COMSOTEC, 2015
Santander 9-11 Septiembre
Economics of utopia and citizenship: A coevolutionary model of subsystem contributions
Isabel Amudi§, Francisco Fatas-Villafranca§, Luis R. Izquierdo*, Jason Potts**
§
University of Zaragoza, Spain
*
University of Burgos, Spain
**
RMIT University, Australia
1) MOTIVATION
• Socio-economic order composed of utopias (subsystems Boulding 1978, Gowdy 1994)
(C) cultural subsystem (prevalence of cultural/traditional values)
(M) market subsystem (neoliberal values)
(V) civil society subsystem (libertarian and self-managed values)
(S) state subsystem (prevalence of centralist and totalitarian values)
(E) environmental subsystem (e.g. conservationist values).
• Citizens-agents:
- Contribute “actively” not only voting, deciding taxes or as rent-seekers
(cf. Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Leighton and Lopez 2012)
- Seek to influence other agent’s political choices, or balance of institutions.
- Choosing the utopia to promote and his/her level of commitment (citizenship)
• Institutional changes result of agents choices (not rationally) and co-evolutionary
process (instead of natural accidents - wars, empires, etc, North and Weingast 1989- or political
elites -Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)
1
2) THE MODEL
•
Degree of citizenship: low (𝑥𝑥1 ), medium (𝑥𝑥2 ) or high (𝑥𝑥3 )
• Distribution of citizens:
For subsystems:
(Cultural) �𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � = {𝑐𝑐1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑐𝑐2𝑡𝑡 , 𝑐𝑐3𝑡𝑡 }
(Market): �𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � = {𝑚𝑚1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑚𝑚2𝑡𝑡 , 𝑚𝑚3𝑡𝑡 }.
(Civil S.): �𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � = {𝑣𝑣1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑣𝑣2𝑡𝑡 , 𝑣𝑣3𝑡𝑡 }.
(State): �𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � = {𝑠𝑠1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠2𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠3𝑡𝑡 }
(Environ.): �𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � = {𝑒𝑒1𝑡𝑡 , 𝑒𝑒2𝑡𝑡 , 𝑒𝑒3𝑡𝑡 }
𝐶𝐶
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑉𝑉
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑆𝑆
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐸𝐸
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
• Citizen payoff
= �𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3. 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 (share of supporters for C)
= �𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 share of M.
= �𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3, 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 share of V
= �𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 share of S.
= �𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗+1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 share of E.
• Average level of citizenship within each subsystem:
3
3
3
3
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 = � 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 = � 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 = � 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 = � 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ,
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸
3
= � 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗=1
• Average level of citizenship of the whole system:
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸
2
• Dynamic Evolution
Intra-subsystemic:
𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐̇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
− 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 � , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3.
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚̇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
− 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 � , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3.
𝑉𝑉
𝑣𝑣̇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
− 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 � , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3.
𝑆𝑆
𝑠𝑠̇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
− 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 � , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3.
𝐸𝐸
𝑒𝑒̇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
− 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 � , 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3.
Inter-subsystemic:
• Index of progress:
𝛾𝛾̇ = 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
⎧ 𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀
⎪ 𝜇𝜇̇ 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
𝜔𝜔̇ 𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
⎨
𝑆𝑆
⎪ 𝜎𝜎̇𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
⎩ 𝜀𝜀̇𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
Π𝑡𝑡 =
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡2
+
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡2
1
+ 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡2
3) A PRELIMINARY ILLUSTRATION:
The rise of a totalitarian State-utopia (Netlogo)
i
xi
mi0
si0
ei0
Utopias
1
0.02
0.25
0.05
0.1
0.45 (M)
2
0.07
0.5
0.35
0.2
0.4 (S)
3
0.12
0.25
0.6
0.7
0.15 (E)
Table 1: Initial Setting
3
1
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
1
9
17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
105
113
121
129
137
145
153
161
169
177
185
193
0
market
state
environmental
The rise of the State Utopia
1
9
17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
105
113
121
129
137
145
153
161
169
177
185
193
1
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
m1
m2
m3
Lack of citizen contribution in the market utopia subsystem
4
1
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
1
9
17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
105
113
121
129
137
145
153
161
169
177
185
193
0
s1
s2
s3
Medium degree of citizen contribution supporting the State
1
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
1
9
17
25
33
41
49
57
65
73
81
89
97
105
113
121
129
137
145
153
161
169
177
185
193
0
e1
e2
e3
Environmentalism failing to consolidate.
5
References
[1] Acemoglu D. and Robinson J. (2012) Why Nations Fail?. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty. Crown Business. New York.
[2] Almudi I. Fatas-Villafranca F. and Izquierdo L.R. (2012) “Innovation, catch up and leadership in
science-based industries. A coevolution model”. Industrial and Corporate Change 21: 345-375.
[3] Arrow K. Dasgupta P. Goulder L. Daily G. Ehrlich P. Heal G. Levin S. Maler K-G., Schneider S.
Starrett D. and Walker B. (2004) “Are We Consuming Too Much?”Journal of Economic Perspectives
18: 147-172.
[4] Black D (1948) “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”. Journal of Political Economy 56:
23–34.
[5] Boulding K. (1978) Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution. Sage Publishers. New
York.
[6] Buchanan J. M. and R. D. Tollison (1984) The Theory of Public Choice II, Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press.
[7] Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Liberty Fund Inc. Indiana.
[8]Caplan B (2007) The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton
University Press: Princeton.
[9]Commons J.R. (1934) Institutional Economics. Macmillan. New York.
[10]Diamond, J (2005) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Viking: New York.
[11] Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”. Journal of
Political Economy 65: 135–150.
[12] Fatas-Villafranca F. Saura D. and Vazquez F.J. (2011) “A dynamic model of public opinion
formation”. Journal of Public Economic Theory 13: 417-441.
[13] Gowdy J (1994) Coevolutionary Economics: The economy, society and the environment. Springer.
[14] Hofbauer, J and Sigmund, K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, UK.
[15] Leighton W, Lopez E. (2012) Madmen, Intellectuals and Academic Scribblers: The economic
engine of political change. Stanford University Press: Palo Alto.
[16] North D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge
University Press. Cambridge, MA.
[17] North D.C. and Weingast B. (1989) “Constitution and Commitment: The evolution of institutions
governing public choice in seventeenth-century England”. Journal of Economic History 49:803-832.
[18] Williamson O. (2000) “The New Institutional Economics: taking Stock, looking ahead”. Journal
of Economic Literature 38: 595-613.
6