Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators IAQF/Thalesians Seminar Series Allan Malz Federal Reserve Bank of New York April 28, 2014 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Outline Overview Construction Results Assessment Issues Working paper available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr607.pdf The views expressed in these lectures are my own and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are my responsibility. 2/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Overview Systemic risk and systemic risk indicators • Systemic risk a financial stability concept • Risk of a systemic event severely impairing financial system • Symptoms include impairment of payment system, sudden stop of credit extension, asset fire sales • Capture underlying phenomena: impact of large common shock, fragility, contagion, connectedness and linkages, leverage • Search for measures, (leading) indicators • Likelihood of systemic event • Are specific institutions systemically important, large contributors to systemic risk? • Balance sheet focus: risk of loss of assets, debt, equity 3/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Overview Summary of our approach • Represent systemic risk as market risk of a portfolio of large-bank stocks • Version of CoVaR, SES, MES and DIP based on derivatives prices • But uses firms’ market values, not liabilities or asset values, as exposure/loss metric • Requires only contemporaneously observed market data, no historical data • Can be computed daily using only that day’s data • Risk-neutral, so contains risk premiums • Option-Based Systemic Expected Shortfall Statistics (OBSESS) 4/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Overview of construction of indicators • 3 building blocks • Option-based risk-neutral probability distributions • Option-based equity implied return correlation • Copula model to tie risk-neutral distributions together and generate simulations • 8 U.S. banks listed as global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) by Financial Stability Board (FSB) 5/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Risk-neutral distributions • Data: Bloomberg implied volatility datasets • Three-month single-stock and index options • Volatility smile interpolation • Cubic spline with clamped endpoints • In moneyness-volatility space • Differencing→risk-neutral CDF and PDF • OBSESS not dependent on this particular data or RNPDF estimation technique 6/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Risk-neutral densities of major U.S. financial firms JPM 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 WFC 1.2 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 C 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.6 0.8 GS 2.5 0.0 0.4 BAC 2.5 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 STT 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.4 BK 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.0 MS 1.2 1.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Density of the ratio of the stock price three months hence to the current outright forward price, Feb. 11, 2011. The forward price is computed using the 3-month T-bill yield and a trailing dividend yield. Points represent the observed implied volatilities. 7/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Risk-neutral probability of large loss 2006–2014 JPM WFC BAC 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 C 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2010 2012 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2014 2008 GS 2012 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014 2012 2014 BK 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 2008 2010 2012 0.0 2006 2014 STT 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2010 2008 2010 MS 2012 2014 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Risk-neutral cumulative probability of a decline in equity value in excess of 25 percent over the subsequent three months, daily, Jan. 4, 2006 to Apr. 23, 2014. Vertical grid lines: first volatility event of the crisis (27 Feb. 2007), BNP Paribas redemption halt (09Aug07), Bear Stearns run (14Mar08), Lehman bankruptcy (16Sep08), first Greek bailout request (23Apr10), U.S. debt ceiling deal (31Jul2011), Joint Economic Committee testimony (22May2013). 8/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Equity implied correlation • Risk-neutral implied correlation of banks’ stock returns • Estimates from index and constituent vols • All ATM and of same 3-month tenor • KBW Bank Sector Index (ticker BKX) • Overlap with but not identical to the list of G-SIFIs (GS, MS not in BKX) • Few other sources of market data on correlation • Constant pairwise correlation, but new estimate each day • Contrast to S&P corr: decline post-Lehman 9/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Risk-neutral BKX implied correlation 2006–2014 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Three-month, daily, Jan. 4, 2006 to Apr. 23, 2014. Vertical grid lines: first volatility event of the crisis (27 Feb. 2007), BNP Paribas redemption halt (09Aug07), Bear Stearns run (14Mar08), Lehman bankruptcy (16Sep08), first Greek bailout request (23Apr10), U.S. debt ceiling deal (31Jul2011), Joint Economic Committee testimony (22May2013). 10/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Construction Computing the indicators via a copula model • Why a copula model? • Joint (and portfolio) return distribution unknown • But marginal distributions known: RNPDFs, updated daily • As well as correlation matrix, updated daily • But all off-diagonal elements equal • Normal copula; but can use other copula models, e.g. t-copula • Doesn’t assume returns multivariate normal • Rather, “normal z’s” corresponding to probabilities corresponding to returns are multivariate normal • Fat-tailed marginals (RNPDFs) generate tail dependence 11/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results From simulation results to indicators • Daily simulation procedure • Draw from multivariate correlated normal • Map to firms’ equity returns via RNPDFs (can incorporate CDS-based risk-neutral default probability) • Raw results: 10 000 simulations of each firm’s equity return • Sort and otherwise manipulate to get • Portfolio returns by cap-weighting within each simulation • Simulated returns sorted by order statistics of any firm’s or portfolio’s simulated returns • Unconditional or conditional risk metrics • Probability of loss of given size, quantiles, VaR, expected shortfall at given confidence level 12/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Unconditional systemic risk measures • Definition of systemic risk event: portfolio loss of given severity or low probability • E.g. firm or portfolio loss ≥ 25 percent over subsequent 3 months 13/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Probability of a systemic risk event 2006–2014 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Systemic risk event: 3-month decline in 8-bank equity portfolio value in excess of 25 percent. Black plot: OBSESS portfolio-based systemic risk probability, blue plot: SPX index-based probability, orange plot: BKX index-based probability. Daily, Jan. 4, 2006 to Apr. 23, 2014. Vertical grid lines: first volatility event of the crisis (27 Feb. 2007), BNP Paribas redemption halt (09Aug07), Bear Stearns run (14Mar08), Lehman bankruptcy (16Sep08), first Greek bailout request (23Apr10), U.S. debt ceiling deal (31Jul2011), Joint Economic Committee testimony (22May2013). 14/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Conditioning from individual bank to portfolio • “Conditional systemic event probability,” probability of systemic risk event conditional on individual FI experiencing extreme loss • Varies more over time than across firms; why? • Should be high for large firm when systemic risk is high, since much dependence of other banks on its financial health (“contagion”) • Should be high for small, relatively non-fragile firm when systemic risk is high, since only very severe shock associated with conditioning event • Can also compute system expected shortfall conditional on individual FI experiencing loss ≥ given quantile • Analogue to CoVaR 15/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Conditional systemic event probability 2006–2014 JPM WFC 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2006 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 C 2010 BAC 2012 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2006 2014 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 2006 0.0 2006 2010 2012 2014 2012 2014 2012 2014 0.2 2008 2010 2012 0.0 2006 2014 STT 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2006 2010 BK 0.8 2008 2008 GS 2008 2010 MS 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 2008 2010 2012 2014 0.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Conditioning event is a 25 percent market capitalization loss of the firm over the subsequent three months. Systemic risk event is a 25 percent market capitalization loss of the portfolio over the subsequent three months. Daily, Jan. 4, 2006 to Apr. 23, 2014. Vertical grid lines: first volatility event of the crisis (27 Feb. 2007), BNP Paribas redemption halt (09Aug07), Bear Stearns run (14Mar08), Lehman bankruptcy (16Sep08), first Greek bailout request (23Apr10), U.S. debt ceiling deal (31Jul2011), Joint Economic Committee testimony (22May2013). 16/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Conditioning from portfolio to individual bank • “Conditional expected shortfall”: firm’s expected shortfall, conditional on systemic event • “Conditional expected shortfall ratio”: divide by portfolio expected shortfall • Is conditional expected shortfall over- or underproportional to firm’s market cap? • Too-big-to-fail indicator? • Probability, VaR or expected shortfall of bank experiencing extreme firm loss conditional on systemic risk event • Analogues to: • DIP (but equity rather than liabilities) • SES (but conditioning on FI portfolio loss, not overall stock market) 17/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Results Conditional expected shortfall ratios 2006–2014 JPM 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 2006 2008 2010 WFC 2012 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 2006 2014 2008 C 2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 GS 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 2006 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 2006 2010 BAC 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 2006 2012 2014 2012 2014 2012 2014 BK 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 2008 2010 2012 2014 2006 STT 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 2006 2010 2008 2010 MS 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 2008 2010 2012 2014 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Ratio of conditional expected shortfall of the firm to the system expected shortfall, both at a 5 percent confidence level. Conditioning event is a 25 percent market capitalization loss of the 8-firm portfolio over the next three months. Daily, Jan. 4, 2006 to Apr. 23, 2014. Vertical grid lines: first volatility event of the crisis (27 Feb. 2007), BNP Paribas redemption halt (09Aug07), Bear Stearns run (14Mar08), Lehman bankruptcy (16Sep08), first Greek bailout request (23Apr10), U.S. debt ceiling deal (31Jul2011), Joint Economic Committee testimony (22May2013). 18/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Assessment How do we validate OBSESS? • Predictive power: second half of 2008 • Comparison with other approaches (using larger portfolio) • CCAR results as “fundamentals-based” or “real-world” estimate of losses • Compare with another, similar systemic risk measure, marginal expected shortfall (MES), defined as the loss a firm would suffer in the event of a 2 percent decline in the broader equity market. 19/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Assessment Conditional expected shortfall and crisis losses C 0.8 MS BAC GS 0.6 0.4 STT JPM BK 0.2 WFC 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 Values on x-axis: firms’ conditional expected shortfall at the 95 percent level (ratio to market capitalization) on July 3, 2008. Values on the y-axis are realized equity market losses between July 3 and Dec. 31, 2008. 20/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Assessment Conditional expected shortfall and stress test results MS BAC 0.6 STI 0.4 KEY GS MET PNC 0.2 BBT USB 0.0 C RF COF JPM WFC FITB STT AXP 0.2 BK 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 Values on x-axis: firm’s average conditional expected shortfall at the 95 percent level (ratio to market capitalization) between Feb. 10 and Mar. 8, 2012. Values on y-axis: (−1×) the ratio of each firm’s Net Income before Taxes, Table 4 of CCAR 2012 documentation, to average market capitalization between Feb. 10 and Mar. 8, 2012. 21/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Assessment Conditional expected shortfall and V-Lab marginal expected shortfall MS 6 C 5 BK FITB GS STI STT COFKEY JPM MET WFC 4 3 BAC RF BBT AXP PNC USB 2 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 Values on x-axis: firm’s average conditional expected shortfall at the 95 percent level (ratio to market capitalization), Apr. 2-30, 2012. Values on y-axis: MES for Apr. 30, 2012 from http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.USFIN-MR.MES . 22/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Issues Issues • Great hopes placed in systemic risk indicators • But was problem really lack of data? • Do OBSESS have predictive value? • Challenge of measuring predictive power of tail probability measures • Can we identify the real-world distribution component of OBSESS? • And if not, how are they useful? • Use as benchmark • Nice to have something sensitive other than CDS • Point of comparison to analogues based on historical data and fundamentals • Market-based cross-sectional systemic risk measures consistent with macro prudential approach to regulation • But based on a particular view of causes of financial crises? • Contagion, externalities, common shocks/canary in the coal mine? 23/24 Risk-neutral systemic risk indicators Appendix Appendix: banks included in OBSESS Ticker WFC JPM C BAC GS MS BK STT AXP USB MET PNC COF BBT FITB STI KEY RF Name Market cap (Dec. 2011) G-SIFIs Wells Fargo & Co 137.0 JPMorgan Chase & Co 121.2 Citigroup Inc 76.1 Bank of America Corp 52.7 Goldman Sachs Group Inc 46.0 Morgan Stanley 28.9 Bank of New York Mellon Corp 23.2 State Street Corp 19.7 other SCAP/CCAR banks American Express Co 54.5 US Bancorp 49.6 MetLife Inc 32.0 PNC Financial Services Group 29.0 Capital One Financial Corp 19.9 BB&T Corp 16.8 Fifth Third Bancorp 11.1 SunTrust Banks Inc 8.8 KeyCorp 6.8 Regions Financial Corp 5.0 Share of total 18.6 16.4 10.3 7.1 6.2 3.9 3.1 2.7 7.4 6.7 4.3 3.9 2.7 2.3 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.7 24/24
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz