. In every party we have seen outstanding individual results
that have countered both national and regional swings. While it is
impossible to define accurately every factor in the success of these
candidate, one factor is clear – the individual work, energy, reputation
and political skills of the individual MP is a clear factor.
In this chapter we aim to set out four of these key roles and
give examples of Labour MPs who are exemplars of this electoral style.
Before looking at these individual factors, there are some more general
points to make.
1. An MP and their Constituency – the Closest Bond
The first important point is that the role of a political candidate is defined
by the nature of that election. First is the size of the constituency. A
candidate in a small council election, with an electorate of perhaps
2,000, should operate in a different way to an MP with an electorate of
some 70,000. A mayoral candidate in a city of a million would also have
a different agenda and priorities again.
In the same way, a candidate in a first-past-the-post constituency
seat operates differently to one in a multi-member constituency. In
the European Parliament elections, for example, as many a dozen
candidates with varying likelihood of election act as a candidate team,
picking up different roles and different public exposure.
This differential applies also to the role of the politician once
elected. A British MP, like a US Congressman or Congresswoman has
a defined and clear constituency. They represent that constituency
in Parliament and have a definite and defined role in the local life
of that constituency. It is up to the individual MP to choose how to
use that bully pulpit, but the nature of the direct constituency link,
which precludes any other MP being the voice of the constituency, is
an important factor in shaping the role of an MP as a candidate for reelection.
We will look at four main roles of a British MP in the 2005
election. These are the MP as legislator, the MP as local representative
and champion, the MP as local party leader and innovator, and the MP
as partisan champion and advocate.
It is important to note that while we, as political insiders, see
differences between the role of an MP and the role of a candidate – and
identify different skills within each role that might suit one MP, or play
to the strengths of another – voters generally do not.
50
FIONA GORDON
Pre-election focus groups revealed that voters evaluated MPs
on a whole set of criteria based firstly and most importantly on party
identification, and then to varying degrees on the perception of their
personality, their industry, their responsiveness, their public image and
their differentiation with opponents. Every role we talk of for an MP
feeds into this general public perception.
When MPs are asked how they wish to be seen by their
constituents this becomes clear. MPs talk of being seen as ‘effective
champions’, of being ‘local leaders’ or ‘locally sensitive legislators’.
Each of these roles is a part of the wider demands placed on the MP
and each contributes to a general sense of an MP being effective,
committed and active.
2. Campaigning is for a whole Parliament, not just for the Election
The final and most important point to be made is that we are increasingly
moving to continual campaigning. No longer do we view the few
months ahead of ‘short campaign’ as the only time in which politicians
are asked to contact voters, build relationships and strengthen their
local party.
Instead, while the election campaign takes up media and voter
interest in a short burst of national interest, MPs and their local parties
face not only European and devolved assembly elections – alongside
for many MPs mayoral elections and annual local elections – but
also a more demanding set of expectations from their constituents.
This provides an electoral incentive to build a strong local political
campaign, but also increases the strategic role of the MP, who as a fulltime politician, will usually be the focal point for campaigning activity
in their constituency, especially where there is no full-time organiser
employed by the party.
In 2005 we saw that politicians and their campaign organisers
were aware that elections are won over the long-term, and that every
name added to a database, every letter sent to a constituent, every
personal contact over the four- or five-year cycle of a parliament acts
as a preface to, and a key part of, the campaign that is fought once the
election is formally declared.
It is also important to note that there is nothing new under the
sun. Reading Robert Caro and Robert Dallek’s competing biographies
of Lyndon Johnson appears to be a popular pastime for progressive
politicians and those who have read about his time as a Congressman
51
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
for the tenth district of Texas from 1937 will have been perhaps
intimidated by the way he organised his office.
According to Caro, it was a 24-hour operation, with shifts of
bright young Texans working long hours to hand type thousands of letters,
circulars, press releases and district casework while Johnson himself
would spend his 18 hour days intervening with federal officials on behalf
of businesses, individuals and farms in his district. All the while it was
ensured that every success and every accomplishment was publicised,
with due credit given to the energetic young Congressman.
Johnson’s success was a political response to the increasing role
of the federal government in the lives of his rural constituents. It
showed an understanding of how a politician can act as a champion
of his constituents, a local leader of his party, an advocate of the
legislation that national political leaders are proposing and a tireless
and energetic worker for ‘their’ constituents. This political capital,
built up over the years in office then becomes the basis and bulwark of
the politician’s re-election campaign. The examples we talk about in
2005 differ in technology, scope and style, but the essential elements
remain the same.
As with Lyndon Johnson, the best election results we will look at
were achieved when the Member of Parliament was clear from the day
after their election what had to be done, how it was to be done and
clearly led the way to doing it. Ultimately, the key contribution an MP
can make to winning their local election campaign comes down to local
leadership. However expressed, that leadership provides direction for
the local party, the issues on which to fight, and the way in which to
approach them.
3. Why should we care about the role of an MP in the 2005
election?
Simply because used correctly, using the power of office to make MPs
the champions of their local community has a powerful impact on their
electoral prospects. In 2001 we saw that the most successful of the
first term 1997 MPs saw a swing in their favour of four to five per
cent more than the national average. This success can be traced to a
combination of strong local MP-led campaigning and effective, driven
incumbency campaigning.
In 2005 we saw local results with similar impact. For example,
Dorset South and Dumfries and Galloway produced superlative results
52
FIONA GORDON
for Jim Knight and Russell Brown. Parmjit Dhanda increased his majority
with a swing to Labour and Phil Woolas increased his majority over the
Liberal Democrats. Norman Lamb for the Liberal Democrats turned a
majority of 483 into a majority of over 10,000, repeating the success
of Ed Davey in the 2001. It is important to recognise that in the 2005
election Labour held the number one and two Tory targets, but lost
Tory targets 74, 86, and 96.
The vital point here is that whilst compared to national issues
such as crime, immigration or the economy, an individual MP’s role is
only a contributory factor, it is nevertheless a contributory factor that
can impact the votes of significant numbers of electors.
Looking at the 2005 results, there are now 17 Labour seats
with majorities of less than 1,000. Holding these seats will be a major
political priority for any future election strategy. This leads us to a
threat and an opportunity.
The threat is that over a third term, a Labour government will
follow a similar path to other third term governments. The central
party, with limited funds and resources, will not be able to provide
the financial support needed to fund organisers, campaigns and local
messaging until shortly before the election. The party, having not
only lost seats in local council elections, but also key organizers to
exhaustion or disillusion will not be renewed effectively, and will not
adapt to the new challenges of a future election will contain.
The opportunity is that we use the power of incumbency to help
MPs over the full course of the next parliament, starting immediately.
If we examine the 50 most marginal seats and move them to the
performance of the best marginal seats, it could be worth as many
as 3,000 votes per constituency. There exists the opportunity to turn
incumbency campaigning into a major strategic advantage for the
2009-10 election.
4. The MP as Legislator
Backbench MPs are sometimes pejoratively called lobby fodder. The
implication being that their only real purpose is to troop through the
voting lobby under the direction of the whips to pass the Government’s
agenda. This derogatory attitude masks the most important element
of an MP’s role. When voting on legislation, MPs are delivering the
legislation that their constituents voted for. They are delivering the
manifesto on which they stood and making a stand for those in their
53
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
community affected by that legislation.
In political terms, the role of the MP as legislator has been
underutilised for many years but today a new generation of Labour
politicians not only understands the seriousness and responsibility of
their legislator role, but also realise how important it is to use their
position as an MP to consult, to explain directly how their votes at
Westminster benefit their constituents, and to demonstrate to local
people why they need their MP to go to Westminster for the main part
of the week on their behalf. For example, one manifesto pledge for
Labour in the 2005 election campaign was the introduction of ID cards.
As the law was before Parliament well before the 2005 election, many
Labour MPs went out and asked their constituents for their views on
the issue.
These constituency surveys generally showed strong public
support for the ID cards proposal- often in the range of 70 per cent to
80 per cent approval. This enabled MPs to build strong databases of
people who supported the Labour position on this issue, and also to
frame their commitment to support the Government position as being
an expression of their commitment to listening to and representing the
views of their constituents. As an example, Steve McCabe, Labour MP
for the marginal seat of Birmingham Hall Green, sent out 10,000 letters
to constituents who had contacted him on various issues, setting out the
issues around ID cards and asking for their views. Over 3,000 responded
– with an overwhelming majority in favour.
All of those who responded were sent a follow-up letter on the
progress of the bill, and when the election was declared and the bill
was delayed by opposition parties, Steve McCabe was able to write to
the 3,000 constituents explaining what had happened, why, and setting
out his own commitment to support ID cards.
The effort put into surveys and follow-up letters to those who
showed an interest demonstrate two things to a constituent. First, that
the MP concerned is making important decisions with the views of their
constituents in mind. Second that the MP is focused on the issues that
concern and are important to them.
Another example of MPs using their role as legislator to build
their political position is over votes on the Budget. The British Budget
is proposed by the Chancellor, usually in the spring, and is approved
by a vote of the House of Commons. This means that Labour MPs can
contact all constituents to publicise the measures in the Budget that
will be beneficial to their constituency, and write to targeted groups,
54
FIONA GORDON
such as local small businesses, charities, home owners and pensioners,
outlining the measures that will impact them. It is worth noting the
importance of differentiating between party political activity and
official parliamentary activity. MPs can use free postal privileges to
communicate with constituents, with obvious ethical and political
restraints.
There is an increasing understanding that in this 24-hour media
age with personalised direct mail coming through the letterbox every
day, the challenge for our Members of Parliament is how to get the
attention of their voters, and how they let them know what they are
doing with their time as MP. That is, how it impacts on their lives and
how it effects their communities.
Of course, no MP should ever use taxpayers’ money for partisan
political advantage, but there are circumstances in which doing a good job
as an MP coincides with communicating and consulting with constituents
on important issues, together with legitimately communicating their
availability to help. Nor should MPs feel restrained from doing their
job well by lack of funds. Members of Parliament have an average
of 60,000 electors, communicating directly with approximately 35,000
households, which takes a considerable amount of time, money and
effective planning. This requires staff time, organisation and a clear
communications plan from day one.
While we are strengthening the support offered to MPs on major
political issues, we still have a long way to go. For example, when
President Bush decided to launch his ill-fated scheme to privatise Social
Security as a political priority, the US House Republican conference
produced a 100-page guide to the issue, a video of George Bush to be
shown to local meetings, a powerpoint presentation for constituency
meetings, meeting guides, press releases, opposition quotes, graphics,
draft speeches, press articles and issue briefing. This package of
support has been backed up with focused visits, media interviews,
opinion pieces and direct mail support. While the fundamental flaws
in the politics and policy stopped the politics succeeding, one cannot
deny that the Republicans were committed to helping their legislators
evangelise for their policies at home.
As we learn more about ways in which MPs can communicate their
political priorities to their supporters, the bully pulpit of parliament
can be used to great effect by many Labour MPs. An example of this is
the work carried out by Jim Sheridan, Labour MP for West Renfrewshire,
whose Gangmasters licensing bill, presented as a private member’s
55
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
bill, reached the top of the British political agenda following a tragedy
involving immigrant agricultural workers. Jim Sheridan’s consistent
efforts on this issue before it hit the national headlines showed his
constituents that he was both committed to serving their interests and
focused on delivering real practical action in parliament.
5. The MP as Representative and Champion
Perhaps the best known election result in the Labour movement in both
the 2001 and 2005 general election result was Jim Knight’s success
in Dorset South. In 1997, with the Labour landslide that swept New
Labour to power, many seats returned a Labour MP for the very first
time. Dorset South was not one of them. In 1997 Jim Knight lost by a
mere 77 votes. After working hard for four more years, Jim was elected
to represent Dorset South in 2001 with the similarly slim majority of
153 and was the only Labour gain of that election.
Many people told him to enjoy himself, but not get too
comfortable, go on as many foreign trips as possible and keep his
CV up to date for May 2005. Luckily for the voters of South Dorset
and the Labour Party, Jim ignored this advice and set out to show
just how wrong people can be. Jim Knight focused on making sure
that he was constantly engaged with local communities, attending
meetings, raising local issues in parliament through debates, through
petitions and through meetings with Ministers. You can see the extent
of his activities online at http://www.jimknightmp.com, where the
campaigns range from the nationally significant, like pensions and
taxation, to the ultra-local, like the impact of the Animal Welfare bill
on local charity Monkeyworld.
The persistence, dedication and drive that Jim showed as an MP
was shown in his final result, when his majority increased more than
tenfold to 1,812. Just as tellingly, when the 2005 Election campaign
was launched, the Prime Minisiter held his first election event in Dorset
South. In the local media interviews that followed, the Prime Minister
was asked ‘In Dorset, we’ve learnt to love Jim Knight. Will the rest
of the country feel the same way about the Government?’ By itself,
this question sums up the impact an MP can have on the way in which
people view them and their candidacy.
Another MP who was elected with an increased majority in 2005
was Gloucester’s Parmjit Dhanda. Fighting an ultra-marginal seat in the
South of England, Parmjit chose to make sure that his effort went into
56
FIONA GORDON
ensuring that his constituents knew who he was and what a difference
he was making on their behalf on issues that mattered for Gloucester
residents.
6. The MP as Local Political leader
A second role, alongside that of champion of the community is that of
local political leader. Another MP elected for the first time in 2001 was
Tom Watson, Member of Parliament for West Bromwich East. In direct
contrast to Jim Knight, Tom was elected with a majority of 9,763 and
a 56 per cent share of the vote. As a result he could have chosen to
sit back and concentrate on his career in Westminster. Instead, with a
small group of Labour Party members’ families and friends, he set out
a plan to engage with as many individual voters as possible with both
him and the local Labour party.
A Listening Panel was established where a cross section of around
1,500 local people were invited to let Tom have their views on a regular
basis throughout the year and to come and have a coffee with him at
least once. As you can see from the examples below, a simple tick box
for people to complete with space for comment if required enables
people to have their say direct to the person seeking to represent them
– it is a powerful tool for both Tom and those taking part.
Probably the most important element of the project is that the
group of 1,500 get a response and a follow up whether they participated
or not. You can tell from the examples of additional comment that
people like to be asked, it makes them feel valued.
Another example of an MP leading their local party is the way
in which Mike Foster, MP for Worcester, changed the organisational
role he had in the election campaign. He agreed with his local party
campaigners that he would be best used in the campaign by making
personal contact with individual electors identified as wavering Labour
supporters. As a result Mike Foster personally spoke to 1,080 voters on
the telephone during the four week campaign. These were all wavering
Labour supporters. A further 470 electors from the same base had
a telephone message left by the candidate. Mike has now matched
the voting record (turnout) of these two groups with a group of the
same voters who were not contacted by telephone. These would have
received the same literature.
For the control group – not contacted on the telephone in any
way – the actual voter turnout was 67 per cent (three percentage points
57
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
higher than the constituency as a whole). It could be that there is a
higher propensity to vote from this group, or that this is the impact of
targeted direct mail.
For the group receiving a telephone message left on their answering
service, the turnout was 75 per cent. For the 1,080 spoken to by Mike
Foster personally, 961 actually turned out to vote – a turnout figure of
88 per cent. Even allowing for a small margin of error, these figures
show the clear benefit of the personal touch to increase voter turnout.
Crudely, over 300 more people actually voted as a result of having a
personal call from the Labour candidate (their MP) or from having a
message left for them.
7. The MP as Advocate for their Party
Chris Bryant was another of the 2001 intake who faced unusual
challenges. While the Rhondda parliamentary seat was one of the
safest in the country, with a majority of almost 25,000, the local party
was shell-shocked, having lost control of both the local council and
lost the seat in the election to the Welsh Assembly in 1999 to the Welsh
nationalist party, Plaid Cymru.
As a new MP, Chris’s majority was safe, but he faced a challenge
in party renewal. If that renewal was not done well, the protest votes
that had swept Labour from power could solidify and provide the
electoral basis for a long-term challenge to Labour in its heartland.
After Chris was elected he worked with his local party to renew
their relationship with voters. They set specific roles for individuals
and promoted Chris as the face of the Labour party in Rhondda – in
conjunction with candidates for the local council and for the 2003
campaign for the Welsh Assembly.
A communications plan was drawn up to promote Chris and
the Labour party: market and street stalls, newsletters, visits to
organisations and clubs in the constituency – using local branch members
to make vital contact and ensure the party message was integrated
into the community. Chris encouraged the CLP to maintain full-time
office, staffed with volunteers alongside his parliamentary office, with
a telephone hotline number promoted in all literature. Voter ID was
undertaken through telephone canvassing door-to-door campaigning
and Labour. Contact was used to great effect.
The work of Chris and his Labour team paid off electorally. In
2003 Labour gained the Rhondda Welsh Assembly seat with a large
58
FIONA GORDON
majority. In 2004, Labour gained 31 seats on the local council and
retook control. In 2005 Chris was re-elected with a swing to Labour
from Plaid Cymru.
8. Exploding a Final Myth
We would like to end this chapter with an attempt to destroy a myth.
While MPs can claim credit for the work of their party, can show their
own effectiveness as MPs and can demonstrate their effectiveness
locally, with success, there is little or no evidence that running against,
or publicising their differences with, their Party leaders on what they
regard as unpopular issues helps MPs to get re-elected.
This should, perhaps be common sense in a House of Commons
that decides the Government of the day. After all, if you disagree
with a government on an issue significant enough to change your vote,
you are unlikely to vote for the candidate of that party, even if they
themselves share your view on this issue. As a result, Labour MPs who
supported the Government of tough political issues between 2001 and
2005 showed almost indistinguishable election results compared to
those who did not. Ann Campbell lost Cambridge despite opposing
the War in Iraq. Keith Bradley lost Manchester Withington on a similar
swing despite supporting it.
Russell Brown in Dumfries and Jim Knight in Dorset were loyalists
who increased their majorities. Parmjit Dhanda in Gloucester rebelled
only on the war and also increased his. Jim Cousins and Andrew Smith
both suffered major reductions in their majority despite taking opposing
position on the war. As one cynic said reviewing the results of defeated
labour MPs who had rebelled against the Government: “That’s not a
surprise. After all, if you keep telling your voters that the Government
is shit, eventually they’ll believe you”.
9. Conclusion: Hard Work, Long Hours and Victory
Using incumbency to secure your re-election is primarily built on
sustained hard work. That work might appear, at the time to be
unglamorous hard slog – and indeed it often is. It is much less appealing
to spend weekends organising street stalls, surveys and policy forums
than it is to stay within a comfort zone of party members, political
activists and journalists.
Yet for those who make the effort, the reward is enormous, as
59
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
recent election results show, the Labour Members of Parliament with
the most effective campaigning and communication strategies, by and
large, achieved the best results. In some cases – to some seemingly
against all the odds – share of the vote was increased and Labour’s
most marginal seats were held.
But when the 2005 general election results are examined on a
seat-by-seat basis, the correlation between how sitting Members of
Parliament effectively use their incumbency factor is clear for all to
see and it quickly becomes less like a case of ‘against the odds’ and
much more about effective hard work paying the ultimate dividend.
The best election results are achieved when the Member of
Parliament is clear from the day after polling what has got to done,
how it is done, and clearly leads the way to doing it. In other words,
when MPs are the political leaders, their electorate chose them to be
so, and their constituents profit by it.
60
Blair’s ‘Masochism Strategy’:
confrontation and connection
Sally Morgan
‘There is,’ as the saying goes ‘nothing new under the sun’. This is
as true in politics and political campaigning today as it has always
been. And so it is with what became known as Tony Blair’s ‘masochism
strategy’ before the last British General Election. Not really a new
idea but a necessary one, at a time when the media are all too keen to
provide a filter between politicians and the public – and then complain
that politicians are ‘out of touch’ or that politics is irrelevant to
real people’s lives. This chapter tries to explain what the so-called
‘masochism strategy’ was and how it worked. In essence it is very
simple: to create a connection with the public by confronting them,
face-to-face, politician and citizen, one-on-one – and of course, with
an audience sharing in the encounter.
It was intended to vault the hurdles of interpretation and
comment which the media seek to erect between politicians and the
public by showing Tony Blair directly listening to and answering the
real questions, real people have about the impact of government on
their lives. By definition it would focus on the public’s agenda – which
has always been more interested in schools and hospitals and living
standards than the media – where Labour held big leads in public
opinion and reinforce the reality that these were issues about which
Tony Blair cares passionately and personally as well. It aimed to
reconnect the Prime Minister with the public after almost eight years
in office, following a difficult and divisive Iraq War where his motives
and honesty had been questioned – and also to take some of the hurt
out of the damage to that relationship which the war had caused.
The first point to make is that this approach to political
campaigning is not new. At election times, democratic politicians have
just about always put themselves in the firing line with the public.
61
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
Conservative Prime Minister John Major used a series of ‘soapbox’
appearances in noisy market towns in the 1992 General Election to
help defeat Labour’s clean-cut, photo-opportunity-based campaign.
In the 1983 Election, Mrs Thatcher famously got caught out during a
live viewers’ phone-in on Nationwide, at the time the BBC’s flagship
early evening news programme. Indeed, William Gladstone was so used
to performing in front of huge, loud, excited and excitable crowds
– most notably during the Midlothian Campaign in the run up to the
1880 General Election – that Queen Victoria complained, ‘he addresses
us as though we are a public meeting.’
And yet, in today’s world of 24-hour news media – with its
voracious appetite for turning any politician’s honest mistake into a
deliberate ‘lie’ and its unaccountable power of hype and hyperbole,
capable of destroying the most able elected politician’s reputation
almost overnight, there is tremendous pressure on campaign strategists
to ensure leading politicians always appear in a controlled environment,
with a hand-picked audience, vetted questions and security-checked
questioners.
It is because the UK media environment is so routinely hostile
to politicians that the decision to place Tony Blair in a series of oneon-one, unscripted, unmediated television encounters with the public,
radio phone-ins, internet and SMS-based question-and-answer sessions
and local newspaper readers’ panels felt so innovative. It was also felt
to be the only way of allowing the Prime Minister to speak directly to
viewers (i.e. voters) rather than be edited or endlessly interpreted by
a succession of political journalists speaking to each other.
The second point is that the approach was not new for Tony
Blair either. New Labour may have earned a reputation for media
‘control-freakery’ – the inevitable and necessary reaction to Labour’s
‘out-of-control freakery’ during the early 1980s – but Tony Blair had
been engaged in unscripted, unmediated television discussions with the
public from the very beginning of his premiership. This was encouraged
by a recognition of Mr Blair’s own skills as the most effective political
communicator of his generation. For example, early in 2000, at a time
when Britain’s National Health Service was under immense strain,
he faced an angry audience of patients and health professionals in
62
SALLY MORGAN
a live debate on the BBC’s Newsnight programme. It was at times,
for supporters and advisers to the Prime Minister, difficult to watch
and yet, it showed him engaged, listening and concerned on the issue
of health reform. A year later, during the 2001 election, a chance
and difficult encounter with the unhappy partner of an NHS patient,
Sharon Storer, provided one of the most important images of Mr Blair
listening directly to the concerns of voters during the campaign. These
confrontations had earned some connection with the public. The seeds
of the ‘masochism strategy’ were being sown. It was the run up to
the war in Iraq, however, which really put the masochism into the
strategy. Tony Blair engaged in a series of television debates not with
mixed audiences, where some backed action against Saddam Hussein
and some did not, but with deliberately hostile groups of people, many
of whom had been on anti-war demonstrations and some who were
actually anti-war activists.
These were painful encounters but only the most hardened
peacenik could have watched without acknowledging that Tony Blair
felt passionately about the importance of removing the threat to
peace which Saddam Hussein had the potential to pose. At the time
one British journalist described this series of discussions as “Mr Blair
allowed himself to be beaten up verbally on several occasions.” Tony
Blair probably shared the sense these were punishing although necessary
confrontations which certainly took their toll on him and thus the
term ‘masochism strategy’ was born. The War and the aftermath took
its course. Tony Blair emerged from the conflict and the subsequent
inquiries having suffered a considerable amount of damage to his
reputation. By summer 2003, it was clearly necessary to put in place a
strategy to rebuild his personal image and restore his connection with
the public.
Post-Iraq this was never going to be the Tony Blair of the early
years: the new, young, popular politician who had at times seemed,
as he has acknowledged himself, to be ‘all things to all people’. This
was a different Tony Blair – toughened by experience, recognised as an
international statesman but focused on the urgent issues at home. The
challenge was to create a means of demonstrating the Prime Minister’s
focus on domestic policy and the future, as well as to reinforce a sense
63
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
that, after the divisiveness of the Iraq War, New Labour in general,
and Tony Blair in particular, were listening and engaging with the
British people on their terms and on their agenda. The truth was, of
course, that the Prime Minister always spent considerably more time
on domestic rather than international affairs but the media were not
keen on talking about that.
This required a return to the previous tactic of direct engagement
between the Prime Minister and the public but this time, in a far more
strategic way and on a much larger scale: involving the party as well as
just the Prime Minister. It would have to run from Autumn 2003 to the
expected date of the General Election in Spring 2005. To achieve all
this, it had to have a point not just be a process.
During the late summer and early autumn, the team around the
Prime Minister, together with the Party’s senior staff, developed the
concept of a nationwide process of public engagement in politics around
a series of controversial and challenging issues which would inform the
content of the election manifesto. There were real policy debates to
be had, of course. But this approach would also provide the basis for a
series of one-on-one discussions between New Labour politicians and
the public – and the opportunity for Tony Blair to undertake a series
of direct discussions where he could be seen listening to and engaging
with the public.
On 28 November 2003, Tony Blair launched Labour’s Big
Conversation with a 77-page setting out of the challenges facing
Britain and asking the public to engage in a dialogue on each of them.
These covered the spectrum of issues from the economy, poverty and
the environment to work-life balance, security in old-age, anti-social
behaviour, asylum and immigration, to public health, childcare and
vocational skills. The public were invited to write in, email and text
their comments. A dedicated Big Conversation website was set up. The
accompanying Party Political Broadcast, which featured a young girl
going to Parliament to discuss with the Prime Minister the issues which
concerned her most, won recognition as the most effective piece of
political communication that year. And around the country a series
of Big Conversation events – some national, some very local − with
the Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of Parliament and local public
64
SALLY MORGAN
representatives were held.
There were some memorable events. For example, on 25
November, for the first time ever, transmitted live from 10 Downing
Street, a British Prime Minister took and answered questions from the
public via a mobile phone chatroom session, hosted by O2. Most of the
Big Conversation events were deliberately targeted at engaging the
public through their local media rather than the national media. It was
clear that the cynicism and obsession with Iraq were not so readily
shared in the regions. Once the public were engaged, the discussions,
not always but often, focused on domestic issues.
The Prime Minister toured the country and conducted a series
of local radio phone-ins, discussions with panels of local newspaper
readers and meetings with groups of people on estates, in community
centres and local schools. Anyone who attended any of these events
could feel the real sense of engagement between the Prime Minister
and the public he met and the rise in enthusiasm and determination
to tackle the issues people were raising with him which each event
seemed to stir in Tony Blair. More importantly, on almost every
occasion, whether with people who had were life-long Labour voters
who had become disillusioned or with dyed-in-the-wool Conservatives,
the initial sense of hostility to Blair evaporated as the face-to-face
discussion took place.
Tony Blair described the impact of the Big Conversation in
a speech to the Labour Party before the 2005 General Election. His
comments reveal the reason why the ‘masochism strategy’ was so
important to the result of that election:
“…starting with the Big Conversation, I went back out, and
rather than talking at, talked with people. And I learnt.
‘I learnt that when I’m working hard, trying my damnedest
and wondering, frustrated, why people can’t appreciate the
delivery, it’s easy to forget life is still so tough for so many
people, a real life daily struggle, not for a life of luxury but just
to get by.
65
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
‘And I learnt that the best policy comes not from courting
popularity or mere conviction, but comes from partnership
between politics and people, from the blend of listening
and leading; that people don’t expect miracles, but they do
demand dialogue; that they aren’t disinterested in politics or
even disengaged but they do feel disempowered.”
This campaign of engagement continued as we had hoped and
planned, almost below the radar of the national media, until February
2005 when, as we approached the General Election campaign proper,
local events gave way to national media coverage.
On the 16 February 2005, the Prime Minister took part in a daylong series of nationally televised encounters with the public under
the banner, Talk to the Prime Minister. Tony Blair was interviewed, on
the same channel, on four separate shows starting in Birmingham at
9am and concluding with an hour-long evening studio discussion. There
were difficult issues and unfortunate individual cases raised. It was
uncomfortable at times but it demonstrated the Prime Minister’s focus
and determination.
Other parts of the national media were cynical and of course,
some were hostile. But all reported the event. Their focus was on the
most difficult encounters and the times when individual members of the
public asked tough questions and refused to even accept the answers
the Prime Minister was giving. And certainly, there was confrontation
but that is the whole point. Confrontation in these circumstances can
produce a real connection with the public. No one could deny that.
For anyone who doubts the longer-term impact such one-onone encounters can have with the wider public, it was interesting that
one of the most vocal participants in the Talk to the Prime Minister
programme, later told the media that she had been inspired to take part
by seeing Sharon Storer, the lady who had confronted the Prime Minister
outside a Birmingham hospital four years previously before during
that General Election. Clearly, for good or bad, she had experienced
some connection with politics and the Prime Minister from that earlier
confrontation. Other similar television and radio events followed up to
and through the General Election – including a memorable appearance
66
SALLY MORGAN
on Ant and Dec’s Saturday Night Take-away, the UK’s most-watched
Saturday evening family television programme on the weekend before
the General Election was called.
That then, is how the so-called ‘masochism strategy’ developed
and unfolded. The question is: did it work for Tony Blair? There is no
doubt that he achieved greater connection with the public during this
period because of the Big Conversation and the engagement events
which went with it. Issues raised during the Big Conversation became
matters of national debate – not least a ban on smoking in public
places.
It would be crass to suggest that this strategy made the difference
between winning and losing the May 2005 General Election. It certainly
helped though. The Prime Minister’s personal ratings improved and
his reputation with the public, which had taken a pounding following
the Iraq War, also made a recovery during this period. The Labour
Party’s internal polling and focus groups registered a small but steady
improvement over time in the public’s belief that we were interested
in the issues which impacted their lives. A comparison of MORI data
from the start of the so-called ‘masochism strategy’ in September
2003 to just before the General Election bears out the Party’s internal
findings: MORI reported in September 2003 that 43 per cent of the
public believed the Prime Minister to be ‘out of touch with ordinary
people’. By April 2005 that figure had fallen to 36 per cent.
The so-called ‘masochistic strategy’ was then in the end part
of an overall approach of connecting directly with the electorate. The
challenge for political parties in the future is to find a way of using
traditional and new media to build that relationship with voters against
a cacophony of noise which bombards them day-on-day.
67
Conclusion: Four Wider Lessons for
European Progressives
Matt Browne
All incumbent governments face the problem of weakening public faith
in their ability to deliver. Since 1997, the New Labour government has
achieved an enormous amount for the people of Britain. A minimum
wage has not only been introduced, but has been increased well above
the rate of inflation, with no parallel rise in unemployment. Spending
on the National Health Service (NHS) has nearly doubled as a percentage
of national income and the quality of care received has increased
markedly. The UK is not only more prosperous than ever before, but
much of the damage inflicted on the public realm between 1979 and
1997 has been repaired. The economy has grown without interruption
and inflation has remained low. While elections are inevitably fought
on a government’s record, voters – quite rightly – are not going to offer
their support purely on the basis of yesterday’s accomplishments. They
are interested in what Labour is going to do next.
Disappointment is inevitable for any incumbent government,
but especially so in the case of New Labour given the expectation of a
‘new dawn’ in 1997. After 18 years of Tory rule, the people of Britain
were prepared to give Labour more time to deliver in 2001. By 2005,
many voters had become disillusioned – particularly as a result of
British involvement in the Iraq war – but Labour held on to win a third
parliamentary term. At the next General Election, probably to be held
in 2009, unless more crucial reforms are delivered, and unless a clear
purpose and rationale for a fourth term of office is provided, it is very
unlikely that the people of Britain will give Labour another chance.
While it is true that a progressive movement cannot afford to
run out of steam intellectually and politically, there are also a number
of campaigning and communication strategies that all progressive and
social democratic parties can employ to ensure that they both get
68
MATT BROWNE
the credit for what they have achieved and ensure firm foundations
for the challenges to come. This conclusion will set out four lessons
for incumbent social democrat governments, based on New Labour’s
experiences in the UK General Election of 2005. These are as follows:
1. Highlight, politicise and promote achievements.
Ministers and MPs can demonstrate the successful implementation
of policies which have directly benefited their constituents
and, indeed, the British people. Gordon Brown’s handling of the
economy is an excellent example of this. Moreover, progressive
leaders can engage with the electorate on a personal basis,
regaining the trust of lapsed voters and tackling the concerns
of hostile citizens head on – Tony Blair’s so-called ‘Masochism
Strategy’ illustrated the effectiveness of this technique.
2. Mount a ‘rolling campaign’.
The development of a strong and healthy MP-constituent
relationship is crucial to this aspect of campaigning; candidates
can often buck electoral trends if they consolidate the support
of their constituents during their parliamentary term, by
communicating and interacting with them personally. Indeed,
campaigning tailored to the individual can also prove successful
because a personal focus makes progressives more attractive and
accessible. Progressives should never neglect lapsed voters.
3. Emphasise values and ideas.
Progressives should always focus on reforming as the momentum
this creates reinforces their electability, especially if reforms
are necessary, popular and successfully explained. Progressives
also profit from the creation of new relationships with
sympathetic NGOs; the networks these produce bolster not only
the ideological foundations of progressive movements, but also
provide local support for campaigning.
4. Set the agenda.
It is imperative that progressives maintain their dominance of
69
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
the centre-ground of the political spectrum – just as New Labour
has done since its inception – because this ensures the positive
definition of the party and its policies. The Right cannot define
what progressives stand for. It is similarly important to have
targeted electoral battles with targeted messages; ‘core’ and
‘coalition’ voters generally do not respond to the same form of
election material.
1. Highlight, Politicise and Promote Achievements with Popular
Party Figures
During the UK General Election of 2005, New Labour benefited from
its diligent hard-work and achievements in government. Candidates
could therefore legitimately highlight the achievements of the
Labour government to wavering voters and demonstrate how the
implementation of election promises has improved the quality of their
lives over the preceding eight years. New Labour’s strong economic
record – the lowest mortgage rates for 40 years and a 19 per cent
increase in average income under Chancellor Gordon Brown, as well as
its vast reduction of child poverty levels – with 2 million fewer children
living in absolute poverty and increasingly successful education
policies – 28,000 more teachers and Sure Start served to counteract
the negative impact of the British involvement in the Iraq war and
often swayed undecided voters and enticed some lapsed voters back
into the progressive fold.
Too often, through failings of our own, progressive parties do
not get the political and electoral credit for their achievements in
office. The reasons for this are often complex, but key among them is
the challenge of incumbency. Once in office for a substantial period of
time, ministers can develop a culture of administration which – rightly –
focuses their attentions on running their departments, the management
of reforms and the delivery of policies. However, as these reforms are
made, the respective government minister often neglects to remind
the public they now serve that the policies and reforms being delivered
are not simply what any government does, nor for that matter are
70
MATT BROWNE
they even what any progressive government does, but that they are
what good progressive governments do. In this respect the large
political and policy consultation process the Labour Party engaged in
prior to drafting the manifesto served a crucial function – it reminded
ministers that they belonged to the Party just as much as they did to
the government.
Other incumbent social democrat parties should follow suit and
ensure that the achievements of the government are used a powerful
campaigning tool: the results of many of our core policies are both
tangible and popular. At times, this also requires focusing efforts on
issues that may seems less important to voters if one were to follow
a strict interpretation of the opinion polls. For example, during the
French Presidential elections in 2002 the Parti Socialiste decided
against making the economy and job growth one of its central political
messages. From opinion polls, the core concerns of voters were crime,
immigration and pensions. As such, what were then considered the
achievements of the 35 hour working week, continued economic
growth and the creation of almost one million new jobs in a five year
period, were largely absent from campaigning materials and messages.
The Parti Socialiste campaign team allowed the Right, and the opinion
polls to set the agenda.
Subsequent analyses have often bemoaned the irony, claiming
the Parti Socialiste had been punished for being too successful on
the economic front over the previous five years, their successful
performance ensuring that the electorate were no longer concerned
about economic growth and jobs (Pierre Moscovici, Policy Network,
September 2002). Yet again, the key here would have been to remind
the French public that sound economic management and employment
creation is not what all governments do, but rather what a good
progressive government does, and that voting for another Party would
put this at risk – as indeed it did (Frederic Michel and Matt Browne,
Policy Network 2002).
Of course, highlighting and promoting achievements is easiest
when one has an individual or group of individuals that embody
that achievement – as Gordon Brown does for the economy in the
UK. Here, then, it is absolutely key that progressive leaders engage
71
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
personally with their electorate. The rigorous demands of office can
isolate ministers and make leaders seem distant from those they are
elected to represent; regaining the trust of undecided or lapsed voters
and appearing in touch with people’s hopes and aspirations is thus
pivotal to the outcome of elections. This is particularly the case when
combating a sense among a certain section of the electorate that it is
‘policy failures’ that need to be addressed. As Sally Morgan’s chapter
in this volume illustrates, Tony Blair was a crucial campaign factor for
the Labour Party in 2005. The ‘masochism strategy’ confronted the
Prime Minister with disgruntled voters on a wide range of issues, most
notably the Iraqi conflict to his visible discomfort. Yet it gave him an
opportunity to prove to the British people that he was prepared to
listen to their views and tackle their concerns directly, making the
case for another New Labour government. Confrontation brought real
connection with the public.
Tony Blair’s experience in the 2005 General Election in the UK
stands in stark opposition to that of Paul Martin in the Canadian General
Election in January 2006. In the run up to this election, the Canadian
Liberal Party had suffered a severe blow to its reputation through a
series of corruption allegations made against the Party. While Justice
Gomery, who conducted the enquiry into the affair, exonerated Paul
Martin and placed the blame at the door of his predecessor Jean Chretien,
the damage to the Party’s image remained substantial. In response,
the campaign team chose to try and deflect attention away from this
issue, rather than allowing the public to vent their frustrations. Paul
Martin, who most Canadians believed to be an honest and honourable
individual, was sheltered from addressing the issue. Unfortunately,
this meant that his powers of persuasion and personal qualities, which
could have reminded and convinced the public of his own integrity and
value as a leader, were not utilised. As such, the impression given was
of a Party and a movement that was no longer prepared to listen, one
that was concerned with incumbency solely for the maintenance of
power and privilege.
This failure to engage with public allowed the concern with
what in reality was a rather minor case of corruption to overshadow
one of the most successful records of any progressive government
72
MATT BROWNE
in recent times. During their thirteen years in office, the Canadian
Liberal Party had turned around a struggling economy, imposed fiscal
discipline and generated a budget surplus, presided over the most
dynamic economy within the G8, and was a leader in the development
of innovative policies in the fields of equality of opportunity, integration
and multiculturalism. The Canadian public removed the Liberals not
because of their policy programme or indeed their political record; it
was their way of doing politics they rejected.
Engaging in open and honest discussions is, then, essential if
progressive leaders of incumbent administrations wish to re-connect
with voters who seem more concerned by a Party’s failings in office
rather than its achievements.
2. ‘Rolling Campaigning’
One of the key implications of highlighting achievements while in
office is that campaigning cannot be restricted to elections alone,
rather, it must be continual. The results of the UK General Election of
2005 indicate that candidates who forged strong relationships between
themselves and their constituents can buck national electoral trends, as
Fiona Gordon argued in this volume. Consolidating constituency support
is achieved by MPs personally interacting with the local community,
solving local problems and promoting national achievements at a local
level. The Labour MPs Jim Knight and Parmjit Dhanda both exploited
this factor effectively, convincingly holding their marginal seats in
May 2005. The challenge of power necessarily distances MPs from
those they are elected to represent – ‘rolling campaigning’ counters
this problem and ensures that MPs remain visibly in touch with their
electors. Although the United Kingdom’s single member constituency
systems foster this type of campaigning, European social democrats
can still draw positive lessons from the British experience and ensure
that they retain as many of their MPs as possible.
Of course, as noted in the previous section, the ‘rolling
campaign’ should not simply be limited to the local or constituency
role of the MP. The ‘rolling campaign’ should also be embedded in
73
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
within the broader communications strategy of the Party throughout
the government’s term of office. We noted earlier that one of the
key tasks of the Party is to remind the government and government
ministers that they also belong to the Party. As such, progressive
parties should ensure that when national policies are announced and
delivered, their own communications strategy, involving ministers as
well as MPs, is designed to ensure that among the key electoral groups
and constituencies they are given political credit for policy. Such a
strategy would include ministers giving, through the Party, regional
and local interviews in which the national policy message is tailored
to the local constituency or region. The key to this strategy is to build
an effective bridge between the national message and the hopes and
concerns of a particular section of the electorate.
‘Rolling campaigning’, then, facilitates the creation of campaigns
tailored to individuals. The personal focus involved in this individualistic
approach makes progressives more attractive and accessible to voters
because they feel their opinion matters. Tailored campaigns allow
candidates, MPs and even ministers to interact directly with voters
and enable them to make their case in a less mediated environment
– either through personal interaction or local media, which tends to be
less comment based. Such an approach is crucial in regaining the trust
(and vote) of lapsed voters.
3. Emphasise Values and Ideas, not just Policies
Reform is the essence of centre-left politics and progressives should
never shirk away from this. Reforming policies are necessary and even
popular if effectively explained as a part of a larger vision of continual
improvements in the public realm. They create a political momentum
which is difficult to counter and increases the electoral success of
progressives. It is crucial, however, to emphasise simultaneously the
values and ideas behind policies, as they usually appeal to a significant
proportion of voters. Thus New Labour gains from electoral support for
its notion of free school education and the value of equality, as well
as its successful policies on improving current provisions, such as Sure
74
MATT BROWNE
Start. Nevertheless, it is also essential to highlight the values and ideas
that underpin these policies, as they serve to remind the electorate of
the ultimate goals of our policies – namely universal fairness, equity
and prosperity.
The lesson here is to focus not only on the reforming policies,
but also on the ideological values and ideas that underscore them
because they illustrate the sense of purpose of the Party has, give a
sense of the conviction to its leaders and candidates, and broaden the
appeal of the Party beyond the traditional members’ and supporters’
networks.
Even with a strong track record of delivery, the failure to
link the proposed policy programme to a broader vision of what the
party wants to achieve for the country and the core values it seeks
to promote can be disastrous, as the experiences of the PvdA (Dutch
Labour Party) and the Parti Socialiste (French Socialist Party) in 2002
highlight. The Jospin Presidential campaign presented a sound series of
policy options for France in terms of crime and immigration, as well as
public service and pensions reform (we have already noted above their
failure to place their economic achievements as a central pillar of their
electoral platform). Unfortunately, there was no red line which bound
these discrete policies into a vision of France the Socialists hoped to
achieve, nor was there any narrative about the journey the country
was undertaking – i.e. Jospin failed to present a sense of purpose.
Similarly, in the Netherlands, Ad Melkert presented his
succession to Wim Kok, the outgoing Prime Minister, as a managerial
continuation of the successful policies of the outgoing government. As
Dick Benschop has argued elsewhere, there was no desire to be bold,
no will to present a new set of challenges and opportunities to the
country, and no capacity to link these to the core values and objectives
of the PvdA. As such, the Dutch Labour Party failed to illustrate why
it was best placed to take the country forward (Dick Benschop, Policy
Network 2002; Wouter Bos, Policy Network 2003).
In both cases, the failure to connect policy with a vision and values
that resonated with the voters created a political vacuum into which
two populist leaders, Pim Fortuyn and Jean-Marie Le Penn, stepped. As
John Edwards has argued, the contemporary global insecurities - which
75
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
have given rise to new fears of terrorism, migration, national security,
outsourcing and off-shoring – have created a climate in which populists
of both the right and left can easily manipulate these insecurities into
a politics of fear. In their proposed resolutions to these problems, be it
economic protectionism for outsourcing or closing national borders to
migrants, populist leaders paint an overly simplified view of the world,
but one which often allows them to appear as though they are acting
with clarity and conviction.
In comparison, progressives seek to offer a nuanced, evidencebased response to the policy challenges, an approach that accepts the
complexity of the current global order and seeks to place its response
within this. Unfortunately, this leads at times to the impression that
we are little more than managers of disorder and change. Stressing
the values and vision of the party and individual allows progressives to
present a sense of conviction – in the words of Edwards, it lets them
“know what you stand for, that you are on their side” (John Edwards,
Policy Network LSE Lecture, 2005).
In an age of decreasing party membership, having clear values
and objectives at the heart of the political programme also facilitates
progressives as they strive to create new networks of support, for
example, by forming close relationships with NGOs that share some
or similar values to the party – such as the Make Poverty History
campaign during the 2005 election campaign in the UK. Intellectually,
these networks can inject new ideas of reform into progressive parties
– bolstering their ideological foundations and revising their values –
ensuring that progressives remain close to the concerns of voters and
with enhanced credibility and endorsement for the policies proposed.
Practically, these networks provide much-needed local support for
campaigning. In the UK, for instance, the Tories’ local campaign teams
outnumber those of New Labour by a significant margin. Organisations
sympathetic to progressive goals redress this imbalance providing a
much-needed boost to the activist strength on which the party can
call upon at election time. The addition of such support networks into
progressive parties across Europe will provide additional resources at
election time and provide a renewed impetus for reform.
76
MATT BROWNE
4. Set the Agenda
The success of progressives in recent European elections is due to
the fact that they have dominated the political centre-ground – New
Labour is no exception. During the 2005 UK General Election, New
Labour successfully presented a detailed manifesto that set out a
clear policy agenda and goals to be achieved during the next term of
office. The credibility of these proposals was strengthened by the fact
that they themselves were linked to departmental five year reform
programmes that had been included in the previous budget. The value
of this approach was twofold. First, it highlighted a clear sense of
purpose and rationale for the third term. Second, it staked out New
Labour’s identity clearly in the centre ground of British politics. As
a result, the Conservative Party was forced either to become more
extreme, or present what were essentially flimsy policy proposals in
comparison. For example, as was the case with their proposals for
public service reform, once their policies and figures were subjected to
serious scrutiny they did not stand up to the light of day. Alternatively,
their stance on migration policy became increasingly extreme – and
the evidence suggests that at the grass roots level in targeted marginal
constituencies local messages were even more subversive than those
broadcast within the national media. Both responses illustrated
successfully to the British public that the Conservatives were neither
a credible Party of government nor representative of the views of the
vast majority of British citizens.
The positive example offered by New Labour stands in stark
opposition to the recent experience of progressives in the United States.
Here, the Republicans have successfully shifted voters attentions away
from domestic concerns about economic growth, jobs, education and
welfare reform (although internal Democrat polls still continually rank
these very same issues as voter priorities). In the 2004 Presidential
Campaign, for example, the failure of the Democrats to present a
credible foreign policy and homeland security alternative was a fatal
weakness – with Kerry being presented as incoherent, voting in favour
of the war but not in favour of an increase in the funds necessary
77
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
to conduct the campaign – despite the continual bad news from Iraq
and the failure of the coalition forces to find any weapons of mass
destruction.
Outside of the United States, however, a more disturbing
trend is beginning to emerge, namely the attempt of right-wing and
Conservative parties to triangulate against progressive parties by coopting our agenda and values as their own. The recent experiences
of the Canadian Liberals and the Swedish Social Democrats, two of
the participants at the Policy Network seminar that inspired this
publication, are instructive. In the run-up to the January 2006 elections,
the Liberal Party’s pre-occupation with corruption scandals effectively
allowed Stephen Harper’s Conservatives to set the policy agenda. As we
discussed above, the Liberals failed to tackle the issue of corruption
head on. Unfortunately, they also seemed paralysed on the policy
front, failing to present any substantive programme of government.
Their presumption, one assumes, is that as he had done previously
in 2004, the leader of the Conservative Party, Stephen Harper would
allow the fundamentalist wing of his newly formed party to get out of
control and frighten Canadian voters.
However, fighting a more controlled campaign in which he
presented himself and his new party as centrist, Harper effectively
stole the initiative from the Liberals. He shied away from identity
politics, gay marriage and abortion rights. Rather, his agenda focused
consistently on five core messages: government accountability, tax
cuts, crime, child care and sustainable health care. His aim in doing so
was to present the Conservative Party as a centrist alternative to the
incumbents, incumbents primarily concerned with the maintenance of
power and government for its own sake.
A similar tactic was also adopted by Fredrik Reinfeldt’s campaign
team in Sweden, the leader of the four-party right-wing alliance that
recently defeated the Government of Goran Persson. Reinfeldt’s
strategy mirrored that of the Canadian Conservatives. Throughout
the campaign he sought to present the incumbent government as
defenders of the status quo and inefficient government. While he
argued in favour of more efficient government, the attack was aimed
at the manner in which the Social Democratic Party had governed;
78
MATT BROWNE
it was not a fundamental attack on the role or purpose of the public
realm. He sought to modernise the welfare state, he claimed, not
simply defend it or remove it. Combined with his youth and energy,
this helped portray the Social Democratic party as tired and devoid of
ideas, and the new right-wing alliance as insurgent modernisers.
Echoes of the Swedish and Canadian experience are all too clear
in the revival of the British Conservative Party’s fortunes following the
election of David Cameron as leader. What Cameron, Reinfeldt and
Harper share is a recognition that to be electable today their parties
must occupy the centre-ground, and that as part of this process they
must re-invent both their policies and their brand image. In many
regards, it is a sign of the success of progressive politics in Britain,
Sweden and Canada that right wing parties have gradually been forced
to accept ever greater parts of our policy agenda. This movement
mirrors the evolutions and learning that took place within many
progressive parties across Europe and beyond during the 1980s and
early 1990s, as they were forced to reject some of the old dogmas of
the past. Whether David Cameron will manage to move the British
Conservative Party to the centre-ground as successfully as Tony Blair
and Gordon Brown transformed the Labour Party through the 1990s
remains to be seen (although it may not be necessary if short term
electoral success is their primary goal). What is clear, however, is that
the nature of the next UK campaign will be very different from the
three that preceded it, and the international evidence suggests that if
Labour is to be successful in winning a fourth term of office it will need
to forge ahead with its plans for public service renewal whilst forging
a bold new agenda for the country.
In doing so, New Labour will have to face up to new economic
and social problems (such as rising income inequality in flexible labour
markets with high employment, long working hours, and the replacement
of skilled manufacturing jobs with low-quality service sector jobs); new
middle class concerns (such as the decline of occupational pensions,
the rising costs of further and higher education, housing and longterm care for the elderly); and face up to the costs of immigration
on community relations and the welfare state. In doing so, however,
it must remain devoutly New Labour. It is not those in our heartlands
79
THIRD TIME LUCKY?
that we risk losing through the Tories’ strategy of triangulation, but
those that joined us in 1997 and fear we are no longer preoccupied by
their concerns and worries. If we fail to convince them over the coming
years, New Labour will suffer the same fate as the Canadian Liberals
and Swedish Social Democrats.
80
New Labour’s 2005 election success was met
with some surprise in other European countries,
as many had predicted a more pessimistic
outcome. There was a great deal of international
progressive interest in the campaign techniques
and strategies which had propelled Tony Blair’s
party to victory. This pamphlet urges greater
co-operation, collaboration and networking
between progressives, particularly in light of
a resurgent and united international Right.
In this respect, the pamphlet is aimed at
an international audience and gives insider
accounts of the strategies and techniques used
by New Labour in order to secure victory.