Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations
Author(s): Joan Acker
Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 139-158
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/189609
Accessed: 10/01/2009 17:20
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Gender and
Society.
http://www.jstor.org
HIERARCHIES,JOBS, BODIES:
A Theory of GenderedOrganizations
JOANACKER
University of Oregon and Arbetslivscentrum, Stockholm
In spite offeminist recognitionthathierarchicalorganizationsare an importantlocation of male
dominance,mostfeminists writingabout organizationsassume that organizationalstructureis
gender neutral. This article argues that organizationalstructureis not gender neutral; on the
contrary, assumptions about gender underlie the documentsand contracts used to construct
organizationsand toprovidethe commonsensegroundfor theorizingabout them.Theirgendered
nature is partly masked throughobscuring the embodied nature of work Abstractjobs and
hierarchies,commonconcepts in organizationalthinking assume a disembodiedand universal
worker.This workeris actually a man;men'sbodies, sexuality,and relationshipsto procreation
andpaid workare subsumedin the image of the worker.Images of men'sbodies and masculinity
pervade organizationalprocesses, marginalizingwomen and contributingto the maintenance
of gender segregation in organizations.Thepositing of gender-neutraland disembodiedorganizational structuresand work relations is part of the larger strategy of control in industrial
capitalist societies, which, at least partly, are built upon a deeply embeddedsubstructureof
gender difference.
M ost of us spend most of our days in work organizations that are almost
always dominated by men. The most powerful organizational positions are
almost entirely occupied by men, with the exception of the occasional
biological female who acts as a social man (Sorenson 1984). Power at the
national and world level is located in all-male enclaves at the pinnacle of
large state and economic organizations. These facts are not news, although
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings,
Chicago, August 1987. I wish to thankJudith Lorber,Pat Martin, and Ronnie Steinberg who
contributed a great deal to this article through their careful and insightful comments and
suggestions.ConversationswithHarrietHolter,CarolePateman,and DorothySmithalso helped
my thinking.
REPRINTREQUESTS:Joan Acker,Departmentof Sociology, Universityof Oregon, Eugene,
OR 97403.
GENDER & SOCIETY,Vol. 4 No. 2, June 1990 139-158
? 1990 Sociologists for Women in Society
139
140
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
sociologists paid no attentionto themuntilfeminismcame along to point out
the problematicnatureof the obvious (Acker and Van Houten 1974; Moss
Kanter1975, 1977). Writerson organizationsandorganizationaltheory now
include some considerationof women and gender (Clegg and Dunkerley
1980; Mills 1988; Morgan 1986), but theirtreatmentis usually cursory,and
male dominationis, on the whole, notanalyzedandnot explained(Hearnand
Parkin1983).
Among feministsocial scientiststherearesome outstandingcontributions
on women and organizations, such as the work of Moss Kanter (1977),
Feldberg and Glenn (1979), MacKinnon(1979), and Ferguson (1984). In
addition,there have been theoreticaland empiricalinvestigationsof particular aspects of organizationalstructureand process (Izraeli 1983; Martin
1985), and women's situationshave been studiedusing traditionalorganizational ideas (Dexter 1985; Wallace 1982). Moreover,the very rich literature,
popularand scholarly,on women andwork containsmuch materialon work
organizations.However, most of this new knowledge has not been brought
togetherin a systematic feminist theoryof organizations.
A systematic theory of gender and organizationsis needed for a number
of reasons.First,the gendersegregationof work, includingdivisions between
paid and unpaid work, is partly created throughorganizationalpractices.
Second, and related to gender segregation, income and status inequality
between women and men is also partlycreatedin organizationalprocesses;
understandingtheseprocesses is necessaryfor understandinggenderinequality. Third,organizationsareone arenain which widely disseminatedcultural
images of gender are invented and reproduced. Knowledge of cultural
productionis importantfor understandinggender construction(Hear and
Parkin 1987). Fourth,some aspects of individualgender identity, perhaps
particularlymasculinity,are also productsof organizationalprocesses and
pressures.Fifth, an importantfeministprojectis to make large-scaleorganizations more democraticand more supportiveof humanegoals.
In this article, I begin by speculatingabout why feminist scholars have
not debatedorganizationaltheory.I then look briefly at how those feminist
scholarswho have paid attentionto organizationshave conceptualizedthem.
In the mainpartof the article,I examineorganizationsas genderedprocesses
in which both gender and sexuality have been obscured througha genderneutral, asexual discourse, and suggest some of the ways that gender, the
body, and sexualityarepartof the processesof controlin workorganizations.
Finally, I point to some directionsfor feminist theory about this ubiquitous
humaninvention.
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
141
WHY SO LITTLE FEMINIST DEBATE ON ORGANIZATIONS?
The early radicalfeminist critiqueof sexism denouncedbureaucracyand
hierarchy as male-created and male-dominatedstructuresof control that
oppress women. The easiest answerto the "why so little debate"question is
that the link between masculinityand organizationalpower was so obvious
that no debatewas needed. However,experiencesin the feminist movement
suggest that the questions are not exhaustedby recognizing male power.
Part of the feminist project was to create nonhierarchical,egalitarian
ways
organizationsthatwould demonstratethe possibilitiesof nonpatriarchal
of working (Gould 1979; Martin1990). Although many feminist organizations survived, few retained this radical-democraticform (Martin 1990).
Otherssuccumbedto the same sortsof pressuresthathave underminedother
utopianexperimentswith alternativework forms (Newman 1980), yet analyses of feminist efforts to create alternativeorganizations(Freeman 1975;
Gould 1979) were not followed by debates about the feasibility of nonpatriarchal,nonhierarchicalorganizationor the relationshipof organizations
andgender.Perhapsone of the reasonswas thatthe realitywas embarrassing;
women failing to cooperate with each other, taking power and using it in
oppressive ways, creating theirown structuresof status and rewardwere at
odds with other images of women as nurturingand supportive.
Another reason for feminist theorists'scant attentionto conceptualizing
organizationsprobablylies in the natureof the concepts and models at hand.
As Dorothy Smith (1979) has argued,the available discourses on organizations, the way that organizationalsociology is defined as an area or domain
"is groundedin the working worlds and relationsof men, whose experience
and interestsarise in the courseof andin relationto participationin the ruling
apparatusof this society" (p. 148). Conceptsdevelopedto answermanagerial
questions, such as how to achieve organizationalefficiency, were irrelevant
to feminist questions, such as why women are always concentratedat the
bottom of organizationalstructures.
Criticalperspectiveson organizations,with the notableexception of some
of the studies of the labor process (Braverman1974; Knights and Willmott
1985), although focusing on control, power, exploitation, and how these
relationsmight be changed, have ignoredwomen and have been insensitive
to the implicationsof genderfor theirown goals. The active debateon work
democracy,the area of organizationalexplorationclosest to feminist concerns about oppressive structures,has been almost untouched by feminist
insights (Rothschild 1987; Rothschild-Whitt,1979). For example, Carole
142
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
Pateman's influential book, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970),
critical in shaping the discussions on democraticorganizationin the 1970s,
did not consider women or gender.More recently,Pateman(1983a, 1983b,
1988) has examined the fundamentalideas of democracy from a feminist
perspective,and other feminist political scientists have criticizedtheoriesof
democracy (Eisenstein 1981), but on the whole, theirwork is isolated from
the main discourse on work organizationand democracy.
Empirical research on work democracy has also ignored women and
gender.Forexample, in the 1980s, manymale Swedish researcherssaw little
relationbetween questions of democracyandgender equality(Acker 1982),
with a few exceptions (Fry 1986). Otherexamples arestudiesof Mondragon,
a community in the Spanish Basque country,which is probably the most
famous attemptat democratic ownership,control, and organization.Until
Sally Hacker's feminist study (1987), researcherswho went to Mondragon
to see this model of work democracyfailed to note the situationof women
and asked no questions about gender. In sum, the absence of women and
gender from theoretical and empiricalstudies about work democracy provided little materialfor feminist theorizing.
Anotherimpedimentto feministtheorizingis thatthe availablediscourses
conceptualize organizationsas gender neutral.Both traditionaland critical
approachesto organizationsoriginatein the male, abstractintellectual domain (Smith 1988) and take as realitythe world as seen from thatstandpoint.
As a relationalphenomenon,genderis difficult to see when only the masculine is present.Since men in organizationstake theirbehaviorand perspectives to representthe human, organizationalstructuresand processes are
theorizedas gender neutral.When it is acknowledgedthatwomen and men
are affected differentlyby organizations,it is arguedthatgenderedattitudes
and behavior are brought into (and contaminate)essentially gender-neutral
structures.This view of organizationsseparatesstructuresfrom the people
in them.
Currenttheoriesof organizationalso ignoresexuality.Certainly,a genderneutral structureis also asexual. If sexuality is a core component of the
productionof gender identity,gender images, and gender inequality,organizationaltheorythatis blindto sexualitydoes not immediatelyoffer avenues
into the comprehension of gender domination (Hearn and Parkin 1983,
1987). CatharineMacKinnon's (1982) compelling argument that sexual
dominationof women is embeddedwithin legal organizationshas not to date
become part of mainstreamdiscussions. Rather\behaviors such as sexual
harassmentare viewed as deviationsof genderedactors,not, as MacKinnon
(1979) might argue, as componentsof organizationalstructure.
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
143
FEMINIST ANALYSES OF ORGANIZATIONS
The treatmentof women and gender most assimilated into the literature
on organizationsis RosabethKanter'sMen and Womenof the Corporation
(1977). Moss Kantersets out to show that gender differences in organizational behavior are due to structureratherthan to characteristicsof women
and men as individuals(1977, 291-92). She arguesthatthe problemswomen
have in large organizationsare consequences of their structuralplacement,
crowded in dead-endjobs at the bottom and exposed as tokens at the top.
Genderenters the picturethroughorganizationalroles that"carrycharacteristic images of the kinds of people thatshould occupy them"(p. 250). Here,
Moss Kanterrecognizes the presenceof gender in early models of organizations:
A "masculineethic"of rationality
andreasoncan be identifiedin the early
imageof managers.This "masculineethic"elevatesthe traitsassumedto
to necessitiesforeffectiveorganiadvantages
belongto menwitheducational
zations:a tough-minded
approachto problems;analyticabilitiesto abstract
in the
and plan;a capacityto set asidepersonal,emotionalconsiderations
a cognitivesuperiority
in problem-solving
interestsof taskaccomplishment;
anddecisionmaking.(1974,43)
Identifying the centralproblemof seeming gender neutrality,Moss Kanter
observes: "While organizationswere being defined as sex-neutralmachines,
masculineprincipleswere dominatingtheirauthoritystructures"(1977, 46).
In spite of these insights,organizationalstructure,not gender,is the focus
of Moss Kanter's analysis. In posing the argumentas structureor gender,
Moss Kanteralso implicitly posits gender as standingoutside of structure,
and she fails to follow up her own observations about masculinity and
organizations(1977, 22). Moss Kanter'sanalysis of the effects of organizational position applies as well to men in low-statuspositions. Her analysis of
the effect of numbers,or the situationof the "token"worker,applies also to
men as minoritiesin women-predominantorganizations,but fails to account
for gender differences in the situationof the token. In contrastto the token
woman, White men in women-dominatedworkplacesare likely to be positively evaluatedand to be rapidlypromotedto positions of greaterauthority.
The specificity of male dominanceis absentin Moss Kanter'sargument,even
thoughshe presentsa greatdeal of materialthatilluminatesgender and male
dominance.
Another approach, using Moss Kanter's insights but building on the
theoreticalwork of Hartmann(1976), is the argumentthatorganizationshave
a dual structure,bureaucracyandpatriarchy(Ressner 1987). Ressner argues
144
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
thatbureaucracyhas its own dynamic,andgenderentersthroughpatriarchy,
a more or less autonomousstructure,thatexists alongside the bureaucratic
structure.The analysis of two hierarchiesfacilitatesand clarifies the discussion of women's experiences of discrimination,exclusion, segregation, and
low wages. However, this approachhas all the problems of two systems
theoriesof women's oppression(Young1981; see also Acker 1988): the centraltheoryof bureaucraticor organizationalstructureis unexamined,andpatriarchyis addedto allow the theoristto deal with women. Like Moss Kanter,
Ressner's approachimplicitly accepts the assumptionof mainstreamorganizational theory thatorganizationsare gender-neutralsocial phenomena.
Ferguson,in TheFeminist Case Against Bureaucracy(1984), develops a
radicalfeministcritiqueof bureaucracyas anorganizationof oppressivemale
power, arguingthat it is both mystified and constructedthroughan abstract
discourse on rationality, rules, and procedures.Thus, in contrast to the
implicitargumentsof Moss KanterandRessner,Fergusonviews bureaucracy
itself as a constructionof male domination.In responseto this overwhelming
organizationof power,bureaucrats,workers,andclients are all "feminized,"
as they develop ways of managingtheirpowerlessnessthatat the same time
perpetuatetheirdependence.Fergusonarguesfurtherthatfeminist discourse,
rootedin women's experiencesof caringandnurturingoutsidebureaucracy's
control, provides a ground for oppositionto bureaucracyand for the development of alternativeways of organizingsociety.
However,thereareproblemswith Ferguson'stheoreticalformulation.Her
argumentthatfeminizationis a metaphorfor bureaucratizationnot only uses
a stereotype of femininity as oppressed, weak, and passive, but also, by
equating the experience of male and female clients, women workers, and
male bureaucrats,obscures the specificity of women's experiences and the
connections between masculinity and power (Brown 1984; see also Martin
1987; Mitchell 1986; Ressner 1986). Fergusonbuilds on Foucault's (1979)
analysis of power as widely diffused and constitutedthroughdiscourse, and
the problems in her analysis have theirorigin in Foucault,who also fails to
place gender in his analysis of power. What results is a disembodied, and
consequentlygender-neutral,bureaucracyas the oppressor.Thatis, of course,
not a new vision of bureaucracy,but it is one in which gender enters only as
analogy, ratherthan as a complex componentof processes of control and
domination.
In sum, some of the best feminist attemptsto theorize about gender and
organizationshave been trappedwithin the constraintsof definitions of the
theoretical domain that cast organizationsas gender neutral and asexual.
These theories take us only part of the way to understandinghow deeply
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
145
embeddedgenderis in organizations.Thereis ampleempiricalevidence: We
know now thatgender segregationis an amazinglypersistentpatternand that
the gender identity of jobs and occupationsis repeatedlyreproduced,often
in new forms (Bielby and Baron 1987; Reskin and Roos 1987; Stroberand
Arnold 1987). The reconstructionof gendersegregationis an integralpartof
the dynamic of technological and organizationalchange (Cockburn 1983,
1985; Hacker 1981). Individualmen and particulargroups of men do not
always win in these processes, but masculinityalways seems to symbolize
self-respect for men at the bottom and power for men at the top, while
confirmingfor both theirgender's superiority.Theories that posit organization and bureaucracyas gender neutralcannot adequatelyaccount for this
continualgenderedstructuring.We need differenttheoreticalstrategiesthat
examine organizationsas genderedprocesses in which sexuality also plays
a part.
AS GENDEREDPROCESSES
ORGANIZATION
The idea thatsocial structureandsocial processesaregenderedhas slowly
emerged in diverse areas of feminist discourse. Feminists have elaborated
genderas a concept to mean morethana socially constructed,binaryidentity
and image. This turn to gender as an analytic category (Connell 1987;
Harding1986; Scott 1986) is an attemptto find new avenues into the dense
andcomplicatedproblemof explainingthe extraordinarypersistencethrough
history and across societies of the subordinationof women. Scott, for
example, defines gender as follows: "The core of the definition rests on an
integralconnection between two propositions;gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the
sexes, and gender is a primaryway of signifying relationshipsof power"
(1986, 1067).
New approachesto the study of waged work, particularlystudies of the
laborprocess,see organizationsas gendered,not as genderneutral(Cockbum
1985; Game and Pringle 1984; Knights and Willmott 1985; Phillips and
Taylor 1986; Sorenson 1984) and conceptualizeorganizationsas one of the
locations of the inextricablyintertwinedproductionof both gender and class
relations.Examiningclass andgender(Acker 1988), I have arguedthatclass
is constructedthroughgender and thatclass relationsare always gendered.
The structureof the labor market,relationsin the workplace, the control of
the work process, and the underlyingwage relation are always affected by
symbols of gender, processes of gender identity, and material inequalities
146
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
between women and men. These processes are complexly related to and
powerfully supportthe reproductionof the class structure.Here, I will focus
on the interface of gender and organizations,assuming the simultaneous
presence of class relations.
To say thatan organization,or any otheranalyticunit, is genderedmeans
that advantageand disadvantage,exploitationand control, action and emotion, meaningand identity,arepatternedthroughandin termsof a distinction
between male andfemale, masculineandfeminine.Genderis not an addition
to ongoing processes, conceived as gender neutral.Rather,it is an integral
part of those processes, which cannot be properly understoodwithout an
analysis of gender (Connell 1987; West and Zimmerman1987). Gendering
occurs in at least five interactingprocesses (cf. Scott 1986) that, although
analyticallydistinct, are, in practice,partsof the same reality.
First is the constructionof divisions along lines of gender- divisions of
labor,of allowed behaviors,of locations in physical space, of power, including the institutionalizedmeans of maintainingthe divisions in the structures
of labor markets,the family, the state. Such divisions in work organizations
are well documented(e.g., Moss Kanter 1977) as well as often obvious to
casual observers. Although there are great variations in the patterns and
extent of genderdivision, men are almost always in the highest positions of
organizationalpower. Managers'decisions often initiate gender divisions
(Cohn 1985), and organizationalpractices maintainthem--although they
also take on new forms with changes in technology and the labor process.
For example, CynthiaCockbum (1983, 1985) has shown how the introduction of new technology in a numberof industrieswas accompanied by a
reorganization,but not abolition, of the gendered division of labor that left
the technology in men's controland maintainedthe definitionof skilled work
as men's work and unskilledwork as women's work.
Second is the constructionof symbols and images that explain, express,
reinforce,or sometimes oppose those divisions. These have many sources or
forms in language, ideology, popular and high culture, dress, the press,
television. For example, as Moss Kanter(1975), among others, has noted,
the image of the top manageror the businessleaderis an image of successful,
forceful masculinity(see also Lipman-Blumen1980). In Cockburn'sstudies,
men workers'images of masculinitylinked theirgenderwith theirtechnical
skills; the possibility thatwomen might also obtainsuch skills representeda
threatto thatmasculinity.
The thirdset of processes thatproducegenderedsocial structures,including organizations,are interactionsbetween women and men, women and
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
147
women, men and men, includingall those patternsthatenact dominanceand
submission. For example, conversationanalysis shows how gender differences in interruptions,turntaking,andsettingthe topic of discussionrecreate
gender inequalityin the flow of ordinarytalk (West and Zimmerman1983).
Although much of this researchhas used experimentalgroups, qualitative
accounts of organizationallife record the same phenomena:Men are the
actors, women the emotional support(Hochschild 1983).
Fourth,these processes help to producegenderedcomponentsof individual identity,which may include consciousness of the existence of the other
threeaspectsof gender,such as, in organizations,choice of appropriatework,
language use, clothing, and presentationof self as a genderedmemberof an
organization(Reskin and Roos 1987).
Finally, gender is implicated in the fundamental,ongoing processes of
creating and conceptualizingsocial structures.Genderis obviously a basic
constitutive element in family and kinship, but, less obviously, it helps to
frame the underlyingrelationsof other structures,including complex organizations. Gender is a constitutive element in organizationallogic, or the
underlying assumptions and practices that construct most contemporary
work organizations(Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). Organizationallogic appears to be gender neutral; gender-neutraltheories of bureaucracyand
organizationsemploy andgive expressionto this logic. However,underlying
both academic theories and practical guides for managers is a gendered
substructurethat is reproduceddaily in practicalwork activities and, somewhat less frequently,in the writings of organizationaltheorists. (cf. Smith
1988)
Organizationallogic has material forms in written work rules, labor
contracts, managerialdirectives, and other documentarytools for running
large organizations,including systems of job evaluationwidely used in the
comparable-worthstrategy of feminists. Job evaluation is accomplished
throughthe use and interpretationof documentsthat describejobs and how
they are to be evaluated. These documents contain symbolic indicatorsof
structure;the ways that they are interpretedand talked about in the process
of job evaluation reveals the underlying organizationallogic. I base the
following theoreticaldiscussion on my observationsof organizationallogic
in action in the job-evaluation component of a comparable-worthproject
(Acker 1987, 1989, 1990).
Job evaluation is a managementtool used in every industrialcountry,
capitalistand socialist, to rationalizethe organizationalhierarchyandto help
in setting equitable wages (InternationalLabour Office 1986). Although
148
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
thereare manydifferentsystems of job evaluation,the underlyingrationales
are similar enough so that the observation of one system can provide a
window into a common organizationalmode of thinkingandpractice.
In job evaluation,the content of jobs is describedandjobs are compared
on criteriaof knowledge, skill, complexity, effort, and working conditions.
The particularsystem I observedwas built incrementallyover many years to
reflect the assessmentof managersaboutthejob componentsfor which they
were willing to pay. Thus today this system can be taken as composed of
residues of these judgments, which are a set of decision rules that, when
followed, reproducemanagerialvalues. But these rulesare also the imagery
out of which managersconstruct and reconstructtheir organizations.The
rules of job evaluation, which help to determinepay differences between
jobs, are not simply a compilationof managers'values or sets of beliefs, but
are the underlyinglogic or organizationthat provides at least part of the
blueprintfor its structure.Everytime thatjob evaluationis used, thatstructure
is createdor reinforced.
b Job evaluationevaluatesjobs, not their incumbents.The job is the basic
unit in a work organization's hierarchy,a description of a set of tasks,
competencies, and responsibilitiesrepresentedas a position on an organizational chart.A job is separatefrom people. It is an empty slot, a reification
that must continuallybe reconstructed,for positions exist only as scraps of
paper until people fill them. The rationalefor evaluatingjobs as devoid of
actualworkersrevealsfurtherthe organizationallogic- the intentis to assess
the characteristicsof thejob, not of theirincumbentswho may vary in skill,
industriousness,and commitment.Humanbeings are to be motivated,managed, and chosen to fit the job. The job exists as a thing apart.
, Every job has a place in the hierarchy,another essential element in
organizationallogic. Hierarchies,like jobs, are devoid of actualworkersand
based on abstractdifferentiations.Hierarchyis taken for granted,only its
particularform is at issue. Job evaluation is based on the assumption that
workersin generalsee hierarchyas an acceptableprinciple,and the final test
of the evaluationof any particularjob is whether its place in the hierarchy
looks reasonable.The ranking of jobs within an organizationmust make
sense to managers,but it is also importantthat most workers accept the
rankingas just if the system of evaluationis to contributeto orderlyworking
relationships.
Organizationallogic assumes a congruence between responsibility,job
complexity, and hierarchicalposition. For example, a lower-level position,
the level of mostjobs filled predominantlyby women, musthave equally low
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
149
levels of complexity and responsibility.Complexity and responsibilityare
defined in termsof managerialand professionaltasks.The child-careworker's responsibility for other human beings or the complexity facing the
secretarywho serves six different,temperamentalbosses can only be minimally counted if the congruence between position level, responsibility,and
complexity is to be preserved.In addition,the logic holds that two jobs at
differenthierarchicallevels cannot be responsiblefor the same outcome; as
a consequence,for example, tasksdelegatedto a secretaryby a managerwill
not raise her hierarchicallevel because such tasks are still his responsibility,
even though she has the practicalresponsibilityto see that they are done.
Levels of skill, complexity, and responsibility, all used in constructing
hierarchy,are conceptualized as existing independently of any concrete
worker.
In organizationallogic, bothjobs and hierarchiesare abstractcategories
that have no occupants, no humanbodies, no gender. However, an abstract
job can exist, can be transformedinto a concrete instance,only if there is a
worker. In organizationallogic, filling the abstractjob is a disembodied
workerwho exists only for the work.Such a hypotheticalworkercannothave
other imperativesof existence that impinge upon the job. At the very least,
outside imperativescannot be includedwithin the definition of thejob. Too
many obligations outside the boundariesof the job would make a worker
unsuited for the position. The closest the disembodied worker doing the
abstractjob comes to a real workeris the male workerwhose life centerson
his full-time,life-long job, while his wife or anotherwoman takes careof his
personal needs and his children. While the realities of life in industrial
capitalism never allowed all men to live out this ideal, it was the goal for
laborunions and the image of the workerin social and economic theory.The
woman worker, assumed to have legitimate obligations other than those
requiredby the job, did not fit with the abstractjob.
The concept "a job" is thus implicitly a genderedconcept, even though
organizationallogic presents it as gender neutral."A job" alreadycontains
the gender-baseddivision of laborand the separationbetween the public and
the private sphere. The concept of "a job" assumes a particulargendered
organizationof domestic life and social production.It is an example of what
DorothySmithhas called "thegendersubtextof the rationalandimpersonal"
(1988, 4).
Hierarchies are gendered because they also are constructed on these
underlyingassumptions:Those who are committedto paid employmentare
"naturally"more suited to responsibility and authority;those who must
150
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
divide their commitments are in the lower ranks.In addition,principles of
hierarchy,as exemplified in most existingjob-evaluationsystems, have been
derived from alreadyexisting genderedstructures.The best-knownsystems
were developed by managementconsultantsworkingwith managersto build
methods of consistently evaluatingjobs and rationalizingpay andjob classifications. Forexample, all managerswith similarlevels of responsibilityin
the firm should have similar pay. Job-evaluationsystems were intended to
reflect the values of managersand to producea believable rankingof jobs
based on those values. Such rankingswould not deviate substantiallyfrom
rankingsalreadyin place thatcontaingendertypingand gender segregation
of jobs and the clusteringof women workersin the lowest and the worst-paid
jobs. The concrete value judgmentsthatconstituteconventionaljob evaluation are designed to replicate such structures(Acker 1989). Replication is
achieved in many ways; for example, skills in managingmoney, more often
found in men's than in women's jobs, frequentlyreceive more points than
skills in dealing with clients or humanrelationsskills, more often found in
women's than in men's jobs (Steinbergand Haignere1987).
The gender-neutralstatus of "ajob" and of the organizationaltheories of
which it is a part depend upon the assumptionthat the worker is abstract,
disembodied, although in actuality both the concept of "a job" and real
workers are deeply gendered and "bodied."Carole Pateman (1986), in a
discussion of women and political theory,similarlypoints out that the most
fundamental abstraction in the concept of liberal individualism is "the
abstractionof the 'individual' from the body. In orderfor the individual to
appear in liberal theory as a universalfigure, who representsanyone and
everyone, the individualmust be disembodied"(p. 8). If the individualwere
not abstractedfrom bodily attributes,it would be clear that the individual
representsone sex andone gender,not a universalbeing. The political fiction
of the universal"individual"or "citizen,"fundamentalto ideas of democracy
and contract, excluded women, judging them lacking in the capacities
necessary for participationin civil society. Althoughwomen now have the
rights of citizens in democratic states, they still stand in an ambiguous
relationshipto the universalindividualwho is "constructedfrom a male body
so that his identity is always masculine"(Pateman1988, 223). The worker
with "ajob" is the same universal"individual"who in actualsocial realityis
a man.The concept of a universalworkerexcludes and marginalizeswomen
who cannot, almost by definition, achieve the qualities of a real worker
because to do so is to become like a man.
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
151
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL, GENDER, AND THE BODY
The abstract,bodiless worker,who occupies the abstract,gender-neutral
job has no sexuality, no emotions, and does not procreate.The absence of
sexuality, emotionality, and procreationin organizationallogic and organizational theory is an additional element that both obscures and helps to
reproducethe underlyinggender relations.
New work on sexuality in organizations(Hearnand Parkin 1987), often
indebtedto Foucault(1979), suggests thatthis silence on sexuality may have
historical roots in the developmentof large, all-male organizationsthat are
the primary locations of societal power (Connell 1987). The history of
modern organizations includes, among other processes, the suppressionof
sexuality in the interestsof organizationand the conceptual exclusion of the
body as a concrete living whole (Burrell1984,1987; Hearnand Parkin1987;
Morgan1986).
In a review of historicalevidence on sexuality in early modernorganizations, Burrell(1984, 98) suggests that"thesuppressionof sexuality is one of
the first tasks the bureaucracysets itself."Long before the emergenceof the
very large factory of the nineteenthcentury,other large organizations,such
as armies and monasteries, which had allowed certain kinds of limited
participationof women, were moreandmoreexcludingwomen andattempting to banish sexuality in the interests of control of members and the
organization's activities (Burrell 1984, 1987; Hacker and Hacker 1987).
Active sexuality was the enemy of orderlyprocedures,and excludingwomen
from certainareasof activity may have been, at least in part,a way to control
sexuality. As Burrell (1984) points out, the exclusion of women did not
eliminate homosexuality, which has always been an element in the life of
large all-male organizations,particularlyif membersspend all of theirtime
in the organization.Insistenceon heterosexualityor celibacy were ways to
control homosexuality. But heterosexualityhad to be practiced outside the
organization,whether it was an army or a capitalist workplace. Thus the
attempts to banish sexuality from the workplace were part of the wider
process thatdifferentiatedthehome, the locationof legitimate sexual activity,
from the place of capitalistproduction.The concept of the disembodiedjob
symbolizes this separationof work and sexuality.
Similarly, there is no place within the disembodied job or the genderneutralorganizationfor other"bodied"processes, such as humanreproduction (Rothman1989) or the free expressionof emotions (Hochschild 1983).
152
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
Sexuality, procreation,and emotions all intrudeupon and disruptthe ideal
functioning of the organization,which tries to control such interferences.
However, as arguedabove, the abstractworkeris actuallya man,and it is the
man's body, its sexuality,minimalresponsibilityin procreation,andconventional control of emotions thatpervadeswork and organizationalprocesses.
Women'sbodies- female sexuality,theirability to procreateand theirpregnancy,breast-feeding,andchild care, menstruation,and mythic"emotionality"- aresuspect,stigmatized,andused as groundsfor controlandexclusion.
The rankingof women's jobs is often justified on the basis of women's
identificationwith childbearinganddomesticlife. They aredevaluedbecause
women are assumedto be unableto conform to the demandsof the abstract
job. Gender segregation at work is also sometimes openly justified by the
necessity to controlsexuality,andwomen may be barredfromtypes of work,
such as skilled blue-collarwork or top management,wheremost workersare
men, on the grounds that potentially disruptive sexual liaisons should be
avoided (Lorber1984). On the other hand, the gendereddefinitionof some
jobs "includes sexualization of the woman worker as a part of the job"
(MacKinnon 1979, 18). These are often jobs that serve men, such as secretaries, or a largely male public (Hochschild 1983).
The maintenanceof genderedhierarchyis achieved partlythroughsuch
often-tacit controls based on argumentsabout women's reproduction,emotionality, and sexuality, helping to legitimate the organizationalstructures
created through abstract,intellectualizedtechniques. More overt controls,
such as sexual harassment,relegating childbearingwomen to lower-level
mobility tracks, and penalizing (or rewarding)their emotion management
also conform to and reinforcehierarchy.MacKinnon(1979), on the basis of
an extensive analysis of legal cases, argues that the willingness to tolerate
sexual harassmentis often a conditionof the job, both a consequence and a
cause of gender hierarchy.
While women's bodies are ruledout of order,or sexualized and objectified, in work organizations, men's bodies are not. Indeed, male sexual
imagery pervades organizationalmetaphorsand language, helping to give
form to work activities (see Hear and Parkin1987, for an extended discussion). For example, the militaryand the male world of sportsare considered
valuable trainingfor organizationalsuccess and provide images for teamwork, campaigns,and tough competition.The symbolic expressionof male
sexuality may be used as a meansof controlover male workers,too, allowed
or even encouragedwithinthe boundsof thework situationto createcohesion
or alleviate stress (Collinson 1988; Hearnand Parkin 1987). Management
approvalof pornographicpicturesin the locker room or supportfor all-male
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
153
work andplay groups where casual talk is aboutsexual exploits or sportsare
examples. These symbolic expressionsof male dominancealso act as significant controls over women in work organizationsbecause they are per se
excluded from the informalbonding men produce with the "body talk" of
sex and sports.
Symbolically, a certain kind of male heterosexual sexuality plays an
importantpartin legitimatingorganizationalpower.Connell(1987) calls this
hegemonic masculinity, emphasizing that it is formed around dominance
over women and in opposition to other masculinities, although its exact
content changes as historicalconditionschange. Currently,hegemonic masculinity is typified by the image of the strong,technicallycompetent,authoritative leaderwho is sexually potent and attractive,has a family, and has his
emotions under control. Images of male sexual function and patriarchal
paternalismmay also be embeddedin notionsof whatthe managerdoes when
he leads his organization(Calasand Smircich 1989). Women'sbodies cannot
be adaptedto hegemonic masculinity;to function at the top of male hierarchies requires that women render irrelevanteverything that makes them
women.
The image of the masculine organizationalleader could be expanded,
without altering its basic elements, to include other qualities also needed,
according to many management experts, in contemporaryorganizations,
such as flexibility and sensitivity to the capacitiesand needs of subordinates.
Such qualities are not necessarily the symbolic monopoly of women. For
example, the wise andexperiencedcoach is empatheticandsupportiveto his
individual players and flexibly leads his team against devious opposition
tactics to victory.
The connections between organizationalpower and men's sexuality may
be even more deeply embedded in organizationalprocesses. Sally Hacker
(1989) argues that eroticism and technology have common roots in human
sensual pleasureand thatfor the engineeror the skilled worker,andprobably
for many other kinds of workers,there is a powerful erotic element in work
processes.The pleasuresof technology,Hackercontinues,become harnessed
to domination,and passion becomes directedtowardpower over nature,the
machine, and other people, particularlywomen, in the work hierarchy.
Hackerbelieves thatmen lose a greatdeal in this transformationof the erotic
into domination,but they also win in other ways. For example, many men
gain economically from the organizationalgender hierarchy.As Crompton
and Jones (1984) point out, men's careeropportunitiesin white-collarwork
depend on the barriersthat deny those opportunitiesto women. If the mass
154
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
of female clerical workers were able to compete with men in such work,
promotionprobabilitiesfor men would be drasticallyreduced.
Class relationsas well as genderrelationsarereproducedin organizations.
Critical, but nonfeminist, perspectives on work organizationsargue that
rational-technicalsystems for organizingwork,such asjob classificationand
evaluationsystems and detailed specificationof how work is to be done, are
parts of pervasive systems of control that help to maintainclass relations
(Edwards1979). The abstract"job,"devoid of a humanbody, is a basic unit
in such systems of control. The positing of a job as an abstractcategory,
separatefromtheworker,is an essentialmove in creatingjobs as mechanisms
of compulsionandcontrolover work processes. Rational-technical,ostensibly gender-neutral,control systems are built upon and conceal a gendered
substructure(Smith 1988) in which men's bodies fill the abstractjobs. Use
of such abstractsystems continually reproducesthe underlyinggender assumptions and the subordinatedor excluded place of women. Gender processes, includingthe manipulationand managementof women's and men's
sexuality, procreation,and emotion, are part of the control processes of
organizations,maintainingnot only gender stratificationbut contributing
also to maintainingclass and, possibly, race and ethnic relations. Is the
abstractworkerwhite as well as male? Are white-male-dominatedorganizations also built on underlyingassumptionsaboutthe properplace of people
with differentskin colors? Are racialdifferencesproducedby organizational
practicesas genderdifferences are?
CONCLUSION
Feminists wanting to theorize about organizationsface a difficult task
because of the deeply embeddedgenderingof both organizationalprocesses
and theory.Commonsensenotions, such as jobs and positions,which constitute the units managersuse in making organizationsand some theoristsuse
in making theory, are posited upon the prior exclusion of women. This
underlyingconstructionof a way of thinkingis not simply an error,but part
of processes of organization.This exclusion in turn creates fundamental
inadequaciesin theorizing about gender-neutralsystems of positions to be
filled. Creatingmore adequatetheory may come only as organizationsare
transformedin ways thatdissolve the concept of the abstractjob and restore
the absentfemale body.
Such a transformationwould be radical in practice because it would
probablyrequirethe end of organizationsas they exist today, along with a
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
155
redefinitionof work and work relations. The rhythmand timing of work
would be adaptedto the rhythmsof life outsideof work. Caringwork would
be just as importantand well rewardedas any other;having a baby or taking
care of a sick mother would be as valued as making an automobile or
designing computersoftware. Hierarchywould be abolished, and workers
would run things themselves. Of course, women and men would share
equally in differentkinds of work. Perhapstherewould be some communal
or collective form of organizationwhere work and intimate relations are
closely related,children learn in places close to working adults, and workmates,lovers, and friendsareall partof the same group.Utopianwritersand
experimentershave left us many possible models (Hacker 1989). But this
brief listing begs many questions, perhapsthe most importantof which is
how, given the present organizationof economy and technology and the
pervasive and powerful, impersonal,textually mediatedrelations of ruling
(Smith 1988), so radicala change could come about.
Feministresearchandtheorizing,by continuingto puzzle out how gender
provides the subtext for arrangementsof subordination,can make some
contributionsto a futurein which collective actionto do what needs doingproducinggoods, caring for people, disposing of the garbage- is organized
so thatdominance,control,andsubordination,particularlythe subordination
of women, are eradicated,or at least minimized,in our organizationlife.
REFERENCES
Acker, Joan. 1982. Introductionto women, work and economic democracy.Economic and
IndustrialDemocracy 3(4):i-viii.
. 1987. Sex bias in job evaluation:A comparableworthissue. InIngredientsfor women's
employmentpolicy, edited by ChristineBose and GlennaSpitze. Albany:SUNY Press.
. 1988. Class, gender and the relationsof distribution.Signs 13:473-97.
. 1989. Doing comparable worth: Gender,class and pay equity.Philadelphia:Temple
UniversityPress.
. 1990. The Oregoncase. In State experienceand comparableworth,edited by Ronnie
Steinberg.Philadelphia:Temple UniversityPress.
Acker, Joan, and Donald Van Houten. 1974. Differential recruitmentand control: The sex
structuringof organizations.AdministrativeScience Quarterly19:152-63.
Bielby, William T., and James N. Baron. 1987. Undoing discrimination:Job integrationsand
comparableworth.In Ingredientsfor women'semploymentpolicy, edited by ChristineBose
and GlennaSpitze. Albany:SUNY Press.
Braverman,Harry.1974. Labor and monopolycapital. New York:MonthlyReview Press.
Brown,Wendy.1984. Challengingbureaucracy.Women'sReviewofBooks 2 (November):14-17.
Burrell,Gibson. 1984. Sex and organizationalanalysis. OrganizationStudies 5:97-118.
. 1987. No accountingfor sexuality.Accounting,Organizationsand Society 12:89-101.
156
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
Calas, Marta B., and Linda Smircich. 1989. Voicing seduction to silence leadership. Paper
presentedat the FourthInternationalConferenceon OrganizationalSymbolism and Corporate Culturein Fountainbleau,France.
Clegg, Stewart, and David Dunkerley. 1980. Organization,class and control. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cockburn,Cynthia. 1983. Brothers:Male dominanceand technologicalchange. London:Pluto
Press.
. 1985. Machinery of dominance.London:Pluto Press.
Cohn, Samuel. 1985. Theprocess of occupationalsex-typing.Philadelphia:Temple University
Press.
Collinson, David L. 1988. Engineeringhumour:Masculinity,joking and conflict in shop-floor
relations.OrganizationStudies 9:181-99.
Connell, R. W. 1987. Gender and power.Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress.
Crompton,Rosemary,and GarethJones. 1984. White-collarproletariat: deskilling and gender
in clerical work Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress.
Dexter, CarolynR. 1985. Women and the exercise of power in organizations:Fromascribedto
achieved status. In Womenand work:An annual review,Vol. 1, edited by LaurieLarwood,
Ann H. Stromberg,and BarbaraA. Gutek Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Edwards,Richard.1979. Contestedterrain.New York:Basic Books.
Eisenstein, Zillah R. 1981. The radicalfutureof liberalfeminism.New York:Longman.
Feldberg,Roslyn, and Evelyn NakanoGlenn.1979. Male andfemale:Job versusgendermodels
in the sociology of work. Social Problems26:524-38.
Ferguson,KathyE. 1984. Thefeminist case against bureaucracy.Philadelphia:TempleUniversity Press.
Foucault,Michel. 1979. The history of sexuality,Vol. 1. London:Allen Lane.
Freeman,Jo. 1975. Thepolitics of women'sliberation.New York:Longman.
Fry, John. 1986. Towarda democraticrationality.Aldershot:Gower.
Game, Ann and RosemaryPringle. 1984. Genderat work.London:Pluto Press.
Gould, Meredith. 1979. When women create an organization:The ideological imperativesof
feminism. In The internationalyearbook of women'sstudies 1979, edited by D. Dunkerley
and G. Salaman. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul.
Hacker, Barton C., and Sally Hacker. 1987. Military institutionsand the labor process: Noneconomic sources of technologicalchange,women's subordination,and the organizationof
work. Technologyand Culture28:743-75.
Hacker, Sally. 1981. The culture of engineering women: Women, workplace and machine.
Womens Studies InternationalQuarterly4:341-54.
.1987. Women workersin the Mondragonsystem of industrialcooperatives.Gender&
Society 1:358-79.
.1989. Pleasure, power and technology.Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Harding,Sandra.1986. Thescience questionin feminism.Ithaca,NY: Corell UniversityPress.
Hartmann,Heidi. 1976. Capitalism,patriarchyandjob segregationby sex. Signs 1:137-70.
Hearn, Jeff, and P. Wendy Parkin. 1983. Gender and organizations:A selective review and
critiqueof a neglected area.OrganizationStudies4:219-42.
. 1987. Sex at work. Brighton:Wheatsheaf.
Hochschild,Arlie R. 1983. The managedheart:Commercializationof humanfeeling. Berkeley:
University of CaliforniaPress.
InternationalLabourOffice. 1986. Job evaluation.Geneva: ILO.
Izraeli, Dafna N. 1983. Sex effects or structuraleffects? An empiricaltest of Kanter'stheoryof
proportions.Social Forces 61:153-65.
Acker / THEORY OF GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS
157
Kanter,RosabethMoss. 1975. Womenandthestructureof organizations:Explorationsin theory
andbehavior.InAnothervoice, editedby RosabethKanterand MarciaMillman.New York:
Doubleday.
. 1977. Men and womenof the corporation.New York:Basic Books.
Knights, David, and Hugh WillmotL1985. Genderand the labourprocess. Aldershot:Gower.
Lipman-Blumen,Jean. 1980. Femaleleadershipin formalorganizations:Must the female leader
go formal? In Readings in managerialpsychology, edited by Harold J. Leavitt, Louis R.
Pondy,and David M. Boje. Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press.
Lorber,Judith. 1984. Trust, loyalty, and the place of women in the organizationof work. In
Women:A feminist perspective 3d ed., editedby Jo Freeman.Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield.
MacKinnon,CatharineA. 1979. Sexual harassmentof workingwomen New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
. 1982 Feminism,Marxism,methodandthestate:An agendafor theory.Signs 7:515-44.
Martin, Patricia Yancey. 1985. Group sex composition in work organizations:A structuralnormativeview. In Research in the sociology of organizations,edited by S. A. Bacharach
and R. Mitchell. Greenwich,CT:JAI.
. 1987. A commentary on The feminist case against bureaucracy. Women'sStudies
InternationalForum 10:543-48.
. 1990. Rethinkingfeminist organizations.Gender& Society 4:182-206.
Mills, AlbertJ. 1988. Organization,genderand culture.OrganizationStudies 9(3):351-69.
Mitchell,Diane. 1986. Review of Ferguson,Thefeministcase against bureaucracy.Unpublished
manuscript.
Morgan,Gareth. 1986. Images of organization.Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Newman, Katherine.1980. Incipientbureaucracy:The developmentof hierarchiesin egalitarian
organizations. In Hierarchy and society, edited by Gerald R. Britan and Ronald Cohen.
Philadelphia:Institutefor the Study of HumanIssues.
Pateman,Carole. 1970.Participationanddemocratictheory.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press.
. 1983a. Feminist critiquesof the public private dichotomy. In Public and private in
social life, edited by S. I. Benn and G. F. Gaus. Beckenham,Kent: Croom Helm.
. 1983b.Feminismanddemocracy.InDemocratictheoryandpractice, editedby Graeme
Duncan. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
-- . 1986. Introduction:The theoreticalsubversivenessof feminism. InFeministchallenges,
edited by Carole Patemanand ElizabethGross. Winchester,MA: Allen & Unwin.
. 1988. The sexual contract.Cambridge,MA: Polity.
Phillips, Anne, and BarbaraTaylor. 1986. Sex and skill. In Wagedwork, edited by Feminist
Review. London:Virago.
Reskin, BarbaraF., and PatriciaRoos. 1987. Statushierarchiesand sex segregation.In Ingredients for women'semploymentpolicy, edited by ChristineBose and Glenna Spitze. Albany:
SUNY Press.
Ressner,Ulla. 1986. Review of K. Ferguson,Thefeminist case against bureaucracy.Economic
and IndustrialDemocracy 7:130-34.
. 1987. Thehiddenhierarchy.Aldershot:Gower.
Rothman,BarbaraKatz. 1989. Recreatingmotherhood:Ideology and technology in a patriarchal society. New York:Norton.
Rothschild, Joyce. 1987. Do collectivist-democraticforms of organization presupposefeminism? Cooperativework structuresand women's values. Paperpresentedat Annual Meetings, AmericanSociological Association,Chicago.
158
GENDER & SOCIETY / June 1990
Rothschild-Whitt,Joyce. 1979. The collectivist organization.American Sociological Review
44:509-27.
Scott, Joan. 1986. Gender:A useful categoryof historicalanalysis.AmericanHistorical Review
91:1053-75.
Smith, DorothyE. 1979. A sociology for women. In Theprism of sex: Essays in the sociology
of knowledge,edited by JuliaA. Shermanand Evelyn TortenBeck. Madison:University of
Wisconsin Press.
. 1988. The everydayworld as problematic Boston:NortheasternUniversity Press.
Sorenson,BjorgAase. 1984. The organizationalwomanand theTrojanhorseeffect. In Patriarchy in a welfaresociety, edited by HarrietHolter.Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Steinberg,Ronnie,and Lois Haignere. 1987. Equitablecompensation:Methodologicalcriteria
for comparableworth. In Ingredientsfor women's employmentpolicy, edited by Christine
Bose and GlennaSpitze. Albany: SUNY Press.
Strober,MyraH., and CarolynL. Arnold. 1987. Integratedcircuits/segregatedlabor:Womenin
computer-relatedoccupationsand high-techindustries.In Computerchips and paper clips:
Technologyand women'semployment,edited by H. Hartmann.Washington,DC: National
Academy Press.
Wallace, Phyllis A., ed. 1982. Womenin the workplace.Boston:AuburnHouse.
West, Candace, and Don H. Zimmerman. 1983. Small insults: A study of interruptionsin
conversationsbetween unacquaintedpersons. In Language,gender and society, edited by
B. Thorne,C. Kramerae,and N. Henley. Rowley, MA: NewburyHouse.
. 1987. Doing gender.Gender& Society 1:125-51.
Young, Iris. 1981. Beyond the unhappymarriage:A critiqueof dual systems theory.In Women
and revolution,edited by L. Sargent.Boston:South End Press.
Joan Acker wrote this article while she was a visitingprofessor at the Swedish Center
for WorkingLife. She has also recentlypublished Doing ComparableWorth:Gender,
Class, and Pay Equity (Philadelphia: TempleUniversityPress, 1989), "Class, Gender,
and the Relations of Distribution,"Signs 13 (1988), and "MakingGender Visible," in
FeminismandSociologicalTheory,editedbyRuthA. Wallace(NewburyPark, CA:Sage,
1989).