METAPHYSICS
BUNDLE THEORY
LECTURE
PROFESSOR JULIE YOO
Comparison of Substratum and Bundle Theories
Van Cleve’s First Version of BT
Van Cleve’s Second Version of BT
Benefits
Problems
Van Cleve’s Third Version of BT
Benefits
Problem
Casullo’s Fourth Version of BT
Problem of Individuation for BT
Problem of Persistence for BT
BT As a Two-Tiered 4-D Theory – “Bundle-Bundle Theory”
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COMPARISON OF SUBSTRATUM AND BUNDLE THEORIES
Substratum Theory
x = s + {F1, … , Fn}
A RED BALL
Relation between
x and F’s
None of the F’s are necessary for x:
that thing, the chalk, could lose its
whiteness, dryness, being a writing
tool, and other features and still be
that very individual.
Bundle Theory
x = {{F1, … , Fn}, Rc}
All of its F’s are necessary for x:
changing a property creates a
different bundle, and because an
individual is nothing but the bundle,
we get a different individual.
VAN CLEVE’S FIRST VERSION OF BUNDLE THEORY
VC formulates BT in the following way: A thing is a complex of properties which all stand in
some contingent relation, call it co-instantiation, to one another.
(BT1) x is a complex entity made up only of properties {F1, … ,
Fn}, where each F is a constituent of x.
Objection 1 – No Unifier: Any set of properties illicitly gets counted as a thing. But
there are many sets of properties without there being a thing for that set.
Objection 2 – False Eternity: A thing is illegitimately rendered eternal and necessary
because properties exist necessarily and a set is defined in such a way that it exists if its
members exist.
Objection 3 – False Attribution: Redness is a member of the set {redness, roundness}
but the set surely isn’t red.
Objection 4 – Impossibility of Change: Things cannot change. A different property
creates a different bundle, and because an individual is nothing but the bundle, we get a
different individual.
Objection 5 – False Necessity: Every property of a thing is essential to it; if every
property of a bundle plays a role in constituting a particular, then all properties are on
equal necessary footing, making it impossible for an object to differ from what it actually
is. But surely there are objects that could be different from what they are (like you could
be a little heavier or a little lighter, etc.).
Objection 6 - Indiscernibility: Requires PII as a necessary truth. Notice that it will not
help to appeal to “impure” or non-qualitative properties, since such properties are
derivative from individuals; for this reason, they cannot be used to construct individuals.
Why don’t we think of individuals as wholes rather than as sets? That way, a whole can
still retain its identity even if it gains or loses some parts. Note that this account of
wholes cannot be a mereological account where a whole is a sum of its parts so that partwhole relation is a notational variant upon the member-set relation. If wholes are note
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merely physical and spatial constructions of their parts, then the only other option is that
they are logical constructions out of their parts. But then this is a different version of BT.
SECOND VERSION OF BT
(BT2) x is a complex entity made up only of properties {F1, … , Fn},
where each F is a constituent of x, and each of the F’s are
compresent.
The term comes from Russell, but there are others: “co-instantiation,” “consubstantiation”
(Casteneda), “togetherness” (Goodman), “collocation,” “combination,” and “coactuality.” As
stated, it is circular, since it makes reference to a thing, rather than being used to explain a thing.
The important thing to appreciate here is that co-instantiation is a contingent relation: if F and
F* are co-instantiated it is not necessary that they are co-instantiated.
Benefits of this Version
Avoids Objection 1: With the concept of co-instantiation, (BT2) is not committed to the
existence of objects wherever there are sets of properties. If those properties in the set are not
co-instantiated, then they do not form an object.
Avoids Objection 2: Again, a thing exists when and only when the properties making it up are
co-instantiated. So although the properties that make up the bundle exist necessarily, the bundle
qua bundle exists only when its members are coinstantiated.
Avoids Objection 3: A bundle isn’t red just because redness is a constituent; it is red only when
the members of the bundle are coinstantiated and complete, when that means that “it must
contain every property than could be added to it without generating inconsistency.” (124)
Problems with this Version
Objection 4, Again: Although a bundle can “change” with respect to its external properties – it is
3 feet away from the window, now it is 2 feet away from the window … – the individual cannot
change, if by change, we mean that the individual x is still the same individual in spite of its
possessing or lacking a different property than before. This is because an individual just is a
bundle, so if we have a different bundle, we automatically have a different individual. Suppose
that x = {F, G, H}, and x* = {F, G, K}. Given that {F, G, H}≠{F, G, K}, it follows £(x ≠ x*).
Objection 5, Again: It is consistent with BT2 that a certain bundle β may not have existed, since
the properties constituting β may not have existed. And it is consistent with BT2 that the
properties F and G constituting β may not have been co-instantiated and thus that F and G need
not have gone together. But it is not possible for β to have had any properties other than the ones
it actually has. We can try to modify the BT by appealing to a distinction between an inner core
of essential properties and an outer fringe of inessential properties:
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(BT2.1) x has F IFF there is a complete bundle of mutually coinstantiated properties y such that i) x is a sub-bundle
within y and either iia) F is constituent of F (in which case x
has F essentially) or iib) F is not an element of x, but is an
element of y (in which case x has F accidentally). (125)
This avoids the objection, but has problems of its own. The core would be too impoverished to
be an individual (for no human is just the co-instantiation of animality and rationality). More
problematically (?) one and the same core is logically compatible with fringes that are
themselves inconsistent (under one fringe, the individual is wise, under another the individual is
foolish). Here is yet another attempt to get around the objection of contingency:
(BT2.2) x has F IFF F is a world-indexed property (WIP), a
property is indexed to a world.
For example, being snub-nosed in world 322 is a WIP. One can have this property essentially
and yet not be snub-nosed essentially. The problem here, though, is that possible worlds
themselves are bundles of properties on the view that particulars are nothing but bundles. If a
world is also a particular, then a world is nothing but a bundle of properties. So it would be
circular to appeal to world-indexed properties.
Objection 6, Again: Is IDIn entailed by BT2? It seems that it is. Suppose a β has as it
constituents {F, G, H}. If properties F, G, and H are again coinstantiated, then they will just end
up being β. Co-instantiation, in other words, is not automatically particularizing. We cannot
assume than one co-instantiation of F, G, and H, is token distinct from another co-instantiation of
F, G, and H.
Another variant upon BT2 is the appeal to tropes. While IDIn still follows from this version (no
two non-overlapping things can share one and the same trope), it can account for exact
similarity, which the previous version could not. The appeal to tropes as constituents of bundles
does not really help, since the aim of the bundle theory is to reduce particular to properties; the
trope account only succeeds in reducing ordinary particulars (the red ball) to more basic
particulars (particular redness + particular sphericality + …). [This raises the question of what
the nature of the project is in giving an account of particulars.]
VAN CLEVE’S THIRD VERSION OF BT
(BT3) x is an individual IFF sentences about x can be translated
into sentences about properties only.
To appreciate the difference between this new version and the previous versions (“the old
version of the bundle theory”), we need to go over two ways of pursuing a reduction. One is
ontological: it seeks to explain one set of objects or facts in terms of a different, more basic, set
of objects or facts. The other is semantic: it seeks to explain one set of statements using terms
that belong to a different, more basic, vocabulary. We can see this distinction with the two
versions of behaviorism: ontological behaviorism (reduce mental states to behavioral states) and
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analytic or logical behaviorism (reduce sentences reporting mental states to sentences reporting
behavioral states). The third version of BT makes “the linguistic turn.”
Benefits of this Version
It can handle objections 4, 5, and 6. Here is Van Cleve’s tidy statement: “Unlike the old theory,
[the new theory] does not populate the world with individuals that are incapable of change,
devoid of accidental properties, and qualitatively unique; but that is only because it does not
populate the world with individuals at all. Or if you prefer to put the point Moore’s way, the
statement, ‘there are individuals’ is true, but there is nothing of which it is true that it is an
individual; hence, there is nothing of which it is true that it is an individual and incapable of
change, etc..” (129) That is, if you get rid of individuals, then you certainly get rid of the
problem of unchanging individuals.
Problems with this Version
As Van Cleve says, “… anyone who held it would be in the following predicament: since
properties would be the building blocks of his universe, and since he would not be identical with
any property or any complex of them, he would have to believe that there is nothing with which
he is identical – or in other words, that there is no such thing as himself.” (130)
CASULLO’S FOURTH VERSION OF BT
Casullo, who’s aim is to defend BT, argues that the problems of change and false necessity have
to be evaluated against the backdrop of two different problems concerning BT: (a) individuation
and (b) identity across time. Individuation is about how to single out an individual – both in the
sense of determining a unified whole from a collection of properties, and in the sense of
distinguishing it from similar looking duplicates. The issue of identity across time is about those
changes an individual can or cannot survive.
Problem of Individuation for BT
A healthy BT must account for two things:
1. How things have properties in common with other thing. This is not a problem for
BT formulated in terms of universals, because universals explain commonality.
2. How each thing is numerically distinct from every other thing. This is a problem for
BT formulated in terms of universals, which runs afoul of PII.
The problem of individuation applies not only to enduring things, but also to temporal slices of
enduring things. The upshot of this is that we need individuators.
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Problem of Persistence for BT
About those changes an individual can or cannot survive. The problem is that the very nature of
change is such that it consists of one and the same individual that undergoes a change in its
properties. With BT, a change in properties just is a change of individuals. It cannot save the
idea of an enduring individual who survives change. The upshot is that we need need
continuants.
BT As a Two-Tiered 4-D Theory – “Bundle-Bundle Theory”
The idea here is that a particular consists of a 1) bundle of temporal slices related in manner R,
where 2) each temporal slice consists of a co-instantiated (compresent) set of properties. This
allows us to replace (1) with (1*), which can then deal with problems of change and false
necessity
(1*) A momentary thing [temporal slice] is a complex of properties which all
stand in the relation of co-instantiation to one another.
Regarding the problem of change, as long as the temporal parts FGH, and FGK stand in relation
R, we have one and the same thing that has undergone the change from losing H to gaining K.
Regarding the problem of false necessity, while each momentary thing may have its complex of
properties essentially, the enduring thing that contains the momentary thing need not have those
properties essentially.
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