Sample Argument Paper
The argument in standard form:
1) When horses are harmed they become worse as horses
2) When dogs are harmed they become worse as dogs
3) So when man is harmed, he becomes worse in the specific virtue of man
4) The specific virtue of man is justice
5) So men who are harmed become more unjust
6) Musicians, by practicing the art of music, do not make men less musical
7) Horsemen, by practicing the art of horsemanship, do not make men less good at
dealing with horses
8) So the just man, by practicing justice, does not make men less just
9) Therefore, the just man harms no one
Analysis and Critique:
This argument occurs in Plato’s Republic (335b-e). Polemarchus had claimed that justice
is doing good to true friends and harming true enemies. Here, Socrates refutes his claim
by arguing to the conclusion that the just man harms no one. Premises 1) and 2) are
specific examples to set up the sub-conclusion at 3) through an inference by analogy. 1)
and 2) are intuitively true—when horses are harmed they become worse at doing horsestuff, and similarly for dogs and dog-stuff. It follows that when a human is harmed, they
become worse as a human and in the ability to engage in distinctly human things.
Premise 4) claims that the specific or unique virtue of man is justice. The idea here is
that no other creature but man possesses the capacity to exercise justice. This seems true
as well, as no other animal seems to have practices surrounding justice or have a concept
of justice. 5) follows straightforwardly from 3) and 4). 6) and 7) act like 1) and 2), as
specific examples to set up an inference by analogy at 8). Premises 6) and 7) seem just as
intuitively true as 1) and 2). By being around musicians and listening to their music, one
certainly isn’t going to become worse at playing music. On the other hand, one will not
necessarily become better either. The conclusion at 9) follows from 3) 4) and 8), if the
just man, in practicing justice, does not make others less just, then it follows (given 3)
and 4)) that the just man harms no one.
One interesting thing to note about this argument is that concluding that the just
man harms no one, does not entail that the just man helps anyone either. In other words,
the argument does establish a general beneficence on the part of the just man to all other
humans. The argument only establishes the weaker “no harm” principle—the just man
will not make you less just, i.e., more unjust, but he will not necessarily make you more
just either.
The other interesting feature of this argument is that it appears to equivocate on
the meaning of harm. When Polemarchus originally claimed that the just man does good
to his friends and harms his enemies, he clearly meant harm in the sense of being able to
physically defeat your enemies. The sense of harm that the argument relies on, however,
is a kind of moral or spiritual harm, where harming a human means to make them a less
just or unjust person. It is not clear what it means to harm someone in this sense, other
than corrupting them and encouraging them somehow to do unjust acts. But even a very
unjust person will not necessarily motivate others to be unjust. The argument seems to
rely heavily on the analogical inferences at 3) and 8), and we can be suspicious of the
aptness of the analogies. When dogs and horses are harmed, if we mean physically
harmed, then of course it follows that they become worse at doing horse-stuff and dogstuff, like being able to run swiftly or track down prey. But when a man is physically
harmed, he does not necessarily become worse at practicing justice. A man could lose an
arm and still act justly. There are similar problems with the move to 8). It is not clear
that justice is an art, like music and horsemanship. It is logically possible that someone
who is the subject of a just practice or sentencing can become resentful at those practices
and become less just.
In conclusion, this argument suffers from at least three problems. It does not
establish that the just person is beneficent, it equivocates on the term “harm,” and
therefore does not refute Polemarchus’s original claim, and there are serious questions
about the aptness of the analogies involved.