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Original Article
National and transnational strategies of LGBT
civil society organizations in different political
environments: Modes of interaction in Western and
Eastern Europe for equality
Ronald Holzhacker
Department of Political Science and Research Methods, University of Twente, PO Box 217,
Enschede 7500 AE, the Netherlands.
Abstract This article focuses on the national and transnational strategies of five
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European Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender civil society organizations (CSOs)
pressing for equality and non-discrimination. We present three modes of interaction
between CSOs and their political environment. The first mode we label ‘morality
politics’. Arcigay in Italy and the Campaign against Homophobia in Poland are
seemingly locked in this mode because they are confronted with a hostile and
organized opposition, both in terms of public opinion and elite opinion. A second
mode of interaction we label an ‘incremental change’ mode and is the strategy pursued
by Stonewall in the United Kingdom and the Hatter Society in Hungary, marked by
discreet elite level lobbying. Finally, we introduce a third mode of interaction we label
‘high-profile politics’. This mode is marked by highly visible public events, coalition
seeking, cooperation with government, and transnational activity at the European
level and abroad. This is a strategy possible by CSOs where there is a high degree of
public support for equality and minimal partisan or religious opposition to the goals
of the movement. The Dutch COC has been pursuing this ‘high-profile politics’ mode
of interaction in their political environment over the past few years.
Comparative European Politics (2010) 0, 1–25. doi:10.1057/cep.2010.21
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Keywords: civil society organizations; transnationalization; social movements; gay
rights; political environment
Introduction
During the annual Pride March in London, the Mayor of London Ken
Livingstone implored the thousands gathered in Trafalgar square to ‘Follow
the spark, follow the spark of San Francisco and Copenhagen and Amsterdam’
to bring about equality for gays and lesbians across Europe.1 These large
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public demonstrations and celebrations – Gay Pride events – held in many
large and medium-sized cities across Europe each summer, are important for
broad social movements to create ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 2000). This social
capital is important for a movement, both in terms of creating a sense of
individual identity and ‘bonding’ within the community, as well as reaching out
and ‘bridging’ to the broader society. These ‘public displays of WUNC –
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment’ (Tilly, 2005) are critical tools of
communication for a social movement. These events have become an integral
part of the Western European movement for equality for gays, lesbians, bisexuals
and transgenders (LGBT) and are now spreading across the continent. These
events are also taking place where they have been resisted by local and national
authorities – for example in Eastern European capitals such as Warsaw and
Riga. Groups want to show their strength, show that they are visible and
proud, and proclaim their demands of equality toward state and society.
The goals of these groups vary by country and the political environment that
the civil society organizations (CSOs) find themselves in, but include arguing for
social acceptance, new laws to ensure equality and non-discrimination, action
against hate crimes, and increasingly for state recognized same-sex partnerships
or the right to marriage. Large public manifestations are only part of the
strategies pursued by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) CSOs
which have emerged across Europe as the institutional embodiment of a broader
social movement. Possible strategies pursued by these groups may be to
communicate with the broader public, to form domestic coalitions with other
CSOs or labor unions, to lobby government, or to reach out transnationally –
up to the European Union (EU) level and across to similar groups in other
countries.
Do these national and transnational activities make a difference in achieving
changes in public policy? While CSOs may be visible and active in raising
awareness, institutional actors are often seen as more decisive for policy
outcomes than the activities of CSOs (see Mazey and Richardson, 1993;
Greenwood, 2003). But nevertheless, groups are active in reaching out to
society to increase social acceptance and to press governments for favorable
action (see Lowery, 2007). Institutional arrangements and political opportunity
structures affect the chance for success (Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1998, 2005).
Scholars studying the state by state ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in the United States, have argued that movements matter and suggest an
interactive process between social movement organizations, public opinion and
political party support accounts for the success or failure of change (Soule
and Olzak, 2004). The literature of interest intermediation and policy change
(i.e. Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) argues that the influence of interest groups
varies by the degree of conflict, the type of interest sought and the structural
conditions of the decision-making process. In the case of LGBT CSOs across
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Europe, they face various degrees of conflict and opposition to their claims
for equality, the type of interest they seek is not a narrow private one but
a public good based on moral claims of equality, and increasingly the structural
conditions for favorable government action are influenced by processes of
Europeanization and transnationalization.
The role of CSOs and their strategies in the multi-level European political
system has received increased attention in the literature in the past decade
(Marks and McAdam, 1996; Beyers, 2004; Porta et al, 1999; Kohler-Koch and
Eising, 2004; Beyers and Kerremann, 2007; Michalowitz, 2007; Ruzzo, 2007;
Butler, 2008). Recent work on racial and ethnic mobilization, likely also
applicable to LGBTs, has emphasized how transnational links are important to
empowering local actors and CSOs. ‘Global processes and links among
international actors provide the motivation and means for ethnic actors within
countries to motivate ethnic populations within and across national
boundaries’ (Olzak, 2006, p. xiv). Others have begun to apply these approaches
to the LGBT movement, for example comparative work on how distinct
political institutional environments affected the developments and strategies of
gay and lesbian movements in the United Kingdom and United States in the
post-war period (Engel, 2001). Still others have focused on the transnational
and global scale of the LGBT movement, incorporating both institutional and
movement perspectives (Adam et al, 1999; Kollman and Waites, 2009). In this
article, we focus on the goals and strategies of LGBT CSOs acting in the
evolving political environments across Europe.
Two models of political interaction have been suggested as possible scenarios
facing gay and lesbian rights in the United States, which may also be applicable
to Europe. These models concern the ‘scope of conflict’ raised and debated in
the public sphere. Schnattschneider (1960) argued that an effective strategy of
interests is to limit or expand the scope of the conflict so that one’s interests
gains an advantage. It has been argued in the United States that interest groups
fare best when they limit the scope of conflict and discreetly lobby policymakers for favorable public policies (Lowi, 1969). On the other hand, Kollman
maintains that external strategies may be beneficial to interest groups in certain
circumstances which may assist in the lobbying of insiders (Kollman, 1988).
One model of interaction between CSOs and the political environment is
‘morality politics’ which predicts that policies toward gays and lesbians will
reflect the influence of religious groups, party competition and partisanship.
Morality politics involves highly salient issues with two competing coalitions
often formed around religious beliefs or partisanship. The pattern of morality
politics can be seen in the United States in abortion politics (Goggin, 1993),
drug and alcohol policies (Meier, 1994) and gambling (Morgan and Meier,
1980). In each case, at least one advocacy coalition (Sabatier, 1988) frames the
issue as one of morality or sin and uses moral arguments in its advocacy
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Overview of the Research
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(Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996). The other mode of interaction found in the
literature may be called ‘incremental change’, which suggests that policies will
reflect interest group resources, elite values and past policy actions (Ibid.). In
this mode, groups typically seek incremental change through discreet elite level
lobbying. Haider-Markel and Meier conclude that in the US states, gay and
lesbian politics resembles interest group politics when groups interact with
sympathetic political elites, but when groups opposed to gay and lesbian rights
are able to expand the scope of the conflict to electoral politics, this changes
to traditional morality politics (1996, p. 333). In this article, we will propose
a third mode of interaction involving CSOs and their political environment,
one we label ‘high-profile politics’ which uses external strategies to reach out to
the broader public, insider strategies to build coalitions and lobby government
in the national arena, and transnational action at the European and global
levels to bring about change.
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In this article we will present a typology of typical modes of interaction between
LGBT CSOs operating in various political environments across Europe. Five
countries have been selected based on their geographical spread across Europe
and the wide variation in the political environment which the CSOs find
themselves, thus a ‘most different’ comparative design has been chosen. The
empirical, qualitative research in this article is based on in-depth, structured
interviews conducted with leaders of LGBT groups in the past 2 or 3 years, and a
review of various brochures, documents and websites which they have produced.
We will discuss the contemporary goals and strategies of the largest and
most important LGBT CSOs in five countries – Arcigay in Italy and the
Campaign Against Homophobia in Poland, Stonewall in the United Kingdom
and the Hatter Society in Hungary, and the COC (Cultuur – en Ontspannings
Centrum) in the Netherlands. While there are many LGBT groups in these
countries (some focused on a particular region or focusing on part of the
community, for example lesbians or transgenders, or social activities such as
sports) these particular national groups have the institutional capacity to
pursue both bonding within the LGBT community and bridging to the
government and broader society. The conclusion of this article questions the
division of the mode of interaction facing such groups into ‘morality politics’
or an ‘incremental change’ mode of interaction, at least for the case of the most
advanced countries in Europe in terms of social policy and human rights.
The Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) in Poland is in a situation like
Arcigay in Italy, and acts in a ‘morality politics’ mode of political interaction,
facing a very hostile government and a coalition of political parties and
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religious groups formed against the equality of LGBT persons. But in Italy the
groups are able to form domestic coalitions with center-left political parties
and labor unions. The domestic political situation faced by the KPH makes
forming domestic coalitions very difficult, but it has cultivated strong transnational ties and benefits from EU programs to fight discrimination. The
group has also benefited from litigation at the Council of Europe to protect the
right of assembly for Pride marches (Holzhacker, 2010).
In the case of the identified groups in the United Kingdom and Hungary, they
generally prefer behind the scenes lobbying, over large protests and public confrontations with the government. Groups like Stonewall in the United Kingdom,
after important gains in the past from sympathetic center-left governments
including the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, work now in the ‘incremental change’ mode of interaction to lobby the government for incremental
change and sound implementation. Stonewall is especially close to business
interests and works closely with them to run corporate diversity programs across
the country.
We will argue that tolerance and acceptance has risen to such levels in
certain countries that a third mode of interaction, high-profile politics, emerges
beyond the clash of morality politics or the incremental, behind-the-scenes
change seen in classical interest group theory. In the case of the Netherlands,
the strategy of COC is to reach out to a broad spectrum of political parties,
work closely with government, and run very open, public campaigns to raise
issues important to them and set the agenda for further progress. The leaders of
the COC want to avoid complacency – people within the community and the
general public taking their rights for granted – and to avoid any possibility of
backtracking in terms of social acceptance. They have chosen to expand the
scope of the argument, to make sure government mainstreams the policy in
various ministries and addresses the issue in new ways, for example in ethnic
and immigrant communities, in schools and in conducting foreign policy. The
COC in the Netherlands has also been very active transnationally in assisting
LGBT CSOs in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet newly independent countries
in Central Asia.
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Strategies of CSOs
Ken Kollman in his book Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group
Strategies (1988) discusses possible trade-off in interest group strategies between insider lobbying and outside lobbying – trying to reach out to the broader
public (Kollman, 1988). Kollman defines ‘outside lobbying’ as attempts by
interest groups to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community
to contact or pressure public officials inside the policymaking community
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(Kollman, 1998, p. 3). Kollmann explains under what circumstances groups
will use outside lobbying and how they go about it. The two purposes of
outside lobbying are signaling and conflict expansion. At times, these strategies
can be effectively combined. ‘Signaling’, for example, is the attempt by interest
groups to communicate public support to policymakers. It has two purposes,
which often reinforce each other to increase their popular support and to
increase the group’s influence on policymakers. Thus, interest group leaders
often want to expand the scope of the conflict to connect with greater parts of
the public. This view of seeing outside lobbying in terms of signaling and
conflict expansion is a return to the argument made by Schattschneider when
he wrote ‘the most important strategy of politics is concerned with the scope of
the conflict. Conflicts are frequently won or lost by the success that the
contestants have in getting the audience involved in the fight or excluding it’
(1960, p. 3).
Yet sometimes the dual purposes are at odds, and interest groups must
attempt careful, targeted outside lobbying campaigns. Too much conflict expansion can provoke opposition groups and swing public opinion to the other side.
Kollmann also contends that too much outside lobbying can disrupt valuable
coalition building. His data drawn from American politics were the first to
connect information about interest group strategies and information on public
opinion on a wide variety of policy issues. It shows that public opinion is
a serious constraint on interest group strategies because it limits the claim of
popular support that group leaders claim in representing constituents. Scholars
on the European side of the Atlantic have also discussed an insider/outsider
model of interest group strategy, for example in the United Kingdom (that is,
Maloney et al, 1994).
Modes of Interaction and the Strategic Environment
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We begin here by laying out the typical political environments faced by LGBT
groups. Here two variables are set forth, first the public stances of political
elites, either polarized or favorable. Secondly, public opinion, which may vary
by position, either divided or positive. This creates a two by two table connecting the strategic environment to the modes of interaction of CSOs. Thus, for
example, here we see that morality politics is a typical mode of interaction
when both elite and public opinion is split or hostile to the group, and the
incremental change mode is typical when public opinion is split or opposed,
but opinion among political elites toward human rights and the groups’ aims
are generally supportive. The vacillating mode occurs when elite and public
opinion is divided, so the group may at times alter strategies depending on
whether directed at the elite or public level (Table 1).
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Table 1: Modes of interaction of civil society organizations in different political environments:
Public and elite opinion toward LGBT equality
Public opinion toward LGBT equality
Opposed/split
Elite opinion
Opposed/split
Morality politics
Supportive
Incremental change
Supportive
Vacillating (morality politics
or incremental change)
High-profile politics
Note: The entries in bold indicate the 3 modes of interaction.
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Next in Table 2, the three modes of interaction are set forth with typical
strategies of CSO’s and their political environment. We focus on four possible
strategies: public visibility, forming domestic coalitions with other important
actors like political parties and labor unions, governmental interaction such
as confrontation, discreet lobbying or close cooperation and transnational networking. Here, for example, we see that for CSOs able to strategically assume
a ‘high-profile politics’ mode of interaction, their events and public visibility
can be very open and celebratory, their coalitions with other groups very open,
they seek close cooperation with government, and they are able to use their
knowledge and resources to export ideas transnationally.
Next, we will begin by discussing the political environment faced by LGBT
CSOs in the five countries under consideration. The stances of political elites and
the position of public opinion toward gays and lesbians have a considerable impact
on the choice of strategy. We do not systematically and objectively analyze the
discourse of political elites toward gay and lesbian rights, but rely on the leaders of
the organizations of their subjective impressions of those elite stances. These
impressions are arguably a more important variable for influencing CSO strategies
than more objective data, but perhaps more difficult to compare across countries.
In terms of public opinion, the level of general acceptance toward gays and
lesbians is highest in the Netherlands. When a representative sample of those aged
15 years and above were asked whether ‘Gays and lesbians should be free to live
their lives as they choose’ the level is highest in the Netherlands at 89 per cent.2
The next EU countries in the ranking are the Scandinavian countries, Denmark
(88 per cent) and Sweden (84 per cent). The proportion with a positive attitude
toward gays and lesbians is somewhat lower in other countries, for example in the
United Kingdom at 75 per cent, Germany and Spain at 74 per cent, and Austria
at 71 per cent. Turning now to Eastern Europe, Hungary has 51 per cent positive, narrowly above a majority. Other East European countries had smaller
percentage of respondents that agreed with the statement – for example, Poland
with 43 per cent. Italy did not participate in this survey.
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Morality politics
Strategies
1. Public visibility
Protest
2. Coalitions
Difficult
3. Government
interaction
4. Transnational
activities
Confrontational
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Table 2: Strategies of civil society organizations based on mode of interaction with their political
environment
Focus on domestic
struggle. May import
ideas and resources
Incremental change
High-profile politics
Small-scale events
Celebratory public
events
Public cooperation
and collaboration
Close cooperation
Discreet cooperation
Discreet lobbying
May input or
export ideas and
resources
Export ideas and
resources
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Next, we will turn to the 2006 Eurobarometer survey and questions that
move beyond general acceptance toward support for equal rights. First, we
consider the proportion who feel gays in Europe should be allowed to marry.3
The Netherlands was the highest, with 82 per cent respondents answering
positively. Next are the Scandinavian countries, with Sweden at 71 per cent and
Denmark at 69 per cent. Considerably lower, but with a majority, Germany
has 52 per cent. Below the line are the United Kingdom at 46 per cent, Italy at
31 per cent, Hungary at 18 per cent and Poland at 17 per cent.
Next, we will turn to introduce our five CSOs and consider the goals and
strategies they pursue within their political environment. We will discuss the
cases in three sections corresponding to the different modes of interaction we
have identified. For each CSO, we stress their strategy in four areas: public
visibility, coalition behavior, government interaction and transnational activities. Table 3 places the CSOs in the mode of interaction based on their political environment and chosen strategy.
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The Morality Politics Mode: Arcigay in Italy and Kampania Przeciw
Homofobii (KPH) in Poland
Italy
We will first focus on the current goals and strategies of Arcigay, the largest,
nation-wide gay and lesbian group in Italy which functions as an umbrella
organization connecting many local groups across the country. Arcigay is in
the ‘morality politics’ mode of interaction with a high degree of opposition
from political parties on the political Right, the Vatican and Catholic lay
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Table 3: Selected LGBT CSOs in Europe based on mode of interaction
Morality politics
Incremental change
High-profile politics
Arcigay (Italy)
Stonewall (United Kingdom)
COC (the Netherlands)
Campaign against
Homophobia (Poland)
Hatter society (Hungary)
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organizations. It will become apparent that the group’s strategies include
forming coalitions, while difficult with some groups, has been successful with
sympathetic center-left political parties and labor unions. In terms of public
visibility, they have organized large protests in Rome to raise awareness of the
need for a new law recognizing same-sex partnerships.
We first asked the President to outline Arcigay’s current main political goals.4
He replied that the main goal is pressing the Italian government to have parliament pass a law recognizing same-sex partnerships. He noted that the organization made the strategic choice of following the French model of demanding
partnership legislation, instead of marriage, for two reasons. First, it was
consistent with the European Parliament’s call for the EU countries to enact
legislation to end discrimination faced by same-sex partners and to ensure that
‘same sex partners enjoy the same respect, dignity and protection as the rest of
society’.5 Second, they believed that a strategy of arguing for a ‘plurality of
family models,’ which would include the legal recognition of unmarried heterosexual couples, broadened support for the law, and diminished debates about the
word ‘marriage’ with the Vatican and the Catholic church hierarchy. From our
theoretical perspective, this particular framing of this issue is an attempt to
narrow conflict and deflect opposition among Catholic voters to legislative
changes to family law. It also is a strategic choice reflective of the political
environment, in particular the public opinion previously mentioned in which less
than a third of Italians feel gays should be allowed to marry.
The second major goal of Arcigay is strengthening anti-discrimination law.
Here, the group wishes to amend existing Italian anti-discrimination law dating
from the mid-1990s based on sex and race to sexual orientation and gender
equality. The CSO feels that extending anti-discrimination to this older law is
more beneficial that a new, separate law, because of the longer-term development of related case law. Furthermore, the group wants the government to
establish an independent authority to monitor compliance. Establishing a
government body that can investigate complaints, which means government
can be pro-active and groups and individuals need not wait to pursue
lengthy and costly judicial remedies. Additional goals of the group include:
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a transgender law modeled on the Spanish model in which name change
and legal sex status may proceed and be independent of surgery, increased
spending on health-care issues (especially AIDS awareness campaigns) and a
law to offer asylum to those suffering prosecution abroad based on their sexual
orientation.
The demand of Arcigay and other LGBT CSOs for the government to pass
partnership legislation (referred to as PACS – from the French: pacte civil de
solidarité, civil pact of solidarity) became a major theme of the 2006 Italian
election (alongside the Iraq War and the building of a high-speed railway across
sensitive alpine environments). Arcigay in collaboration with other CSOs
brought hundreds of thousands to Rome in protests to support the creation
of PACS. The issue received extensive comment by the two major candidates
during the two television debates, with Sylvio Berlusconi defending the traditional conception of the Italian family and the Catholic Church’s teaching,
whereas Romano Prodi was cautiously in favor of at least some measures in the
direction of creating PACS.
In this matter, we see how Arcigay’s government interaction, even with
potential allies may be confrontational at times. The issue of PACS divided
Prodi’s rather fragile coalition. While many of the political parties which were
part of the center-left Unione coalition were in favor of such legislation, two
Catholic oriented parties of the coalition, Udeur and Margherita were opposed.
The activities of Arcigay, the large demonstrations, and the widespread media
attention they raised did not go unnoticed by the head of the ticket of the
Unione coalition. Prodi sent a letter to Arcigay dated 1 March 2006 and stated
(English translation from the Italian):
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I register your dissatisfaction with the compromises made in our governing program y the matter of the legal recognition of the rights y of all
persons who are part of de-facto unions. What I am asking you is y to
recognize my determination, and that of each component of the coalition y
to bring about an effective and full recognition of these rights. What I ask of
you is y there is no necessity of making noise but rather of full and
commensurate dialogue, quiet and not loud y
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The response back from Arcigay in a public letter addressed to Prodi, indicated
that the group was pleased to accept the commitment of the candidate, but
refused to be silenced during the election campaign. Thus, while Prodi in
essence says ‘I support you but don’t be so loud’ during the election campaign,
Arcigay replies that it will be loud and clear fighting for their rights as citizens
in a democracy. One can also see from the letter that the governing program of
the center-left coalition does not propose to create a new legal institution to
recognize same-sex partnerships, but instead focuses on the individual rights of
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persons in de-facto (thus non-legally) recognized unions. This is far less than
what Arcigay is demanding.
One of the strategies of Arcigay is to reach out and build coalitions with
labor unions in Italy. At the 1992 Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
(CGIL) Congress, the union created a special gay and lesbian section headed
by Dr Maria Toniollo, to be part of the New Rights office with other groups
such as women, racial minorities and the disabled.6 This trade union is the only
one in Italy working on gay and lesbian issues. The right wing-trade unions and
Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) – Italy’s second largest
trade union and Catholic orientated, openly oppose them. Arcigay and
Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori have maintained this coalition
and have focused on efforts to combat mobbing, homophobia and
discrimination on the work floor.
While Prodi’s coalition triumphed on 10 April 2006, the government was
not able to pass a law recognizing same-sex partnerships. The cabinet approved
a draft of a law on 7 February 2007 to be submitted to parliament – ‘Diritti e
doveri dei conviventi’ DICO (Rights and Duties of Co-Habitating). A furious
debate ensued, and on 21 February 2007 Prodi resigned over a negative vote in
Parliament concerning the Italian troops in Afghanistan, but was reinstated by
President Napoletano a few days later and asked to form a new government.
The general weakness of the coalition on the left at this time, made it difficult
to proceed with equality legislation. This very narrow parliamentary majority
collapsed in 2008, leading to new elections and the return of Berlusconi and his
center-right political party Forza Italia to power, greatly reducing Arcigay’s
ability to cooperate with the government.
Currently, a cycle of demonstrations on both sides of the morality conflict
have occurred. On 9 March 2007, Arcigay and the CGIL union turned out over
50 000 in Rome to demonstrate in favor of DICO. On 12 March 2007, hundreds
of thousands turned out for ‘Family Day,’ a church backed demonstration to
defend the ‘natural family’. On 17 June 2007 the annual gay Pride March was
held in Rome, with reports of close to a million in attendance, with many signs
against the position of the Vatican and demands for the DICO law to be passed.
It is apparent that despite the strategy of Arcigay to collaborate with
sympathetic center-left political parties and labor unions, and reaching out to
the public with large protests, that their gains have been largely limited to the
Italian anti-discrimination measures mandated at the EU level. So far, their
calls for the recognition of same-sex partnerships have failed to pass the
parliament. Arcigay for the time being is locked in a ‘morality politics’ mode of
interaction with the powerful opposition forces of the Vatican and Catholic
groups, and a hostile government of the right led by Berlusconi. The presence of
Berlusconi and the conservative majority in parliament does not bode well for
the imminent success of the legislative goals of Arcigay.
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Poland
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The Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) is a very important LGBT group in
Poland, very active in reaching out to both the LGBT community and the wider
public, and also lobbying the government for equal rights.7 They have been in a
‘morality politics’ mode because of the strong opposition from the conservative
government and Catholic religious forces in the country. While the previous
government formed by the party ‘Law and Justice’ was openly homophobic, the
current government led by Donald Tusk of the party Civic Platform may be
considered liberal on economic issues, but is very conservative on social issues.
KPH has a number of goals it is pursuing with the new government.8 KPH
wishes to ‘start a conversation with the government’ concerning the establishment
of civil unions. This rather cautious approach seems consistent with the political
environment in Poland, with a conservative government and public opinion in
which less than a fifth of Poles support marriage rights for same-sex couples.
KPH is also very concerned that the government initially closed the office
that handles discrimination matters. Having such an office is a requirement of
the EU anti-discrimination directives. The previous Office of Equal Rights for
Men and Women was closed by the Law and Justice government, and an office
of the family created. That office was subsequently closed by the government,
which only after a long delay created a new body to deal with discrimination.
KPH reached out to women’s group with a coalition strategy, to build a broader
base to press the government to establish a new office. Although an equality
body for equal treatment was established in the Prime Minister’s Chancellory in
April 2009, it took many months to become organized. Thus, while other CSOs
have effective and active government equality bodies with which they can interact, in Poland this interaction with the government remains confrontational
because the government is only minimally engaged on discrimination issues.
European engagement on LGBT issues is very important to KPH. The CSO
is worried that the EU is not pressing the Polish government very hard on the
issue of anti-discrimination. The Secretary General of KPH, Tomasz Szypula
notes that whereas the Law and Justice Party was openly homophobic and
provoked strong condemnation with the European Parliament and the EU, the
new ‘government is liked in Europe, so now politicians abroad try to give it a
chance’. KPH would like the EU to press the new government to properly
activate the equality body.
Szypula also says the more benign face of the government means some
domestic support has dried up for KPH. ‘After two years of the Law and Justice
party, many gays and lesbian volunteers joined us, but many straight people
supported us because they were against the government. That support has dried
up’. This underscores the idea that opposition forces to a CSO may also expand
the scope of conflict to such an extent, that it drives people to support the
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CSO, in this case the KPH and their anti-discrimination agenda. The new Prime
Minister in Poland is very pro-European and focuses on economic issues, not
social issues. The government says that their agenda has changed and that social
issues will not be a focus – this applies not only to gay and lesbian issues but also
to women and racial issues. The government wants to ‘avoid these hot potato
issues and refrain from losing its popularity’ states Szypula.
In terms of public visibility, KPH continues to attempt to organize protets in
Warsaw and other large cities across Poland. In 2005, municipal authorities in
Warsaw prohibited the gay pride march (see Holzhacker, 2010). Public opinion
continues to be quite negative – two-third of the society state that gays and
lesbians should not have the right to hold such public events (CBOS, 2008).
The KPH is also continuing with other public visibility campaigns. It has a
very subtle poster campaign it calls ‘You’re not alone’ featuring a picture of a
man or women dressed as various professionals, doctor or teacher and so on.
The campaign reminds the public that gays and lesbians are part of the society
and right next door. The campaign began in Warsaw and the big cities, but has
now moved exclusively to smaller towns and cities.
Turning finally to transnational activities, the KPH is assisted by the
transnational activities of other LGBT CSOs. The COC in the Netherlands
provided funds for KPH to gather in February 2008 in Gdansk with other gay and
lesbian groups across Poland to discuss strategy for the upcoming 2 or 3 years.
George Soros is also funding a project in which KPH will be monitoring human
rights – LGBT and women’s rights in Poland. They will be preparing a report that
includes legal developments, political developments and media monitoring.
KPH held a major conference in June 2008 in Warsaw, with over 70
participants from Poland and abroad, which focused on the workplace. The
objective was to get trade unions involved in the anti-discrimination debate.
The conference also involved trade unions abroad, such as UNISON from the
United Kingdom and Ver.de from Germany. This cross-border transnational
cooperation between Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and unions,
helps expand the conflict by bringing in additional players and allows for best
practices to be shared across EU countries. It is clear that KPH continues in
their struggle for equality and non-discrimination in Polish society, but they
have formidable opponents slowing their progress.
The Incremental Change Mode: Stonewall in the United Kingdom and the
Hatter Society in Hungary
United Kingdom
Stonewall was founded in 1989 by a small group who had been active in
the repeal of Section 28 of the Local Government Act, a measure from
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s time, which forbid the ‘promotion’ of
homosexuality in schools. The aim from the beginning was to create a
professional lobbying group and to move away from divisions within the gay
and lesbian community. ‘We wanted a fast lobbying team which is not
constrained by complex constitutions or by membership issues’.9 Efficiency and
effectiveness are highly valued by this highly professionalized organization.
The group worked closely with the Labour government to achieve ‘some
major successes like the equalization of the age of consent, lifting the ban on
lesbians and gays serving in the military, securing legislation allowing same-sex
couples to adopt and the repeal of section 28’.10 More recently, Stonewall
helped secure civil partnerships and ensure that the new Equality Act included
protection of gays and lesbians in terms of goods and services.
It is clear that globalization brings new insights, and Stonewall is well aware of
perspectives from other groups abroad. ‘If you compare us with the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) in the United States, you will see that we accept civil
partnership, whereas the HRC demands absolute parity, full marriage’.11 The
Head of Policy noted that Stonewall accepted this compromise position, so that
it could bring about real change quickly and successfully get it through the
House of Lords. The organization now identifies itself as a ‘conservative’ organization, with a small c’ to consolidate the legislative gains of the past years and to
focus on monitoring careful implementation of that legislation.11 This willingness to compromise is a hallmark of the incremental mode of interaction.
A focus of the strategy of Stonewall is very close interaction with the government and elites, in discreet, behind the scenes lobbying. For example, it worked
closely with the Ministry of Health on issues related to human in-vitro
fertilization in ways that would not attract media attention or the ire of the
House of Lords. Stonewall also works a lot with companies to insure effective diversity strategies are implemented. Over 300 high-profile businesses
have joined the ‘Diversity Champions’ program, to instigate best practice in
ensuring gay and lesbian diversity in the workplace.
Stonewall also conducts empirical research, which feeds into their strategy
of presenting carefully constructed arguments to policymakers and government. We are ‘known to be very professional, very measured, very sensible.
We keep things very concise. Our research fits into this, if we cannot present
things in top 10 hits, we don’t present it’.11 The research typically focuses on
a needs assessment, to give the government solid empirical evidence for action.
Stonewall, for example, conducted a survey of over 1000 gay and lesbian
school children. Eight out of 10 reported incidents of bullying and some even
death threats. Stonewall uses this information to argue for change with the
government departments, as part of their ‘Education for All’ campaign.
Stonewall’s head of policy explained these choice of strategies were developed
in light of the very different political environment the movement saw itself in
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during the last 10 years under the Labour government, compared to the previous
conservative governments. Most of the legislative battles have been won, so the
focus turns to careful implementation and changing people’s hearts and minds.
Stonewall is also itself not an organizer of the large-scale pride events, organized
instead by other groups in the broader social movement, preferring to focus on
an incremental change strategy of consolidating gains. The focus is very much on
the United Kingdom, and little energy is expended now on achieving aims at the
EU level or assisting LGBT groups transnationally.
Clearly, Stonewall’s mode of interaction is currently in the incremental
change mode, responding to changes in their political environment by attempting to solidify earlier legislative gains by carefully monitoring implementation
by government, employers and private businesses.
Hungary
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The Hatter Society in Hungary also operates primarily in the ‘incremental
change’ mode of interaction, involving insider, discreet lobbying. The Hatter
society is a traditional service based organization which survives on small
grants from government or private funding organizations given for such activities as running a help line and providing AIDS education campaigns. Their
ability to interact with the government tends to be reactive, not proactive, to
developments of the government, because of their current institutional capacity. The main proponent of the idea of partnership legislation came from
the political parties, and then a lawyer’s committee came together under the
auspices of Hatter to advise and lobby the government for the designated
contours of such a law.
In terms of public visibility, the Hatter Society has taken part in gay pride
marches, which are of a smaller scale than are seen in Western European
capitals. The 2007 gay Pride in Budapest was organized around the motto
‘Marriage for Everyone’ and was designed to supplement the lobbying strategy
of trying to get the government to pass same-sex partner legislation. The march
attracted between 1000–2000 participants, according to Hatter. There was both
an official opposition of perhaps 200–300 persons organized by a rightist
political party, Jobbik, in an area designated by the police for such counterdemonstrations. Here there were signs and placards attacking the Liberal party
support for the legislation. There were also verbal and violent physical attacks
from elements of the radical right, from individuals who emerged from groups
holding flags representing right wing groups in the country that were dispersed
along the parade route.
This was the first year that such a large official opposition was present and
such a high degree of violence directed at the participants of the march was
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seen. One of the young Hatter activists who participated in the march said
‘It was horrible. We left the march before the end because of all of the abuse’.12
There were more than a dozen persons injured and at least one participant
from Germany was taken to the hospital. Those persons who were seen as most
transgressing traditional gender roles, for example transgenders participating
in the march, were attacked. A lot of the violence happened in the evening
at the end of the march, and Hatter received reports that the police failed to
respond to these incidents of violence.
There was transnational support for the march, for example the International Lesbian and Gay Association – Europe based in Brussels, was present
with a group of about 10 persons. They had scheduled a conference concurrently with the march, because they had heard of the planned opposition.
The President of Hatter, Laszlo Mocsonaki, says that the Hungarian politicians are very sensitive to their image abroad. Thus external pressure from outside Hungary is very important to the group’s success. He says that ‘visibility
and external pressure is everything’. The government especially does not want
attacks on foreigners, especially prominent ones able to attract media attention
abroad.
In turning to the legislative agenda, the discreet cooperation strategy of
Hatter with sympathetic political parties is apparent. The Liberal Party raised
the issue of extending marriage rights after the Pride event, and said that full
marriage with adoption was their goal. A State Secretary in the Prime
Minister’s Office, Gábor Szetey urged the Socialist party to act, saying that
Hungary should be like her European counterparts (Hirszerzo, 2007). The
Socialist party finally moved toward a registered partnership law, thus a
measure short of full marriage equality. This law passed parliament on 17
December 2007 and was to enter into force on 1 January 2009. The bill was
supported by the Socialists (although four Socialist MPs voted no, and
five abstained) and the Liberals. Both same-sex and different-sex partners
could enter into registered partnerships. This law was struck down after
Constitutional challenges in court regarding the protection of marriage and
family provided in the Constitution. The parliament adopted an updated
Registered Partnership Act, which entered into force on 1 July 2009, with
the same regulations as the former act for same-sex couples (See Dombos,
et al, 2007).
Why was there so much opposition and violence at the 2007 Pride march
directed at the participants? This is likely related to two factors. First, the
government – a coalition of the Socialist and the much smaller Liberal party –
had been working on a partnership law (for both same-sex and opposite-sex
partners) to introduce in parliament. Thus the policy process was coming to
a head. Second, the opposition forces to the government had been previously
mobilized. In the fall of 2006, after the prime minister’s admission that he had
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misled the public during the previous election campaign concerning the state of
the economy. This led to large, and sometimes violent demonstrations around
parliament, public television and other government buildings directed against
the government.
The Hatter society, in addition to the services it offers to the community in
terms of a help-line and education programs, is thus mainly involved in incremental change through lobbying on such issues as partnership recognition (not
marriage) and being involved in relatively small Pride marches for ‘bonding’
within the community and for reaching out to the broader community. The
difficult general political environment in Hungary has encouraged the Hatter
society to move cautiously forward with incremental change.
The High-Profile Politics Mode: COC in the Netherlands
The Netherlands
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We now turn from the ‘morality politics’ and ‘incremental change’ mode of
interaction to a more dynamic mode combining internal and external strategies.
The COC Netherlands has over the past 4 or 5 years embarked on a different
kind of interaction, which we label ‘high-profile politics’. This mode of interaction is marked by high visibility public campaigns, strong domestic coalitions,
close cooperation with government in policy development and implementation,
and transnational engagement. We will highlight the broad range of activities
of the COC during Dutch national elections, a celebratory public visibility
strategy apparent in the gay Pride event in Amsterdam, and a focus on
international solidarity by helping LGBT CSOs abroad, designed to keep issues
and positions of the group high on the agenda both nationally and
internationally. This high-profile politics strategy is pursued by the COC,
working within a political environment with widespread support for LGBT
equality among political elites and the public.13 The Netherlands, in 2001,
became the first country in the world where same-sex partners were legally
allowed to marry.
The COC developed a strategy to be active in all stages of the 2006 Dutch
national election: the campaign, the party coalition talks after the election, the
negotiations for the governing agreement between the coalition parties, and later
program implementation by the government. During the election campaign, the
COC first conducted a survey among the political parties, discussed the position
of the political parties on issues important to them on their website, and held
political debates with leaders from the parties. They were careful not to endorse
any particular party, but got the political parties to respond to issues of concern
to them.
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The COC was also very successful at getting press attention to their cause to
increase the public visibility of their goals. They organized major events, which
attracted media attention during the election campaign, including coverage on
the main TV news program. The first, on 12 November 2007, featured the
controversial minister and prominent member of the VVD (liberal-conservative
party), Rita Verdonk in a gay cafe in Amsterdam. The integration minister
announced funds to make ‘Homosexuality discussable in ethnic circles’ and
the event received coverage on the evening news program. At a second event,
on 18 November just days before the election, the leader of the PvDA (Labor
party) Wouter Bos attended a large public event in a plaza in Amsterdam
organized by COC and the party and a 10-step policy commitment was made.
After the election, during government formation talks, COC was also active.
The COC wanted to make sure that the success of the religious parties in
the election would not bring a set back for gays and lesbians in the country.
While many possible coalition possibilities were initially discussed, formal
coalition talks opened between two large parties, the Christian Democratic
Appeal (CDA) and the PvDA, as well as the much smaller Christian Union
party. The COC was successful at arranging a meeting with the leader of the
Christian Union party, André Rouvoet, to discuss ‘homosexual emancipation
in the new cabinet policy’ during the coalition discussion’.14 The Christian
Union was very interested in allowing civil servants in city halls across the
country to bow out of the requirement to marry same-sex couples, a symbolic
concession which they later largely won from their coalition partners. This level
of involvement of a CSO during a national election and government formation
process was truly extraordinary, a time when normally political parties dominate in the party-based elections in Europe.
The COC has also chosen to take on a very high-profile strategy to reaching
out to the public. According to the City of Amsterdam, the gay Canal Pride is
now the third largest public event in Amsterdam during the year (after Queens
Day and the ‘Uitmarkt’ featuring free cultural performances) and thus a major
draw of tourists from across the Netherlands and Europe and beyond. In 2007,
the event was held over four days and marked the first time that the COC
took on a larger role within this event that is traditionally organized by the
commercial bars and clubs of the city. The COC desired to add more social and
political elements to the activities. The president of COC that year, Frank van
Dalen talked about the strategy of the event: visibility, tolerance and social
acceptance and integration in the community (‘zusamenleven’ – literally ‘living
together’). The president mentioned the efforts of COC to reach out to gay and
lesbian handicapped persons. He also talked about efforts to organize education program in schools, which has been quite successful.
The COC had seven large boats in the Canal Pride event in Amsterdam in
2007, each devoted to a special theme which they wished to highlight. One was
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a boat with activists from the Balkans and Caucuses, as well as Poland.
Participants were waving large flags from their countries, flanked by a banner
in English which read ‘Building Safe Societies for All’. At the front of the boat,
was a character dressed in bright purple as one of the teletubbies from TV,
called Tinky Winky. This was to mock a statement widely reported earlier in
the summer from the Polish Minister for Families that this fictional children’s
TV character for the pre-school set was gay because his magic bag looked like a
ladies hand-bag, and thus a part of the attack of Western values on traditional
Poland. There was also a COC boat with signs in Dutch proclaiming ‘More
oversight and registration of violence against homosexuals and ‘25 per cent
extra penalty for Homosexual Hate Crimes’ to back the national political
agenda for new legislation and police efforts to curb hate crime.
This focus on new legislation to fight hate crimes received considerable media
attention following the march. The Dutch premier national news program, NOS
Journal, within the first 10 min of the main stories on Monday, 6 August reported that four persons had been attacked on Sunday in Amsterdam, including
a gay American couple. The news also reported that the Homo-Monument,
a large triangle situated on a canal near a church in Amsterdam, which honors
the homosexuals deported from the Netherlands to the concentration camps
during World War II, had been damaged the night before. The report featured
visual images from the march and the signs calling for more action against
violence to gays and lesbians.15
In a coalition strategy, the COC also encouraged other CSOs to participate
in the gay Pride event. There was a boat from Amnesty International with signs
proclaiming ‘Make Some Noise for Gay Rights in Turkey’ which featured both
Dutch and Turkish activists. The COC also assisted the Dutch international
bank, ING Bank, to organize an all day ‘Company Pride Conference’ for
business managers involved in marketing, human resources and diversity.16
The following year, during the 2008 gay pride event the Mayor of Amsterdam,
Job Cohen, rode for the first time in the City of Amsterdam boat. The day
before, he spoke at an event organized by COC and a new foundation for the
emancipation of Dutch North Africans, NAFAR (Zelforganisatie voor NoordAfrikaanse jongeren met homoseksuele gevoelens, Self-organization of North
African Youth with Homosexual Preferences). The event featured talks about
homosexuality in Morocco, as well as men and women sharing their experiences
with coming out in the Netherlands.
The 2008 gay pride also received a lot of attention because of the attendance
of the Dutch education minister, Ronald Plasterk, who is responsible for
the gay emancipation portfolio of the government and declared ‘I represent
here this country’. Other Dutch ministers from the Labour party (PvDA) were
also present. This participation was not without controversy. A minister from
the Christian Union party, defense minister Eimert van Middelkoop, said that
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he found the presence of these ministers at the gay Pride event ‘A little provocative’ toward the CDA and Christian Union coalition partners. This incident
underscores the COC’s strategy of seeking public cooperation and collaboration with government, even if controversy emerges, because it raised public
awareness of the issues.
The COC was also involved in advising Minister Plasterk on the policy
document mainstreaming LGBT policy, which became known as ‘Simply
Gay’.17 This indicates that the COC can also engage in the kind of behind the
scenes consultation with government during the implementation stage of
policy, typical of the ‘incremental change’ mode of interaction.
In terms of transnational activities and the aim to share expertise abroad,
during the 2007 gay Pride week the COC also held a symposium with LGBT
activists from groups in Eastern Europe and Central Asia called the ‘Frontline’.
Joyce Hamilton, Vice President of COC and international coordinator, said to
the assembled activists from the Balkans and the Caucuses (and to the Dutch
foreign minister seated in the front row) ‘we are humbled by your enthusiasm,
your cause is our cause. You are a source of inspiration for us’.18 Hamilton
commented that whereas the EU was able to place pressure on countries during
the accession process to the EU, she wanted to see the European Commission
be more willing to keep the pressure on the commitments made by countries
like Poland. After the meeting, one of the board members of COC privately
explained the connection between the domestic and transnational strategies of
the organization. He commented that part of the strategy of raising the plight of
gays and lesbians abroad was to inspire continued activism in the Netherlands.
‘We need an opposition’ to be able to mobilize our constituency and to realize
the urgency of collective action and continued vigilance.19
The COC has also been active transnationally in additional ways, taking
a leadership role across Europe and beyond. It organized an event in The
Hague on 15 May 2007 to protest homophobia and efforts to restrict the right
of gay Pride events to be held in Lithuania and Poland. It reached out to other
important trasnational civil rights organizations to broaden the scope and raise
the profile of these events, by having the director of Amnesty International
speak first at this event.20 It then sent a delegation under the leadership of the
President of the COC to the Warsaw Pride march.20
It is apparent that the COC in the Netherlands has embarked on a ‘highprofile politics’ mode of interaction, a strategy option that emerged within
a conducive and supportive political environment among elites and the public
for equal rights for LGBT persons. While the substantial legislative gains
such as the right to marriage may be in the recent past, the COC reaches out to
the public with visibility campaigns, it forms coalitions with other CSOs,
reaches out to political parties and cooperates with a largely sympathetic
government.
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Conclusion
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This article presented an empirical investigation of the goals and strategies pursued by five LGBT CSOs: Arcigay in Italy, KPH in Poland, Stonewall
in the United Kingdom, the Hatter Society in Hungary and the COC in the
Netherlands. From the five cases presented here, it is apparent that the two
possible modes of interaction faced by LGBT CSOs offered in the literature,
either highly divisive ‘morality politics’ or an ‘incremental change’ mode of
interaction, must be joined by a third which we call ‘high-profile politics’. This
mode of interaction with the political environment is one marked by high
visibility public events, coalition seeking, close cooperation with government,
and transnational activity at the EU and global levels. This is a strategy
possible where this is a high degree of public and elite support for equality, and
minimal partisan or religious opposition to the movement.
Using Kollman’s concept of outside lobbying and the importance of
expanding or limiting conflict, one sees that groups in a morality politics mode
use outside lobbying to protest, show their strength, and communicate their
demands to political elites and the broader public who are very divided about
the group’s aims. Groups in an incremental change mode attempt to limit their
use of outside lobbying to narrow the conflict to realizable, concrete goals with
political elites. But groups in the ‘high-profile politics’ mode of interaction use
outside public visibility events to maintain and expand the scope of conflict
which may bolster their inside lobbying strategies to achieve success both
nationally and abroad.
The inclusion of sexual orientation in Article 13 EC in the Treaty of Amsterdam
and the subsequent anti-discrimination directives at the European level, galvanized
and provided new opportunities for LGBT CSOs across Europe to work together
transnationally. The announcement in 2008 by the European Commission that
they will attempt to extend the protection beyond the area of employment,
currently stalled by reluctant national governments, provides new impetus for such
cooperation.
The Europeanization of anti-discrimination has laid a minimum ground
floor, in which further extension of rights beyond the area of employment, to
include equality in housing, the provision of services and other areas have
become possible. In addition, while some countries have extended rights of
marriage to same-sex couples or offer other forms of state recognized partnerships, this has emerged as an attainable goal for LGBT CSO groups in other
countries. The Europeanization of the policy area has led to a growing transnationalization of the movement, in which national groups learn and are
assisted by groups in other countries across Europe.
The modern LGBT rights movement in Europe has moved well beyond
identity politics to demand equal rights, including anti-discrimination measures
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and the right to marriage. While some gay and lesbian civil rights groups
remain trapped in a ‘morality politics’ mode of interaction because of strong
opposition to their demand for equal rights which makes success difficult, other
groups may be able to achieve results through an ‘incremental change’ mode of
political interaction. But we have seen other CSOs like the COC in the
Netherlands, are now able are able to use the tolerance, acceptance, even
celebration of their diversity won in their societies for a ‘high-profile politics’
strategy to maintain and advance their political and societal goals at home and
abroad.
OR
This research was conducted during the period 2006–2009 and began during
a Jean Monnet Fellowship at the European University Institute (EUI) in
Florence. I am very grateful to the EUI for this period of research and
intellectual reflection.
About the Author
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Ronald Holzhacker is Assistant Professor for political science at the University
of Twente. He holds the PhD from the University of Michigan in political
science and a JD from the University of Minnesota. He serves as one of four
senior EU experts for the Network of Socio-Economic Experts in the Field of
Anti-Discrimination established by the European Commission to monitor the
implementation of equality in the member states. He was a 2006 recipient of
the Jean Monnet Fellowship to the European University Institute. He is
broadly interested in the interaction between NGOs and international
institutions striving for human rights. He is currently finishing an edited
volume Global Rights, Global Movements focused on the tension between
universal human rights and the need for local movements to take into account
national governments and societies when striving for those rights. He most
recently was visiting scholar during spring 2010 at the Institute for the Study of
Human Rights at Columbia University in New York.
Notes
1 Speech by Ken Livingstone, former Mayor of London, at the Pride London event, Trafalgar
Square, 30 June 2007.
2 Opinions of population 15 years and older, 2004, percentage who agree or strongly agree,
European Social Survey as reported by Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) – the
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Netherlands Institute for Social Research in Saskia Keuzenkamp and David Bos, Out in the
Netherlands (2007).
2006 Eurobarometer, population aged 15 years and older, as reported by SCP in Saskia
Keuzenkamp and David Bos, Out in the Netherlands (2007). Also, see 2006 Eurobarometer,
p. 43, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf.
Interviews were conducted with four members of the organization, the President – Sergio Lo
Giudice, the Press Secretary – Luigi Valeri, the Liason with Labor – Sando Mattiou, and the
health issues specialist – Raffaele Lelleri on 16 May 2006 at the groups’ headquarters in
Bologna.
European parliament resolution passed 18 January 2006 (EP Resolution P6_TA(2006)0018).
Dr Maria Gigliola Toniollo, the director of the Settore Nuovi Diritti (New Rights Section)
within the CGIL, was interviewed in the CGIL headquarters in Rome on 21 April 2006.
Interview on 20 February 2007 with Lisette Kampus and Tomasz Szypuza, Secretary General of
Kampania Przeciw Homofobil, Campaign Against Homophobia, in their headquarters in
Warsaw.
Telephone interview with Tomasz Szypula, Secretary General of the Campaign Against
Homophobia, 23 January 2008.
Interview with Ruth Hunt, Head of Policy, Stonewall, London, 3 July 2007.
Home page of Stonewall, http://www.stonewall.org.uk/.
Interview with Ruth Hunt.
Interview with the President of the Hatter Society, Lazlo Mocsonaki and a young, anonymous
activist in Budapest, 4 December 2007.
We wish to underscore that this is a strategic choice followed by COC. There are LGBT CSOs
in Europe acting within a similar political environment, which have not chosen this mode of
interaction. For example, the Danish National Association of Gays and Lesbians (Landsforeningen for Bøsser og Lesbiske – LBL), operates with a supportive public and elite opinion
toward equality for LGBT persons, but LBL is not engaged in such a high-profile political
strategy like that of the COC, either within Denmark or transnationally.
Article in Trouw, a major national Dutch newspaper considered on the center-right, ‘ChristenUnie
en COC praten over homobeleid’, 22 January 2007, pp. 4–5.
NOS Journal, television news 18.07, 6 August 2007.
Held at ING House, Amstelveenseweg 500, 1 August 2007.
Dutch government policy document 2008–2011 ‘Gewoon homo zijn; Lesbisch en homoemancipatiebeleid (‘Simply gay; Dutch Government LGBT Policy document 2008–2011’).
Joyce Hamilton, COC Vice-President and international coordinator, Amsterdam, 2 August
2007.
Personal conversation after the LGBT Frontline Symposium with COC board member Wouter
Neerings at the COC Amsterdam, Rozenstraat 14, Amsterdam, 2 August 2007, later president
of COC.
See COC website, www.coc.nl, nieuws: Week van Protest tegen Homofobie in Polen, accessed
21 May 2007.
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