A N A LY S I S
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PAPERS
March 2009
Deterrence and Defense in
“The Second Nuclear Age”
BY
ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR .
R AVI R. HICHKAD
DANA J. JOHNSON
PHILIP W. PRATT
A N A LY S I S
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PAPERS
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE ........................................................................................3
DEFINING “THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE” ...............................................................................................5
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ........................................................................5
ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ......................................................7
THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: LOOKING FORWARD ....................................................................11
DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ......................................................................................12
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL : CONSTRAINING U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES ..........12
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEWS: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY ...........................................13
TAILORED DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE .......................................................14
TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: MODERN
NUCLEAR STATES .................................................................................................................................14
TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: ROGUE STATES,
NUCLEAR ASPIRANTS, AND NON-STATE ACTORS ........................................................................17
DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ...............................................................................................22
MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE FIRST NUCLEAR AGE ...........................................................................22
TAILORING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE .......................24
MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? ...................27
SYNCHRONIZING DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ..........................31
PREVIOUS EFFORTS ..............................................................................................................................31
OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION .................................................................................................33
ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION ...........................................................................33
OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO ..........................................34
CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ...............................39
ABOUT THE AUTHORS .................................................................................................................................41
Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”
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Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States, the other sovereign members of the nuclear club, and a number of
would-be proliferators have now entered what has been described as the “second nuclear
age.” This paper examines the deterrence and defense requirements presented by this new
age, arguing for the value to be gained through their integration. Offense-defense integration will provide to national decision-makers timely and informed choices of security
options needed to address the spectrum of conflict likely to unfold within the second
nuclear age.
The second nuclear age has some similarities with the first, but also exhibits marked contrasts. The security environment has transitioned from the first nuclear age, a bipolar, longterm competition between two technologically sophisticated states and their allies, to one
of multi-polarity with emerging threats, unstable actors, and varied inventories of nuclear
weapons and delivery means. In addition to the post-Cold War nuclear capabilities of
Russia and China, new challenges are emerging from rogue states, fractured nuclear states,
nuclear aspirants, and non-state actors. To deal with the uncertain environment and range
of actors characteristic of the second nuclear age, the United States must revisit its policies
and force structure underwriting the missions of deterrence and defense.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a “tailored deterrence” strategy.
This concept is built on the understanding that, owing to the range of actors present in the
second nuclear age, Cold War deterrent theories, strategies and forces alone will not effectively address the new security environment. Tailoring nuclear deterrence for the future will
require a careful mix of the strategies and forces proven in the first nuclear age, coupled with
new policies and capabilities to meet the emerging threats from new nuclear actors. These
will include modernization of the traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bomber forces to
enhance their deterrent capability and credibility.
The first nuclear age stressed the value of deterrence over defense. U.S. policy choices specifically rejected anti-ballistic missile systems to enable the stability engendered by the bipolar
balance popularly characterized as “mutually assured destruction.” However, the new actors
in the second nuclear age give little indication they will be similarly deterred. Therefore, the
second nuclear age demands the development and deployment of layered missile defenses
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capable of meeting a wide range of threats and a strategy leveraging their capabilities. This
system will require persistent awareness, global warning, tracking and handoff, and mobile,
flexible, rapidly deployable missile defenses capable of intercepting inbound warheads in
their boost, ascent, mid-course and terminal phases of flight.
Critical to these new capabilities, and central to our argument, is a strategy to integrate and
synchronize deterrent and defensive systems to meet future threats, thereby providing a
broad range of flexible, integrated, and time-sensitive options for U.S. decision-makers.
Offense-defense integration unifies and synchronizes the operational elements—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, layered missile
defense, and a range of offensive capabilities—to strengthen deterrence and defense across
a spectrum of plausible contingencies.
Fashioning a strategy that unifies and synchronizes the offensive and defensive elements of
our military capabilities to provide a range of options is imperative to meet the challenges
of the second nuclear age. Important steps toward this goal include:
• The U.S. Department of Defense should use the opportunity of the pending QDR and Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) to sustain and strengthen the overall credibility and capability of the traditional nuclear triad.
• New investments should be directed toward increased awareness and understanding of emerging
threats coupled with a prompt global strike capability to hold those threats at risk. A conventional
intercontinental ballistic missile, either sea- or land-based, and a next-generation bomber are deterrent capabilities that should be called for in the next QDR and NPR and funded for fielding a
decade from now.
• A layered system of global, rapidly deployable sea-, land-, air-, and space-based capabilities to defend
against ballistic missiles in all phases of flight should be high on the list of the nation’s defense
priorities.
• A distributed, automated, real-time, collaborative planning capability that is multi-dimensional
(vertical through the strategic-operational-theater command structure and horizontal among geographic combatant commanders and joint force commanders) and multi-mission (encompassing all
missions from ISR to missile defense and offensive options) needs to be implemented to support
the operational synchronization of deterrence and defense.
• Sustained support for operational planning and exercise activities conducted by the combatant
commands and the service components is required to implement operational synchronization and
to familiarize key decision-makers with its capabilities.
This paper examines policies and programs needed to underwrite new approaches to combining deterrence and defense across the spectrum of conflict in the second nuclear age.
Planning towards the operational synchronization of offensive and defensive forces will
provide for a future in which national decision-makers are given a range of options to deter
an enemy from striking U.S. or allied interests, or to defend in stages if deterrence fails. The
second nuclear age demands a military strategy integrating the policies, practices, and capabilities of deterrence and defense.
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Deterrence and Defense in
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INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
In his 1983 book titled The Nuclear Future, Michael
Mandelbaum posited that the nuclear future would
be much like the past.1 The reason that the nuclear
future would follow a middle path, he argued, was
that the alternatives, disarmament and war, were
“either too difficult to achieve or too terrible to risk.”
This belief formed the basis of American defense
policy and nuclear strategy during the Cold War.
The “delicate balance of terror” existing between the
two nuclear superpowers could be made less so
through strategies designed to deter and forces fielded
to enhance stability. A credible nuclear “triad” of
strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), and ballistic-missile launching submarines
(SSBNs) was seen as a guarantor of deterrence and
stability. Considerable investment was dedicated to
that triad of forces throughout the Cold War to
ensure there could be no single point of failure.
promised, in the worst case, to be the destruction
of the aggressor’s population and industry after a
“counter-value” response.
The primacy of deterrence (currently defined by
Joint Publication 1-023 as “the prevention from
action by fear of the consequences”) over defense
during the first nuclear age goes back to the earliest
days of the Cold War and deliberations over strategic containment of the Soviet Union within the
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Within
the Kennedy Administration, the McNamara
Pentagon calculated the contribution of strategic
offensive and defensive forces toward reaching the
objectives of “assured destruction” and “damagelimitation.”4 Secretary McNamara’s inclination
toward a strategy of assured destruction was initially strengthened by a 1964 report authored by
Air Force Lieutenant General Glenn Kent concluding that a damage-limiting strategy mixing missile
and civil defenses was far from cost-effective: the
economic advantage remained decidedly with the
offense.5 As the missile defense debate continued
through the 1960s, additional studies by the
Defense Secretary’s Systems Analysis office added
weight to Kent’s earlier thesis, arguing the Soviets
could easily offset the effect of any plausible
attempt to defend the U.S. from ICBM attack.
McNamara’s decision against deploying the Nike-X
system designed to defend the U.S. solidified the
dominance of deterrence over defense that was to
last throughout the first nuclear age.6
There was not such a failure and, despite the fears of
Fred Ikle and others, nuclear deterrence managed to
last through the 20th century.2 It survived, it seems,
owing to a condition termed mutual assured
destruction (MAD) in which the shared vulnerability of the two nuclear superpowers created a sense of
stability. The Cold War nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States were so
conservatively planned and technically redundant
that neither state could completely destroy the
other’s retaliatory force by launching first, even in
the worst no-warning case—a “bolt from the blue.”
The result of such a “non-splendid” first strike
1
2
3
4
5
6
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
See Fred Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Outlast the Century?” Foreign Affairs, January 1973.
Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.
Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough, New York: Harper, 1971, p. 176. “Damage-limiting” forces included both offensive strikes and defensive systems.
See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 320-25.
Enthoven and Smith, op.cit. pp. 188-194. Subsequent programs to defend ICBM sites received greater support, and the ABM Treaty allowed 200 ABMs in two sites for
both sides. However, the U.S. eventually fielded only one site, and soon dismantled it.
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• Deterrence is by definition a peacetime objective,
while defense is a wartime value.
The United States, the other sovereign members of
the nuclear club, and a number of would-be proliferators have now entered what has been described
as the second nuclear age.7 As we look to the
nuclear future in this new age, can we remain as
confident as Mandelbaum was that the world will
not stray from a middle path between disarmament
and nuclear weapons use? And should we remain
as fixed in our beliefs and policy prescriptions
regarding a policy choice between deterrence and
defense? In a classic Cold War bifurcation of what
he termed the “two central concepts of general war
strategy,” Glenn Snyder warned that debates on
national security policy were often inconclusive
because participants argued from different perspectives: those of deterrence or defense. For Snyder,
those differing premises were striking:
• Nuclear weapons are designed and deployed to deter,
conventional weapons are planned for defense.
Despite describing the differences between deterrence and defense in the first nuclear age, Snyder
was prescient in anticipating the needs of the second. Thus, he argued, “We must find some way of
combining their value on both yardsticks, in order
accurately to gauge their aggregate worth or ‘utility’ and to make intelligent choices among the various types of forces available.”8 In examining the
second nuclear age from a policy perspective, this
paper argues that a prudent road towards enhanced
deterrence and defense in the future begins by
appreciating the necessity of integrating their value
to enable timely and informed choices of national
security options available along a spectrum of conflict populated by actors and threats very different
from those of the first nuclear age.
• Deterrence works on the enemy’s intentions, while
defense reduces his capabilities.
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See Fred Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999;
Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1996; Paul Bracken, “The Second Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February
2000; and the discussion in the following section.
Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction,” in Head and Rokke (eds.) American Defense Policy, Third Edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1973, p. 100.
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DEFINING “THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE”
• A bipolar, long-term competition between two technologically sophisticated states and their allies.
Defining the second nuclear age provides a foundation for examining the roles of nuclear deterrence
and defense within the post-Cold War world.9
During the first nuclear age, Cold War nuclear
strategy was driven by clearly stated intentions and
demonstrated capabilities of the two principals to
ensure a bipolar nuclear balance of power. The second nuclear age features new actors whose possession of nuclear weapons capability is likely to lead
to a destabilized international security environment.
• Large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons.
• Sophisticated command, control, and communications systems.
• Multiple phenomenological approaches to ensure
accurate and timely strategic and tactical warning.
• Continuing communications through arms control
negotiations.
• Crisis management procedures and mechanisms to
avoid or contain accidental launches or weapons
system testing.
The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age
Understanding the structure of the second nuclear
age may best begin by comparing it to the first. At
its core, the first nuclear age was a contest of strategy between the Soviets, the Americans, and their
respective Cold
Cold War
Warallies.
allies.
was was
That confrontation
confrontation
bipolar in structure,
structure,featurfeaturing nation-states
with
nation-states withalleallegiances or ties to one side of
the ideological divide or the
other. Nuclear weapons and
their delivery
delivery systems
systemswere
were
developed, acquired,
acquired,comcommanded, and
controlled
manded,
and
controlled
with the
goal
of
maintaining
the goal of maintainstable
andand
credible
levels
of
ing
stable
credible
levels
mutual
deterrence.
We can
of
mutual
deterrence.
We
summarize
the firstthe
nuclear
can
summarize
first
age
as
being
characterized
nuclear age as being characby:
terized
by:
• Relative transparency of fielded forces through arms
control counting rules.
• Open discussions of nuclear doctrine and
declared policy.
The second nuclear age
features new actors whose
possession of nuclear
weapons capability is likely
to lead to a destabilized
international security
environment.
9
• Escalation restraint.
• Mutual rationality postulating that neither side would
ultimately risk the destructive
consequences of nuclear war.
The stand-out feature of the
second nuclear age is that
the competition is no
longer confined to two
principal players. Its actors,
extensive and growing in
both number and nature,
add a level of complexity
and volatility to today’s
On the role of nuclear weapons see George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn (“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p.
A15). See also the response to that position by Harold Brown and John Deutch ("The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19),
Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States of December 15, 2008, and the findings of the CSIS Beyond GoldwaterNichols report, "The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century" (March 2008) authored by Clark Murdock. We find ourselves in agreement with
those authors that the United States will “have nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.”
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challenges. Finally, it will likely fall to the United
States and its closest allies to offset or counter these
nuclear choices.
security environment making it increasingly difficult to assess the role of nuclear weapons and their
implications for policy.10 Additionally, the rational
actor model on which deterrence rested has been
brought into question.
Acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in the second nuclear age (as it was in the first) is seen as a
symbol of prestige and power – it puts one front
and center on the world map. This is particularly
true among aspiring new powers; their perceived
status within the international community might
rise through nuclear empowerment. However,
nuclear empowerment can be a two-edged sword:
the level of investment put forth by an impoverished state or non-state actor to indigenously
develop, steal, or buy nuclear weapons capabilities
may be disproportionate when compared to their
economic strength and political clout. To illustrate,
the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister
and later Prime Minister of Pakistan, said of obtaining the atomic bomb, “We will eat grass or leaves,
even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”13
A number of nations, some of which could be
described as having rogue leadership at the helm,
have either acquired nuclear weapons or demonstrated an interest in pursuing the capabilities
needed to develop them. In addition to these countries, the rise of transnational actors suggests there
are terrorist organizations, some state-supported
and some not, actively seeking nuclear weapons not
for deterrence but for use as weapons of mass terror. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon’s long-time
Director of the Office of Net Assessment, has cited
the utility of thinking historically, within a timeline that represents the level of available technology from antiquity to today, about the number of
people ten determined individuals can kill before
being killed themselves.11 Given proliferation
trends linked to global terrorism, that number is
higher today than at any other point in history.
Given such sentiments, the costs associated with
developing or acquiring nuclear weapons may easily
displace the prudent planning and resources
needed to manage them once they are in hand.
Therefore, the extensive command and control
infrastructure contributing to reliability and stability among players in the first nuclear age may not
apply in the second. In times of crisis, a new member of the nuclear club lacking a strong command
authority might too easily reach for a nuclear
weapon. Lastly, a nation’s investment in nuclear
weapons capabilities may also come at the expense
and marginalization of its conventional capabilities.
As a result, the second nuclear age has the makings
of creating players with second-rate armies and
navies relying primarily on a nuclear-based military
strategy. During times of crisis, this may create a
situation of escalating tensions, dangerous unpredictability, and limited response options.
Some of the actors in the second nuclear age benefit from what some have called a “free-ride to
nuclear know-how.”12 Much of the technological
underpinnings, strategic thinking, and planning of
nuclear forces are open to actors no longer required
to undertake difficult and expensive research and
development. This “free-ride” enables actors of the
second nuclear age to estimate whether the benefits
of pursuing or expanding a nuclear weapons capability outweigh the risks. The consequences of this
latent proliferation are several. First, any actor with
modest technical and economic resources has the
potential to exercise the option of going nuclear or,
in some cases, to grow existing nuclear capabilities
(although many actors, protected by the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, have chosen not to or have disbanded
ongoing developmental efforts). Second, identifying opportunities and actions to dissuade those
actors from going nuclear have met considerable
10
11
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Although motives for acquiring nuclear weapons in
the second nuclear age may not differ widely from
See Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis, Summer 2003, pp. 399-413.
Marshall speaks in reference to the work of Yale economist Martin Shubik. See for example, Douglas McGray, “The Marshall Plan,” WIRED, February 2003. The recent
tragic Mumbai terrorist attacks provide a baseline for assaults using conventional weapons.
Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age.” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, September 25, 2003, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030925.americawar.bracken.secondnuclearage.html.
From a 1965 speech to Pakistan’s National Assembly.
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• Escalation and first-use as plausible options.
those of the first, what does vary is the evolving
complexity of how national interest in pursuing a
nuclear capability translates to national security.14
In the case of nation-states, a country’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons rests on the belief that its security
will be enhanced. On the other hand, the notion of
national security as a basis for acquisition among
non-state terrorist networks has little meaning. Their
motives are likely to be organizational image and
pursuit of a radical agenda, rooted in a willingness
to inflict as much destruction as possible to achieve
their objectives.15 Thus, in the second nuclear age,
the traditional “security dilemma” of international
politics takes on a troubling dimension. Rather than
threatening another nation’s security by enhancing
one’s own, a non-state actor seeks nuclear weapons
solely to threaten the security of others.16
• The presence of non-deterrable actors.
• Domestic pressures to acquire nuclear weapons
outweigh external pressures to discontinue nuclear
weapon proliferation.
Actors and Capabilities in the Second
Nuclear Age
The previous section offered a general overview of
the second nuclear age, but this age’s developments
are best examined in greater detail through an assessment of key players. Today’s nuclear weapons activities involve both state and non-state actors; some
are responsible powers and others are not. It is the
combination of these governments and entities and
the challenges they present that defines the second
nuclear age and that dictates policy and force planning implications for U.S. deterrence and defense.17
The characteristics of the second nuclear age, in
contrast to the first, can be summarized as:
The Modern Nuclear State
• A multi-polar security environment involving nearterm and emerging threats and unstable regimes.
The threat posed by a modern (peer or near-peer
are other terms frequently used) nuclear state is
most reflective of what the U.S. faced in the first
nuclear age, and it continues to be one that cannot
be ignored in the second. This case is represented
by Russia and China.
• Varied inventories of nuclear arsenals ranging from
emerging capability to sophisticated threats.
• Collaboration among state and non-state actors on
proliferating nuclear technologies and weapon
capabilities.
Russia at times looks strikingly reminiscent of the
former Soviet Union.18 It rarely sees eye-to-eye
with the U.S. on security issues, real democratic
activity and open media are scarce, and it interferes
in the domestic and foreign affairs of neighboring
former Soviet republics by exploiting their dependence on Russian energy resources.19 These trends
have been labeled in different ways, but the notion
of Russian “revanchism” may not be far off the
mark.20 Moscow appears bent on reclaiming its
• Weak or non-existent nuclear command, control,
and communications systems.
• Limited communications channels among would-be
adversaries.
• Little protection against accidental/rogue launch.
• Uncertain capabilities and intentions among many
nuclear actors.
• Questionable doctrine well removed from traditional deterrence.
14
15
16
17
18
19
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An excellent analysis of this subject may be found in Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security,
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86. Furthermore, examining the instances of states that have pursued a nuclear capability but have subsequently chosen to defer
or stop their pursuit, may offer insights for deterrence and defense as well as for counter-proliferation efforts. Strategies of “nuclear reversal” and “nuclear hedging” are
addressed in Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.
Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-8, pp. 10-11.
Unless the non-state actor is interested in increasing its own power at the expense of other non-state actors, e.g., Al-Qaeda by becoming the leading Islamic terrorist organization to which other terrorist organizations swear allegiance.
It is not necessary to forecast rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to define the second nuclear age; the current actors possessing a range of capabilities and
intentions do that quite well. For a good review of contemporary social science research on nuclear proliferation dynamics see William C. Potter and Gaukhar
Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Summer 2008, pp. 139- 169.
Certainly the comparison has been drawn recently given Russian military moves into the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. See “Russia, Pledging to Leave
Georgia, Tightens Its Grip,” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, p. A1; and Stephen Sestanovich, “What Has Moscow Done?” Foreign Affairs, November/December
2008, pp. 12-28.
Steven Woehrel, Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, CRS Report for Congress, RL34261, updated March 27, 2008, pp. 7-13.
See for example, Richard A. Clarke, “While You Were at War…,”The Washington Post, December 31, 2006, B01; and Paul Reynolds, “New Russian world order: The five
principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008 at http://news.bbc.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm.
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strategic dominance and geopolitical influence lost
following the end of the Cold War. In contrast to
the United States policy of decreasing its reliance
on nuclear forces, Russia is expanding its nuclear
weapons capability, deploying more road-mobile
and silo-based ICBMs, fielding both a new class of
ballistic missile submarine and associated SLBM
forces, and pursuing a new long-range bomber.21
Former President and current Prime Minister of
Russia Vladimir Putin has also stressed that work to
field entirely new land-based systems beyond current
Russian Topol ICBMs continues.22 Furthermore,
Russia has repeatedly engaged in provocative military exercises involving nuclear assets, has forewarned the U.S. and its allies that it will target
proposed European missile defense sites, and has
threatened to withdraw from the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. All indications
are that Russia’s modernized nuclear arsenal will
remain a defining factor of its force posture.23
A preponderance of
evidence argues that
Russia will continue
to prompt major
considerations for U.S.
nuclear strategy and
deterrent capabilities in
the second nuclear age.
Therefore, despite the view suggested in the 2001
NPR that Russia was not a nuclear adversary to
plan against, a preponderance of evidence argues
that Russia will continue to prompt major considerations for U.S. nuclear strategy and deterrent
capabilities in the second nuclear age.24 In this age,
the United States and Russia no longer view each
other as open adversaries locked in a battle for
strategic superiority, yet diplomatic relationships
between the two nuclear superpowers are strained.25
Within this semi-adversarial relationship, the two
primary actors of the first nuclear age maintain
large nuclear arsenals in various stages of readiness.
Here, the second nuclear age remains remarkably
reminiscent of the first.
China is becoming a regional political and economic
power with expanding global influence, raising
concerns over its growing military power and rising
space and defense spending.26 Much of China’s
strategic focus continues to be centered on its claim
of sovereignty over Taiwan. It is Beijing’s official
position that an independent Taiwanese state must
be prevented “at any cost.”27 This statement implies
that China deems escalation to nuclear war to be a
credible deterrent threat in the event of a military
conflict involving Taiwan. However, Taiwan is not
China’s sole security concern. China is also preparing its military for other contingencies such as conflict over resources and disputed territories.28
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“Russia: Sevmash Launch of New Borey-Class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy, Bulava Update,” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, April 17, 2007. Translated in Open Source Center, Doc.
ID: CEP20070417330001; Aleksey Nikitin, “Who Will More Rapidly Obtain a New Generation Bomber,” Internet Natsionalnaya Informatsionnaya Gruppa. Translated in
Open Source Center, Doc. ID: CEP20070717358004.
“Putin Says Russia Developing ‘Completely New’ Strategic Missile Systems,” Moscow: Rossiya TV, October 18, 2007. Transcribed in Open Source Center, Doc. ID:
CEP20070707950033.
Another factor is the large number of tactical nuclear warheads Russia has retained, and the nuclear moves suggested in response to U.S.-supported missile defense in Eastern
Europe, to include stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba or pointing nuclear warheads at Ukrainian territory. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Russia’s Nuclear Threat is More Than
Words,” The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2008, p. A11.
The fact that Russia suspended observing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and announced the INF treaty “no longer serves Russian interests” adds credence
to this conclusion.
Stephen J. Blank lists several examples of American “growing wariness about Russian intentions.” See Blank, Towards a New Russia Policy, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
College, February 2008. See also Edward Lucas, The New Cold War, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 1.
“Xinhua: ‘Full Text’ of White Paper titled ‘China’s National Defense, 2004’,” Beijing: Xinhua, December 27, 2004. Transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Doc. ID: CPP200412270000034.
Annual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 1.
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With those scenarios in mind, how is China modernizing its strategic nuclear weapons? Should
China, for planning purposes, be regarded as a
small “modern nuclear state” or a large “rogue?”
China has at least ten types of ballistic missile systems either operational or in development, and is
pursuing further SLBM deployments.29 Despite a
professed “no first use” policy for its nuclear
weapons, China’s military leaders have occasionally
indicated otherwise, particularly in a situation facing American conventional capabilities.30 A book
published by the People’s Liberation Army’s
Second Artillery, the division of the Chinese military that oversees strategic nuclear missiles, noted
that a reduction in the nuclear use threshold be
instituted during wartime as a deterrent to enemy
conventional strikes on the mainland.31 In the second nuclear age, China, like Russia, may increasingly rely on its nuclear capability to underwrite its
foreign policy objectives.
sympathetic to various extremist causes are known
to be present in sectors of the Pakistani military
and intelligence organizations, raising the prospect
that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may fall into radical hands. Moreover, Islamabad’s historical antagonisms and conventional force shortfalls vis à vis
India, another nuclear power, illuminates a worrisome scenario in the event of a regional armed conflict. Additionally, high levels of political upheaval
and domestic strife suggest that Pakistan may at
best remain a fractured state and at worst become a
failed one. While there is no obvious reason to
consider Pakistan as antagonistic towards U.S.
interests, there are serious concerns about Pakistan’s
nuclear course, given its unpredictable future.
The Rogue State
If the previous cases are questionable regarding the
actors’ nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions,
the threat posed by a rogue state is highly unpredictable. North Korea illustrates this type of actor.
In the case of modern nuclear states such as Russia
or China, one must also acknowledge the less overt
threats that may emerge from a large, complex, and
potentially risk-prone nuclear infrastructure. These
activities range from illicit technology transfer or
leakage, to the inadvertent or unauthorized launch
of a nuclear weapon. Prescriptions for future U.S.
nuclear policy and strategic defense must recognize
these myriad dangers.
North Korea claims to have demonstrated its
nuclear weapons capability in a 2006 test. While it
has been suggested that the demonstration may
have actually been a nuclear device that misfired, a
later test might prove more successful. Coupled
with that consideration is North Korea’s long
record of developing WMD and fielding ballistic
missiles capable of striking U.S. soil.33 While a
North Korean nuclear weapons capability has been
dismissed as simply a powerful diplomatic tool for
its rogue leadership, its potential for employment is
real. Pyongyang has historically leveraged its
nuclear activities through a string of broken international commitments; there is little evidence to
suggest a more transparent or reliable course. Even
in light of North Korea’s most recent pledge (and
recantation) to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, its checkered past calls for continued U.S.
wariness. Absent the verification that North Korea
no longer poses a threat, holding Pyongyang’s
fledgling but potentially devastating ICBM force at
The Fractured Nuclear State
The “fractured” nuclear state—one that has
achieved a nuclear weapons capability yet lacks the
political stability to ensure its sovereignty and the
security of those weapons—is one of the most worrisome prospects of the second nuclear age.
Pakistan may be the greatest concern in this regard.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex is thought to
be limited and distributed, however the reliability
of its command and control of these weapons has
been questioned.32 Radical Islamic elements
29
30
31
32
33
PAPERS
U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to the Congress, November 2006, p. 136.
Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,” New York Times, July 15, 2005.
The Science of the Second Artillery Campaigns, Beijing: Press of the PLA, March 2004, p. 394.
David E. Sanger, “So, What About Those Nukes,” The New York Times, November 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/weekinreview/11sanger.html.
Steven A. Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2007, RS21473. North Korea is thought to have
enough plutonium to make between six to ten nuclear weapons. See “Disarming North Korea,” The Economist, July 19, 2008, p. 51.
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risk—and defending against it—is a prudent hedging strategy in this evolving nuclear age.
(2) transnational terror networks and spontaneous
terror cells.37 The former category includes
regional armed groups such as Hezbollah and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that may
control, or attempt to control, territory and population, and may have organizational structure and
access to substantial resources. Because of these
characteristics, this category of actor may be somewhat predictable and deterrable in a more traditional sense.38 Alternatively, the second category of
non-state actor is characterized by a diffusion of
ideology, high motivation and ruthlessness, and the
use of operational methods across wide geographical areas.39 Little to nothing is predictable about
nuclear weapons acquired by transnational terrorist
organizations other than their desire to obtain
them. The most visible of these groups have already
applied other unconventional weapons with devastating results, and some, including Al Qaeda, have
made it known that they seek nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Aspirant
The nuclear aspirant is defined as having a desire
for nuclear weapons capability yet lagging behind
the rogue in terms of progress towards that goal.
Iran and Syria provide good examples.
Iran’s nascent nuclear program has also generated
much international attention, but Tehran’s capabilities and intentions remain largely unknown.
Although a recently released National Intelligence
Estimate deemed Tehran’s nuclear weapons program
on hold, indications are that Iran could have the
capability and resources to produce a nuclear weapon
within several years if it continues its “peaceful”
nuclear program.34 Added to that are the troubling
facts that Iran’s leadership continues to support and
finance terrorist organizations, to improve the
range and payload of Iran’s long range missiles, and
to declare opposition to Israel’s existence.35
Given the potential for proliferation today, nonstate actor acquisition of nuclear weapons may arise
through numerous routes: direct transfer from a
patron state or government actor within that state;
theft or purchase of fissile material from any number of compromised state nuclear complexes; or
development of the technical base and materials
needed to construct a bomb from scratch. While
the last of those possibilities is highly unlikely, the
first two are certainly not. Clearly, the prospect of
nuclear weapons in the hands of individuals or
small groups is the most uncertain dimension of
the second nuclear age.
Syria has long been thought to have had an interest
in developing nuclear weapons, alongside its other
pursuits of stockpiling chemical and biological
agents as well as acquiring advanced missile capabilities. How far along it may be or how considerable its
interest in that capability remains uncertain.
However, Israel judged Syria’s path toward development unacceptable enough to have recently
bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear site. If the speculation that Syria received a reactor for producing
plutonium from North Korea is true, this would be
the latest on a long list of Pyongyang’s proliferation
pursuits.36 If Damascus maintains a desire for
nuclear weapons, its long-standing relationship of
clandestine technology transfer with North Korea
suggests a path for that pursuit.
The potential for collaboration among the actors
described above is also worrisome. A nuclear actor
prompted by state-sponsored terrorism or motivated by state-supported religious zeal offers a
likely scenario of weapons acquisition in the second nuclear age. Pakistan is often cited as an
example largely because of the combination of its
nuclear capabilities, sympathy and sanctuary for
Islamic insurgents, and internal instability.
The Non-State Actor
The non-state actor is characterized by two different categories: (1) regional armed groups and
34
35
36
37
38
39
PAPERS
Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” CRS Report for Congress, December 5, 2007, RL32048.
Ibid.
See for example, Martha Raddatz, “The Case for Israel’s Strike on Syria,” ABC World News, October 19, 2007.
Austin Long, Deterrence—From Cold War to Long War; Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research. RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 81.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 83.
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Government-to-government collaboration is also
likely, given a supplying government fraught with
political volatility. Pakistan’s record supports the
trend of collaborating with other nations—Iran,
North Korea, and Libya— to facilitate nuclear proliferation.40 Recently, an assessment by the
Institute for Science and International Security
documented that A.Q. Khan, widely considered
the father of Pakistan’s bomb and chief purveyor of
its illicit nuclear proliferation network, was
involved with the planned sale of blueprints for
small highly-sophisticated nuclear weapon
designs.41
PAPERS
The Second Nuclear Age: Looking Forward
Nuclear weapons will continue to be leveraged in
various ways: politically, as the proverbial big stick
behind soft words, and militarily, as the absolute
weapon.42 Will deterrence prevail as a strategy of
non-use as in the first nuclear age? Or is the use of
nuclear weapons more likely in a world of continuing proliferation, potential “loose nukes,”
unguarded or unaccounted fissile material, unreliable command and control equipment and procedures, and duplicitous and rogue governments?
It is within the uncertain environment of this second nuclear age that the United States must craft
its strategic policy and plan the necessary forces
and defenses to support it. Almost two decades
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it would be
wise to examine how U.S. strategic offensive forces
and defenses originally deployed to deter the
U.S.S.R. may now address a broader range of dangers. Does the deterrent strategy of assured secondstrike carried over from the earlier age still hold?
Should the long-held calculation asserting that
strategic defenses may prove destabilizing in times
of crisis be revisited? The definition of deterrence
must be updated with considerations of strategic
defense to address the motivations and capabilities
of new nuclear adversaries.
There is no shortage of actors with the capability
to threaten the security of American interests and
those of its allies. If we envision a threat landscape
that stretches across the challenges of the second
nuclear age, we can position the types of nuclear
actors based on their capabilities and intentions.
As Figure 1 depicts, the categories of actors appear
along a spectrum, and the threat each poses is generally defined by two inversely related qualities, the
probability of an attack and that attack’s intensity.
Throughout this paper, the spectrum will serve as a
visual reference for how the effectiveness of deterrence and defense changes with the characteristics
of the threat.
Modern
Nuclear States
Intensity of Attack
HIGHER
Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in the Second Nuclear Age: A Threat Landscape.
Fractured
Nuclear States
Rogue States
LOWER
Nuclear
Aspirants
LOWER
Non-state
Actors
HIGHER
Likelihood of Attack
40
41
42
Richard P. Cronin, et al., “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” CRS Report
for Congress, May 24. 2005, RL32745.
David Albright, “Swiss Smugglers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 16, 2008.
In reference to Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.
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PAPERS
DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE
This paper examines the second nuclear age from a
policy perspective, with the specific intention of
advocating the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of this new
era. Issues of reducing the number of nuclear
weapons, slowing proliferation, and avoiding the
possibility of nuclear weapons use remain high on
the national agenda, and there are choices within
the structure of the nuclear triad, both old and
new, that must be made.43 This section of the
paper details how current policy and force structure commitments will affect future assessments
and choices.
Nuclear Arms Control: Constraining U.S.
and Russian Nuclear Forces
START I is the one major nuclear arms reduction
agreement remaining from the Cold War. The
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, first proposed
by President Reagan in the early 1980s, was signed
in July 1991, and entered into force in December
1994.44 The principal focus of START I was not
only to reduce deployed nuclear weapons launcher
systems (land and sea-based ballistic missiles and
long-range bombers) to 1600 for the United States
and Russia, but also to establish counting rules limiting each side to 6,000 warheads. The deployment
(and destruction) of warheads to reach this number
was to be verified by an intrusive regime requiring
on-site inspections and regular information
exchanges as well as continued reliance on
“national technical means,” i.e., overhead surveillance satellites. Although the Treaty is scheduled to
expire on December 5, 2009, it can be extended in
five-year increments, and both sides have expressed
interest in applying key provisions of START’s verification regime to monitor force levels agreed to
under the 2002 Moscow Treaty reductions.45
The policy setting for nuclear weapons choices in
the second nuclear age is framed by two objectives
carried over from the first: reducing launchers/warhead numbers in accordance with international
arms control agreements and treaties, and specifying the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy. The documents defining the parameters of the
policy choices in these issue-areas are the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), in effect until
December 2009, and the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT, otherwise known as the
Moscow Treaty), with a target of 1700-2200
deployed nuclear warheads on each side by 2012.
The Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) of 1993 and
2002 stand as guidance for how the U.S. will
implement those treaty agreements. In FY 2008
legislation, Congress directed that an NPR be conducted in 2009.
43
44
45
SORT is the second major arms control agreement
affecting future U.S. nuclear force size and structure. Signed in 2002 and entered into force the following year, SORT commits the U.S. and Russia to
reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to
1700-2200 warheads. The Treaty allows each country
Then President-elect Obama stated, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, I will retain a strong, safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent to protect us and our allies.
But I will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons and related capabilities.” Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama at
http://armscontrol.org.
Despite Russian threats to break it, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) also limits the nuclear capabilities of both sides, but we are principally concerned here with
strategic nuclear forces.
See George P. Schultz, et al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2008, p. A13.
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Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”
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to determine for itself the number of bombers, missiles and SSBNs that would compose the force and
deploy those warheads. This deployed warhead
limit takes effect on the day the Treaty expires,
December 31, 2012. After that, each side is free to
adjust their deployed nuclear forces as they see fit.
Because SORT lacks verification mechanisms, the
inspection regime instituted under START I could
be applied to reductions taken under SORT. But,
as noted above, START I is due to expire at the
end of 2009, three years before the Moscow Treaty
limits must be reached.
at risk a range of assets valued by that nation’s leadership. The force posture required to meet that
deterrent mission was slightly smaller than the
Cold War triad, and included 450-500 Minuteman
III ICBMs, each carrying a single warhead. In justifying the ICBM component, the NPR stressed the
importance of maintaining a triad of strategic
forces to hedge against a failure in any one component, and noted that each leg of the nuclear triad
possessed unique characteristics and specific advantages.
The 2002 NPR offered a considerably different
context for U.S. nuclear force planning: an environment of uncertainty, military transformation,
and capability-based planning.48 While the traditional triad of nuclear offensive forces was maintained, a “New Triad” presented in this NPR
included conventional forces for strategic missions,
missile defenses, and the nuclear weapons infrastructure. With regard to sizing the nuclear force,
the NPR declared the United States would end the
Cold War-era nuclear relationship with Russia,
consider multiple potential nuclear opponents, and
“deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons
consistent with the security requirements of the
U.S.”49 The uncertainties of the nuclear future
allowed this policy review to chart a path for warhead reductions in the near term, but it was unclear
how those forces would be structured to meet the
SORT goals of 1700-2200 operationally deployed
warheads by 2012. What was clear was the George
W. Bush Administration intended to rely on the
nuclear triad of old, had plans to fully fund life
extension programs for each leg, and declared that
land and sea-based ICBMs and bombers would
play a vital role in the nation’s defense until at least
2020.50
Nuclear Posture Reviews: U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy
The U.S. Department of Defense has conducted
two major reviews of its nuclear posture in an
attempt to adjust American strategic nuclear forces
to a post-Cold War world. The first of these
reviews, chartered in 1993, concluded that despite
the international upheavals that brought about the
demise of the Soviet Union, “nuclear weapons
remained an essential part of American military
power.”46
In considering the size and role of U.S. nuclear
forces in a post-Cold War world, the 1993 NPR
declared that it was the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, not Russia’s nuclear arsenal (although
those might be related), that posed the greatest risk
to the United States. Therefore, the context of the
NPR became “lead but hedge.” That is, as the U.S.
sought to strengthen the non-proliferation regime
by de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in American
defense policy, some hedging was required. With
START I just entering into force and START II
not ratified, Russian nuclear capabilities remained
the focus of the NPR because they constituted “the
only nuclear arsenal that can physically threaten
the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.”47
Thus, the direction for future U.S. nuclear forces
and policy has been framed by the arms control
treaties and policy reviews of the past, and the
authors of the next NPR have much to build on.
However, the challenges confronting U.S. security
as we enter the second nuclear age are considerably
The 1993 NPR determined it was essential that the
U.S. retain sufficient nuclear forces to deter a
potentially hostile Russian government by holding
46
47
48
49
50
PAPERS
“Nuclear Posture Review,” http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html.
Ibid.
“Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2002/us.
U.S. Department of Defense, Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002. The theoretical Soviet “first strike,” the Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan
(RISOP), used to plan a U.S. second strike was formally cancelled in February 2005. See “FAS says U.S. continues nuclear strike planning,” Aerospace Daily, July 23, 2008, p. 2.
Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review. By this time the U.S. had indicated its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, thus allowing for development and deployment of
integrated ballistic missile defenses.
13
Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”
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more complex
complexthan
thanwhen
when
those documents
documents
were were
signed. Importantly,
Importantly,as as
a a
part of the 2006 QDR, the
Bush Administration
Administrationoutoutlined a a“tailored
“tailored
deterdeterrence” strategy.
strategy.
This This
concept isisstructured
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that,that,
owing to the
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age,
War deterrent
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theories, strategies
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and forcesand
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aug- to be
51
Tailoring
mented.51 Tailoring
augmented.
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CENTER
There are good arguments
for adhering to the
strategies and forces that
have brought us stable
deterrence in the past
against known nuclear
rivals, while investing in
tailored measures and
capabilities to cope with the
uncertainties of the future.
How should nuclear deterrence be structured to
meet the requirements of the second nuclear age?
There are good arguments for adhering to the
strategies and forces that have brought us stable
deterrence in the past against known nuclear rivals,
while investing in tailored measures and capabilities to cope with the uncertainties of the future.
Tailoring Deterrence for the Second
Nuclear Age: Modern Nuclear States
Along the spectrum of deterrence that stretches
across the challenges of the second nuclear age, first
priority must be granted to the most serious threat,
the nuclear inventories of Russia and China. What
do the lessons of the Cold War teach us about
nuclear deterrence at these most dangerous levels?
We must admit we don’t know for sure, because we
know only that those policies and practices didn’t
fail. We don’t know that they worked, because the
intentions of our adversaries are largely unknown.52
Yet prudence dictates that the United States maintain and sustain its deterrent capabilities for some
time until it can conclude that the nuclear arsenals
of Russia and China threaten no more harm to the
U.S. mainland than do those of Great Britain and
In dealing with traditional nuclear competitors,
deterrence in the second nuclear age and the forces
underwriting it may not differ significantly from
the first. Classic deterrence convinces would-be
aggressors that the costs of pursuing hostile actions
far outweigh any prospective benefits. However, in
the second nuclear age, there is a spectrum of
deterrence that can be tailored to specific actors
based on their known capabilities and suspected
intentions, and on our ability to provide credible
attribution of their actions. Even at the highest levels
52
of Cold War confrontation,
U.S. strategic nuclear policy
was based on tailored
deterrence of a sort, ever
since the 1970s when
“countervailing strategies”
and “limited nuclear
options” added counterforce capabilities to make
retaliation more credible.
The second nuclear age
departs significantly from
the Cold War stalemate of
two superpowers. The U.S.
and its allies face a wide
array of actors occupying
varied positions along a
spectrum of potential
threats. Nevertheless, the
saliency of responding
credibly to the existential
threat to one’s homeland
and to extended deterrence
for allies requires a deterrent that maintains and
sustains many of the properties that fostered peace
and stability during the first nuclear age.
Tailored Deterrence for the Second
Nuclear Age
51
PAPERS
See Keith B. Payne, “Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century,” Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2006, Number 10,
http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php.
See Keith Payne’s discussion of “the valor of ignorance” in Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. But Payne is not so much questioning the wisdom of maintaining forces and
policies that deterred Cold War threats successfully. Rather, he is questioning the extension of those theories and practices to a new range of WMD-armed adversaries and
expecting similar successes.
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Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”
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France. Therefore, the near-term objective of U.S.
nuclear policy must be to rationalize the offensive
arms reductions called for in the Moscow Treaty
with an adequate and affordable nuclear posture to
deter the extant danger. From a variety of perspectives, as outlined below, continuing to field and
modernize a substantial force composed of all three
legs of the traditional triad appears to be a prudent
course in underwriting this deterrent capability for
the future. Furthermore, because no explicit constraints on the U.S. ICBM, SLBM or bomber force
remain in place, the United States retains considerable freedom in structuring the size and composition
of nuclear forces to meet both legacy commitments
and future challenges. A number of factors—
stability, survivability, reliability, credibility, sovereign basing, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
flexibility—will shape and size that force.
weapons systems. The remaining warheads have been
redistributed across the deployed force of Minuteman
III missiles. Maintaining a distributed alert force of
450 land-based ICBMs helps convince an adversary not to attempt a disarming counter-force
strike. However, reductions below this level begin
to introduce stability concerns in that a nuclear
power such as Russia, in times of crisis, might consider a first-strike against a diminished target set
rather than suffer a first nuclear blow against its
own vulnerable forces—particularly if strategic
defenses are included in the exchange calculations.
Further weighing against a preemptive strike is a
distributed and deployed force of submarine-based
missiles, regarded as inherently survivable and
therefore stabilizing, and a bomber force that can
be generated and dispersed for survivability.
Survivability, Reliability, and Credibility
Stability
The December 2006 Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities
concluded that the “overriding priority for the U.S.
nuclear weapons enterprise is to provide and sustain a reliable, safe, secure, and credible set of
nuclear weapons needed to maintain the nuclear
deterrent.”54 It is precisely those qualities of reliability, safety, surety, and credibility that continue to
point to the need for an ICBM/SLBM/bomber
force to provide a complementary combination of
these attributes. Regarding the sea-based deterrent,
the first of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will retire in 2029—with SSBNs backfitted for the D-5 missile remaining in service until
at least 2042. Nevertheless, a retirement starting in
two decades suggests that the Navy must begin
designing a replacement submarine—the
SSBN(X)—no later than 2012. SSBN options
include a variant of the Virginia-class attack submarine, a new design, or a variant of the Trident.
Other factors to be considered are the continued
modification of SSBNs to SSGN configuration
(with conventional cruise missiles) or reconfiguring
the Trident to meet the initial Prompt Global
Strike system requirement.55 In any event, owing to
its flexibility and inherent survivability, the SSBN
In September 2002, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) released a study examining the estimated costs savings of reaching nuclear arms reduction goals through two approaches. The first of
these alternatives presented was to maintain the
existence of all deployed delivery systems while
reducing the weapons load on each. The second
was to completely retire delivery systems from service and remove entire legs from the nuclear triad.53
Unsurprisingly, it was shown that the option to
retire nuclear delivery platforms allows for a considerable cost savings by eliminating the operating
costs of associated systems. However, the decline in
deterrence and stability accompanying any reduction in force structure by increasing the number of
warheads on the remaining missiles was determined to be far more costly over the long term
than any short-term budget benefit. Therefore, the
CBO recommended reducing the number of
deployed warheads on each delivery vehicle, rather
than decreasing the number of missiles. Over the
last fifteen years, reductions in the total number of
deployed warheads have been partially achieved by
retiring two components of the land-based ICBM
force, the Peacekeeper (MX) and Minuteman II
53
54
55
PAPERS
Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs and Savings from Implementing the Moscow Treaty, Washington, D.C., September 2002.
Final Report of the DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
December 2006.
The DoD request, unsupported by Congress, was to modify two Trident II D-5 missiles on each of the 12 deployed strategic ballistic missile submarines and replace their
nuclear warheads with conventional re-entry vehicles. See the Statement of Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic Capabilities, to the Senate
Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, March 28, 2007.
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fleet will continue to form an important component of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force in the
second nuclear age.
Cost-Effectiveness
Defense planners will be faced with a number of
budgetary trades forced by rising operations and
maintenance (O&M) costs, expensive conventional
weapons programs, the continuing war on terrorism, and contesting discretionary expenditures.
With a future ICBM replacement beyond the horizon and current plans calling for extending the life
of the Minuteman III to 2040, the appropriate
investments to maintain that course and capability
appear modest in comparison to the return. While
the other legs of the nuclear triad will continue to
display complementary capabilities in the second
nuclear age, Minuteman III continues to be the
most cost-effective weapon system for underwriting tailored deterrence at the highest end of the
spectrum of plausible nuclear conflict.
Sovereign Basing
A deterrent force based on American soil signifies
that the U.S. maintains maximum control over its
nuclear arsenal and guarantees an appropriate
response when a vital interest is threatened. The
land-based ICBM and bomber force coupled with
a deployed SSBN fleet also reassures U.S. allies that
they are protected by an American nuclear umbrella.
The extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to allied
nations has strengthened a presumption against
proliferation when those countries face a nuclear
threat. For example, Japan and South Korea, both
of which rely on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence and
stability, each might have pursued an independent
nuclear deterrent following North Korea’s provocative nuclear activities.56 Given the prospects for
further proliferation among rogue states and
nuclear aspirants such as Iran, it is conceivable that
U.S. nuclear umbrella will be extended to cover
friends and allies in the Middle East and elsewhere
in Europe. Amid the uncertainties of the second
nuclear age, both allies and would-be nuclear
adversaries are aware of the deterrent value—capability and credibility—of the U.S. nuclear triad.
Flexibility
In a paper analyzing the 2002 NPR, Lexington
Institute’s Dan Goure noted that the “new triad” of
the NPR was wise in preserving the capability and
synergy of the old triad of nuclear forces that retain
the characteristics of being “robust, flexible and
responsive.”59 He also argued that the ICBM leg of
the triad was emerging as the most relevant of the
three in the second nuclear age:
High accuracy, counterforce potential, speed and
responsiveness were all characteristics of ICBMs
that gave rise to problems in the context of the old
East-West confrontation. …Now, those same operational characteristics must be considered as positive
benefits in the context of the new security environment… The operational characteristics of the
ICBM, prompt responsiveness, speed, precision and
the ability to deliver unique payloads, are highly
desirable when considering the range of strategic
scenarios the United States could confront.60
Responsiveness
A 2003 National Institute for Public Policy paper
noted the traditional arguments for a triad of
nuclear forces in the second nuclear age, but specifically championed the ICBM’s “promptness, short
time of flight and accuracy.”57 Until the United
States pursues and successfully fields a conventional
prompt global strike capability, the ICBM is the
principal weapon to hold at risk a strategic target—
that could be hardened or deeply buried—threatening the American or an ally’s mainland with a
nuclear strike.58 The land-based ICBM maintains
exceptionally high rates of alert using continuous,
secure communications, ensuring a timely response.
56
57
58
59
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If we now revisit the previously noted spectrum,
this time from a deterrence standpoint as illustrated in Figure 2, we see that triad forces carry
increasing significance as priority is granted to the
threats posed by modern nuclear states.
Details of U.S. security obligations to Japan, for example, may be found in “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” Security Consultative
Committee Document, October 29, 2005, available at The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html.
“Strategic Offensive Forces and the Nuclear Posture Review’s ‘New Triad’,” Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2003, p. 24.
A “Prompt Global Strike” capability has been called for by the Congress, but they have rejected plans to convert SLBMs, ICBMs or a space-plane-like concept to fill this
requirement.
Daniel Goure, “Strategic Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security in the 21st Century,” Arlington, VA: October 2002, p. 18.
Ibid.
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Intensity of Attack
HIGHER
Figure 2. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.
Modern
Nuclear States
Fractured
Nuclear States
Effective Deterrence
Rogue States
LOWER
Nuclear
Aspirants
LOWER
Non-state
Actors
HIGHER
Likelihood of Attack
Can “rogue” states be deterred? The United States
has acknowledged that the “contemporary and
emerging missile threat from hostile states…
requires a different approach to deterrence…:61
Tailoring Deterrence for the Second
Nuclear Age: Rogue States, Nuclear
Aspirants, and Non-State Actors
To this point, this paper has argued that from a
number of policy perspectives, the traditional triad
of nuclear forces remains essential to the formulation and execution of U.S. deterrence policy in the
second nuclear age. Indeed, at the end of the spectrum that remains less likely but potentially far
more devastating, the triad must meet the requirements generated by the existential threat as the U.S.
Deterring these threats will be difficult. There are
no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states. Our new adversaries
seek to keep us out of their region, leaving them
free to support terrorism and to pursue aggression
against their neighbors. By their own calculations,
these leaders may believe they can do this by holding a few of our cities hostage. Our adversaries seek
enough destructive capability to blackmail us from
coming to the assistance of our friends who would
then become the victims of aggression.62
Can “rogue” states
be deterred?
There is a range of views on whether nuclear
weapons can deter rogue states like North Korea
that may possess limited nuclear capability. The
belief that such states cannot be deterred has contributed to a doctrine calling for preventive military action against such states before they could
threaten to launch or transfer nuclear weapons.
Indeed, that was one of the principal, if ultimately
mistaken, factors in prompting the U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003. But Jeffrey Record has argued that
because “rogue states have critical assets that can be
held hostage to the threat of devastating retaliation”
nuclear deterrence will likely remain credible.63
builds down its nuclear force under the terms of the
Moscow Treaty. If we extend deterrence to the
more uncertain ends of the spectrum, however, the
problems of policy and force structure become
more complex and choices less clear. The two new
groups of actors posing nuclear threats where
deterrence becomes problematic are “rogue” states
with nascent nuclear capabilities and non-state
actors that might gain rudimentary nuclear
weapons and delivery systems.
61
62
63
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 20, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2003.
Ibid.
Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,” Policy Analysis, No. 519, July 8, 2004, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf.
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Record supports his analysis by pointing out that
no rogue state has ever used WMD against an
enemy capable of such retaliation, and concludes
that strengthening deterrence against these emerging threats is far more promising for international
stability than resorting to preventive war.64
and wide-ranging intelligence that identifies and
weighs the factors influencing the rogue’s decisionmaking, and a flexible and certain nuclear force
with global reach to underwrite regional deterrence
policies. A recent RAND study concluded that
classical Cold War deterrent strategy may not be
applicable against nuclear-armed regional adversaries because those actors may conclude they will
not “be any worse off for having used nuclear
weapons than if they were to forego their use.”70
Because game theory provided considerable insight
into the behavior of nuclear adversaries during the
Cold War, it may also be useful to apply such a
deterrent framework to the interaction of the
United States and rogue states in the second
nuclear age.65 Game theory is based on an assumption that the players are rational but, as Roger
Myerson has recently observed, although our
adversary’s interests may vary widely from our own,
it is also likely that we share common interests,
such as avoiding the costs of destructive conflict.66
Adopting a game theory perspective, Myerson
argues against regarding any adversary as irrational,
lest such a declared position evolve into a selffulfilling prophesy during times of crisis.67
Deterrence is much less likely to be effective in
dealing with terrorist groups threatening the use of
nuclear weapons. As David Holloway has argued,
such groups should be deterrable in principle,
“because something they value can be put at risk.”71
However, Holloway adds that they are likely to be
“shadowy” groups with no return address, that they
miscalculate the consequences of their actions (9/11
comes to mind), or that they actually seek to provoke
a massive response to fit their apocalyptic vision and
cult of martyrdom. Acknowledging these factors,
the U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy states
clearly that “traditional concepts of deterrence will
not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed
tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of
innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is
statelessness.”72 The June 2008 National Defense
Strategy reinforces this statement: “Deterrence may
be impossible in cases where the value is not in the
destruction of a target, but the attack and the very
means of the attack, as in terrorism.”73
Others agree that deterrence must continue to be
relied on in the face of these new nuclear threats.
Baker Spring and Kathy Gudgel, in acknowledging
the threats of regional powers armed with WMD
wrote, “The Cold War arsenal must be adjusted, in
numbers and types of weapons, to provide deterrence in a new and dynamic situation.”68 Writing
earlier, Keith Payne similarly noted that “it is not
possible to establish a generic formula for predictably
deterring a rogue challenger.”69 Because different
opponents (such as North Korea and Iran) will
have different motivations in acquiring nuclear
weapons, Payne argued that “the U.S. nuclear deterrent threat must be sufficiently flexible to speak to
all of these particular opponents and incentives.”
Payne’s prescription was therefore for substantial
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
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Those who believe that deterrence strategies will
have little success with transnational terrorist
groups such as Al Qaeda tend to urge policies of
defense, preemption or prevention rather than
threats of punishment. Sophisticated defenses have
However, demonstrating a willingness and ability to resort to preventive military action in certain cases may act to dissuade others from similar provocative behavior, including the acquisition or transfer of WMD. See Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage, “Dissuasion Strategy,” Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, www.CSBAonline.org.
The seminal classic is T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Roger B. Myerson, “Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist’s Perspective,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007.
Myerson goes as far to assert that, “It is generally much safer to assume that our adversaries will respond appropriately to a firm deterrent strategy when our resolve and
restraint are both made clear to them.” Ibid. p. 22. But that may not be true for all the potential players in the second nuclear age.
“The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Heritage Foundation, April 13, 2005, www.heritage.org/Reserach/NationalSecurity/wm721.cfm.
Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, op. cit., p. 127.
David Ochmanek and Lowell Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. The monograph goes on to advocate preventative measures to be taken before any missile launch, and active defenses to be employed after a launch.
“Deterrence, Preventive War, and Preemption,” in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba (eds.) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006, p. 57.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002.
National Defense Strategy, June 2008, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, p. 12.
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important roles in the second nuclear age, and they
are discussed below. But there are those who argue
that, because terrorists seeking to use nuclear
weapons are highly dependent on other actors in
their quest for nuclear capability, deterrence also
will play a role.74
techniques and integrating them to levels of high
confidence, is still in its early stages, and faces both
technical and organizational challenges. As
Talmadge concludes, “deterrence will depend on
convincing other states … that the United States
actually has the capability to identify the origins of
a nuclear weapon detonated on its soil.”79 If the
U.S. develops a demonstrated nuclear attribution
capability, and backs it up with credible threats of
retaliation, the odds of nuclear deterrence against
terrorists and other non-state actors in the second
nuclear age will be strengthened.
While threats of retaliation will not have much
utility if terrorists are bent on blowing up themselves along with their victims, “deterrence tactics
can be employed against their organizations and
territorial bases in a targeted manner.”75 Nuclear
terrorism is likely to be the result of theft or transfer from a nuclear-capable state, from indigenous
production or the purchase of nuclear weapons or
material. But these proliferations of nuclear capability cannot occur without some state support.76
The deterrent prescription, according to Paul K.
Davis and Brian Jenkins, is stark: the United States
must “credibly announce that any state or non-state
organization that even tolerates the acquisition of
WMD by terrorists within its borders will be subject to the full wrath of the United States.”77 This
statement, with tones reminiscent of U.S. policy
during the Cuban-missile crisis, is followed up by
the authors with the assertion that the United
States might “lower standards of evidence in ascribing guilt and may violate sovereignty” in its preemptive attack to remove guilty regimes by force.
What are the force planning implications for deterring these new actors in the second nuclear age?
U.S. deterrent policies and forces must be prepared
to address a wide range of nuclear threats, some
still requiring a clearly disproportional retaliatory
response. In other cases such punitive deterrent
threats may be ill-suited to deter an actor who does
not highly prize the civilian population or any
infrastructure that might be placed at risk.80
Maintaining and modernizing the traditional triad
to deter the capabilities of modern nuclear states is
essential as the United States builds down its strategic arsenal. But what additional capabilities might
be required to deter actors emerging along the
spectrum of plausible nuclear conflict? A 2003
RAND study on future roles for U.S. nuclear forces
argued that the forces and operational practices
underwriting a contemporary theory of nuclear
deterrence “are likely to look very different from
the current U.S. approach.”81 Specifically, the
RAND authors posited three situations (counterforce, special targets and critical situations) in
which the U.S. might threaten the use of nuclear
weapons against such actors:
Although the United States has not moved to this
level of declaratory policy, it has shifted in that
direction. The 2006 National Security Strategy
describes a “new deterrent calculus” declaring that
states harboring terrorists assume their guilt, and
will be “held to account.” This policy, referred to
by some as “expanded deterrence” relies heavily on
the ability of the U.S. to “define the nature and
source of a terrorist-employed WMD” to enable
the rapid response efforts that “may be critical in
disrupting follow-on attacks.”78 This process of
nuclear attribution, developing appropriate forensic
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
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COUNTERFORCE
Counterforce is defined as the targeting of enemy
nuclear forces to limit damage to the United States
See Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, pp. 21-34.
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “The Future of Deterrence,” SWP Research Paper S13, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2005, p. 13.
See “Nuke blueprints found on computers kept by smugglers,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 19, 2008, p. 4.
Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism,” Santa Monica: RAND NDRI, p. xv. See also Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?
New York: Prometheus, 2008, in which the author advocates steps for securing and decreasing nuclear arsenals, and strengthening both international institutions and
terrorist-related intelligence.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, www.whitehouse.gov.nsc/nss/2006.
Talmadge, op. cit. p. 30.
See Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, “U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies,” Santa Monica: RAND, 1995.
Glenn Buchan, David M. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, “Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces,” Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. xix.
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in a nuclear exchange. The RAND authors
speculate that fledgling nuclear powers are unlikely
to deploy hardened or survivable nuclear forces, and
that even a modest U.S. capability would represent
“considerable inherent counterforce capability
against emerging nuclear powers.”
to leverage near-term technologies to field a next
generation long-range strike system (NGLRS, also
called next-generation bomber, or NGB) to replace
the oldest B-52s by 2018, and continue the divestiture of legacy bombers. The NGLRS system is
expected to be manned and nuclear-capable.83
SPECIAL TARGETS
Persistent Awareness
If an adversary does take steps to harden or deeply
bury nuclear assets such as command centers, manufacturing plants or storage sites, nuclear weapons
may be required to destroy such sites. The RAND
study notes that maintaining a capability to successfully attack these targets “is the most fundamental
tenet of deterrence… holding at risk whatever the
enemy values.”
The RAND argument calling for ISR support
comparable to that for conventional weapons
demands an integrated, layered system of sensors,
platforms and decision support aids. ISR operations
in the second nuclear age may include overflights
in relatively benign air defense environments.
Because of this, nonstealthy unmanned vehicles, such
as the Global Hawk and Predator, and manned systems such as Joint STARS with improved movingtarget indicator radars may be included as part of
the ISR tools utilized by theater and ground commanders.84 However, most proposed layered ISR
systems call for a mix of space-based capabilities
and stealthy unmanned vehicles, with satellites
offering both space and terrestrial situational
awareness and a hedge against intelligence prediction shortfalls, and stealthy unmanned vehicles able
to seek and track mobile missiles or similar fleeting
targets. The Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System
(N-UCAS), currently in a demonstration phase, is
a promising system to provide such targetable
information over great distances and long duration
with sustained survivability.85
CRITICAL MILITARY SITUATIONS
Crises might arise in which nuclear use surfaces as
an option because other alternatives (e.g., conventional force, missile defense) appear inadequate.
Such a situation may require flexible nuclear-capable
forces that can be put in place to convey a deterrent
threat and that will be perceived as credible by the
adversary.
In all of these cases, the RAND analysts concluded
that if the United States is to adopt a nuclear posture
capable of deterring emerging threats in the second
nuclear age, it will require the targeting flexibility
and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support “comparable to that needed for conventional weapons.”82 In addition to preserving
and modernizing the triad, then, three additional
force planning initiatives to underwrite deterrence
in the second nuclear age appear promising.
Prompt Global Strike
Recent proposals for a non-nuclear prompt global
strike capability have been advanced on the premise that there are several circumstances “in which it
could serve U.S. national objectives to be able to
strike targets very rapidly, with high accuracy and
high confidence of reaching the target, and with
necessary military effect, but without using nuclear
weapons.”86 The circumstances under which a
Next Generation Bomber
Within the traditional triad, the long-range
bomber force is critical to maintaining U.S. longrange nuclear capability, flexible targeting, and
man-in-the-loop command and control (whether
the aircraft is manned or not). The Air Force plans
82
83
84
85
86
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Ibid. p. 93.
But it will surely have conventional capability and an unmanned variant is a strong possibility. See Robert Haffa and Michael Isherwood, The 2018 Bomber, Northrop
Grumman Analysis Center Papers, August 2008.
See Michael Isherwood, Global Hawk and Persistent Awareness, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Papers, August 2008.
See Tom Erhard and Robert Work, The Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 10,
2007. N-UCAS is not being designed as a weapons platform, although it will have such a capability, if desired.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report, Committee on Conventional Prompt Strike Capability, National Research Council, Washington D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, May 11, 2007, p. 2. The topic of this paper generally restricts the conversation to nuclear deterrence and defense, although conventional force can
clearly have a deterrent effect against emerging nuclear actors and capabilities and defensive systems that have for many years been conventional only. For a dated but valuable
bibliographic essay on conventional deterrence see Charles T. Allan, “Extended Conventional Deterrence,” The Washington Quarterly, 17 (Fall 1994), pp. 203-33.
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prompt global strike capability might be used are
generally conceived quite narrowly: a time-critical
strike to counter non-state actor or rogue state
activities or a strike at a distant target at the leading
edge of major combat operations. In the near term
the only non-nuclear option for such a global strike
must rely on forward-deployed conventional forces;
however, several proposals have been advanced to
gain a prompt global strike capability. One option
is to convert some nuclear warheads on the Trident
II missile carried on ballistic missile submarines to
a conventional capability. But Congress has balked
at funding this proposal, owing principally to the
concern that, in a crisis, launching a conventionallyarmed SLBM might be misinterpreted, eliciting a
“launch on warning” response. Other prompt
global strike conventional options include conventionally armed land-based ICBMs, intercontinental
hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, modification of
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor booster, or hypersonic cruise missiles launched from bombers or
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ships. Even if politically acceptable, the desirability
and feasibility of such capabilities will be subjected
to considerable scrutiny. As a search for a prompt
non-nuclear global strike platform continues, in the
second nuclear age the only existing capability
remains with nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
Not long after the end of the Cold War, senior
U.S. policy makers acknowledged that “deterrence
may not provide even the cold comfort it did
during the Cold War. We may be facing terrorists
or rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons at the same time in the future,
and they may not buy into our deterrence theory.”87
Fortunately, the United States does not have to rely
solely on deterrence in the second nuclear age as it
did in the first. It can now add missile defense and,
perhaps more importantly, the synchronization of
deterrence and defense. It is to these topics we
now turn.
Fortunately, the United
States does not have to rely
solely on deterrence in the
second nuclear age.
87
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, quoted in Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 58.
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DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE
Although the United States has pursued defensive
systems since the ballistic missile threat first
emerged, the post-Cold War period has seen the
most progress in developing and deploying missile
defenses. It is unlikely that these defenses will have
to contend with massive hypothesized Cold War
nuclear exchanges, nor are they designed to do so.
Rather, it is the advent and rise of nuclear threats
posed by rogue nations, nuclear aspirants, fractured
states, and non-state actors that necessitate layered
missile defenses capable of rapid deployment and
effective response. Although a lengthy historical
review of U.S. ballistic missile defense is beyond
our scope, certain milestones in missile defense
concepts and capabilities deserve a quick summary
to help position current programs and initiatives.
program led to the development of the SprintSpartan program: the Sprint for point, terminal
defense and the Spartan for defeating re-entry vehicles as they transited through space. Despite this
original formulation of a layered missile defense
system, the Systems Analysis office in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense judged that the Soviets
could easily negate the system’s effectiveness.89
Efforts continued, nevertheless, focused on the relatively limited number of Chinese ICBMs rather
than on the larger Soviet force.
In 1967 President Johnson ordered the fielding of
the Sentinel system to provide a limited population
defense from the Chinese missile threat.90 The
Nixon Administration refocused U.S. missile
defenses to protect U.S. ICBMs, renamed the program Safeguard, and initiated the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks that led to the signing of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty91 in 1972. The
ABM Treaty limited the United States and the Soviet
Union to two defense sites each, with no more
than 100 interceptors at each site. Additionally, the
Treaty constrained each side’s ability to develop,
test, or deploy ABM launchers and prohibited
development of sea-based, air-based, or space-based
ABM systems.92 A 1974 protocol reduced the
ABM sites to one for each country. Soon thereafter, Congress directed that the Safeguard site in
North Dakota be closed, essentially abandoning
missile defense for the balance of the Cold War.93
Missile Defense in the First Nuclear Age
In the late 1950s, owing to Sputnik, the perceived
“missile gap,” Soviet ICBM development, and a
growing concern about the increasing vulnerability
of U.S. strategic forces, a series of studies and tests
were conducted to explore the desirability and feasibility of defense against intercontinental ballistic
missiles. At this time the U.S. Army pushed for
deployment of a national missile defense system
based on the Nike-Zeus program, but it was judged
to be ineffective against the large-scale attacks the
Soviets might be capable of launching in the ensuing decade.88 The shortfalls in the Nike-Zeus
88
89
90
91
92
93
The system was designed around a slow interceptor missile and mechanically-steered radars, limiting its ability to distinguish decoys from real warheads, and leaving it
vulnerable to saturation attacks. See Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough, p. 185.
See Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 187-190.
MDA Historian’s Office, Ballistic Missile Defense: a Brief History, MDALink, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html.briefhis.html, accessed June 24, 2008. Much of the
historical discussion in this paper comes from this document.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Test and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 edition, Washington, D.C.:
ACDA, pp. 137-138.
MDA Historian’s Office, op. cit.
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In addition to establishing the primacy of deterrence over defense, the ABM Treaty focused on
continental missile defense. This effectively separated missile defense into different national and
theater programs and stunted the development of
an integrated BMD system. A decade later,
President Reagan’s 1983 speech again called for a
way to “render nuclear weapons impotent and
obsolete…” through a “long-term research and
development program…”.94 As a result, the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
(later renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization [BMDO] and now called the Missile
Defense Agency) was formed. SDIO worked
within existing treaty constraints and technical
hurdles weighing against national missile defense
to develop missile defense capabilities to counter
primarily the Soviet threat. However, the importance of theater missile defense was heightened
during the 1990-91 Gulf War when short-range
Scud missiles were launched against deployed U.S.
and allied forces. The ensuing Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) concept, comprised ofofground-based
ground-based
National Missile
Missile Defense,
Defense,
ground-based
ground-basedTheater
Theater
Missile
and a and
Missile Defense,
Defense,
Space-based
GlobalGlobal
a space-based
Defense proposed an inteintegrated ballistic
missile
ballistic
missile
defense system
system capable
capableofof
countering these
theseproliferproliferating threats.95
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106-38) was signed into law by President Clinton.
The Act declared:
“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as
soon as is technologically possible an effective
National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate).”
Subsequently, in response to the Iranian and Korean
tests of medium-range ballistic missiles, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States pointed to a growing threat and recommended that U.S. practices depending on extended
warning of future enemy missile deployment be
revised to reflect a non-warning environment.96
It was principally diplomacy, rather than technology that had constrained the progress of missile
defense. It was not until 2001 when President Bush
declared that the ABM Treaty had outlived its
Cold War-era usefulness that BMD deployments
could begin and an integrated ballistic missile
defense system (BMDS) could be engineered.
The 2002 National Policy
on Ballistic Missile Defense
eliminated the artificial
distinction between
“national” and “theater”
missile defenses, and
advocated a global
BMDS capable of protecting the U.S. homeland, as well as American
allies and friends. To deal with evolving threats,
the policy called for a layered defense system capable of defending against missiles throughout their
boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of flight.97
It was principally diplomacy,
rather than technology, that
had constrained the progress
of missile defense.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration increased the
priority on improving existing air defense programs
such as the Patriot and Aegis systems so that they
could intercept ballistic missiles. The administration also promoted Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), and advocated regional terminal missile defense technological advances, including the Army’s Extended Range Interceptor’s
(ERINT) hit-to-kill capability. This emphasis on
theater missile defense continued as ballistic missile
technology proliferated. On July 22, 1999, the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law
94
95
96
97
The result of that layered approach to ballistic
missile defense is shown in Figure 3. It illustrates
the planned approach to the sensors (radar,
infrared) on multiple platforms (space-, sea-, and
ground-based), interceptors and the command,
control, battle management and communications
systems to counter threats throughout the boost,
President Ronald Reagan, address to the nation, March 23, 1983.
Ibid.
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998.
Ibid.
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Figure 3. The Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (Current and Planned).
Sensors
Defense Support
Program
Space Tracking and
Surveillance System
Sea-Based Radars
Forward-Based Radar
with Adjunct Sensor
Boost Defense Segment
Midcourse
X-Band Radar
Early Warning
Radar
Terminal Defense Segment
Midcourse Defense Segment
Sea-Based Terminal
Airborne Laser
Kinetic
Energy
Booster
Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense/
Standard Missile-3
Multiple Kill
Vehicle
Ground-Based
Midcourse
Defense
Terminal
High Altitude
Area Defense
Patriot Advanced
Capability-3
Command,
Control, Battle
Management &
Communications
NMCC
USSTRATCOM
USNORTHCOM
Designated Lead Service:
Army
USPACOM
Navy
EUCOM
Air Force
CENTCOM
TBD
Adapted from: Lt Gen Trey Obering, USAF, Director,
Missile Defense Agency, "Ballistic Missile Defense
Program Overview," 10 June 2008.
midcourse, and terminal
phases of ballistic missile
trajectory. The complexity
of designing, developing
and integrating a BMDS
for operation along very
short timelines is suggested
by this figure.
Just as we must tailor
deterrence for the second
nuclear age, so must we
also tailor defense.
intelligence of those
actors’ capabilities and
intentions, missile defense
can hedge against the
uncertain nuclear path
adversaries such as Iran or
North Korea may take.
Thus, missile defense contributes to “deterrence by
denial.”98 Developing
BMD systems and conducting tests convey the
capability and the intent to defeat an attack, thus
dissuading an adversary from aggressive acts against
U.S. or allied interests.99
Tailoring Ballistic Missile Defenses for the
Second Nuclear Age
Just as we must tailor deterrence for the second
nuclear age, so must we also tailor defense. Indeed,
defense takes on an even greater role in this age,
because the U.S. faces a growing number of state
and non-state nuclear actors lacking the qualities of
stability, rational decision-making, and positive
weapons control that characterized Cold War
deterrence. In the absence of sufficient and effective
98
99
Where should emphasis be placed in tailoring missile defense in the second nuclear age? Figure 4
illustrates the potential contributions of missile
defenses against individual categories of actors,
defending against attack and denying the capability
Glenn Snyder developed the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, suggesting that denial capabilities worked on influencing the aggressor’s
calculations of achieving his objective, while deterrence by punishment affects his cost calculations. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003 p. 107.
See M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum, No. 225, January 2007.
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PAPERS
more modest 3,113.101 As previously indicated,
observers have noted a resurgence of the importance of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy,
with modernization of ICBM, SSBN, and bomber
forces all underway. Russia is expected to abide by
the terms of the Moscow Treaty, but may still possess an inventory of 2,490 deployed strategic
nuclear weapons in 2015.102
The contributions of missile
defense are likely to be the
greatest precisely where the
deterrent effect is the most
uncertain.
The quantity and quality of this post-Cold War
Russian inventory argues for an emphasis on strategic deterrence. Indeed, as the United States has
withdrawn from the ABM Treaty consistent with
its national interests and moved to field missile
defenses, it has stressed that these defenses are not
targeted at Russian missiles nor meant to threaten
Russia’s deterrent.103 Clearly, defending against an
all-out attack of some 2000 Russian warheads from
fully-alerted forces is beyond the capability of the
existing and planned Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system (GMD). The only plausible way in
which these defenses could be useful to thwart a
Russian nuclear attack is in the off-design scenario
featuring an unauthorized attack by a “mad submarine commander” or from an unauthorized or accidental attack from a Russian ICBM site.104 Thus,
of the attacker to inflict serious damage.100 In contrast to Figure 2, where deterrence loses effectiveness against actors seen as less deterrable, defense
gains effectiveness. Thus the contributions of missile defense are likely to be the greatest precisely
where the deterrent effect is the most uncertain.
That suggestion deserves further elaboration.
The Modern Nuclear State
Russia possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the
world, estimated at roughly 14,000 nuclear
weapons, while its strategic nuclear warheads
deployed on the Russian triad are counted at a
Modern
Nuclear States
Effective Defense
Intensity of Attack
HIGHER
Figure 4. Ballistic Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age.
Fractured
Nuclear States
Rogue States
LOWER
Nuclear
Aspirants
LOWER
Non-state
Actors
HIGHER
Likelihood of Attack
100
101
102
103
104
Although not shown in Figure 4, intelligence, broadly defined, provides insights into the nature and characteristics of individual threats to shape a tailored missile defense
response to those threats. Furthermore, accurate and timely intelligence can enable missile defenses to be more efficient and effective than they would be without.
“Russian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008, p. 54.
Ibid. p. 57.
See Remarks by the Honorable Walter B. Slocombe on “National Missile Defense Policy,” November 5, 1999,http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/Slocombe1199.html.
Also see “Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,” Moscow, Russia: March 17, 2008,
http://www.stae.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102315.htm.
See Russ Shaver, “Priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense,” in Paul K. Davis (ed), New Challenges for Defense Planning, Santa Monica: RAND, 1994, p.265.
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directed against China; it is designed to deal with
the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat.109
regarding Russia, missile defenses play a minor role
along our spectrum of actors and threats in the
second nuclear age.
Despite that declaration, the U.S. deployment of
missile defenses on its homeland may have prodded
Chinese strategic modernization. For that matter,
the U.S. implied it did not object if China modernized its long-range missile force if that would make
China more comfortable with American missile
defense plans.110 Regardless of that buildup and the
state of U.S.-Chinese relations, the missile defense
capability being deployed by the United States will
pose a significant defense and “deterrent by denial”
to any planned and deployed Chinese nuclear force
over the next decade and beyond.
China is the second state with the capability of
launching an intercontinental missile attack on the
United States—and it is increasing its capability to
do so.105 Projections of China’s growing military
strength suggest that the PRC “seeks to maintain
domestic and regional stability while it develops its
economic, military, scientific, and cultural
power.”106 Consistent with that strategy and with
an anti-access/area denial capability, the PRC is
developing numerous types of ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. Current estimates are that China now has about 176 deployed
nuclear warheads, and up to 240 counting stored
warheads. But China’s recent deployment of the
new DF-31 and 31A ICBMs with ranges up to
7,000 miles may be the most worrisome development. The U.S. intelligence community predicts
that China may have about 100 warheads capable
of reaching the United States mainland by 2015.107
Rogue States, Nuclear Aspirants, Fractured States,
and Non-state Actors
The threats presented by rogue states, nuclear aspirants, fractured states, and non-state actors are the
focus of the current BMDS. Developing a means
of defense against rogue states possessing both WMD
and ballistic missiles reduces the level of risk associated with the uncertainty regarding these actors’
motivations and intentions, and establishes a defensive hedge against a deterrence failure. North
Korea is the rogue state most commonly referred to
in arguments supporting missile defense, and Iran
is a nuclear aspirant; both have demonstrated capabilities to conduct multiple-salvo missile launches.
While these countries rightly receive the most
attention for missile defense, the global proliferation of WMD and delivery means demand a
BMDS capable of global flexible response.
Although the U.S. chose not to defend itself
against Soviet ballistic missile attack, that was not
the case regarding China. The Sentinel missile
defense system proposed by President Johnson in
1967 and supported by President Nixon in 1970
was primarily designed to provide an area defense
of the United States against Chinese ICBM
attack.108 With the signing of the ABM Treaty
and the eventual deactivation of the Safeguard
complex in 1976, defense against Chinese ICBMs
was forgone. However, the subsequent operational
capability of the GMD system has again raised the
issue of negating the Chinese strategic deterrent.
When China and Russia issued a joint statement
condemning American plans to field national missile defense, the U.S. State Department declared
that such a system was not directed against them:
North Korea publicly stated its intention to launch
a satellite on its Taepo Dong I. While the 1998
alleged satellite launch failed, the missile was
launched over Japan’s Honshu Island, creating
political turmoil in Japan and eventually pushing
the Japanese government toward its own missile
defenses and a change in its constitution to allow
such capabilities.111 Variants of the Taepo Dong
We’ve made it clear that our National Missile
Defense is not directed against Russia and it is not
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
PAPERS
“Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, p. 42.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, p. 1.
“Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008,” p. 42.
Enthoven and Smith, op.cit., p. 192. See also Keith Payne, The Great American Gamble, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008, pp. 137-140.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “US Says Missile Defense not Aimed at China, Russia,” July 19, 2000,
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/19/eng20000719_45848.html.
See William E. Berry, Jr., “Northeast Asia Implications,” in Wirtz and Larsen (eds), Nuclear Transformation, p. 227.
Steven A. Hildreth, CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, CRS RS21473, January 24, 2008, p. 2.
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missile have different ranges. The short or intermediate range versions could reach Guam, Okinawa,
and Japan, and the Taepo Dong II may be able to
reach Alaska and Hawaii from North Korea.112
of state-sponsored terrorism and WMD technology transfer. The likelihood of these actors using a
nuclear weapon, once in their possession, is high.
But the intensity of such an attack, and the probability of ballistic missile use, is low. Nevertheless,
any such prospect bolsters the need for mobile,
flexible missile defenses, supported by persistent
awareness, tailored to deal with a threat from unanticipated and unpredictable directions.
Iran has an ambitious ballistic missile development
program aided by Russia, China, and North Korea.
Its Shahab-3 long range ballistic missile was tested
as recently as July 2008.113 That missile’s estimated
range of 1,250 miles poses a threat not only to
Israel, but also to Pakistan, India, Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia, and parts of Eastern Europe. This
could lead the U.S. to assist its allies in seeking
regional missile defense solutions. Iran’s refusal to
halt its nuclear production program promotes concern that fissile material could be diverted to a
weapons capability.114 Publicly acknowledged U.S.
intelligence assessments suggest that Iran could
develop a nuclear-tipped ICBM before 2015.115
Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age:
How Much is Enough?
Given the diverse threats of this second nuclear
age, how much missile defense, and of what kind, is
enough? Dean Wilkening sketched out an
approach to answering that question a decade
ago.118 Once an intercontinental threat appeared,
he argued, a defense with about 100 interceptors
deployed at one or two sites around the U.S.
should be able to intercept an incoming attack of
10-20 warheads. That assumed that defensive systems could detect and track those warheads with
nearly perfect accuracy, but that the probability of
kill for each interceptor was relatively low.
Challenges that could stretch these rates of success
included more numerous threats, decoys, and countermeasures, and thus Wilkening argued for a layered system of boost-phase, mid-course and
terminal missile defenses, with particular emphasis
placed on airborne boost-phase intercept systems.
Pakistan, motivated principally by India’s plans to
deploy a nuclear triad of aircraft and land- and seabased missiles, appears to be improving its nuclear
weapons and delivery capabilities. Recent estimates
of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal suggest as many as
60 nuclear weapons and perhaps four types of ballistic missiles that can deliver significant payloads
over various ranges. The most troubling of these is
the Shaheen-2 with a range of more than 1,200
miles. Still under development, that missile was
tested in February 2007.116 It is not only the
Pakistani deterrent with respect to India that is of
concern, but also the chance that instability, civil
war, or a coup could result in a new set of actors,
hostile to U.S. interests, obtaining control of these
weapons and delivery systems.117
Eased by the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty in 2002, a good deal of progress toward that
layered system of missile defense has been made
since Wilkening made those projections. In the
words of the Missile Defense Agency:
Non-state Actors are generally characterized as
undeterrable extremists or terrorists seeking WMD
to carry out their radical goals. The global reach of
these non-state actors is a product not only their
own capabilities, but also their worldwide network
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
PAPERS
With the initial fielding of the BMDS in July 2006,
the United States now has a limited defense against
ballistic missile attack. This initial capability provides a defense against short and medium-range ballistic missiles using Patriot Advanced Capability
Ibid.
“U.S. Source Disputes Iran Missile Tests,” CNN, July 10, 2008. While Iran launched seven missiles, including a Shahab-3, on July 9, U.S. intelligence community officials disputed the Iranian claim to multiple launches on July 10. See also “Iran Reports Test of Craft Able to Carry a Satellite,” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, p. A5; and
“Iran looks forward to next satellite launch attempt,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 14, 2008, p. 2.
Michael Goodman and Wyn Q. Bowen, “Behind Iran’s Nuclear Weapons ‘halt’,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 19, 2008, http://thebulletin.org.
See also “Iran Issues New Warnings after Defying a Deadline,” The New York Times, August 5, 2008, p. A10.
Richard Garwin, “When could Iran deliver a nuclear weapon?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2008, http://thebulletin.org.
See “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74.
See David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” October 2001, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypper.html.
Dean A. Wilkening, “How Much Ballistic Missile Defense is Enough,” Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation, October 1998.
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(PAC-3) missiles and Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The
initial capability also enables engagement of intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles
in the midcourse phase using Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs). These layers are integrated
through an advanced C2BMC network.119
Global Warning, Tracking and Handoff
Since the 1960s, the United States has developed a
highly reliable and accurate surveillance and missile
warning system comprised of space-based sensors,
ground-based radars, and a command and control
network providing integrated warning of ballistic
missile launches. Because of the criticality of missile warning, the U.S. relies on sensors based on
multiple phenomenology (e.g., radar, electro-optical/infrared) to ensure accuracy and confidence in
attack warning and attack assessment. However,
the increasing complexity of the global threat, coupled with technological improvements in sensors
and communications, drive the requirement for
advanced sensor capabilities serving both intercontinental and regional missile defense. Tracking ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase against the
cold backdrop of space calls for sensors able to
detect and discriminate among decoys, chaff, and
other countermeasures, to then track the warhead,
and to hand off its trajectory to interceptor fire
control. Multiple terrestrial and space-based sensors and their associated C3 form the foundation
for a layered approach to a global sensor network.
Operational integration of these various systems
poses a considerable challenge as each platform,
interceptor, and the command and control and sensor systems enabling them, proceed along differing
paths to maturity. For example, the GMD system
has encountered considerable testing hurdles, while
the THAAD system, after a number of failures, has
enjoyed a string of successes.120 This unevenness in
system performance and technological maturity
poses significant challenges to integrated missile
defense: “the interaction of active defense systems,
passive defense systems, and attack operations, as
well as the battle management, command control
and communications, and intelligence systems
required to support them.”121
Where should emphasis be placed in the BMDS as
we grapple with the threats of the second nuclear
age? A glance at the spectrum of deterrence and
defense in the second nuclear age (Figure 4) suggests that the United States may wish to place
increasing weight on the most problematic of these
threats; the rogue, nuclear aspirants, and fractured
states with nuclear weapons and delivery capability.
While North Korea and Iran provide the focus for
the near term deployed BMDS, the growing relationships among these actors suggest a strategy
comprised of global, mobile BMD interceptor
capabilities integrated with the ability to provide
global precise and persistent tracking, discrimination, and space situational awareness.
Mobile, Flexible, Rapidly Deployable Interceptors
Only a mobile interceptor capability can be sufficiently flexible to be deployed wherever needed to
respond to a wide range of threats. The problem
with fixed missile defense sites, other than those
constructed on U.S. soil, is that they rely on strategic assumptions that may not prove to be long-lasting.122 Daniel Goure has argued that assumptions
that Russia could be treated as an ally, and that we
could safely predict the launch locations of ballistic
missile threats, leading to a decision to place a permanent “third site” in Eastern Europe, must, in
light of the Russian invasion of Georgia, be questioned.123 Unlike fixed installations that are subject
to political whim, geo-political pressures, and preventive or pre-emptive attack, mobile missile
defenses can respond to each of these vagaries.
In the previous section we outlined key factors, such as
stability, survivability, flexibility and sovereign basing,
that should shape U.S. deterrent capability in the
second nuclear age. What are the factors that should
structure a missile defense system for the future?
119
120
121
122
123
PAPERS
“Missile Defense Worldwide,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. DoD, BMDS Booklet, Fifth Edition, 2008, p. 1. C2BMC stands for Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications.
“U.S. anti-missile testing takes a hit, scores a hit,” C4ISR Journal, August 2008, p. 8. See also, Steven Hildreth, “Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status
Overview,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2007.
Kerry M. Kartchner, “Implementing Missile Defense” in Wirtz and Larsen, op.cit., p. 78.
For instance, premising strategic decisions on the continued willingness of a sovereign nation to allow permanent missile defense basing on its territory may not prove viable
over the longer term.
Daniel Goure, “Dealing with the Russian Threat,” Defense News, September 8, 2008.
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These land-mobile, sea-mobile, or air-based systems
do not require a permanent, negotiated and, possibly,
disruptive overseas presence, nor do they require a
large force protection footprint. They are responsive to changes in domestic attitudes on defense,
are less vulnerable to foreign attack, and are projected to be more cost-effective. A rapidly deployable missile defense capability provides a quick,
defensive option to an unexpected missile crisis,
could be used to reinforce existing defenses as a crisis escalates, and would have to be factored into an
adversary’s deterrent calculus as he contemplates
the success of an initial missile strike. Such a capability, owing to its flexible deployment, basing mode
and technologies employed, could add value to a
layered system throughout the boost, ascent and
mid-course phase of missile and warhead flight.
Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
program. C2BMC is designed to ensure the flow of
information necessary to detect, track, link sensors
and weapons, and defeat any missile attack on any
vector, in any phase of flight.
C2BMC provides a planning capability to locate
sensors and weapons systems to counter identified
threats; situational awareness at all leadership levels
of the evolving battle and status of defensive assets,
sensor netting to detect, identify, track and discriminate threats; global integrated fire control to pair
the right sensors and weapons systems against multiple threats for the highest probability of kill and
most efficient management of a relatively limited
shot magazine; and global communications networks to manage and distribute essential data efficiently.124
Ground, Airborne and Space-based Sensors
What are the force planning implications for a ballistic missile defense system to meet the challenges
of the second nuclear age? The good news is that,
unlike deterrence, we do not have to ponder the
question of whether the putative adversary will be
influenced by the measures we put in place. The
ability to defend against a missile strike is a technical, not a psychological problem. The bad news is
that the threats are proliferating, and show no signs
of abating. Thus the challenges for missile defense
are every bit as great as those facing an offensive
“prompt global strike” capability, with the added
challenge that these defensive systems must
respond on a moment’s notice, and they cannot
afford to miss. Given those challenges, and the
above requirements, a prudent investment path for
missile defense in the second nuclear age should
include the following.
A layered integrated system of ballistic missile
defenses must first rely on a family of sensors. This
family will include current and modified groundbased sensors, and mobile, sea-based sensors and
radars such as X-band radars on Aegis destroyers as
well as a “very powerful X-band radar mounted on
a semi-submersible.”125 Currently, the legacy
Defense Support Program is the only operational
space-based missile defense sensor providing early
warning alerts on launch and initial trajectory aim
point information. Critical additions to this capability will be the Space-Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) and the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS). These will provide attack warning,
target detection, and precise tracking for interceptor fire control solutions and engagement in all
phases of the missile’s ballistic trajectory. Deployed
to a forward theater, airborne sensors provide additional sources of sensor phenomenology for persistent awareness.
Missile Defense C4ISR
“Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance” (C4ISR) is generally far too
encompassing a phrase to provide meaningful force
planning guidance, but an integrated approach to a
global ballistic missile defense demands investment
across-the-board. The centerpiece of the Missile
Defense Agency’s plans for a layered missile defense
system is its Command and Control, Battle
124
125
PAPERS
Sea-based Missile Defense
Reportedly, a threat posed by a new Chinese ballistic missile against U.S. Navy ships led to the recent
decision to build more DDG-51 class-destroyers to
meet sea-based missile defense requirements.
Evidently, it also led U.S. regional combatant commanders to demand upgrades to current sea-based
U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense—Worldwide,” Washington, D.C.: BMDS Booklet, Fifth Edition, p 15.
DoD News Briefing with Lt. General Henry Obering, Director, Missile Defense Agency, July 15, 2008.
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missile defense capability and increased production
to meet future demands.126 While these improvements may enable U.S. naval forces to overcome
anti-access barriers in place along the Pacific Rim,
an integrated Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
ballistic missile defense system with sea-based
capability able to defeat long-range ballistic missiles during boost, ascent and mid-course phases of
flight will be a more important contribution. The
KEI system is designed to interoperate with existing sensors, planned BMDS sensors, and the
C2BMC system to add an additional layer of
“high-performance, high-mission assurance, and
cost-effective” BMDS capability.127 KEI’s fire control allows the system to be sensor indifferent and,
therefore, compute an intercept solution based on
threat information gathered from any sensor in
the family.
Airborne Boost-phase Missile Defense
The airborne laser (ABL) is the near-term airborne
capability of most interest to ballistic missile
defense. Focused on the boost-phase threat posed
by ballistic missiles, the ABL uses a chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) “capable of producing a
megawatt-class beam with a range of several hundred kilometers.”130 Integrated into a modified
commercial aircraft, the ABL is seen as a “first line
of defense” in the BMDS, owing to its ability to
destroy a missile in boost phase. This capability
reduces the number of targets that subsequent layers of the system will need to engage. The ABL’s
ability to detect launch sites will also facilitate
counterstrikes as required.
To this point in the paper, we have described the
features of the second nuclear age, suggested its
deterrent and defense requirements, and sketched
the force planning implications of those requirements.
But we also noted that a principal feature of this age
is the a departure from the Cold War separation of
deterrence and defense in favor integrating and
synchronizing deterrent and defensive systems to
meet future threats. In a previous study, Strategic
Synchronization, General John Piotrowski (USAF,
Ret.) related the dangers of ignoring defense and
cited historical events as evidence to support his
assertion.131 Recognizing the need for continued
strong offensive/deterrent capabilities, he went on
to emphasize that "[w]hat is needed is offense/defense
synchronization (ODS) for the entire U.S. defense
establishment."132 The final section of the paper
outlines how synchronization might be achieved.
Land-based, Rapidly Deployable Missile Defense
A major advantage of the KEI system is that it can
be rapidly deployable by air to land-bases abroad,
and made operational within hours to meet an
unexpected threat. This concept of operations is
“based on the premise that if we have a very high
acceleration booster that’s mobile, we can move
close to the threat country and be able to get the
acceleration needed to shoot down a missile” while
in the boost/ascent phase.128 Like its sea-based
cousin, a land-based KEI provides a high-confidence boost-phase defense layer while also offering
a flexible, forward-based mid-course intercept
capability.129
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
PAPERS
“Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut,” Defense News, August 4, 2008, p. 1.
“Missile Defense—Worldwide,” p. 33.
DoD News Briefing with General Obering, July 15, 2008.
See Amy Butler, “Striving for Speed,” Aviation Week, September 15, 2008, pp. 48-50.
“Missile Defense—Worldwide,” p. 19.
Strategic Synchronization: The Relationship between Strategic Offense and Defense, General John L. Piotrowski, USAF (Ret.), The Heritage Foundation, 2002, p. 7.
Ibid. p. 45.
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PAPERS
SYNCHRONIZING DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE
The prevailing paradigm in the first nuclear age
was that national interests and treaty obligations
necessitated that deterrence, defense, and the forces
underwriting them be separated in pursuit of distinctly different objectives. Meeting the challenge
of the second nuclear age calls for synchronizing
deterrence and defense to provide a range of flexible, integrated, and time-sensitive response options
enabling U.S. decision-makers to counter a range of
current and emerging nuclear threats.
of nuclear weapons and missile defense issues was no
longer appropriate, suggesting the “complex nexus
of offenses, defenses and multiple actors can be
seen as a set of interconnected gears.”134 Although
the vectors of the varying nuclear actors could not
be predicted with high confidence, Bunn argued
that it was necessary to understand their directions
and connections, “in order to develop a comprehensive approach to nuclear deterrence and missile
defenses.” In that regard, she challenged the
authors of the next NPR to “take a longer view…of
where the United States should be headed with
regard to the emphasis it places on offenses and
defenses and the proper mix of forces.”135
Previous Efforts
There was some conceptual and operational blending of deterrence and defense in the first nuclear
age. It was often argued that missile defenses could
“deter an opponent from attacking because he has
less confidence that his attack will succeed.”133 This
deterrence by denial relied on a calculus very different from deterrence based on punishment.
Therefore, most of the strategic thinking and force
planning of the first nuclear age compartmentalized the concepts of deterrence and defense, and
ballistic missile defense was seen by many as unnecessary, costly, and possibly destabilizing. The realities of the second nuclear age have altered that
outlook considerably.
The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review took several
important declaratory steps toward offense-defense
integration/operational synchronization within the
concept of a New Triad. Nevertheless, its three
components—offensive (strike) capabilities,
defenses, and infrastructure—were treated separately in that report.136 Accordingly, as analysts
such as Kurt Guthe concluded, “the innovative
aspect of the New Triad is primarily conceptual.”137
Perhaps the most important NPR initiative toward
offense-defense integration was that the three elements of the New Triad would be supported by a
common command and control, intelligence and
planning infrastructure so it would be “adaptable to
the broader range of adversaries, types of conflict,
Writing in anticipation of the 2001 QDR and NPR,
Elaine Bunn noted that the “piecemeal” handling
133
134
135
136
137
W.K.H. Panofsky and Dean A. Wilkening, “Defenses against Nuclear Attack on the United States,” in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, (eds.) U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006.
M. Elaine Bunn, “Strategic Nuclear Forces and National Missile Defense: Toward an Integrated Framework,” in Michele A. Flournoy (Ed.) QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven
Choices for America’s Security, Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2001, pp. 319-349.
Ibid. p. 344. Others were contemplating the linking of deterrence and defense in post-Cold War strategic thinking as well. See Michael O. Wheeler, “The Limits of Defense,”
http://www.ndu/inss/symposia/jointops99.
See J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2002.
Kurt Guthe, The Nuclear Posture Review: How is the “New Triad” New? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, p. 5.
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and military threats…”138 The emphasis on command and control, intelligence and planning was
specifically meant to develop secure wide-band
communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces, to
develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, and to upgrade the United States Strategic
Command’s (USSTRATCOM) capability for
adaptive planning.139
Although his report to Congress also tended to follow achievements along the three legs of the triad,
General Cartwright also emphasized the goal of
synchronization through the “key enablers of command and control, intelligence and planning.”
Toward that end he pledged to:
Three years later, the judgment of a conference on
“Implementing the New Triad” held that much
work remained to be done. The conference
acknowledged that the foundation of the New Triad
was the C4ISR network intended to tie together
the three legs of the triad to “provide policymakers
with the timely information needed to calibrate
each of the legs to develop tailored strategies and
capabilities for a given contingency.”140 However,
the conference then devoted its attention to judging the progress made and efforts needed on the
three separate legs, rather than deliberating the
ways and means to integrate and synchronize those
capabilities to meet an uncertain security future.
• Improve the apportionment practices to manage
low-density, high-demand ISR assets more efficiently
and achieve persistence through the integration of
those assets, capitalizing on the long dwell time of
unmanned and unattended sensors.
• Enhance collaboration among distributed STRATCOM assets as a step toward a global C2 capability
connecting all triad forces.
• Determine essential global strike command and control services to include a more fully integrated terrestrial and space-based approach to situation awareness.
• Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a network-enabled architecture to
move information to the user.
• Transition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance from a legacy, nation-state approach to a
global enterprise tailored to meet regional needs,
emphasizing unmanned vehicles to identify and
track mobile targets.
Although the following year’s Quadrennial Defense
Review was largely silent on nuclear deterrence,
defense and the issues raised by the IFPA
Conference, it did reiterate the requirement for
“tailored deterrence.”141 That appeared to be sufficient guidance for General James Cartwright,
USSTRATCOM Commander, who in subsequent
testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee acknowledged that the progress to date
enabled and foretold the integration of nuclear
deterrence and defense.142
• Improve responsive space access; integrate air and
space capabilities and resource space surveillance
capabilities.143
As depicted in Figure 5, a more flexible, comprehensive military strategy that fuses deterrence and
defense is required in the second nuclear age. For
modern nuclear states, traditional deterrence
remains largely effective. For fractured, rogue, and
nuclear aspirant states, and for other actors who
might not be deterred by traditional means, layered
missile defenses and other adequate defenses are
essential. This dual requirement drives the need to
derive combined deterrence and defense strategies
and operational constructs that will provide decision makers and Joint Force Commanders integrated decision aids and engagement options to
meet any contingency in the second nuclear age.
In noting USSTRATCOM’s assignment to bring
the full range of offensive, defensive, command and
control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to bear against any adversary,
General Cartwright pointed to a reorganized headquarters staff charged with “conducting integrated
and synchronized strategic level planning.”
138
139
140
141
142
143
Ibid. p. 8.
Pentagon briefing slides, “Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002.
IFPA-Fletcher National Security Conference, “Implementing the New Triad, Washington, D.C.: December 14-15 2005, Executive Summary, p. ix. Proceedings available at
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IFC36.pdf . See also James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen (eds.) Nuclear Transformation, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Including “prompt global strike capabilities to defend and respond in an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks, and air and missile defenses…”Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, p. 27.
Statement by General James E. Cartwright, Commander, United States Strategic Command, before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, March 29, 2006.
Ibid.
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Intensity of Attack
HIGHER
Figure 5. Integrating Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age.
Modern
Nuclear States
Effective Defense
Fractured
Nuclear States
Effective Deterrence
Rogue States
LOWER
Nuclear
Aspirants
Non-state
Actors
LOWER
HIGHER
Likelihood of Attack
As the graphic suggests, the Joint Force Commander
must be able to integrate deterrent and defense
options to counter threatened nuclear use in a
future scenario. That means capitalizing on joint
force capabilities within and among mission areas,
merging inter-/intra-theater fights into a global
collaborative activity, establishing flexible and
adaptable kill chains, accommodating expeditionary
operations and coalition warfare, and integrating
offensive-defensive capabilities.144 How might a
strategy fusing deterrence and defense be implemented? Operational Synchronization, also known
as offense-defense integration and multi-mission
integration, offers an answer to that question.
Achieving Operational Synchronization
Operational Synchronization of deterrence and
defense is important because the pace of modern
conflict compresses the battlespace and compels
decision-makers to select response options within
severely reduced timelines. Operational Synchronization creates synergy between offensive and
defensive forces through a four-phase process
depicted in Figure 6:
• Global Awareness and Understanding: Formulating
the global situation requiring a response.
• Collaborative Planning: Applying existing processes,
procedures, and tools in an automated, multi-mission
environment to produce optimal, synchronized
courses of action (COA) and options.
Operational Synchronization
Operational Synchronization “… is the synergistic
employment of defensive and offensive operations,
prompt and persistent ISR made possible by effective
C2, and communications” to forge synchronized
actions through integrated engagements.145 Operational Synchronization accomplishes this by combining information throughout planning and operations
to provide an array of tailored decision options that
exploit the full range of military capabilities to
achieve the military objectives. It is a multi-mission
integration that, through command and control,
synchronizes the operational elements of deterrence and defense—ISR, strike and missile defense.
144
145
• Execution Planning: Refining these optimal COA/
response options considering cost, risks, consequences,
and probability of success.
• Execution: Implementing the plan.
Global Awareness and Understanding
Global Awareness and Understanding establishes
the initial conditions. During peacetime Deliberate/
“What If ” Planning, a contingency is postulated
and placed within the context of declared objectives,
policy, doctrine, commander’s intent, operational
USSTRATCOM Missile Defense Prioritized Capabilities List, March 2006.
USSTRATCOM: Balancing the New Strategic Triad – Study Plan, 1 August 2006.
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Figure 6. Operational Synchronization through Automated, Multi-mission Collaborative Planning.
Simulated Global Situation
Deliberate / What If
Global Awareness
and Understanding
Policy,
Doctrine
Plan Orders,
Directives,
Guidance
Collaborative Planning
Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlespace
Commander"s Intent,
Rules of Engagement
Initial
COAs
Wargames, Exercises
Analysis, Evaluation
Optimal
COAs
Execution
Planning
Execution
Plan Repository
Real World Global Situation
Crisis / What Is
constraints, rules of engagement and other factors
that drive the intelligence preparation of the battlespace. As a real-world situation intensifies and the
situation is updated with information from persistent surveillance and reconnaissance assets, Crisis/
“What Is” Planning is employed as and offensive
and defensive force readiness are factored in.
Execution
Execution implements the offensive and defensive
COA/TTP options selected based on mission
objectives. During and after execution, surveillance
and reconnaissance assets are tasked to collect data
for analysis that will determine the degree to which
the objectives were achieved. These analyses form
the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the mission, assessing the response of the adversary, replanning the next actions, preparing after action reports,
and gathering lessons identified to be applied to
future operations.
Collaborative Planning
Collaborative Planning produces the optimal
COAs to be refined during Execution Planning.
From this point in the process, planners collaboratively develop an initial set of COAs and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP). These
COAs/TTPs are wargamed, tested, analyzed, optimized, and evaluated to determine performance,
effectiveness, and expected outcomes relative to
desired mission objectives. Optimal COAs with
favorable predicted outcomes are submitted to the
appropriate decision-making level and, once commanders have approved the COAs, they are
released for training and mission rehearsal.
Operational Synchronization: An
Illustrative Scenario
Perhaps the best way to illustrate operational synchronization is through an illustrative scenario,
reflected in Figures 7 thru 10, which steps through
each of the four phases described above. (Steps are
indicated by numbers in the graphic illustrations.)
In this scenario, we assume that a southwest Asian
nation has escalated global tensions, has started to
mobilize forces, and, consistent with the process
above, the U.S. is deliberating its options to deter
and defend.
Execution Planning
Execution Planning refines the final COAs/TTPs
into plans to be executed. Execution Planning has
the attributes of collaborative planning, except that
it is typically fast reaction planning done with the
most up-to-date global situation understanding,
current forces, forecasted weather, and a reduced
set of directly-applicable COAs/Plans/TTPs.
At this point in the scenario, [Step 1, Figure 7]
U.S. global ISR assets have detected and are monitoring suspicious activity in southwest Asia. Sensors
detect transporter and erector launcher (TEL)
movement and missile transportation to a launch
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Figure 7. Global Awareness and Understanding.
2
USSTRATCOM
Receives ISR
Situational
Awareness Data
and Validates
Collection With
National Agencies
1
Indications and
Warning (Intel /
Surveillance)
Detect TEL
Movement and
Missile
Transport to
Launch site.
WMD:
Probability>95%
USSTRATCOM
site. The observed data are sent to the command
authorities and intelligence analysts [Step 2].
Additionally, when combined with other intelligence information, the analyses conclude with high
confidence that at least one of the boosters carries a
weapon of mass destruction.
National
Agencies
Upon receiving the confirmed intelligence analysis
and conclusions, [Step 3, Figure 8] USSTRATCOM
alerts the President and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who in turn [Step 4] direct
Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to
prepare a range of defensive and offensive options
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Figure 8. Collaborative Planning.
5
Distributed, Collaborative
Plan Developed Using
Pre-planned COAs
Collaborate,
Prioritize, Evaluate
4
3
Combatant Commanders Collaborate to Develop a
Comprehensive Package of Dominant Options
Space
Operations
Special Ops
Mission
Intelligence
Surveillance/
Recon.
Cyber
Operations
Global Strike/
Attack
Operations
Integrated
Missile
Defense
USSTRATCOM
Alerts National
Leadership
and
Combatant
Commanders
Centralized Plan
Management
Select
CollectCourse
Courses
ofof
Action
Action
Course of Action Approved
6
7
COAs for Approval
Approved COAs
National
Leadership
Early Warning
Radars
THAAD
USSTRATCOM
National
Agencies
USPACOM
Joint Force
Commander
with predicted probability of success. GCC planning staffs then [Step 5] collaboratively develop a
comprehensive set of coordinated, synchronized
courses of action that are then [Step 6] sent forward
for leadership review and approval. Approved
COAs are returned [Step 7] to the GCCs and
Execution Planning is authorized.
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Figure 9. Execution Planning.
9
Distributed, Collaborative
Plan Developed Using
Approved COAs
Collaborate,
Prioritize, Evaluate
CollectSelect
Courses
Planof Action
Foreign ISR Asset
Included In Situational
Awareness Pipeline.
8
Execution Planning for Specific COA(s)
Space
Operations
SATRAN /
‘Clearing
House’
Intelligence
Surveillance/
Recon.
ISR
Tasking
Cyber
Operations
Network
Attack,
Defense
Global
Strike
Conventional
PGCS,
ICBM
Attack Ops
Strike
Conventional
B-2,
Cruise
Missile
Integrated
Missile
Defense
THAAD,
CG(X)
Cooperative
Foreign
ISR
Plan Approved
10
11
Plans for Approval
Approved Plans
National
Leadership
Early Warning
Radars
THAAD
Positioned
USSTRATCOM
National
Agencies
USPACOM
Foreign Asset
Alerted to Threat .
Offers ISR
Assistance.
Joint Force
Commander
CG(X)
Positioned
coordinated and synchronized. The plans are then
[Step 10] reviewed by appropriate leadership and
[Step 11] approved and returned for any fine tuning and Execution.
As with the previous deliberate, adaptive, and crisis
planning, GCC planning staffs [Step 8, Figure 9]
plan engagement specifics for the approved COAs.
As before, plans are derived collaboratively [Step 9]
so that offensive and defensive actions are fully
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Figure 10. Execution.
Space IR
Assets
BDA
Space Imaging
Assets
BDA
Space
Operations
Intelligence
Surveillance/
Recon
Cyber
Operations
SATRAN /
‘Clearing
House’
ISR
Tasking
Network
Attack,
Defense
Global
Strike
Conventional
PGCS:
Transporter
Erector
Launcher
Attack Ops
Strike
Conventional
Integrated
Missile
Defense
B-2: To
Shelter
THAAD,
CG(X) on
Alert
Cooperative
Use
Foreign
Foreign
ISR ISR
Tasking
National
Leadership
Airborne
ISR Tasked
Early Warning
Radars
Tasked
Prompt Global
Conventional
Strike
THAAD
on Alert
USSTRATCOM
National
Agencies
USPACOM
Airborne Conventional
Strike
Joint Force
Commander
CG(X) on Alert /
Intercept
Pre-planned defensive options might include the
rapid deployment of a sea-based, airborne or landbased missile interceptor systems. Deterrent
options could fail for a number of reasons and, if
they do, the defensive options provided by a layered missile defense system would come into play.
In this scenario, a prompt global conventional
strike against the fixed launch site and an airborne
conventional strike capability have been included
as deterrent options. Other options include forward basing of manned or unmanned stealthy aircraft, preparation for cyber offensive and defensive
actions, and contingency defense of allied interests.
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CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN
THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE
In a recent article in Joint Force Quarterly, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Michael G. Mullen, argued that a new deterrence
model must be based on a ready and credible
nuclear and conventional force, and that it must
address the challenges to national security posed by
extremists.146 We believe that we have presented
such a model in this paper, a model constructed of
capable and credible offensive and defensive forces
that, in this second nuclear age, must be increasingly seen as integrated and synchronized. The
challenge of the second nuclear age is to fashion a
strategy that provides efficient and effective
responses to emerging threats using integrated
offensive and defensive elements of military power.
threats coupled with a prompt global strike capability to hold those threats at risk. A conventional
intercontinental ballistic missile, either sea- or landbased, and a next-generation bomber are deterrent
capabilities that should be called for in the next
QDR and NPR and funded for fielding a decade
from now.
• A layered system of global, rapidly deployable sea-,
land-, air-, and space-based capabilities to defend
against ballistic missiles in all phases of flight should
be high on the list of the nation’s defense priorities.
• A distributed, automated, real-time, collaborative
planning capability that is multi-dimensional (vertical through the strategic-operational-theater command structure and horizontal among geographic
combatant commanders and joint force commanders) and multi-mission (encompassing all missions
from ISR to missile defense and offensive options)
needs to be implemented to support operational synchronization of deterrence and defense.
We might begin by turning the trends we see evolving in the second nuclear age to our advantage.
That means leveraging existing capabilities and
investing in and augmenting those capabilities
needed to meet requirements of precise, persistent,
global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
fast reaction offensive and defensive weapons with
global reach, and innovative practices permitting
the flexibility, agility, and adaptability needed to
meet the challenges of the changing threat environment. Some steps that will take us down that path
include:
• Sustained support for operational planning and exercise activities conducted by the combatant commands and the service components is required to
implement operational synchronization and to
familiarize key decision-makers with its capabilities.
In summary, deterrence and defense can no longer
be thought of and structured separately. If the
United States is faced with a situation in which the
U.S. homeland or that of an ally is threatened with
an imminent missile attack, national decision makers must be presented with a range of offensive and
defensive options to deter, prevent, or negate such
a strike. Those options should be presented along a
collaborative continuum of action and reaction.
• The U.S. Department of Defense should use the
opportunity of the pending Quadrennial Defense
Review and Nuclear Posture Review to sustain and
strengthen the overall credibility and capability of
the nuclear triad of strategic forces.
• New investments should be directed toward
increased awareness and understanding of emerging
146
Michael G. Mullen, “It’s Time for a New Deterrence Model,” Joint Force Quarterly, 4th Quarter, 2008, p. 2.
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This paper has examined the policies and programs
needed to underwrite new approaches to combining deterrence and defense across the spectrum of
conflict. Planning towards an operational synchronization of offensive and defensive forces will provide for a future in which national decision-makers
PAPERS
are given a range of options to deter an enemy from
striking U.S. or allied interests, or to defend in
stages if deterrence fails. The second nuclear age
demands a military strategy integrating the policies
and practices of deterrence and defense.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR .
Dr. Haffa is Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy,
holds an M.A. degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. He is an adjunct professor in the Government program at Johns Hopkins University. Prior to joining Northrop,
Dr. Haffa served as a career officer in the U.S. Air Force, retiring in 1989 with the grade of Colonel. His Air Force service
included operational tours in the F-4 aircraft in Vietnam, Korea, and Europe, teaching political science at the Air Force
Academy, and directing a staff group supporting the Air Force Chief of Staff. At Northrop Grumman, Dr. Haffa’s work has
included analyses of U.S. military strategy for the business sectors of the company and the development of Corporate
strategic planning scenarios.
R AVI R. HICHKAD
Mr. Hichkad is a Research Associate at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center where he provides research and analysis
regarding defense policy developments and their relationship to the company’s business sectors. Within the Analysis Center
his work involves assessing issues and trends related to space and ISR systems, missile defense, and naval programs. Before
joining Northrop Grumman, Mr. Hichkad completed graduate school and held an internship as a Research Associate at the
Congressional Research Service’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division. His post-undergraduate work involved employment with the governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea as well as experience in the private sector. Mr. Hichkad is an
honors graduate of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and holds a master’s degree in
security studies. His undergraduate education was at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill where he received a
bachelor’s degree in anthropology, graduating with honors and highest distinction as well as Phi Beta Kappa.
DANA J. JOHNSON
Dr. Johnson is a Senior Analyst with the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center in Arlington, Virginia, responsible for assessing
space and missile defense issues and trends for Northrop Grumman’s business sectors. Dr. Johnson has extensive experience in government and industry aerospace-related research. She joined Northrop Grumman in June 2003 from RAND where
she spent almost 15 years as a national security policy analyst with a specialty in space policy and operations. While at RAND
she led or participated in a number of studies in space, aerospace, and aeronautics conducted for the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Department of Defense, the Air Force, NASA, and the NRO. She also participated
in several congressionally mandated commissions, including the NIMA Commission, the Commission on Roles and Missions,
and the Aerospace Commission. Other prior experience includes policy and mission analysis of national security space programs in several leading aerospace companies, and diplomatic history and research at the U.S. Department of State’s Office
of the Historian. Dr. Johnson holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California, and is also an
Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, teaching space and security.
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PHILIP W. PRATT
Mr. Pratt is Director of Business Development with Northrop Grumman’s Information Systems Sector in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. Mr. Pratt’s current responsibilities are in developing Warfighter-advocated approaches to integrating missile
defenses into operational warfighting capabilities, Joint and Coalition BMC3ISR, Homeland Defense, and operational integration of C2 across multiple missions. Mr. Pratt’s thirty-seven years of industry experience has included both Department of
Defense research and development and Civil Space programs. Within the DoD, he has led Air and Missile Defense systems
engineering, integration, test, and analysis; developed and tested operational Missile Warning and Space Defense systems;
and developed ground-based synthetic environments for integrating and testing tactical fighter embedded computer operational flight programs. In Civil Space, Mr. Pratt‘s teams performed launch vehicle guidance, navigation, and steering equation
validation and verification for Earth-orbital and inter-planetary missions. In 1999, the Internal Research and Development team
Mr. Pratt co-led was awarded the TRW Chairman’s Award for Innovation. Mr. Pratt holds a Master’s and Bachelor’s Degree in
Aerospace Engineering from Iowa State University, and has completed course work toward a Masters in Business
Administration.
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The NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION established the
Analysis Center in 1977 to conduct objective analyses of strategic trends, defense policy, military doctrine, emerging threats
and operational concepts, and their implications for the defense
industry. The Analysis Center works on the leading edge in
shaping U.S. strategy and defining operational requirements.
The Analysis Center Papers present ongoing key research and
analysis conducted by the Center staff and its associates.
Analysis Center Papers are available on-line at the
Northrop
Grumman
Analysis
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Web
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at
www.analysiscenter.northropgrumman.com. For substantive
issues related to this paper, please contact Robert P. Haffa,
at [email protected], or call him at 703-875-0002.
For copies, please call 703-875-0054.
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