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Journal of
CONSUMER
PSYCHOLOGY
Journal of Consumer Psychology 20 (2010) 17 – 19
Research Dialogue
Elaborating a simpler theory of anchoring
Shane Frederick a,⁎,1 , Daniel Kahneman b,1 , Daniel Mochon a,1
a
Yale University, School of Management, PO Box 208200, New Haven, CT 06520, USA
b
Princeton University, USA
Received 7 December 2009; accepted 7 December 2009
Available online 3 January 2010
Abstract
Within the classic anchoring paradigm, in which respondents are forced to consider provided numbers as possible responses to a target
judgment, Wegener et al. (2008) proposed that cognitive load affects the psychological mechanism by which these anchors influence judgments.
We propose, instead, that level of cognitive resources does not fundamentally affect how anchoring works, but only whether respondents can
access other considerations that bear on the target judgment. Though we share the authors' view that environmental circumstances can influence
the relative contribution of associative and deliberative inputs in judgments, we contend that cognitive load primarily affects the types of
information that respondents consider, not the manner by which a focal element is processed.
© 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Anchoring effects are said to be easy to generate, but hard to
explain. The explanatory difficulty may rest partly on the
variety of psychological mechanisms potentially involved,
including numeric priming (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995;
Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996; Wong & Kwong,
2000), selective accessibility of information (Chapman &
Johnson, 1994, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997), effortful adjustment (Epley & Gilovich,
2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and scale distortion
(Frederick & Mochon, 2009).
Drawing heavily on work by Blankenship, Wegener, Petty,
Detweiler-Bedell, and Macy (2008), the focal paper proposes
that principles from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1998) can help identify the
mechanisms underlying anchoring effects. The authors of the
target article interpreted the anchoring literature very differently
than we do. They write: “The incorporation of relatively nonthoughtful processes by which anchoring can occur differentiates our elaboration-based approach from prominent anchoring theories that propose relatively elaborative versions of
confirmatory search/selective accessibility as the sole process
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Frederick).
1
Authorship order is alphabetical. All authors contributed equally.
responsible for anchoring in the standard paradigm” (p. 12).
By contrast, in our experience, most anchoring findings are
currently attributed to “non-thoughtful processes”—specifically
to automatic associative processes that retrieve information
compatible with the provided anchor (Chapman and Johnson,
1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999)2. Thus, to us, it remains
unclear whether ELM can make a distinctive contribution to our
current understanding of anchoring. The findings that Wegener
et al. (2008) advanced to support their model are entirely
compatible with the dual-system view that is already prevalent
in the judgment and decision making literature.
In Study 1, Blankenship et al. (2008) showed that under
normal (low load) circumstances, target judgments are affected
by experimentally manipulated background information as well
as by the provided numeric anchor. If cognitive load is
increased, the numeric anchor continues to be influential, but
the background information is largely neglected. The authors
interpreted this result as showing that anchoring reflects
different psychological mechanisms in the two conditions:
under low load, anchoring is attributed to differential accessibility of the information the comparative standard activates
2
A distinct form of anchoring, recently explored by Epley and Gilovich
(2001, 2006), and also by LeBoeuf and Shafir (2006), appears to involve
effortful adjustment.
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.004
18
S. Frederick et al. / Journal of Consumer Psychology 20 (2010) 17–19
(which depends in part on the background information
provided), but under high load, it is assumed to be caused by
something else, such as numeric priming, which background
information does not affect.
The idea that two forms of anchoring are involved seems
unnecessarily complex. We propose instead that the background knowledge and numeric anchor manipulations have
independent and additive effects. If load is sufficiently low,
respondents can recall and incorporate the background
information provided in prior paragraphs. If the load is too
high, they cannot. In contrast, the numeric anchor, which is
present at the moment of judgment, exerts influence regardless
of load. Current views of anchoring assume that the initial task
activates an associative process that retrieves information
compatible with the anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 1999;
Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). This is generally regarded as an
automatic process; as comparatively effortless and unfettered by
current cognitive demands (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Wilson et
al., 1996). In our view, judgments will reflect automatic
processes activated by comparison to the numeric anchor, and
(if load is not too high) will also reflect the more effortful
processes required to link paragraphs providing general
information about astronauts to the current, specific target
judgment: Neil Armstrong's age when he walked on the moon.
Because the ELM model embraces parallel activation of the
peripheral and central routes, we see no reason why Wegener et
al. (2010) needed to assume that the judgments made under low
load reflect a single process of “effortful anchoring.”
A no-anchor control condition would have helped distinguish these two interpretations. Namely, we would predict that
background knowledge would influence judgments under low
load but not under high load—apart from a decision to also
include an anchoring manipulation. We see no reason to assume
that the background information works specifically by modifying the pool of knowledge the anchor could activate—a
necessary assumption for the conclusions that Wegener et al.
(2010) drew. Thus, in our view, the results of experiment 1
provide no new insights into the processes causing anchoring.
The finding that judgments made under low load are more
durable is also fully compatible with a traditional dual-system
view, since increased thoughts about the judgments should
render them more persistent, independently of the process
initially generating the anchoring effect. Many explanations,
such as a difference in the participants' ability to encode and
consequently remember their judgments could account for the
results. Note further that since the authors invoked different
mechanisms to explain anchoring effects under low and high
load, they must treat, as a coincidence, the finding that the
effects have the same magnitude in both conditions. By
contrast, this result follows directly from our assumption that
the mechanism underlying the anchoring effect is independent
of load.
Last, the effects of source credibility on judgments should
not be credited as a unique prediction of the ELM model. Any
model of judgment would conclude that more reliable
information would be weighted more and that judgments
should assimilate towards these highly informative numbers.
Thus, these results seem to have little to do with anchoring at all,
as we understand that term.
Though we are not persuaded that the imposition of the ELM
framework helps us better understand anchoring within the
classic “enforced comparison” paradigm, it might provide an
important insight into when or whether ‘basic anchoring’ effects
occur. These effects are notoriously fragile: documented by
some (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong &
Kwong, 2000), but disputed by others (Brewer & Chapman,
2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). The ELM framework
suggests that these inconsistencies may reflect the amount of
processing involved, since basic anchoring only occurs when
experimental circumstances discourage thoughtful processing.
This is consistent with prior work showing that subliminal
anchoring only occurs under time pressure, which precludes the
opportunity to recruit information that may override the
numeric prime (Reitsma-van Rooijen & Daamen, 2006). It is
also consistent with a result from Critcher and Gilovich (2008)
demonstrating stronger basic anchoring effects among participants who forgot the incidental anchor (suggesting the
information had not been processed deeply).
Conclusion
In our view, the distinction between the Attitudes and
Persuasion (A&P) and the Judgment and Decision (JDM)
perspectives is less sharp than the authors imply. The two-system
view we embrace is quite similar to the Elaboration Likelihood
Model that pioneered this family of theories. We generally agree
about the characteristics and consequences of more or less
elaborate thinking. However, with respect to the specific research
cited, we disagree about whether the processes causing anchoring
within the classic paradigm must be regarded as ‘thoughtful,’
as Wegener et al. (2010) proposed, and consequently whether
two distinct processes must be invoked to explain the effects.
Our impression is that students of A&P and of JDM are
distinguished more by the company they keep than by important
differences in the models they apply. For the topic anchoring,
especially, the boundary between the disciplines already seems
porous—the contributions of social psychologists have already
been integrated into the standard JDM view. We view the
present conversation as further progress toward the adoption of
a unified framework between the two fields.
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