Practical Ethics - Scand

Scand-LAS 2017, Copenhagen
Peter Singer,
Princeton University &
University of Melbourne
“The question is
not, Can they
reason? nor, Can
they talk? but,
Can they suffer?”
Jeremy Bentham
1748-1832
Introduction to the Principles Of Morals and
Legislation (1789), Ch. XVII, Sec. 1.
Man in his arrogance
thinks himself a great
work worthy of the
interposition of a
deity, more humble & I
believe truer to
consider him created
from animals.
Charles Darwin, Notebook B,
1837-8
Anatomical
and physiological
similarities with us.
Behavioral
parallels in
appropriate circumstances.
Shared
evolutionary history
We have some duties to be kind to
animals and to avoid being cruel to
them.
Wanton cruelty is bad
Animal interests count, but not
comparably to ours. Their
interests may be overridden by our
interests, for example in eating
them or using them in research.
Equal
Consideration of
Interests:
We ought to give equal
weight to similar interests,
irrespective of the species
of the being whose interests
they are.
Animals of
different
species may
have different
interests.
The interests of these cows and their
calves are fully satisfied by having enough
to eat, protection from the weather and
predators, and the social group natural for
them. We have those interests, but
additional ones as well.
“a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor
of the interests of members of one’s
own species and against those of
members of other species.”
Speciesists disregard or discount the
interests or rights of members of other
species on the grounds of their species
alone.
Rational
Autonomous
Moral
agents
Self-aware
Language users… etc
“So
far as animals are concerned,
we have no direct duties. Animals
are not self-conscious, and are
there merely as a means to an
end. That end is man.”
Immanuel
Ethics.
Kant, Lectures on

“What else is it that should trace the
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of
discourse? But a full-grown horse or
dog is beyond comparison a more
rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a
day, or a week, or even a month, old.
 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789), Ch. XVII, Sec. 1.
 If
we answer “yes” then we can also ask:
 What
if there were no (nonhuman)
animals?
 Would
we say that we need to
experiment on humans at a similar
mental level to the animals on which we
are experimenting?
If
we say that we need to
experiment on animals, but
would not say we need to
experiment on humans at a
similar mental level, how do
we justify the difference?
Then
We
we are not speciesists.
will be able to justify
some experiments, but far
fewer than we do today.