Introduction to
International Relations
Realism vs. Liberalism II
Jaechun Kim
REALISM VS. LIBERALISM – PART II
NEO-NEO DEBATE (NEO-REALISM VS. NEOLIBERALISM)
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Problem of Collective Action
in Int’l Relations
Assumptions of the game!!!
Rationalist assumption
One-shot game
No communications between actors…
Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective Action
It is difficult to provide collective (public) goods in the absence of
central authority…
Introduction to International Relations
Prisoner's
Dilemma
John
C
D
-3
-3
0
-20
C
Jane
-20
0
-10
-10
D
DC > CC > DD
Characteristics of collective goods?
Non-excludability (transitivity of usage)
Problem of “Free Riding”
Application in IR
Cooperation between states is “quasi-public goods”
e.g., disarmament, free trade…
How can we overcome this problem? How can
we elicit cooperation among states in the
absence of int’l government?
Neorealist – states would seldom cooperate…
Neoliberals – not necessarily… states can cooperate
even in the absence of central authority… !!
int’l institutions (or int’l regimes) can replace the
role of central authority…
NEO-LIBERALISM
(aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also
Regime Theory)
Emphasizes the
institutions…
independent
role
of
int’l
Uses realist assumptions
anarchy
assumption of unitary-rational actor; uses game theory
Major arguments
Pathology of anarchy can be mitigated (if not
eliminated) by the role of int’l institutions (or
international regimes)…Cooperation under anarchy is
not easy, but int’l institutions (or regimes) can facilitate
it…
Therefore international institutions are independent
actors that can compete with states!
Why do int’l institutions (or international
regimes) matter?
Reduce transaction costs of cooperation
What is “transaction costs”?
the costs and risks associated with carrying out an
agreement..
Int’l institutions provide rules of agreement and
coordination mechanism  lower transaction costs 
induce cooperation
Increase transparency
Int’l institutions provide correct information  this
will reassure states that they are not being cheated..
(increase transparency)  induce cooperation
Induce participants to
through sunk costs…
make
commitments
You invested a lot of money into a cooperative
agreement, then leaving it would impose you additional
costs…  induce cooperation
Provide enforcement mechanism
Make sure that defectors are penalized!!
Make explicit threat of retaliation to defection… 
induce cooperation
Create and foster norms of reciprocity
Make sure that the game is played as iterated game..
If the game is iterated…
You can keep track of past behavior of other
states… reputation matters!!
This will create shadow of the future
(promise of future gains) … states would not
discount the future value of cooperation… 
induce cooperation
Neorealist’s answer to Neoliberalist?
Relative gains matter more!
Because “intl relations” is zero sum game!
(Neo)liberal Institutionalism
 Third leg of liberalism
DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY
An important liberalist theory
First leg of liberalist paradigm of int’l relations
(theory)
Role of liberal
democracy
political
institution;
liberal
cf. Second leg of liberalism?
•
Role of liberal market economy and economic
interdependence
Democratic Peace finding is statistically very
robust!
Then why Democratic Peace?
Institutional explanation
Restraining effects of public opinion and
the checks and balances of democratic
political institutions..
Normative explanation
Democratic norms and culture shared by
democracies…