Claudine v Arlo: The elements constituting a battery are: a direct physical act that interferes
with person of the plaintiff and is accompanied by fault. Arlo fulfills all the above elements as
he willingly invited Claudine’s to open the letter by drawing her attention to it. It then
exploded all over her, which is entirely what he wanted to happen. The law that can be
applied to the facts of this case are from Garret v Dailey (1955) 279 P 2d 1091where a young
boy pulled a chair out from the plaintiff and resulted in her hip fracturing. The law in this case
stated that “the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension” Arlo
set up the prank in a way he knew this contact would occur proving his intention for the
contact. Although Arlo may not have wanted his teacher to be harmed and was merely
playing a prank “the mere absence of an intent to injure the plaintiff or play a prank…would
not absolve him from liability” (Garret). Based on the facts of the case and the laws applied it
is likely that Arlo be liable for battery.
Claudine v/Brent/A’s Parents: The three main elements of negligence are that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the duty needs to have been breached and that the breach
resulted in harm to the plaintiff. In order to establish whether Brent’s failure to lock the
cupboard door constituted negligent behavior that resulted in Claudine’s injuries it must be
established whether Brent had a positive duty of care (DOC) towards Claudine. A positive
duty of care can be established through the law in Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76 (Gett)
“reasonable foreseeability of harm is usually sufficient to establish duty of care”. Brent was
aware that break-ins had been occurring at the school and he knew about the dangerous
chemicals in the cupboards and if the chemicals fell into the wrong hands potential harm
could occur. Now that a positive DOC has been established the relevant standard of care
(SOC), which is an objective test, must be assessed through s31 of the Civil Liability Act
(CLA)“To determine whether D was negligent, the SOC required of D is that of a reasonable
person in D’s position who was in possession of all the information that D either had, or ought
to have reasonably to have had, at the time of the incident out of which harm arose”. It is
evident based on the present facts Brent had all the knowledge of a reasonable person and was
aware of the effects of the powder as a science teacher therefore it is likely he failed to meet
this basic standard of care and hence breached his duty. In order to determine the calculus of
negligence S32 of the CLA can be applied this had previously been common law however it
is now in legislative form and applied through S32 2 of the Civil Liability Act. S 32 1) “a
person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless” a) the risk
was foreseeable b) if the risk was signinficant and c) if in the circumstances a reasonable
person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions”. The risk was reasonably
foreseeable as teachers had been warned protect dangerous chemicals due to break ins and if
said chemical fell into the wrong hands harm could occur. The significance of the risk was
high as it was known students like Arlo did like to be adventurous and play practical jokes
and finally a reasonable person in Brent’s position would not have left the cupboard door
open. In s32 2 the calculus of negligence is addressed a) the probability of the risk must be
determined and whether it is probable that harm would result if Brent had taken not taken
necessary precautions to prevent it. The law, which can be applied here, comes from Wyong
Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 and states “a risk is foreseeable if it is not fanciful
or far-fetched”. It is likely that the risk was not fanciful or far-fetched as harm would occur to
the powdered Claudine once she stepped out into the rain. The gravity of the harm must also
be assessed s32 2 b), if the likelihood of serious harm is high then Brent will be seen as
negligent. The likelihood of the powder being activated on a rainy day is extremely high. The
burden of taking precautions s32 2 c) were low as all Brent had to close the cupboard. Finally
s32 2 d) considers the social utility of the activity. From the facts of the case no social
benefits were revealed as a result of Brent not locking the cupboard. Based on the facts it is
likely that Brent owed a DOC, as harm resulting from his actions were reasonably foreseeable
and that he breached his DOC by not closing the cupboard door. However s35 of the CLA
states, “In determining liability for negligence, the plaintiff always bears the burden of
proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation”. If Brent
had not been negligent Claudine would not have suffered harm therefore there are two
elements that must be addressed in order to establish causation. Whether the plaintiff’s
injuries result as a result of the defendant’s negligent act. s34 1) a) of the CLA “if it were not
for the negligent act or omission would the plaintiff had suffered harm?” Yes it Brent had
locked the door Claudine would not have been injured. s34 1 b) considers the scope of
liability and whether the scope of Brent’s liability should extend to the harm which occurred
to Claudine. However, Brent’s decision to make the exploding letter can be seen as a novus
actus interviens, a 3rd party intervention between negligence and harm, in the case of March v
E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 (March) it “is said to break the chain of
causation which would otherwise have resulted from an earlier wrongful act”. Arlo’s decision
to make the exploding letter was the intervening act and March also stated “the voluntary
intervention of B (Arlo) is…the true cause, A’s (Brent) act being nothing more than an
antecedent condition not mounting to a cause”. Therefore, it is likely that Brent would only be
liable for injuries that may have been sustained prior to Arlo’s intervening act, which caused
the harm of Claudine and the court will apportion liability between Brent and Arlo as
appropriate. Finally whether or not Claudine could successfully sue Arlo’s parents can be
decided based on the facts from the case Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256 where a 13-year
olds boys parent’s were sued by the plaintiff as he was injured by the former’s son flinging a
stone in the latter’s eye with a slingshot. In this case “the court held that a duty of care did
arise but that it had not been breached because the parents had acted reasonably in telling their
son not to use the slingshot outside the family home”. Arlo’s father had given him reasonable
warning to not push the boundaries when using the practical jokes book, therefore its likely
they will not be held liable for the harm that occurred to Claudine.
Brent v Arlo/A’s parents: In order to establish whether Brent can bring a cause of action for
mental harm s 53 1 b) of the CLA must be addressed which states that a person can only
claim damages if they were present at the accident, the facts of the case only say that Brent
discovered what happened to Claudine, not that he was present when it occurred. He also fails
to meet s53 1 b) as he is Claudine’s fiancé, not spouse nor domestic partner. It is likely that
Brent will be unable to bring a cause of action against Arlo or his parents for mental harm.
Claudine’s mother v School Principal/Arlo: Claudine’s mother however, will be able to claim
damages as she fulfills the parental requirement of s 53 1 b). However, in the case Tame v
NSW;Annetts v Australian Stations (2002) 211 CLR 317 a judgment from Justice Windeyer
stated “where “shock” is caused purely by communication, in the absence of an intention to
cause ‘shock’, no action lies against the bearer of bad tidings or to the person who caused the
event of which they tell” . Therefore its not likely the school principal will be held liable for
harm suffered or Arlo as he is the person of which the principal told.
Gregg v Franco: In Stephenson v Waite Tileman Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 152 (Stephenson) a man
slashed his wrist, which later began to swell and caused the plaintiff to become sick, which
later led to debilitated use of his arm. In this case it was found that the cut was a reasonably
foreseeable harm but the later disability would not have necessarily been reasonably foreseen.
In order to establish causation The Eggshell Skull Principle implies that “the wrongdoer
should take their victim as they found them” (Stephenson) therefore it could be assumed that
if Greg is liable for the reasonably foreseeable harm of the cut despite that “there are many
matters of detail which nobody could predict but for which the wrongdoer remains liable”
(Stephenson) meaning it would be likely that he be liable for the subsequent harm.
Gregg v Teacher: There is a relationship between a student and teacher which gives rise to a
duty of care. However, the SOC is lowered in the schoolyard. It was decided in the case of
ACT v Al Sheik (2000) Aust. Torts Reports 81-577 “it would require an army of supervisors
to prevent any incident that might give rise to physical injury”. Despite the teachers warnings
the harm that occurred may not have been reasonably foreseeable meaning it’s likely that the
teacher would not be liable for the harm that occurred.