Honesty Pays: On the benefits of having and
disclosing information in coalition formation
Ilja van Beest, Wolfang Steinel and Keith Murnighan
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, 20-24 august 2009
Leiden University Institute for Psychological Research
Information dilemma
- Revealing information facilitates the achievement of joint outcomes but
simultaneously increases personal vulnerability (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson,
& Pillutla, 1999)
- Economic theory reacts to the information dilemma by suggesting that people
should keep information private, because revealing information can lead rational
others to use this information for their own advantage.
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A definition:
- “The process in which two or more parties negotiate about
the decision to allocate payoffs to those that are included and
those that are excluded in a coalition (Van Beest & Van Dijk,
2007)”
B
A
C
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Benefits of private information
- Being able to exchange one’s chips for a higher value than other
players is a huge advantage in coalition formation because it (a)
enables this person to obtain more payoffs than other players when
chips are handed in at the end of a negotiation, and (b) because it
enables this person to make more attractive offers to potential
coalition players than those who do not have an exchange advantage
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Study 1: having private information
- Participants are players in a 4(3 2 2) majority game.
- payoffs are 10 valuable chips
- Player A can exchange chips for 2 euro.
- Player B and C can exchange chips for 1 euro.
Manipulation:
Complete information: all players know
Incomplete information: only player A knows
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What should you do?
- AB = 3:2
- AC = 3:2
- BC = 2:2
- Thus if A is smart he/she
offers more than 50% to
either B or C
- Strength is weakness
predicts that BCcoalitions will be formed
- Put differently, more than 5
chips
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Study 1: offers
Chips offered to either B or C by A
6
5.47
5.5
5
4.82
From A to B/C
4.5
4
3.5
3
Incomplete
Complete
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Study 1: actual payoffs
Actual payoffs in Euro
7
6
5
Incomplete
Complete
4
3
2
1
0
player A
Player B
Player C
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Summary so far
- Having private information about exchange advantage was detrimental
for own outcomes.
- But what about active information sharing? Will participants place
themselves in a situation that resembles the full information
condition or will they seek a situation that resembles the incomplete
information condition?
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Study 2: sharing private information
- Participants are player As in a 4( 3 2 2) majority game.
- payoffs are 20 valuable chips
- Player A can exchange chips for 1.5 euro.
- Player B and C can exchange chips for 1 euro.
-Question 1: Will player A reveal exchange advantage or not?
-Question 2: How will this affect attractiveness of offer?
-Question 3: How is this related to fairness considerations?
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Study 2: a process
.13 (.37**)
Fairness
Offer
Deception
-.57**
-.41**
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Study 3: SVO and perspective taking
-Perspective taking is the cognitive capacity to consider the world from other
viewpoints. It allows an individual to anticipate the behavior and reactions of
others (Davis, 1983).
- Galinsky (2008) shows that perspective takers created more value and claimed
more payoffs in a bilateral negotiation.
- So how would a focus on the position of potential coalition partners affect the
likelihood that participants signal that they are attractive?
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Study 3: Revealing information
80
70
60
perspective
taking
50
40
control
30
20
10
0
prosocial
proself
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Conclusions 1
- Coalition bargainers fail to use private information to make
themselves attractive
- This is facilitated by self-interest motivations and inhibited by fairness
motivations
- Which are in turn augmented by perspective taking
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Conclusions 2
- Strength is weakness is based on the assumption that players fail to understand
that they do not have power. Instead we observe that players fail to understand
that they have to make their power base known
- Perspective taking increases joint gains and individuals gains. We show that this
may depend on the social value orientation of the participant. Prosocials may
increase joint gains. Proselfs may increase individuals gains.
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Conclusions 3
- Social Utility Model of Coalition formation (van Beest & Van Dijk,
2007)
- Self-interest and fairness consideration fuel both ends of the
information dilemma
- Self-interest inhibits disclosing of information
- Fairness facilitates disclosing of information
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References
-
Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E. (2007). Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection
and payoff allocations in groups. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 132 – 174.
Van Beest, I., Andeweg, R., Koning, L., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). Do groups exclude others more readily than individuals in coalition
formation? Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11, 69-81
Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., De Dreu, C. K. W. & Wilke, H. A. M. (2005). Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and
promote fairness cognitions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 609-617.
Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2004). Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: the effects on payoff, self-serving behavior,
and bargaining length. European of Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 713-728.
Van Beest, I., Wilke, H., & Van Dijk, E. (2004). The interplay of self-interest and equity in coalition formation. European of Journal of Social
Psychology, 34, 547-565.
Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2003). The excluded player in coalition formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 237247.
Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G., & Van Dijk, E. (2008). Get Angry, Get Out: The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communication in Multiparty
Negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 993-1002
Leiden University Institute for Psychological Research