Effect of Risk Orientation in a
Real-time Public Goods
Dilemma
Jane M. Y. Fung, Winton W. T. Au,
Weipeng Hu, Kan Shi
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Risk preference and cooperation

Risk-seekers cooperate more frequently than
risk-averse in a repeated 5-person prisoner’s
dilemma (Parks, 2004)


Cooperation is a risky choice in PGD because it
may have the player end up with a loss
The effect is more salient when the chance of
losing is more likely (i.e. in the “tough” condition)
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Risk orientation and SVO in PGD

Prosocials are likely to cooperate while
proselfs are likely to defect (Balliet, Parks, &
Joireman, 2009)



Since cooperation in PGD are risky…
Risk orientation affects prosocials’ but not
proselfs’ cooperative behaviors
In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, riskseeking prosocials cooperate more than their
risk-averse counterparts
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Risk orientation and SVO in
Real-time PGD
When players can observe preceding players’
decisions before making their own…


Decisions are still risky for prosocials, but not for
proselfs, at the beginning of the game
Risk-orientation affects prosocials but not proselfs
# of others' decisions

8
6
4
2
0
Time
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Risk orientation and SVO in
Real-time PGD



When choice is risky, and information is
available, people tend to defer decision and
seek additional information (Tversky & Shafir,
1992)
In real-time PGD, this implies…
Prosocial risk-averse wait longer and see
more of others’ decisions before making their
own
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Consequence of waiting in
Linear Real-time PGD



Longer wait means more likely to see others’
cooperative moves
In a linear real-time or sequential PGD, more
preceding cooperation could increase the
incentive to defect because of greed
Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to
defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in
linear real-time PGD
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Summary of predictions


In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, riskseeking prosocials cooperate more than their
risk-averse counterparts
Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to
defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in
linear real-time PGD

This effect is mediated by the number of
cooperative choices the player perceives before
making the decision
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Experiment



240 college students
Randomly assigned to a group of 4 to 8 in
each of the 35 trials
Real-time public good game (30 sec decision time)


All-or-none contribution
Linear payoff
Cooperation
60 participants per condition
Displayed
Not Displayed
Displayed
Full info
Personal info only
Not Displayed
Joint info only
No info
Defection
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Real-time PDG – Full info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal
account:
Personal account:
Joint account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Displayed
Full info
Personal info only
Not Displayed
Joint info only
No info
Defection
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Real-time PDG – Joint info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal
account:
Joint account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Displayed
Full info
Personal info only
Not Displayed
Joint info only
No info
Defection
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Real-time PDG – Personal info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal
account:
Personal account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Displayed
Full info
Personal info only
Not Displayed
Joint info only
No info
Defection
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Real-time PDG – No info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal
account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Displayed
Full info
Personal info only
Not Displayed
Joint info only
No info
Defection
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Measures of individual differences


Social value orientation (SVO) was measured
by Ring Measure (Liebrand, 1984)
Risk orientation (RO) was measured by Risk
Orientation Scale (Rohrmann, 2004)


Scale of 1 (risk-averse) – 7 (risk-seeking)
12 items
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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SVO distribution

individualist
61%
Prosocial – 32.3%


Cooperator – 92%
Altruist – 8%
altruist
2%
157
160

Proself – 67.7%


cooperator
29%
competitor
8%
Individualist – 93%
Competitors – 7%
F 140
r 120
e
q 100
u 80
e 60
n
c 40
y 20
75
0
prosocial
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
proself
15
Risk orientation distribution
140
120
Frequency
100
80
60
40
20
0
1
Less risk-seeking
2
3
4
5
RO Index
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7
More risk-seeking
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Result – % of cooperative choices

Significant 4-way RO X SVO X Joint info X
Personal info Joint Info
Personal Info
100%
100%
90%
90%
Proself
Proself
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
Choice(%)
Choice(%)
Prosocial
50%
40%
30%
30%
20%
100%
100%
10%
90%
No Info
0%
10%
90%
Proself
-0.73322494
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
Full Info
0
Prosocial
Choice (%)
Choice (%)
80%
50%
40%
20%
Prosocial
0%
0.73322494
-0.73322494
RO (centered)
Proself
Prosocial
0
0.73322494
RO (centered)
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
0%
-0.73322494
0
RO (centered)
0.73322494
-0.73322494
0
0.73322494
RO (centered)
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Result – No Info
100%
90%
Proself
Prosocial
80%
70%
Choice (%)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Slope:
proself: 0.055, p = 0.204
prosocial: 0.241, p < .01
10%
0%
-0.73322494
0
Less risk-seeking
RO (centered)
0.73322494
More risk-seeking
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Result – Full info
100%
90%
proself
prosocial
80%
70%
Choice (%)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Slope:
proself: -0.039, p = 0.448
prosocial: 0.149, p < .05
10%
0%
-0.73322494
0
Less risk-seeking
RO (centered)
0.73322494
More risk-seeking
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Mediator –
Number of cooperators perceived

Prosocials who are less risk-seeking are
more likely to delay their decisions and see
more cooperators

Regression of RO, SVO on number of perceived
cooperators
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Mediator –
Number of cooperators perceived
2
1.8
proself
prosocial
1.6
# of cooperators perceived
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
Slope:
proself: 0.042, p = 0.677
prosocial: -0.302, p < .05
0.2
0
-0.73322494
Less risk-seeking
0
0.73322494
RO (centered)
More risk-seeking
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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Mediation

Number of cooperators perceived fully
mediates the effect of SVO and risk
orientation on cooperation when full
information is provided
-ve
p < .05
risk-seeking
X
prosocial
# of cooperators
-ve
p < .001
cooperation
p = .232
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Conclusion

Risk orientation affects prosocials, but not
proselfs, in PGD


The more risk-seeking is a prosocial, the more
he/she cooperates
Same effect is also found in real-time linear
PGD both cooperation and defection
information is available

This effect is fully mediated by the number of
cooperative decisions made by preceding players
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
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References




Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value
orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis.
Group Processes Intergroup Relations, 12, 533-547.
Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives,
communication and group size on behavior in an N-person multistage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 14, 239-264.
Parks, C. D. (2004). Risk preference as a predictor of
cooperation in a social dilemma. In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu,
I. Fischer, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary research on
social dilemmas (pp. 71-98). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Tversky, A. & Shafir, E. (1992). Choice under conflict: The
dynamics of deferred decision. Psychological Science, 3, 358361.
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