EuropeAid
The View from Inside AntiCorruption Authorities (ACAs):
Evaluating Performance and
Challenges
Francesca Recanatini
Senior Economist
The World Bank
Prepared for the EuropeAid Anti-Corruption Seminar,
Brussels, 18-21 October, 2010
Motivation
• Empirical observation and for policy
guidance
• 1980s and 1990s: international standards
and agreements and parallel mushrooming
of ACAs
• Increased support of ACAs by multi- and
bilateral donors
• Observed limited “impact” (Meagher (2005),
Doig et al.(2005), Heilbrunn (2004), U4
(2007), UNDP (2005), Pope (1999))
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Observed lifecycle of ACAs
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ACA unable to meet unrealistic
expectations, gets stuck
ACA is established –
work begins with high
expectations
Loss of credibility of ACA plus
increasing political pressure
Funding cut; attention goes
down
Anti-Corruption
Commitments are made
(usually by politicians)
ACA quietly expires (Honduras,
Peru, Guatemala) or is suddenly
dismantled by the top
leadership (SL, Nigeria, Zambia)
Public Awareness &
Political Consensus on
Corruption
Perceived level of corruption in
the country remains the same
Crisis
Time
Questions
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• Can ACAs be (or become) an effective tool in
the fight against corruption?
• If so, are there are policies that can be used to
make ACAs more effective?
=> Starting point: a more systematic analysis
of ACAs and of “factors” that can affect their
functioning and effectiveness
Methodology
• Anti-Corruption Authority: a specialized
agency, body, unit or department
established by a government that has the
mandate of addressing corruption.
• Initial information based on Workshop
(March 2010) with 10 ACAs
• Factual information from 30 ACAs collected
through a mailed-in survey
• Plus 5 case studies (in-depth interviews in
the field)
• On going
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Anti-Corruption Authorities
Sampled
Case Studies: Rwanda, Indonesia
Ethiopia, Mongolia, Slovenia
Latvia
(2002)
Slovenia
(2004)
Slovakia
(2004)
Estonia
(1918)
Mongolia
(2007)
South Korea
(2002)
Senegal
(2003)
Guatemala
(2008)
Costa Rica
(2004)
Brazil
(2001)
Peru
(2010)
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Sierra Leone
Haiti
(2000)
(2004)
Rwanda
(2003)
Philippines
(1987)
Ethiopia
(2001) Kenya
(NA)
Singapore
(1952)
Indonesia
(2004)
Mauritius
(2002)
Malawi
(1997)
Uganda
(1986)
Botswana
Namibia
Tanzania
(1994)
(2006)
(2007)
Zambia
(1982)
Sri Lanka
(1994)
Mozambique
(2004)
Lesotho
(NA)
Outline
1. Challenges
2. Structure and mandate of ACAs
3. Institutional structure and relation with
other agencies
4. Resources and internal organization
5. Independence, oversight and
accountability
6. External stakeholders and expectations
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Results (1): Challenges of
ACAs
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• Critical: to have the key institutions and laws in
place jointly with support of the leadership
• Tension between prevention and prosecution
• Big fishes or small ones?
• Importance of outreach and education
• Perceived unfair evaluation of ACAs and need
for more focus on measuring prevention
activities as a measure of success
• Engaging the private sector
• Politics and ACAs
Results (2): Structure and
mandate
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• ACAs can take many forms and display
different functions and mandates, from
prevention to investigation and prosecution,
policy and research and outreach.
• There is a tension among practitioners when it
comes to the functions that ACAs should have.
• Organizational theory recommends single
mandate to increase effectiveness. In our
sample => “effective” ACAs among both single
function agencies and multi-function agencies
(Hong Kong, Brazil vs Slovenia).
ACAs and functions
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KPK’s Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
To coordinate
Article 7
To supervise
Article 8
Mandates
Article 6
To pre-investigate,
to investigate,
to prosecute
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1. Attorney General's Office
2. Police
3. Supreme Audit
4. All Inspectorate Generals
5. Others
1. Attorney General's Office
2. Police
3. Supreme Audit
4. All Inspectorate Generals
5. Others
1. Agencies which render public
services
Article 11
To prevent
1.All powers granted to other
LEA by the Law of
Procedures
Article 13
1.Certain powers which are
not granted to other LEA
To review systems
Article 14
Results (3): Institutional structure
and relations with other agencies
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• Clear mandate leads to better coordination
among different agencies
• Need for clear agreements among agencies
• Important to understand who was performing
some of the functions that the ACA is taking over
and why it was not working
• Good examples of “links” with central banks,
judicial agencies and revenue monitoring
agencies
• Less common => relations with regulatory
agencies especially agencies regulating natural
resources
• Remaining challenge: de jure versus de facto
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Investigating corruption cases:
Indonesia
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The Supreme Audit Board (BPK)
Provide the Investigative audit report,
initial data, state loss estimation
Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK)
Provide the Suspicious Transaction to
support investigation process
Bank and Insurance Companies
Provide the Financial Statement to
support investigation and asset tracing
process
Other Departments (National Land
Agency, Immigration, Department of
Law and Human Rights, etc)
Provide supporting data related to the
case (People Movement System,
Company Profile, etc)
Colombia: Agencies with
Jurisdiction
Institution
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Type of Control
Anticorruption Czar
Administrative
Comptroller General
Fiscal
Attorney General’s Office
Disciplinary
Prosecutor General’s Office
Criminal
National Accounting Office
Compliance
Taxes and Customs
Administrative/Criminal
Internal Control Offices
Administrative/Disciplinary
Results (4): Resources and
internal organization
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• Critical to get the technical and organizational
foundations established. But…
• …resources are a constraint.
• Potential factors :
o
Lack of a long term horizon commitment
o
Unskilled staff
o
Donors’ involvement
• Strategy for coping with limited resources (ex.
triage of allegations, focus on innovation and IT)
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Figure 5: Donor Involvement
South Asia
Latin America
No
East Asia
Yes
Europe
Africa
0
2
4
6
8
10
Results (5): Independence,
oversight and accountability
• Importance of legislative set up
• Independence: selection/removal of ACA
leadership and freedom of action
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Appointment of ACA head
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Results (5): Independence,
oversight and accountability
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• Importance of legislative set up
• Independence: selection/removal of ACA
leadership and freedom of action
• Reporting line
• Accountability: administrative and judicial
• Established mechanism to show results. But…
Political interference remains the key
challenge
Monitoring performance: selected
examples
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• Mongolia: number of cases investigated and
solved under the law, percentage of public
officials who submitted income and asset
disclosure forms, number of actions plans
adopted by public organizations and local
governments
• Indonesia: number of cases investigated and
conviction rate
• Brazil: number of internal investigations
completed and penalties enforced, number of
companies suspended or debarred, data portals
and number of visits, number of training
delivered and of participants
Results (6): External
stakeholders and expectations
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• To manage expectations and to balance
sensationalism with prevention work are key
(SL, Nigeria, Kenya, Indonesia)
• Citizens and the media are powerful tools that
can create an enabling environment. But…
• …the ACA needs:
o
o
o
Continuous engagement with public and with the
media for inputs and for feedback (KPK)
To provide unrestricted access to information
To have communication strategy to avoid risks
linked to political pressure (Slovenia)
Main messages
• ACAs can have an impact. The challenge
may be to be able to measure it.
• Replication of “successful experiences” should
be done only with caution, after having
carefully understood and integrated countryspecific factors
• Political pressure, vested interests and State
Capture are the key challenge
• Finally, there is a need for further analytical
work based on a broader set of countries.
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