Origins of Extremism in
Terrorist Movements
• Why do some terrorists refuse to accept deals that are efficient in
favor of fighting that is inefficient?
• Why aren’t ‘moderates’ deterred from negotiating?
• Argument: Extremism is not caused by ideology, but rather by fear
of exploitation in movements with multiple factions.
• Violence occurs when weaker factions accept deals in static movements.
• Or, when stronger factions collaborate when they are in decline.
The Problem of Extremists
• “Extremist” factions oppose peace because they are rent seeking,
intensely resolute, or simply do not prefer it.
• Extremists → extremist violence → failure of peace processes.
• Cannot identify ex ante.
• Cannot really establish causality.
Re-conceptualizing Extremism
• Individual terrorists may be thrill-seeking, religious, criminals, local
warlords, or political reformers.
• These individuals have distinct preferences, but coalesce into a
group or movement to coerce governments.
• However, since there are varying preferences within larger terrorist
movements, there may be no one deal that satisfies all factions.
• This implies that any deal will exclude some parts of the terrorist
movement while including others.
Internal Commitment Problem
• Leads to internal competition over what faction represents the
movement.
• This decision is made by governments, who decide which faction
to include in negotiation and which to exclude.
• The “extremists” may oppose deals not because they hate
negotiating, but because their issues are excluded from
negotiations and the government empowers the included faction.
•
We now need to identify specifically when we should observe
extremist violence empirically.
Model
• Three players: Government G and two terrorist factions (A, B)
involved in a dispute.
• G prefers to end the conflict.
• A and B prefer to get a settlement, but both prefer to control how
the benefits of the settlement are distributed.
• G is free to negotiate with either A or B.
• Once G chooses a partner (A, B), the excluded faction either
accepts the deal, or rejects it and begins a terrorist campaign.
Terrorist Attacks
•
Number of successful attacks drawn from a Poisson distribution.
•
λ = 10(pφw) for A and λ = 10(1-pφ)w for A.
•
G’s payoff following these attacks is 1 – w – α(k).
Terrorist Attacks
•
Assume that infighting between the factions collectively weakens the movement.
•
G upholds peace if 1 – w – α(k) > w2
•
Negotiation therefore subverted if k > (1-w-w2)/α
Assumptions
• G strictly prefers a deal to no deal (1 – w > -w).
• A disarms B in an internal conflict with probability, and is initially
more powerful: p > 1-p.
• But, assume power may be in flux. Assume power in the
movement is static if φ=1 and A is declining if φ=2, where:
pφ  [0,1]
• (A, B) receive respective payoffs that are consistent with their
internal power: pw and (1-p)w, where w [0,1].
• Collectively weaken if infighting begins: w falls to w2.
SPE as a Function of the Balance of
Power between Factions
Case 1. A is Preponderant Over B
• A deters B from using terrorism after negotiation.
• A can therefore accept any deal without risk (w > pw).
• Since G’s best outcome is to negotiate with A, a deal is reached.
• Empirical Implication: No extremism if one faction is dominant
over the others.
Case 2. A is Moderately Powerful
• Static power in this case creates a mutual balance of terror.
• A rejects negotiation because it fears internal conflict.
• B also rejects negotiation for fear of an internal conflict.
• Empirical Implication: Negotiation is less likely to occur if power
in the movement moderately favors one faction.
• Ex: Taliban.
Case 3. A and B are Balanced
• In static cases, A will retain the majority of power in the future.
• A therefore prefers to reject negotiation and avoid a conflict with B.
• However, B may attempt a power grab by cutting a deal with the
government since A’s relative power is relatively less.
• Implication: G is more likely to negotiate with weaker factions if the
power is relatively balanced within the terrorist movement.
• Ex. Boko Haram.
Case 4. Shifting Power
• A commitment problem is created if power is shifting in favor of
the weaker faction…
• A is powerful at time t, but will see its share of the movement fall if
it waits to negotiate.
• Fear of losing influence in the movement later motivates more
powerful factions to settle with government immediately.
• Implication: Stronger factions are more likely to negotiate if power
is shifting within the terrorist movement.
• Ex: MEND.
Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 1. Extremist violence is less likely to occur in
movements dominated by one faction.
• Hypothesis 2. Weaker factions are more likely to accept
negotiation in static movements, triggering extremist violence.
• Hypothesis 3. Stronger factions are more likely to accept
negotiation in dynamic movements, triggering extremist violence.
Comparison of Boko Haram and MEND
• Nigeria faces two different groups in the 2000s.
• Both relatively successful, and both have factions with comparable
power.
• Allows us to examine the effect of shifting power.
• Boko Haram was relatively static: comprised of several similar cells
led by Shekau’s more powerful one.
• MEND was dynamic: consisted of factions that all drew their power
from oil rents and control of extortion rackets.
Boko Haram
• “Defectors” from Boko Haram attempt to negotiate.
– 2011: Individual claiming to represent the group offers to disarm in exchange
for religious protections from Nigeria, but is shot.
– 2012: More moderate Boko Haram faction states that it is willing to negotiate.
Boko Haram officials deny this and state that “internal divisions were
eliminated.” Done through beheadings.
– 2014: Alleged “Shekau” is killed following significant fighting with state and
discussions of peace.
• Result: Weaker factions appear to attempt negotiation, but they are
punished and stopped by stronger faction.
MEND
• 2009 Amnesty provides key leaders with substantial financial
windfalls and gives all of their followers jobs.
• But, the amnesty did nothing to clean up land or regulate oil
production.
• Eleven commanders reject the deal and continue to fight.
• Major leaders fend off challenges with government assistance by
maintaining control of oil fields and providing protection to MNCs.
• Result: Stronger factions agree to negotiation and hold the peace
despite ‘extremist’ terror from excluded factions.
Conclusion
• We propose a rationalist explanation for extremism: results from
internal commitment problem within terrorist movements.
• In static movements, weaker factions may try to grab power through
negotiation – and will face punishment from stronger ones.
• In dynamic movements – stronger factions will try to lock in their
power by cutting deals – and will face punishment from weaker ones.
• Third type of extremism occurs where all factions are deterred – and
the movement looks like it will never negotiate.
• Suggests that further theoretical and empirical investigation into
internal dynamics of rebel movements is worth pursuing.