1. Israel: Despite fairly resounding condemnation of Israel, its blockade of Gaza
and particularly
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100531_israel_tactical_breakdown_flotilla_at
tack><the May 31 boarding of the MV Mavi Marmara> that left nine dead, little
appears to have substantively changed on the ground in the subsequent week.
Our Geopolitical Weekly will examine how the most important consequences of
Israeli's choices in the wake of this crisis may well be longer term. But the
situation is far from settled.
The Turks have gained a great deal of regional credibility and achieved a public
relations coup, but they appear to be following a pragmatic path and do not
appear intent on breaking ties with Israel. Yet they are continuing to pursue the
alleged illegality of the incident, in which Turkish nationals were killed in
international waters. How far does Ankara intend to push the legality issue? What
other avenues are they considering? The Turks are not all of one mind on this -religious leader Fethullah Gülen in particular has been pushing to take the crisis
further -- so we need to be probing for splits within Turkey's religious
conservative camp as well.
At the same time, what will Israel do to attempt to mend relations with Ankara
and cool tempers? What concessions are under consideration?
2. Iran: But even if Turkey holds to the pragmatic route, others may not. Iran, too,
requires close scrutiny. We are less concerned about what are almost certainly
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100606_iran_competition_ankara_palestinia
n_cause><empty threats to dispatch Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
warships> to the Mediterranean to escort aid ships bound for Gaza than we are
about what Iran is really thinking. Like Turkey, it appears to be sitting pretty.
World attention has shifted from its nuclear program to Israel, which is now in the
hot seat. But the return of a regionally powerful and active entity to the Anatolian
peninsula presents very real challenges for Persia, especially in the Levant.
Turkey may be wary of becoming too closely embroiled in the unpredictable and
fractious world of the Palestinian struggle, but Iran very much needs to brandish
its own pro-Palestinian credentials and has every intention of taking further
advantage of this latest bout of anti-Israeli sentiment to keep pressure on Israel.
Its most effective means of doing so does not include warships, but rather its
proxies Hamas and especially Hezbollah. Even if Turkey and Israel are intent on
stepping back from the brink on this crisis, Iran may find it useful to stoke the fire
further. What are Tehran's intentions?
3. Afghanistan: The peace jirga in Kabul has ended. The main result has been
the resignation of the Interior Minister and intelligence chief for failing to prevent
the attack (ineffective though it was) on the first day of the meeting of 1,600
Afghans and foreign dignitaries. The jirga recognized the need to talk to the
Taliban, but the Taliban were not invited and thus far are showing little interest in
talking. By most measures, this appears to have been another ineffectual, albeit
highly publicized, bit of political showmanship. Ultimately, the American strategy
depends in no small part on the Taliban coming to the table. Has there been any
progress in negotiations with the Taliban behind the scenes? Is more substantive
enticement now on the table as a result of this jirga? From the other perspective,
are participants in the jirga suffering retribution at the hands of the Taliban? The
worst of all worlds would be if Kabul's attempt to win over those in the middle
ground between the Taliban and Afghan President Hamad Karzai's regime
instead left them with the opposite conclusion.
4. U.S.: General Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, is optimistic
about the drawdown of American forces now under way, and insists that
everything is on schedule. There are now less than 90,000 American troops still
on the ground in Iraq, and that number will begin to fall with increasing rapidity
this summer. Yet the Iraqi struggle to form a governing coalition -- much less
shake out an equitable and acceptable distribution of control of the military,
security and intelligence organs of the government -- remains very much in
question. If things come together this summer, Odierno's assessment may yet
hold. But if it does not, things may begin to unravel and sectarian strife reemerge. We need to take a close look at whether the governing coalition that has
yet to take shape is simply delayed because of politics and political maneuvering
in Baghdad, or if it is reflective of more intractable issues.
5. The euro is at a four-year low in reaction to the deepening financial and debt
crisis, and a handful of opinion leaders have started extolling the virtues of a
weak euro. Considering that a weak euro does not help the eurozone states
whose debts are primarily in euros and who export very little outside of the
eurozone (for example, Greece), this is a pretty thin reed of an argument. The
Europeans tried a Greek bailout and the markets were not impressed (though it
may have staved off something worse). The Europeans tried a larger pre-emptive
bailout, which still left no impression. Now they are talking budgetary discipline.
That might get some traction, but it would take months of solid progress on the
budget-balancing front before anyone could seriously highlight a shift. Therefore,
the Europeans –- somewhat desperately –- need something to shift in their favor.
The next likely venue for pitching a new idea is the G-20 summit in Toronto on
June 26-27. But that would be for the formal pitching. If the Europeans are going
to come up with something creative, they’ll need to –- at a minimum –- get
American and Japanese buy-in before the summit. We need to look at the
intentions behind discussions of a bank transaction task and figure out what else
might be under consideration.