Lecture #7
Models of the Foreign Policy Making
Process
Introduction
• Different models of how foreign policy is made
have been proposed
• Graham Allison famously applied 3 models to
the Cuban Missile Crisis in the classic work
Essence of Decision
Introduction
• Each model brings certain elements into focus
and obscures others (like a set of lenses)
• Subsequent work has elaborated and critiqued
these 3 models, but they are a good starting
point for understanding foreign policy making
Model I: Rational Actor
• States as unitary, rational actors
• The national interest drives foreign policy
behavior
• Important in realist theory and rational choice
models
Model I: Rational Actor
• Most widely used method among media/public
for explaining countries’ actions
• Oversimplification?
• Critics: yes, empirically flawed and can be very
misleading
• Proponents: “As if” model with predictive accuracy
Model II: Organizational Process
• Organizations play key roles throughout
policymaking process:
• Gathering/analyzing info: CIA & other intelligence
agencies
• Developing options: State, Defense, NSC
• Implementing decisions: same organizations
Model II: Organizational Process
• To control large numbers of people,
organizations need standard operating
procedures (SOPs)
• SOPs can promote efficient and effective responses
• SOPs can be unduly rigid and inappropriate for the
situation
• Example: nuclear SOPs nearly resulting in nuclear
accidents/war (Sagan)
Model II: Organizational Process
• Organizations’ SOPs and routines can undermine
rationality at the state level and diverge from
national interest
• Orgs aren’t following coherent, integrated national
strategy but are “mindlessly” executing routines
• Contradicts Model I
• Examples: Soviet rocket forces and infantry had
SOPs that revealed their presence on Cuba when
Khruschev wanted their activities kept secret
Model III: Bureaucratic Politics
• Foreign policy actions result from a “political
game” played by actors who differ in:
• Goals/interests
• Power
• Presidential power is the power to persuade
(Neustadt): Presidents can’t just command; they
must cajole, bargain, etc.
Model III: Bureaucratic Politics
•
“Where you stand depends on where you sit”:
parochial interests
• Example: recurring State Dept. vs. Defense Dept.
clashes
• Outcomes may reflect a combination of different
actors’ interests (or no one’s interests)
• Contradicts Model I’s assumption of rational pursuit
of national interests
Model III: Bureaucratic Politics
• Krasner’s critique:
• Empirical flaws: president is more like a King than
“first among equals”
• Practical danger: absolves the president of
responsibility for actions (e.g., Vietnam)